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ABSTRACT 
This thesis acts upon the numerous calls that are being increasingly heard for 
the introduction of postmodernist/poststructuralist perspectives into 
environmental education (CaUicott & da Rocha, 1996; Dreyfus, Wals, & van 
Weelie, 1999; A. Gough, 1997, 1999; Gough, 1993, 1994b, 1996, 1997, 1998b, 
1999a; Littiedyke, 1996; Panel for Education ^ r Sustainable Development, 1998; 
Sauve, 1999; Sosa, 1996; Stables, 1996, 1997) and die current interest in 
uncertainty in environmental education (Panel for Education for Sustainable 
Development, 1998) and the broader education arena (Atkinson, 2001; Bligh, 
2001; Grant, 2001; Kenway & Bullen, 2000; Torres & Arnott, 1999; Villaume, 
2000). These interests in uncertainty and postmodernist/poststructuralist 
perspectives in education often coincide. This is not surprising given that it is 
common to encounter claims that herald "postmodernism as an Age of 
Uncertainty" (S. Kelso, 1997, p. 457). In environmental education, this 
conjunction is exemplified in the report presented to the Department for 
Education and Employment (E)/EE) and the Qualifications and Curriculum 
Authority (QCA) by the Panel for Education^r Sustainable Development (1998), 
in the United Kingdom. This report advocates that students shoxild "understand 
the concept of cultural change and the shift from the certainties of the modern 
age to the uncertainties of the postmodern age, and what opportunities this may 
afford for realising a more sustainable society" (1998, p. 11). However, 
'postmodern uncertainties' have not been theorised in environmental education or 
the broader education arena. This thesis initiates poststructuralist theorisations of 
uncertainty. 
In keeping with postmodernist/poststructuraUst concerns for the Other, this 
thesis strives to respect uncertainty as uncertain. It does not strive to render a 
definitive account of uncertainty. Such a totalising approach would render 
uncertainty certain. In order to avoid the violence that would deprive uncertainty 
of the honour of its name, this poststructuralist theorisation of uncertainty is 
framed in 'the neighbourhood of. 'The neighbourhood of is "somewhere about" 
(Oxford English Dictionary). It is relationality through and through; yet despite 
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this immense relationality, it is an unstable space with indistinct boundaries. 
Chapter One introduces the figuration of 'the neighbourhood of and advances its 
relevance for both postmodernist/poststructuraUst theorisations of uncertainty 
and environmental education. Chapter One also presents readings of key motifs 
in 'the neighbourhood of environmental education and argues that discursive 
constructions of uncertainty are important in positivist, liberal and critical strands 
of environmental education. Brief readings of the postmodernist/poststructuraUst 
(dis)positions and motifs that are used as structural elements in the arguments 
constructed in this thesis are also provided. These readings precede the 
formulation and problematisation of the 'aims' and 'objectives'. Chapter One 
'concludes' with a discussion of the difficulties that attend writing a thesis that 
strives to respect uncertainty as uncertain. 
Chapter Two, Methodological (Dis)Positions and Methods, presents readings 
of two of the three research methods that were explored during the course of this 
project. The denouement of this project could be considered evolutionary, if the 
term 'evolutionary' is understood as a process in which relatively stable periods are 
punctaated by instabilities that result in major transformations, rather than a 
gradual, continuous and accretive series of minor modifications. This 
evolutionary path led to dramatic deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations of 
the theoretical terrain. The three research methods explored were Drees' 
constructive consonance (1988, 1990), Peirce's fallibilism (1931), and Deleuze and 
Guattari's rhizomatics (1980/1987), which was ultimately chosen for this project. 
The readings presented in Chapter Two, however, are limited to constructive 
consonance and rhizomatics due to constraints on space. The inclusion of a 
research method that was turned aside may be considered unusual. However, 
Drees' constructive consonance offers a valuable framework for research projects 
in environmental education that are aligned to either critical theory or to 
mediations of critical theory and postmodernism, as per Best and Kellner (1991, 
1997), Giroux (1988, 1990, 1992, 1996) and McLaren (1995, 1997). Thus, wWlst 
constructive consonance was not chosen for this particular project, its inclusion 
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opens up a space for alternative theorisations of uncertainty from other 
perspectives in environmental education. 
Chapter Three, Tracing Uncertainty in Environmental Education, presents a 
reading of the existing engagements with uncertainty in environmental education 
and, in some instances, extends the already-said by following the paths that the 
existing engagements preconfigure. This chapter constitutes the tracing section of 
Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatics; it portrays existing territories by delineating 
boundaries and the spaces enclosed. Whilst the number of engagements with 
uncertainty is relatively small in environmental education, the engagements are 
dispersed across diverse theoretical terrains. This chapter presents a reading of 
the scientific disco^arse of uncertainty and allied concepts, such as risk, 
indeterminacy and ignorance, and positions environmental education engagements 
with uncertainty in relation to this discourse. 
Chapters Four and Five are the first two mapping chapters. As each chapter is 
discrete, they may be read in any order. Chapter Four, Face to Face with the 
Environment, draws a line of flight from the educational dimension of 
'uncertainty and precaution in action' proposed by the Panel for Education ^ r 
Sustainable Development to Levinas' ethical relationship known as the 'face to 
face' (Levinas, 1957/1987 1961/1991, 1962/1996, 1968/1996, 1974/1991, 
1982/1985, 1984/1996). This line of flight is enabled by die panel's attribution of 
plurality and a limitation of knowledge to uncertainty. This conjunction is central 
to Levinas' philosophy. However, Levinas' formulation of the face to face 
relationship exclusively attends the realm of human sociality. This restriction 
would result in a highly anthropocentric ethics if applied directiy to environmental 
education. However, it is argued that when Levinas' ethics is cross-read with 
Heidegger and others, as per Llewelyn (1991), an ethico-political framework 
emerges that can inform environmental values education and environmental 
education's commitment to eco-political agency. This framework disavows 
anthropocentrism and has an undeniably deep green orientation, but it avoids 
many of the criticisms levelled at deep green approaches, such as apoliticism. This 
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chapter anticipates and counters two lines of resistance that could be raised 
against the introduction of a Levinasian eco-ethics in environmental education. It 
is concluded that the relendess provocations that Levinas' philosophy presents 
would enable environmental education to engage uncertainty in a manner that 
maintains the conditions of uncertainty, rather than offering a conduit to certainty, 
which would defeat the purpose of engaging Levinas from the outset. 
Chapter Five, Narrative Uncertainties, takes flight from Vance's (1917) 
rendition of certainty. Environmental education has not been artictilated to 
Vance's work previously. However, given that Vance formulated one of the 
earliest versions of critical realism and given that critical realism tinderpins many 
orientations in environmental education, his philosophy is wholly germane to 
environmental education. This chapter exploits the egress that Vance's rendition 
of certainty provides into narrative theory. After taking advantage of this egress, 
the chapter presents readings of the three major theories of truth - the 
correspondence, coherence and pragmatic theories of truth - in order to anticipate 
and ward off possible resistance to the adoption of narrative theory in 
environmental education through arguments that could be used to discursively 
contain and diminish the theorising of narrative uncertainties that follow. Whilst, 
Gough (1994b) has argued against such discursive containment of narrative 
theory, he has presented arguments that undermine the fact/fiction dichotomy. 
The thorny issue of truth has received scant attention in environmental education 
to date. As a matter of prudence, the chapter also counters the misreadings of 
Derrida's deconstruction (1967/1976, 1967/1978, 1972/1981) as a denial of (die) 
material environment and as a destructive and anti-environmental discourse. 
These misreadings have been applied widely in environmental education and 
deconstruction has been subjected to discursive containment and denigration as a 
result (Bowers, 1993b; CaUicott & da Rocha, 1996; Littiedyke, 1996; Sauve, 1999; 
Sosa, 1996). FoUowing these precautionary denouements, this chapter formulates 
four forms of narrative uncertainty and discusses how these uncertainties can be 
engaged in environmental education. 
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Chapter Six, Shifting Terrains, maps secondary lines of fUght from the terrain 
constructed in the previous two chapters. SpecificaUy, this chapter forges links 
between uncertainty and feminist theory, critical Uteracy and postmodernist/ 
poststructuraUst ethics. These trajectories proUferate links with key motifs in 
environmental education, such as engaging indigenous voices, the construction of 
environmental subjectivities and eco-poUtical agency, and environmental values 
education. However, the arguments presented in the chapter cause these 
influential themes to resonate in unfamiUar tones. 
Chapter Seven, Decalcomania, enacts the final stage of rhizomatic analysis. It 
consists of laying the tracing of environmental education's current engagements 
with uncertainty presented in Chapter Three over the maps constructed in 
Chapters Four, Five and Six. The purpose of decalcomania is twofold. First, this 
process of laying the tracing over the maps enables the identification of blockages 
and sUences in the akeady-said. Thus, this aspect of decalcomania has a decidedly 
deconstructive aspect. Second, laying the tracing over the maps enables an 
exploration of the effects that the maps can induce in the tracing. There is a risk 
of a power take-over in this second aspect of decalcomania. The map may be 
hegemonicaUy forced to conform to the tracing, thus sustaining the concepts and 
structures that configure the already-said. Consequentiy, the analytical emphasis in 
this chapter is that of 'plugging the map into the tracing' in order to minimise the 
risk of a power take-over. 
FinaUy, Chapter Eight, In-Conclusion, invokes Deleuze and Guattari's 
figuration of 'becoming' as a means to both trouble the notion of a conclusion 
and frame the reflections upon the 'aims', 'objectives' and 'findings' of this 
project. It is argued that becoming-uncertain is an important objective and 
pedagogical venture for environmental education. Becoming-uncertain is not to 
be taken UteraUy; it does not designate the path to, or arrival of, incertimde. 
Instead, becoming-uncertain refers to the experience of thinking uncertainty 
differentiy, experiencing the capacity of uncertainty to affect and be affected, and 
experiencing the spaces that this opens up, transforms or forecloses. 'Becoming-
X 
uncertain' is a poUtical strategy to undermine the hegemonic containment imposed 
by dominant discourses. Deleuze and Guattari's 'becoming' is a program for 
Utopian poUtics (Colebrook, 2000). I argue throughout this project that 
environmental education is characterised by Utopian poUtics. This is a provocative 
stance that wiU be defended as this project unfolds. Further, foUowing Gatens 
(2000), I subscribe to the view that to think differentiy, is to exist differentiy. 
Therefore, mindful that the readers wiU assuredly draw their own conclusions, I 
advance the situated and provisional conclusion that becoming-uncertain can be 
read as an agentive strategy to exist differentiy and that by thinking and existing 
differentiy we can imagine and enact more sustainable futures. The conclusion 
also identifies openings for further research. In keeping with the rhizomatic nature 
of this project, numerous possible Unes of flight are identified. 
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION: ... 'THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF' ... 
This thesis acts upon the numerous caUs that are being increasingly heard for 
the introduction of postmodernist/poststructuraUst perspectives into 
environmental education (CalUcott & da Rocha, 1996; Dreyfus et al., 1999; A. 
Gough, 1997, 1999; Gough, 1993, 1994b, 1996, 1997, 1998b, 1999a; Littiedyke, 
1996; Panel for Education^r Sustainable Development, 1998; Sauve, 1999; Sosa, 
1996; Stables, 1996, 1997) and the current interest in uncertainty in environmental 
education (Panel for Education for Sustainable Development, 1998) and the 
broader education arena (Atkinson, 2001; BUgh, 2001; Grant, 2001; Kenway & 
BuUen, 2000; Torres & Arnott, 1999; VUlaume, 2000). These interests in 
uncertainty and postmodernist/poststructuraUst perspectives for education often 
coincide. This is not surprising given that it is common to encounter claims that 
herald "postmodernism as an Age of Uncertainty" (S. Kelso, 1997, p. 457). 
In environmental education, this conjunction is exempUfied in the report 
presented to the Department for Education and Employment (E)/EE) and the 
QuaUfications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) by the Panel for Education ^ r 
Sustainable Development (1998), in the United Kingdom. This report advocates 
that students should "understand the concept of cultural change and the shift 
from the certainties of the modern age to the uncertainties of the postmodern age, 
and what opportunities this may afford for reaUsing a more sustainable society" 
(1998, p. 11). However, 'postmodern uncertainties' have not been theorised in 
environmental education or the broader education arena. This thesis draws on the 
phUosophies of Bardies (1957/1972, 1968/1977, 1971/1977), Deleuze and 
Guattari (1980/1987), Derrida (1967/1976, 1967/1978, 1972/1981, 1972/1982, 
1993/1994, 1997/1999, 1999), and Levinas (1961/1991, 1974/1991) to explore 
the (im)possibiUty of theorising uncertainty from postmodernist/poststructaraUst 
perspectives and the (im)possibiUty of enacting these theorisations in 
environmental education. The Unes of flight that are forged in tiiis project 
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connect with key motifs in environmental education, such as the social 
construction of (the) environment, environmental values education, and the 
construction of environmental subjectivities and eco-poUtical agency, indicating 
that uncertainty is impUcated in each. 
This chapter introduces the structural themes of this project whUst 
acknowledging that the notion of 'the introduction' is problematic in 
postmodernist/ poststructuraUst thought. The figuration of 'the neighbourhood 
of is advanced as a means to negotiate simated introductions, whUst 
acknowledging that beginnings never are. The figuration of 'the neighbourhood 
of is also used to 'introduce' the surge in education's interest in uncertainty, the 
polarisation of this interest, and the commitment of this project to theorise 
uncertainty in a manner that respects uncertainty as uncertain. It is also advanced 
that 'the neighbourhood of is an apt metaphor for the field of environmental 
education, which can be best described as a field of shifting relations animated by 
contestation. Brief readings are presented of the competing environmental 
education positions that are encountered during the denouement of this project: 
the social construction of (the) environment, environmental values education and 
eco-poUtical agency. It is also argued that uncertainty is an important issue for 
each of the major orientations in 'the neighbourhood of environmental education'. 
This chapter also explores and counters common disparagements of 
postmodernist/poststructuraUst perspectives and advances that postmodernist/ 
poststructuraUst perspectives are germane to environmental education. This is 
foUowed by brief readings of the postmodernist/poststructuraUst themes that are 
mobiUsed in this project. The 'aims' and 'objectives' of this project are presented 
and problematised after consideration of these postmodernist/poststructuraUst 
themes. This chapter also addresses the problems that attend documenting a 
project that theorises uncertainty from postmodernist/poststructuraUst 
perspectives. These result in the need to disrupt a sense of certitude inhabiting 
the text and the need to chart a course between clarity and obscurity. FinaUy the 
chapter concludes with brief chapter summaries. 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION: ... 'IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF' ... 
. . .THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF ... 
'The neighbourhood of is "somewhere about" (Oxford EngUsh Dictionary). It 
is relationaUty through and through; yet despite this immense relationaUty, 'the 
neighbourhood of is an unstable space with indistinct boundaries. These 
boundaries, which delineate that which is other than our neighbourhood, are 
irrepressibly fluid; they cannot be transgressed; there is no exteriority. The 
neighbourhood of cannot be fixed or enclosed; yet it cannot be denied. Its 
inexacmess is its exactitude. The neighbourhood of denotes inescapable 
situatedness. As Derrida reminds us: "one never Uves elsewhere" (1972/1981, p. 
12). 
Now think of 'the neighbourhood of as language. 
As St. Pierre (2000a) and Stronarch and MacLiure (1996) note, introducing any 
work is a tricky enterprise and introductions to poststructuraUst works provide 
one of the greatest chaUenges. This chaUenge arises from the inevitabiUty that 
introductions to poststructuraUst works wiU disappoint in one of two ways, in 
addition to the myriad of other ways in which introductions may disappoint. They 
wiU disappoint either by trying to orient the reader to the work, or by resisting the 
impulse to do so. 
These modes of disappointment arise from the problems opened up by 
poststructuraUst critiques of origins, the Death of the Author, and the Death of 
the Subject. The figuration of 'the neighbourhood of, however, provides a means 
to grapple with these problems and forge an engagement, where the term 
'engagement' is used in the dual senses of entering into a conflict and a promise of 
marriage. This engagement, then, is a warring alUance. Clearly, betrayal is in the 
air. But this is a betrayal that aUows an introduction to occur, whilst 
acknowledging that beginnings never are. 
To introduce a work, one must know where one is, presumably at a beginning. 
PoststructuraUst critiques of origins, however, demonstrate the impossibiUty of 
beginnings. Derrida, for example, demonstrates this impossibiUty through the 
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endless play of differance, which compels him to proclaim that there is not "a 
rightful beginning, an absolute point of departure" (1972/1982, p. 6). Where, 
then, can we begin? Derrida argues that we can only begin, "Wherever we are: in a 
text where we already beUeve ourselves to be" (1967/1976, p. 162, Derrida's 
emphasis). 
The figuration of 'the neighbourhood of problematises the notion of 
introducing a work in a manner that is whoUy consistent with Derrida's and other 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987) poststrucmraUst critiques of origins. The notion 
of 'a rightful beginning' has no efficacy in 'the neighbourhood of because there 
are no absolute points of reference in a shifting terrain; there is only relationaUty. 
One can start only where one believes oneself to be because the fluid boundaries 
preclude the possibiUty of a meta-vantage point from which to get one's bearings. 
Thus, there cannot be any introduction in an absolute sense, but this does not 
preclude or invaUdate movement within this space and, more importantly, this does 
not preclude the recognition of this movement. Thus, this movement is 
intelUgible; it can be acknowledged; it can be 'introduced' in 'the neighbourhood 
of in a manner that recognises the inescapable situatedness and contingency of 
the introduction. Even projects that promise to introduce a work that is entirely 
'new' can only position their 'newness' or difference relationaUy. The recognition 
of this inescapable situatedness does not mean, however, that such introductions 
should be apologetic or less than rigorous. On the contrary, the recognition of the 
immense relationaUty of 'the neighbourhood of compels that sharp attention be 
paid to context. This does not betray the critiques of origins; it upholds them. It 
admits introductions whUst acknowledging that beginnings never are. 
Given that it is possible to offer a simated introduction, mindful of its 
impossibiUty in any absolute originary sense, one has to face the issue of the 
Deatii of die Audior, as per Bardies (1968/1977), Derrida (1972/1981), Eco 
(1962/1989) and Foucault (1969/1988), which seriously threatens to snatch die 
possibiUty of an introduction away again. The poststructuraUst motif of the Death 
of the Author threatens the possibiUty of an introduction by shifting the 
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construction of meaning both spatiaUy and temporaUy. This is similar to the 
critiques of origins. In postmodernist/poststructuraUst thought, the Author is not 
held to be the originator of meaning; there is no 'sovereign author' (Derrida, 
1972/1981) or 'Autiior-God' (Bardies, 1968/1977) who governs die meaning of 
the text. Instead, the meaning of the text is cast as a function of language: the 
meaning of "the text is held in language, [it] exists only in the movement of 
discourse" (Barthes, 1971/1977, p. 157). This does not dissimulate or transcend 
the author/reader binarism. Rather, it troubles the binarism by compUcating the 
relations between the author and the reader. Therefore, the introduction cannot 
be a solo performance. This chaUenges the possibiUty of the introduction by 
questioning who can offer an introduction and when introductions occur. 
The relations between the author and the reader concomitandy problematise 
the notion of 'authorial intention', which is typicaUy afforded a special role in the 
introduction. Thus, the Death of the Author not only questions who can offer an 
introduction and when introductions occur, it also questions a central purpose of 
the introduction. In other words, the Death of the Author also questions the what 
and the why of the introduction. This, however, does not amount to the annulment 
of purpose. The inabiUty to privilege the position of the author in this complex 
miUeu does not annul authorial intentions. As Derrida argues, the author's 
"declared intention is not annuUed by this but rather inscribed within a system in 
which it no longer dominates" (1967/1976, p. 243). 
The Death of the Author, therefore, seriously disturbs the introduction by 
problematising the construction of meaning. Meaning is no longer preset by the 
author or self-contained within the work. Instead, meaning is actively constructed 
in a dynamic system in which the author and the reader are co-participants. The 
author cannot opt out of this partoership and the author's 'presence' should not 
be ignored, as WakeUng notes: 
however playful others may be in their interpretations, however one 
might agree that there is no unified 'presence' in the text who has 
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ownership of its meaning, no originator in a "fixed or fetishized" 
sense, as Hutcheon terms it (1998, p. 126 ), it has nonetheless stiU 
been constructed by an empirical writer at a particular time and 
place. It has been constructed, moreover, from a point of view of a 
specific gender, race, sexuaUty, as weU as out of a personal, national 
- and even global - history. The text therefore bears a relation to 
Ufe, thought, experience, other texts and culmral artefacts of its own 
or past times, and it would seem to be short-sighted to leave the 
producer, producers' meanings, out of the equation aU together. 
(WakeUng, 1998, p. 6) 
Stonarch and MacLure argue further that it is not only short-sighted to omit or 
overlook authorial 'presence', but that "authorial 'absence' should, in any case, be 
treated with scepticism ... the writer is never more present than when she [or he] 
seems absent" (1996, p. 35). This comment is made in relation to modernist texts 
claiming objectivism, but it is just as relevant to postmodernist/poststructuraUst 
engagements with the Death of the Author. 
The Death of the Author seriously troubles the who, the what, the why and the 
when of the introduction. But as argued above, the author cannot bow out and 
should not be ignored. The author must write an introduction and offer 
intentions, but this "must not be conceived of as 'the first stage of meaning', its 
material vestibule" (Bardies, 1971/1977, p. 158). The figuration of 'die 
neighbourhood of provides a means of understanding how this can be done. Any 
point in 'the neighbourhood of can only be located relationaUy. The question, 
"Where am I?", cannot be answered intelUgibly by an account of the ground under 
one's feet, no matter how detaUed such an account may be. When 'the 
neighbourhood of is used as a metaphor for the landscape of meaning, the 
meaning of the introduction, or the work, cannot be understood in terms of its 
'content'. Meaning can only be constructed relationaUy. Thus, the introduction 
and the work in 'the neighbourhood of cannot be conceived as 'the first stage of 
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meaning', rather, the meaning is instantiated and configured by the relationaUty 
itself 
Thus, the Death of the Author does not snatch away the possibility of the 
introduction. The intentions of the 'empirical writer' (Hutcheon, 1998) are not 
annuUed, but they no longer govern meaning. Meaning is transacted relationaUy. 
Thus, the closest attention must be paid to the complex relations between the 
author and the reader, and their inescapable and whoUy contingent situatedness 
within 'the neighbourhood of language. It is essential to offer an introduction in 
order to prepare the conditions for relationaUty to occur. 
The discussion of the Death of the Author, thus far, has nuanced the author 
and the reader unproblematicaUy. WhUst it has been acknowledged that complex 
relations exist between them and that they are inescapably situated within specific 
socio-cultural-historical contexts, they have been nuanced as stable subjects within 
an unstable terrain. The Death of the Subject, however, supplants the notion of 
stable unified subjects with discursive subjects that are multiple, fluid and 
narrativised (HaU, 1996). This has impUcations for the introduction because it 
further problematises the author/reader binarism by positing each as an 
instantiation of discourse. This leads Barthes to proclaim that the Ufe of "a paper-
author" is "but a fiction contributing to his [or her] work" (Barthes, 1971/1977, 
p.l61). It foUows then, as a matter of logical consistency, that the reader 'is but a 
fiction' contributing to the work as weU. This fictionaUsation of the author and 
the reader is not to be understood in a pejorative sense. It in no way constimtes a 
denial of embodied existence, the author and reader do not 'melt away', nor does 
it constimte a devaluation of the construction of meanings in which they 
participate. On the contrary, in order to be noticed something must be deemed 
worthy of attention. Noticing is normative. Therefore, the accentuation of the 
active construction of the discourses in which we participate can be read as a high 
valuation simply by virtue of its accentuation. This accenmation concomitandy 
offers a salutary reminder of the ethico-poUtical aspect of writing. 
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The figuration of 'the neighbourhood of is whoUy consistent with the 
poststrucmraUst theme of the Death of the Subject. The neighbourhood of does 
not and cannot admit that the author and reader are stable positions within an 
otherwise shifting terrain. Instead, the author and reader are cast as parts of the 
fabric of the shifting relations that constimte 'the neighbourhood of. Thus, 'the 
neighbourhood of can be read as a theoretical framework within which to 
"rearticulate the relationship between subjects and discursive practices" (HaU, 
1996, p. 2) and within which introductions, in their deconstructed form, occur. 
The critiques of origins, the Death of the Author and the Death of the Subject 
compel the introduction to operate 'under erasure' (Derrida, 1972/1982), as "an 
idea which cannot be thought in the old way, but without which certain key 
questions cannot be thought at aU" (HaU, 1996, p. 2). Thus, I take up the chaUenge 
to introduce this work in 'the neighbourhood of, mindful that beginnings never 
are. Intentions, methods and contexts wiU be advanced, whilst recognising that 
these are not only indissociable from the immense relationaUty of 'the 
neighbourhood of, but that their instantiation is whoUy contingent upon this 
relationaUty. This does not diminish or weaken the introduction. On the 
contrary, it increases the potential of the introduction by forging connections to 
sites that have been otherwise blocked. This does not mean that the figuration of 
'the neighbourhood of resolves or transcends the issues raised by 
postmodernist/poststructuraUst thought. Rather, 'the neighbourhood of provides 
a strategic means of foregrounding these issues and accenmates the vigilance 
required to negotiate them in a manner that assures their continued provocation. 
IN T H E NEIGHBOURHOOD OF UNCERTAINTY 
A cursory Uterature search wiU demonstrate that there is a burgeoning body of 
Uterature addressing the topic of uncertainty. A search of only two databases, 
using the key words 'education' and 'uncertainty', revealed tides such as 
"Education in the age of uncertainty" (Kenway & BuUen, 2000), "Educating for 
uncertainty" (Torres & Arnott, 1999), "Learning from uncertainty" (BUgh, 2001), 
"The necessity of uncertainty" (ViUaume, 2000), "The power of uncertainty" 
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(Grant, 2001) and "The promise of uncertainty" (Atkkison, 2001). No longer 
relegated to apologetic footootes, uncertainty is leading the text through bold tides 
such as these. 
These tides announce a celebratory tone in relation to the topic of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is portrayed as an opportunity laden with potential. This celebratory 
tone is countered, however, by an equaUy large body of Uterature that adopts a 
negative attimde toward uncertainty. The negative Uterature presents uncertainty 
as a threat rather than an oppormnity and posits education as a means to reduce 
and manage this threat in order to aUeviate adverse manifestations such as anxiety, 
stress and distrust (Bradac, 2001; Brashers, 2001; Guard & Wright, 2001; 
Hargreaves, 1997; Kramer, 1999; SchiraUi, 2002). 
This polarisation of attitudes towards the relations between education and 
uncertainty appears to be highly correlated to the authors' sympathies towards 
postmodernism/poststructuraUsm. This is not surprising given that it is common 
to encounter statements proclaiming "postmodernism as an Age of Uncertainty" 
(S. Kelso, 1997, p. 457). Those works that present uncertainty as an oppormnity 
are generaUy sympathetic toward postmodernist/poststrucmraUst perspectives, 
whereas the negative portrayals tend to either ignore postmodernist/ 
poststmcturaUst perspectives or launch into scathing attacks on postmodernism/ 
poststructuraUsm. 
This polarisation of attimdes towards uncertainty along the axis of modernism 
versus postmodernism/poststructuraUsm is weU represented in environmental 
education's engagements with uncertainty. Agenda 21 (UNCED, 1992), a key 
environmental education document that operates within a positivist frame, 
assertively promotes uncertainty reduction and emphasises that uncertainty 
reduction is both a responsibiUty and an imperative in education. These 
sentiments are upheld beyond positivism by Diduck (1999, who is committed to 
critical theory. In both of these examples, uncertainty is assigned a whoUy 
negative value. In contrast, Rosenbaum and Bressers (2000), who operate within a 
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positivist perspective, advance that incidental benefits, such as soUdarity, can be 
gained from working in the face of uncertainty. Yet, Uke Agenda 21 and Diduck, 
they emphasise the importance of reducing uncertainty and advocate education as 
a means to achieve this end. Thus, they assign a positive instrumental value to 
uncertainty whUst upholding a negative intrinsic value. 
In contrast to the negative value that these modernist approaches assign to 
uncertainty, postmodernist/poststructuraUst engagements assign uncertainty a 
positive value and seek to engage uncertainty toward beneficial ends. The most 
striking example of the conjunction of uncertainty as an oppormnity and support 
for postmodernist/poststructuraUst perspectives in environmental education 
theorising and curriculum documents has been advanced by the Panel for 
Education yor Sustainable Development (1998). The panel has developed global 
educational objectives for education^r sustainable development around seven key 
themes, the last of which is 'uncertainty and precaution in action'. This placement 
is significant because the panel contends that uncertainty and precaution in action 
are a logical consequence of engaging with each of the preceding themes. Thus, 
engaging with uncertainty and acting with precaution can be read as the ultimate 
achievement of education for sustainable development. Furthermore, the 
educational objectives within this theme clearly demonstrate the positive value 
that is attached to both uncertainty and postmodern perspectives. For example, 
the panel stipulates that smdents should "understand the concept of culmral 
change in the shift from the certainties of the modern age to the uncertainties of 
the postmodern age, and what opportunities this may afford for reaUsing a more 
sustainable society" (Panel for Education ^ r Sustainable Development, 1998, p. 
11). 
Despite aU the interest that is being focused on uncertainty, however, 
uncertainty per se has not been theorised in environmental education or in the 
broader arena of education. Both the proponents and the critics of uncertainty's 
role in education appeal to intuitive understandings of uncertainty. This project 
seeks to respond to this lack and to the increasing number of caUs for the 
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introduction of postmodernist/poststructuraUst perspectives into environmental 
education (CaUicott & da Rocha, 1996; A. Gough, 1997,1999; Gough, 1991,1993, 
1994b, 1996, 1997, 1998d, 1999a; Littiedyke, 1996; Panel for Education for 
Sustainable Development, 1998; Payne, 1999; Sauve, 1999; Sosa, 1996; Stables, 
1996, 1997). Thus, this project aims to theorise uncertainty from 
postmodernist/poststructuraUst perspectives. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties that attend characterising postmodernist/ 
poststrucmraUst perspectives, it is uncontentious to assert that postmodernist/ 
poststmcmraUst thought opposes the violence infUcted upon the Other by 
totaUsing practices. Thus, a postmodernist/poststructuraUst theorisation of 
uncertainty must avoid totaUsing practices, which, in this instance, would infUct 
the greatest violence on the topic of investigation by rendering uncertainty certain. 
Thus, this project does not aim to yield a definitive account of uncertainty. A 
definitive account would render uncertainty certain, thereby depriving uncertainty 
of the honour of its name. Instead, this project strives to respect uncertainty as 
uncertain. 
This commitment to respecting uncertainty as uncertain stands in stark 
opposition to Hargreaves' approach (1994). Rather than respecting uncertainty as 
uncertain, Hargreaves proclaims: "WhUe I am interested in such things as the 
coUapse of scientific certainty as a social phenomenon, I do not myself embrace 
that absence of certainty in the way I analyse it!" (1994, p. 40). This is a most 
curious statement. The mark of exclamation signals Hargreaves' recognition that 
the statement "gives expression to some absurd idea" (Urquhart, 1913, p. 166), 
which arises, in this instance, from Hargreaves' (con) fusion of certainty and 
certimde. 
The difference between certimde and certainty has been put succinctiy by 
Vance (1917). According to Vance (1917, p. 217) certainty "is a quaUty of 
propositions" and certimde is "a state of repose foUowing upon our assent to the 
tmth of a statement". In Ught of this distinction, certimde and certainty may face 
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each other without loss of integrity since certimde is a psychological state and 
certainty is a linguistic phenomenon. However, whUst they may face each other, 
the distance between them is irreducible and untraversable. Certimde and 
certainty cannot be fused and should not be confused, except as a rhetorical ploy. 
Hargreaves' (con) fusion of these terms provocatively entices debate. This ploy 
wiU not be foUowed in this project, however. Instead, Vance's distinction between 
certainty and certimde wUl be maintained throughout the arguments presented in 
this project and the same distinctions wUl be appUed to uncertainty and 
incertimde. 
Modernist approaches to theorising uncertainty must begin with the question: 
what is uncertainty? From postmodernist/poststructuraUst perspectives, this 
question initiates a path of violence since such a question arises from an impulse 
to presence uncertainty, to capture it in a concept, to render it certain, thereby 
eradicating its possibiUty through totaUsation. Yet, on the other hand, this is a 
question that must be asked for several compelling reasons, as Deleuze and 
Guattari indicate: 
You have to keep enough of the organism [or concept] for it to 
reform each dawn; and you have to keep smaU suppUes of 
significance and subjectification, if only to turn them against thek 
own systems when the circumstances demand it, when things, 
persons, even simations, force you to; and you have to keep smaU 
rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to 
respond to the dominant reaUty. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, 
p. 160) 
Deleuze and Guattari seek to avoid die violence of representational diought, 
yet their contention that 'you have to keep smaU suppUes of significance and 
subjectification' indicates diat in order to pursue die padi of least violence, it is 
necessary to retain mUiimaUst representation. In die context of diis project, it is 
necessary to refrain from completely abandoning die question: what is 
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uncertainty? A faUure to retain a minknaUst representation of uncertainty would 
result in losing the topic of investigation. This negUgent violence is on a par with 
eradicating uncertainty's possibiUty by rendering it certain. Thus, it is ethicaUy 
imperative to refrain from whoUy endorsing and whoUy abandoning 
representational thought so that uncertainty can 'reform each dawn'. There are 
also several compelling pragmatic reasons for why uncertainty should 'reform each 
dawn'. Firsdy, if a minimaUst representation were not retained, how could we 
recognise and respond to uncertainty? Secondly, maintaining minimaUst 
representation is necessary to forestaU an idolatry of uncertainty as a result of 
elevating its stams to the mystical, which would thwart critical engagements with 
it. 
FoUowing Deleuze and Guattari, it is also necessary to retain a minimaUst 
representation of uncertainty in order to turn such representations 'against their 
own systems when the circumstances demand it, when things, persons, even 
simations, force you to'. Thus, retaining minimaUst representations is necessary 
for deconstructive readings of uncertainty. FinaUy, it is necessary to ask the 
question - what is uncertainty? - in order to identify and 'respond to the dominant 
reaUty'. Modernists orientations do indeed strive to render uncertainty certain by 
capmring it in a concept in order to pursue research projects that few would deny 
are both necessary and urgent. Many such projects share risk reduction as a motif 
and they are prevalent in areas such as health and safety, environmental impact 
assessment, and so forth. These projects are of great interest to environmental 
education. The need for environmental education, generaUy, to be able to 
respond to the dominant reaUty has been put succinctiy by Stables and WUUams: 
Environmental education is a response to a perceived ecological 
crisis which is itself both a product of, and a chaUenge to, the 
instimtions of modernity; inevitably, environmental education must 
also be grounded in the educational traditions, the discourses, of 
modernity, even though these have (at least, in part) caused the 
ecological crisis. This impUes that environmental education, if is to 
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be ameUorative, must entail a critical reading of modernity. (Stables 
& Scott, 2001, p. 262) 
Thus, whUst postmodernist/poststructuraUst perspectives eschew 
representational thought due to the violence that totaUsation inflicts upon the 
particular and upon difference per se, it is necessary to ask the question: what is 
uncertainty? It is also necessary, however, to disrupt totaUsation by ensuring that 
representation is minimaUst. In this project, uncertainty is minimaUy predicated as 
'a quaUty of propositions'. TotaUsation is also disrupted in this project by 
employing Deleuze and Guattari's logic of rhizomatics (1980/1987). This 
involves focusing on questions such as: What does uncertainty function with? 
What is uncertainty's capacity to affect and be affected? How does it connect with 
other things? How can we position theory and practice in relation to uncertainty? 
These questions reach outward in many directions; they explore 'the 
neighbourhood of uncertainty'. Thus, they dismpt totaUsation by shifting the 
focus away from the inwardly directed process of capmring uncertainty in a 
concept. 
By working in 'the neighbourhood of uncertainty, this project strives to ensure 
that uncertainty preserves the honour of its name by stridendy resisting the 
impulse to render the uncertain certain. The constimtive instabiUty of 'the 
neighbourhood of disrupts this work's certainty by denying totaUsation, enclosure 
and presence. This research wanders along fragmented paths in 'the 
neighbourhood of uncertainty as a fiirther means to disrupt certainty. This 
wandering, however, is not aimless. Instead, this nomadic movement acts upon 
Deleuze and Guattari's (1980/1987, p. 20) contention that sometimes "in order to 
designate something exactiy, anexact expressions are utterly unavoidable". I read 
this statement as being supportive of the intention of this research to respect 
uncertainty as uncertain. 
WhUst this project strives to respect uncertainty as uncertain, however, it must 
be noted that this project does not stand in opposition to risk reduction 
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enterprises, which seek to render uncertainty certain; nor does it deny or decry the 
necessity and urgency of such projects. In other words, whUst the views presented 
in this project are grounded in the beUef that rendering uncertainty certain is 
violence, it is also recognised and affirmed that risk reduction is both necessary 
and urgent in many circumstances. This is not ambivalence, a paradox or an 
assertion that reducing uncertainty is a necessary evU. However, these dual 
convictions are contradictory; they cannot be upheld simultaneously dejure or de 
facto since each conviction's possibiUty reUes upon a set of phUosophical 
assumptions that is incommensurable with the other. Each possibiUty can be 
thought alternately, but not simultaneously. Each possibiUty is contingent upon 
its context, its 'neighbourhood of. 
IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 
The teeming sociaUty of 'the neighbourhood of is laden with significance for 
environmental education. The question 'Who is my neighbour?' abounds with 
ethico-poUtical impUcations. Is each and every other individual my neighbour? Is 
the stranger or my enemy my neighbour? Is my neighbour non-human? Ethico-
poUtical impUcations issue from, and are immanent within, the strategies of 
inclusion and exclusion of neighbours. What are the rights of, the responsibiUties 
and obUgations to, neighbours? And under what authority are these issues 
determined? These are central questions in environmental education in relation to 
both the 'social' and 'natural' environments. 
The figuration of 'the neighbourhood of is also an apt metaphor for the 
manner in which the field of environmental education positions itself in relation 
to these questions. Environmental education is a contested field and it is 
characterised more by contestation than agreement in relation to these questions. 
Moreover, this contestation per se is highly prized. Almost two decades ago, 
Robottom asserted that "it is important to attempt to create and maintain 
conditions for debate and practical deUberation about the 'essentiaUy contested 
concepts' of die field, and to resist attempts to foreclose such debate" (1987, p. 
26). This sentiment is stUl held today. For example, de Alba, Gonzalez-
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Guadiano, Lankshear and Peters (2000, p. 67) stress that in the debates in 
environmental education "it is not a question of closing the discursive circuits 
with essentiaUst taxonomies but of contributing Unes of discussion in an open 
system of analysis". Skmlarly, Jickling and Spork (1998, p. 322) maintain that "if 
environmental thinking is to have the opportunity to evolve, we must not aUow a 
particular vision to be embedded at the heart of environmental education". Thus, 
the field of environmental education defines itself in terms of unstable and 
contesting relations between various nodes within a network; environmental 
education sees itself as a dynamic, shifting field and resists moves that would 
coalesce this terrain to a stable, unified point. The image that environmental 
education projects to itself and the broader education arena, and which it seeks to 
preserve is whoUy compatible with the figuration of 'the neighbourhood of. 
The 'origins' of contemporary environmental education can be located in The 
Belgrade Charter (UNESCO-UNEP, 1976) and The Tbilisi Declaration (UNESCO-
UNEP, 1978), the latter of which formulated and advanced five broad categories 
of environmental education objectives: 
Awareness: to help social groups and individuals acquire an 
awareness and sensitivity to the total environment 
and its alUed problems. 
Knowledge: to help social groups and individuals gain a variety 
of experience in, and acquire a basic understanding 
of, the environment and its associated problems. 
Attitudes: to help social groups and individuals acquire a set 
of values and feelings of concern for the 
environment and the motivation for actively 
participating in environmental improvement and 
protection. 
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Skills: to help social groups and individuals acquire the 
skiUs for identifying and solving environmental 
problems. 
Participation: to provide social groups and individuals with an 
opportunity to be actively involved at aU levels in 
working toward resolution of environmental 
problems. (UNESCO-UNEP, 1978, p. 3) 
The debates about the 'essentiaUy contested concepts' in environmental 
education arise from differing discursive interpretations of these categories of 
objectives and the relative importance that should be assigned to each. These 
differing interpretations arise from the diversity of phUosophical positions upheld 
in environmental education, which can be loosely classified as positivist (Culen & 
VoUc, 2000; Knapp, VoUc, & Hungerford, 1997; Ruskey, WUke, & Beasley, 2001; 
Zmt & Peyton, 2001), UberaUst (Barcena & Payne, 1995; SterUng, 1993, 1996), 
neo-Marxist (Di Chko, 1987a, 1987b, 1999; Diduck & Sinclair, 1997a; Fien, 1993; 
Fien & TraUier, 1993a; Huckle, 1993, 1996, 1999; Robottom & Hart, 1993) and 
poststmcmraUst (Ferreka, 1999/2000; A. Gough, 1997, 1999; Gough, 1993; 
1994b, 1997, 1998d, 1999a; Stables, 1996, 1997; Stables & Bishop, 2001). The 
ontological and epistemological differences that differentiate these positions 
preclude agreement on a 'common ground' to designate as (the) environment. The 
differences proUferate from here, leading to heated ontological, epistemological 
and pedagogical debates. The fiercest debates involve the awareness, attimdes and 
skiUs objectives. More specificaUy, these debates address the issues of the 
discursive/hegemonic constmction of (the) environment and environmental 
problems, environmental values education and eco-poUtical agency. 
The Unes of flight undertaken in this project encounter aU of these debates 
along the way, kidicating that uncertainty is unpUcated in each. Thus, brief 
readings of these debates wUl be presented here m order to trace the existing 
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contexts that the lines of flight encounter. This is foUowed by a reading of why 
interest in uncertainty can be sustained across the different phUosophical positions 
that are held in environmental education. 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF (THE) ENVIRONMENT 
The notion of (the) environment as a social construct can be upheld across 
most phUosophical orientations in environmental education, although the 
meanings assigned to the 'social construction of (the) environment' differ 
radicaUy. For those operating within positivist, postpositivist and classical 
UberaUst frameworks, the social constmction of (the) environment refers to the 
alteration of the material environment as a result of intentional or unintentional 
human activity. As such, the social constmction of the environment has been 
occurring since the dawn of humankind. There can be no pristine environment in 
any absolute sense, although some environments can be regarded as being more 
or less pristine than others depending upon the degree of human impact. 
Knowledge of the social construction of the environment and the environmental 
issues that ensue, then, can be gained through empirical/analytical research which 
upholds the beUef in the coUection of objective data and the notion of a 
correspondence between knowledge and the world. 
Contemporary UberaUsts, critical theorists and poststructuraUsts differ from the 
classical UberaUsts, positivists, and postpositivists by taking seriously the power/ 
knowledge complex in the social construction of (the) environment and 
environmental issues. This, however, is a very loose connection and disparities 
proUferate beyond this broad level of agreement. Both classical and contemporary 
UberaUsts uphold the beUef that freedom is attamed through the acquisition of 
knowledge. Unlike classical UberaUsts, however, contemporary UberaUsts admit the 
influence of restrictive, social constraUits in the pursuit of knowledge and 
freedom. However, the break between contemporary and classical UberaUsts is 
partial. Feinberg argues that the contemporary UberaUst "removed some barriers 
and supported others. Yet his [sic] phUosophy was so constmcted to convmce 
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hknself and others that the latter were not barriers at aU but were mevitable 
aspects of an external envkonment to which the wUl had to adjust itself in order 
for man [sic] to be free" (1975, p. 18). Femberg's use of the expression 'the 
external envkonmenf is broad; it is not specificaUy referring to (the) envkonment 
m the ecological sense. Nevertheless, this broad use of the expression does have 
dkect impUcations for (the) envkonment ki the ecological sense and, by extension, 
for envkonmental education. In the context of envkonmental education, this 
partial removal of barriers casts some aspects of the social construction of (the) 
envkonment as immutable. This constrains the extent to which we can participate 
in the social reconstruction of (the) envkonment and envkonmental issues in an 
effort to Uve in more sustainable ways. 
The critical theorists uphold many of the contemporary UberaUsts' views, but 
argue that they are Uisufficient in the pursuit of an envkonmentaUy sustainable 
fiimre (Fien, 1993, 1997b; Fien & Trainer, 1993a). In terms of die social 
constmction of (the) envkonment, critical theorists reject the contemporary 
UberaUsts' partial break from the classical UberaUsts on the issue of power. Critical 
theorists advance, instead, that the power relationships that constimte ideologies 
are aU encompassing and, as such, ideologies are knpUcated in the construction of: 
(the) envkonment, envkonmental issues, envkonmental ethics and envkonmental 
poUtics. These power relationships are seen to have both 'positive' and 'negative' 
effects. The positive effects include providing a "sense of personal and group 
identity", "a view of what the world should be like and how such a state can be 
attained" and a "set of criteria or moral values by which social processes and 
events can be evaluated" (Fien, 1993, pp. 16-17). Di Chko's reading of the critical 
theorist's conception of the social constmction of the envkonment reflects these 
positive aspects attributed to ideology. 
The envkonment is what surrounds us, materiaUy and socially. We 
define it as such by use of our own individual and culturaUy 
imposed interpretive categories, and it exists as the envkonment at 
the moment we name k and Unbue it widi meaning. Therefore, the 
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envkonment is not something that has a reaUty totaUy outside or 
separate from ourselves and our social mUieux. Rather, it should be 
understood as the concepmal interactions between our physical 
surroundings and the social, poUtical and economic forces that 
organise us in the context of these surroundings. It is in this sense 
that we can say that the concept 'envkonment' is sociaUy 
constmcted. And if we view the envkonment as a social construct 
then we accept that certain aspects of it can be changed or 
transformed according to whichever social relations are in 
operation. (Di Chko, 1987b, p. 24-25) 
As noted above, however, the notion of ideology also has a 'negative' or 
pejorative connotation. This pejorative connotation casts ideology as a lens that 
propagates distorted worldviews that lead to "incorrect reading[s] of reaUty" 
(Huckle, 1993, p. 45) which hegemonicaUy suppress participation in the social 
construction of (the) envkonment in order to effect social oppression and Ucense 
envkonmental exploitation and degradation. Critical theorists in envkonmental 
education draw upon both connotations of ideology in relation to the social 
construction of (the) envkonment. 
Postmodernist/poststructuraUst positions would not oppose Di Chko's 
rendition of the social constmction of (the) envkonment. However, they do 
oppose the attribution of the power necessary for the social construction of (the) 
envkonment to 'ideology'. This opposition results from ideology being posited as 
a centre that grounds the tmth or vaUdity of discourse. This opposition does not 
constimte an utter rejection. Indeed, postmodernist/poststructuraUst perspectives 
are indebted to Marxism. Derrida, for instance, states that deconstruction would 
not have been thinkable "in a pre-Marxist space" (Derrida, 1993/1994, p. 92). 
The issue here is transcendence. Postmodernist/poststructuraUst perspectives 
replace transcendence with immanence. Thus, they argue that power is propagated 
immanendy within texts (Derrida, 1967/1976), petits recits (Lyotard, 1984), 
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discourses (Foucault, 1966/1970) or planes of immanence (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1980/1987). 
These projects are enormously varied and this variety cannot be entered into 
here. As the lines of flight forged in this research result in an argument that posits 
uncertainty as a constimtive element of the social construction of (the) 
envkonment in a manner that draws on Derrida's deconstruction of 
transcendence, only Derrida's critique of transcendence wiU be examined with 
respect to the social constmction of (the) envkonment. FoUowing Derrida, (the) 
envkonment can be apprehended only through texts. This resonates with Di 
Chko's contention that the envkonment becomes intelUgible at the moment we 
name it and imbue it with meaning. The cmcial difference, however, Ues in the 
issue of reference. Di Chko and other critical theorists in envkonmental 
education adhere to critical reaUsm, which admits the notion of a correspondence 
between language and the world, whUst acknowledging that this correspondence 
need not necessarUy be straightforward. Straightforward or otherwise, critical 
reaUsm entaUs that meaning is instantiated in the correspondences between 
language and the world. This is a transcendent manoeuvre. Derrida, however, 
disavows the notion of correspondence and posits the construction of meaning in 
the differential play of language itself; the construction of meaning is immanent. 
Thus, the expression 'the social construction of (the) envkonmenf refers to 
texmal inscriptions of (the) envkonment, which acquke coherence only through 
processes of exclusion, through what is not said. Thus, (the) envkonment can be 
reinscribed differentiy. The possibility of reinscribing (the) envkonment and, by 
extension, envkonmental issues, envkonmental ethics and envkonmental poUtics 
is whoUy relevant to envkonmental education as it provides a means to re-
imag(in)e envkonmentaUy sustainable practices. This view of the social 
constmction of (the) envkonment is supported and advanced in envkonmental 
education by Gough (, 1993, 1994b, 1997, 1998d, 1999a) and Stables (1996, 1997; 
Stables & Bishop, 2001). The arguments in this project go further than those 
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presented by Gough and Stables, however, by theorising the constimtive role of 
uncertainty in the social construction of (the) envkonment. 
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES EDUCATION 
Envkonmental values education has been an enduring theme in envkonmental 
education. There is agreement across aU phUosophical positions within 
envkonmental education concerning the constimtive role of envkonmental values 
education. Beyond this broad level of agreement, however, envkonmental values 
education is intensely and passionately contested. The lines of flight pursued in 
this project connect with two thorny aspects of this debate, namely anthropocentrism 
and indoctrination. Envkonmental educators generaUy strive to distance themselves 
from both of these aspects of the envkonmental values education debate, but 
charges of anthropocentrism and indoctrination are wielded in attempts to 
undermine opposing positions. 
Anthropocentrism / Ecocentrism 
The anthropocentrism/ecocentrism debate concerns whether (the) 
envkonment has intrinsic value and, if so, whether the intrinsic value should be 
privUeged over, set on a par with, or subordinated to instmmental values. In 
relation to the former, there is a broad consensus in envkonmental education that 
(the) envkonment has intrinsic value. Therefore, the debate revolves around the 
prioritising of intrinsic versus instrumental value. This debate would be brought 
to a swift end if the intrUisic value were prioritised and enacted unconditionaUy. 
Thus, this debate concerns the question of 'balance'. This question of balance has 
recentiy been given expression through the notion of 'sustainable development'. 
Proponents of sustainable development fiiUy maintaki that (the) envkonment has 
intrinsic value, but concede that this value must be compromised at times to 
promote human flourishing. This enables instrumental values to be prioritised 
under certain ckcumstances. The issue then becomes a matter of determining 
which instmmental values can legitimately be prioritised, determkikig die 
ckcumstances that warrant this prioritisation and deterrrdning who has the 
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authority to tender answers to these questions. This 'question of balance', 
however, has been confronted recendy by de Alba et. al who endorse the notion 
of sustainable development, but withdraw whole-hearted support for the intrinsic 
value of (the) envkonment: 
We do not entirely reject the thesis of deep ecology. Nonetheless, 
we beUeve that the search for Nature's rights should not blind our 
eyes to the rights of people who have nothing, of those who suffer, 
of those who have become dispensable. That would lead to a 
sophisticated form of social exclusion based on green excuses, (de 
Alba et al., 2000, p. 63) 
The anthropocentrism/ecocentrism debates exert considerable sway in 
envkonmental education. Li (1996), however, argues that these debates are 
problematic, retrograde and krelevant. In relation to the former claim, Li 
questions the cogency of the notion of intrinsic value. The cogency of this issue 
has been accepted, hitherto, as a matter of faith rather than demonstrated in 
envkonmental education. This assumed cogency, however, has been intensely 
engaged in phUosophical debates and found to be wanting. Some phUosophers 
have constmcted arguments around the question of rights. These arguments 
entaU the thesis that (the) envkonment and animals have rights if and only if the 
unborn, babies and inteUecmaUy impaked persons have rights. Both the positive 
and the negative arguments deploying this thesis are persuasive, but they are 
problematic as weU (see Nuyen, 1981). The cogency of intrinsic values has also 
been chaUenged by epistemological arguments, which favour negative positions. 
Epistemological arguments revolve around the premise that the "presence of 
inherent value in a namral object is independent of any awareness, interest or 
appreciation by a conscious bekig" (Regan, 1985, p. 71). This leads kito the 
famiUar epistemological bUid that sceptics and poststmcturaUsts strive to address: 
"there can be no value apart from an evaluator ... aU value is as if Ui the eye of the 
beholder. The value that is attributed to the ecosystem, therefore, is humanly 
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dependent or at least dependent upon some variety of moraUy and aestheticaUy 
sensitive consciousness" (CalUcott, 1989, p. 27). 
Neither analytical arguments based on the question of rights nor 
epistemological arguments can present a conclusive case that supports the notion 
of intrinsic value. In Ught of the seemingly intractable nature of the problems that 
attend the question of intrinsic value, Li argues that envkonmental educators 
ought to recognise and accenmate the capacity of instrumental values to 'solve' 
envkonmental problems and pursue more sustainable practices. Furthermore, Li 
argues that focusing on instrumental values is more consistent with envkonmental 
education's contention that (the) envkonment is a social construct. Accordingly, 
focusing on the anthropocentrism/non-anthropocentrism debate introduces a 
false dichotomy that surreptitiously upholds the culture/namre binarism, which 
envkonmental education has sought to dismande on the grounds that it is highly 
culpable in (the) envkonmental crisis. Thus, Li contends that the 
anthropocentrism/non-anthropocentrism debate is not only problematic and 
krelevant, but a retrograde move in envkonmental values education. 
Indoctrination 
If (the) envkonment is a social constmct, as per the contemporary UberaUsts', 
critical theorists' and postmodernist/poststructuraUst's understandings of social 
constmct, then it foUows, as a matter of logical consistency, that envkonmental 
values are sociaUy constmcted as weU. Accordingly, there is no sovereign 
authority to ground envkonmental values; they are contestable. This generates the 
question of whether there is a set of 'good' sociaUy constmcted values to expUcitiy 
develop in smdents or whether it is a matter of critiquing aU values equaUy in an 
effort to avoid favouring more to one than another. This question is central to 
the indoctrination debate in envkonmental education. 
LiberaUst envkonmental educators (Breiting & Mogensen, 1999; JickUng, 1992; 
JickUng & Spork, 1998) ardendy uphold the latter approach of critiquing aU values 
equaUy in an attempt to avoid the risk of indoctrination. As Mason notes: "A 
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Uberal education is one that teaches that there is always more than one way to see 
things and that it is always up to the individual to judge just where the tmth Ues in any 
particular issue" (1992, p. 10, emphasis added). JickUng has presented one of the 
most influential arguments for the adoption of a UberaUst approach in 
envkonmental education: 
I would not want my chUdren to be "educated for sustainable 
development." The very idea is contrary to the spirit of education. 
I would rather have my chUdren educated than conditioned to 
beUeve that sustainable development constimtes a consteUation of 
correct envkonmental views. ... I would Uke my chUdren to know 
about the arguments that support it and attempt to clarify it. But I 
would also like them to know that sustainable development is being 
criticized, and I want them to be able to evaluate that criticism and 
participate ki it if they perceive a need. I want them to realize that 
there is a debate going on between a variety of stances, between 
adherents of an ecocentric worldview and those who adhere to an 
anthropocentric worldview. I want my chUdren to be able to 
participate intelUgentiy in that debate. To do so, they wUl need to 
be taught that those positions also constimte logical arguments of 
greater or less merit, and they wiU need to be taught to use 
phUosophical techniques to aid thek understanding and evaluation 
of them. They wiU need to be weU educated to do this. (Jickling, 
1992, p. 8) 
LiberaUsts support thek contention that indoctrination is 'contrary to the spirit 
of education' by arguing that the dkect teaching of particular values: does not 
promote deeper and fiUler understandings of the issues; deprives smdents from 
exercising thek own critical faculties; and denies smdents' personal engagements. 
Breiting and Mogensen (1999) augment these objections with the contention that 
the dkect teaching of particular values limits the learners' capacity to participate in 
the resolution of envkonmental issues to the here and now. They maintain that in 
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an ever-changing world it is necessary to equip learners with strategies that can be 
used to cope with future envkonmental problems rather than prescriptions that 
can rapidly become out-dated. 
However, others in envkonmental education chaUenge the UberaUst view by 
questioning whether education can afford to adopt a 'neutral' stance when faced 
with so many powerful influences in society. Bonnett notes that those who 
chaUenge the UberaUst stance question whether "in such ckcumstances we are 
justified ki an assumption that 'pure' rationaUty wUl: (i) prevaU; (U) provide the 
tmth; (iU) support the democratic values that its proponents favour; (iv) support 
sustainabUity of the desked sort?" (1999, p. 321). Critical theorists in 
envkonmental education provide negative responses to each of these questions 
and defend the stance that envkonmental values ought to be actively promoted in 
envkonmental education. Fien, for example, contends that "dkecdy teaching for 
the values of a critical envkonmental ethic should be an overt purpose of 
education^r the envkonment" (1993, p. 63). SimUarly, Scott and Oulton promote 
learning experiences in which "value sets are made expUcit, actively espoused and 
entrenched" (Scott & Oulton, 1998, p. 222). 
Despite this forthright normative stance, however, critical theorists are keen to 
avoid the charge of indoctrination. Critical approaches are often advanced as a 
means to avert such a charge on the basis that indoctrination is commonly 
designated as the teaching a body of knowledge uncriticaUy for the purpose of 
bringing about acceptance and aUegiance. Fien goes further than simply 
advocating a critical approach, however, by recommending the inclusion of KeUy's 
(1986) strategies for 'committed knpartiaUty' as a means to protect learners from 
unethical teaching practices. In addition to accenmatmg the Uiclusion of critical 
approaches, the proponents of the dkect teaching of particular values emphasise 
that educational instimtions, curricula and classroom practices are value-laden 
through and through. Accordingly, Fien argues that "the key issue for educators 
concerned with questions of values and ethics in education should not be to check 
whether a particular approach to teaching is indoctrination but to ask questions 
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related to the ways, and in accordance with what values and ends, should schools 
and teachers 'indoctrinate'" (1997a, p. 438). 
The arguments presented in this project avoid the charge of indoctrination by 
drawmg on Derrida (1967/1976, 1967/1978, 1972/1981, 1972/1982, 1988, 1999) 
to advocate deconstmctive envkonmental Uteracy. This involves paying close 
attention to the strucmre of texts in order to discern how they configure 
envkonmental subjectivities such that we wiU subscribe to the envkonmental 
values that have been foregrounded rather than those that have been discursively 
marginaUsed. The arguments presented in this project also support a non-
anthropocentric approach to envkonmental values education by drawing on 
Llewelyn's (1991) cross-readkig of Levkias (1961/1991, 1974/1991) and odiers. 
This results in a deep green envkonmental ethics in which the sheer existence of a 
thing other than me, independent of its predicates, imposes an obUgation of non-
indifference upon me. This disavows a priori prejudice in favour of human beings. 
At the same time, however, it disavows a priori prejudice against human beings. 
Thus, this results in a green ethics that does not "lead to a sophisticated form of 
social exclusion based on green excuses" (de Alba et al., 2000, p. 63). 
ECO-POLITICAL AGENCY 
The notion that eco-poUtical agency is an outcome of envkonmental values 
education has exerted considerable sway in envkonmental education. Knapp's 
view that: ""Values education" refers to a planned or unplanned school program 
dkected toward or resulting in the development of a personal value system and an 
associated set of behaviours" (1983, p. 22) has been highly influential Ui 
envkonmental education and forged a seemingly 'natural' conjunction between 
eco-poUtical agency and envkonmental values education. This conjunction, 
however, has been chaUenged on the basis that it does not take economic and 
poUtical considerations kito account (Fien, 1993; Huckle, 1980, 1983, 1999) and 
because it embraces an unproblematic view of subjectivity (DiUon, Kelsey, & 
Duque-Aristizabal, 1999; N. Gough, 1999a; Payne, 2000). Therefore, dus readmg 
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of the various positions in relation to eco-poUtical agency wiU not be treated as an 
extension of the previous section on envkonmental values education. Instead, it 
wiU trace four competing perspectives of eco-poUtical agency: behaviourist, Uberal, 
emancipatory and poststmcturaUst. Each of these positions wiU be considered 
with respect to the way in which they discursively read the statement that "an 
action (or event) is caused by an exertion of power by some agent endowed with 
wiU and understanding" (Rowe, 1995, p. 13). 
Behaviourist Approaches 
Behaviourist approaches to eco-poUtical agency are generaUy attributed to 
positivist and postpositivist orientations in envkonmental education (Robottom & 
Hart, 1993) and associated with envkonmental education approaches in the 
United States (A. Gough, 1997). There are, however, a number of decidedly 
behaviourist approaches being presentiy advocated in Europe and the United 
Kingdom from envkonmental educators who claim other affiUations (Breidler, 
1999; Eder, 1999; UzzeU, 1999). The 'Ecologisation of Schools' programme in 
Europe represents a significant strengthening of behaviourism's hold; the medium 
term goal is to have the programme mnning in 1000 schools across 10 countries 
by 2005 (Posch, 1999). UzzeU's (1999) readkig of die Action Competence 
programmes in the United Kingdom also promotes behaviourist approaches to 
eco-poUtical agency. 
Behaviourist approaches towards the development of eco-poUtical agency view 
learners (potential agents) as manipulable: "it is considered proper to apply 
'behaviour intervention strategies' and to 'manipulate simational factors in order 
to produce desked behavioural changes' even if the individuals ... do not 
necessarUy want to change in this way" (Robottom & Hart, 1993, p. 36). 
Accordingly, the wiU and interest to act as an eco-poUtical agent are shaped (Posch, 
1999) or trained (UzzeU, 1999) by hierarchicaUy stmctured, rule-based educational 
programmes that include systems of Uicentives and penalties to poUce 
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envkonmental behaviour (Eder, 1999, p. 357). As such, participants are endowed 
with power to act within sanctioned ways. 
These three elements of the behaviourist's approach to eco-poUtical agency are 
exempUfied in the manner in which the Ecologisation of Schools programme has 
been implemented in a primary school in Austria. Headteacher Eva Eder, provides 
a vivid account of 'innovations' that are behaviourist through and through. 
Smdents in this school are appointed as 'eco-sheriffs' for two-week periods. 
These smdents are identified by 'eco-sheriff badges, "carry out tours of 
inspections before lessons begin" and at the end of each appointment "there is a 
discussion about the quaUty of thek work in the presence of aU the pupUs in the 
school with appropriate praise, appreciation and criticism, if need be" (Eder, 1999, 
p. 357). This system of incentives/disincentives is embedded in similar systems 
operating at different levels. The schools, for example, are rewarded for thek 
progress along the path of ecologisation with financial and other incentives and 
there are oppormnities to gain further recognition and rewards through national 
contests (Breidler, 1999; Eder, 1999). 
Uberal Approaches 
The Uberal ideology of education evolved from Greek doctrines that involved 
harmonious relationships between the mind and knowledge, and between the 
mind and reaUty. The fkst set of doctrines hold that the raison d' etre of the mind is 
to pursue knowledge. The acqmsition of knowledge, therefore, fulfUs the mind's 
purpose and leads to the development of a 'good' mind. The second set of 
doctrines hold that "the mind, in the right use of reason, comes to know the 
essential nature of things and can apprehend what is ultimately real and 
immutable" (Hkst, 1972, p. 2). Greek education was viewed as 'Uberal', then, as it 
freed the mind to function Ui accordance with its 'tme' nature, freed reason from 
iUusion and falsity, and freed a person's conduct from wrong by reveaUng how 
people ought to Uve both individuaUy and sociaUy. 
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The Uberal concept of achieving freedom through the acquisition of 
knowledge resulted in the secondary concept of equal oppormnity. Classical 
UberaUsts viewed everyone as being free to achieve thek wiU and a faUure to do so 
was meritocraticaUy attributed to personal inadequacy; external constraints were 
not considered. Contemporary UberaUsts, however, reject this laisse^aire view of 
freedom, acknowledge the influence of external societal constraints and 
acknowledge people's abiUty to alter the social envkonment (Feinberg, 1975; 
Smith & Knight, 1982). In the classical UberaUst view, societal transformation was 
possible as a result of individuals coUectively exercising the sound judgment that 
was gained through the acquisition of a 'good' mind. For the more contemporary 
UberaUst, societal transformation requked the elimination of restrictive societal 
constraints as weU. 
The contemporary UberaUst's view is translated dkecdy into Uberal approaches 
to envkonmental education and the associated conceptions of eco-poUtical 
agency. Thus, the wiU and the understanding requked to act as an eco-poUtical 
agent are seen to arise from freeing the mind to function in accordance with its 
'true' nature, and the power to act as an eco-poUtical agent is seen to arise 
'naturaUy' in the pursuit of a 'tme' path. However, it is acknowledged that some 
persons are hindered in thek pursuit of this path, which results in caUs to promote 
the ideals of democracy in envkonmental education (Barcena & Payne, 1995; 
Breitmg & Mogensen, 1999; JickUng, 1992; Jones, Merritt, & PaUner, 1999). 
Emancipatory Approaches 
Both the behaviourist and UberaUst approaches uphold social contract theory, 
which explains poUtical and social cohesion as a product of an agreement among 
mdividuals. This casts kidividuals as being concepmaUy prior to poUtical and 
social units (Ham, 1995). Critical theorists Ui envkonmental education, however, 
oppose concepmaUsUig an individual's relationship to poUtical and social 
community in this way. Critical theorists emphasise the pejorative connotation of 
ideology as a constmct that "fiinctions as a system of beUefs which legitimate and 
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render 'namral' asymmetrical relations of power and wealth in society ... [in a 
manner that] creates a distorted view of reaUty for 'subordinate' groups who take 
the positive world view of dominant social groups for granted" (Fien, 1993, p. 17). 
Critical theorists argue that the wiU to act as an eco-poUtical agent, the choices 
that we perceive as being avaUable and the power, or lack of power, that we 
perceive ourselves as being endowed with may be "false or distorted 
interpretations of stmctures, processes, experience and events" (Huckle, 1993, p. 
47). Accordingly, critical theorists argue that ideological critique and the 
development of poUtical Uteracy skiUs are essential "to raise the consciousness of 
learners to the ideological interests served by the present construction of thek 
envkonment and to empower them to engage in reflective action (praxis) to 
transform it" (Fien, 1993, p. 73). Thus, the development of eco-poUtical agency is 
cast as an emancipatory process. Furthermore, critical theorists argue that "to 
reveal the emancipatory potential of education for sustainabiUty we need to 
consider the critical theories of society and nature offered by modern social 
scientists working within the Marxist tradition" (Huckle, 1993, p. 48). 
Poststructuralist Approaches 
Unlike each of the previous positions, poststmcturaUst approaches to eco-
poUtical agency take a problematic view of (the) subject. Rather than assuming 
the existence of a stable, unitary, a priori subject, poststructuraUsts view subjectivity 
as an effect of the discourses/texts in which we participate. Thus, subjectivity can 
be seen as an ambidextrous inscription: like Escher's sketch of a hand drawing, 
and being drawn by, another hand, so too subjectivity is written by the 
texts/discourses we write. It foUows, that as we participate in multiple 
texts/discourses that can be rewritten, subjectivity is a fluid and multiple 
construction. 
Importandy, subjectivity is not seen to be at the mercy of capricious texts 
because we are actively engaged in the construction of these text/discourses, 
which enables the possibiUty of agency from poststmcturaUst perspectives. With 
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respect to poststmcturaUst notions of eco-poUtical agency, close readings of 
texts/discourses enable analyses of how and which envkonmental issues are being 
instantiated and how these instantiations simultaneously construct subjectivities 
such that we wiU accede to that instantiation. This process of close reading also 
caUs for attentiveness to the texmal sUences that erase the instantiation of other 
envkonmental issues and counter-subjectivities that may cause us to act in more 
or less envkonmentaUy sustainable ways. The wiU to eco-poUtical agency derives 
from the necessity to engage in ongoing deconstmctive readings on the basis that 
each texmal reading is contingent upon constimtive blindnesses. Gough (1994b, 
1997, 1999a) promotes this perspective in envkonmental education. The 
arguments developed in this thesis extend Gough's work by mapping the 
constimtive role of uncertainty in the development of eco-poUtical agency. 
UNCERTAINTY AS AN ISSUE ACROSS ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 
Uncertainty is gaining a high profUe within 'the neighbourhood of 
envkonmental education, suggesting an apparent 'common interest'. Common 
interests in envkonmental education, however, cannot be taken at face value. The 
diversity of the phUosophical positions that comprise the field results in common 
interests being configured and justified in entirely different ways. This section 
presents readings of why uncertainty can be entertained as an issue worthy of 
consideration in envkonmental education from the phUosophical positions of 
positivism, UberaUsm and critical theory. As a range of sub-positions constimtes 
each of these phUosophical positions, the readings presented adopt a broad stroke 
approach. This section is not concerned with how these interests are manifested in 
envkonmental education. Readings of specific engagements with uncertainty are 
presented in Chapter Three. 
The interest demonstrated in uncertainty by positivists and postpositivists has 
been clakned to indicate the adoption of a humbler stance by the scientific 
community with respect to the Umitations of scientific method and scientific 
knowledge (Ashley, 2000). This adoption of a humbler stance, however, is highly 
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contestable, WhUst the strict formulation of the verifiabiUty principle has been 
thoroughly discredited and positivism is dead as a phUosophical movement, 
tempered renditions of the verifiabiUty principle are stiU upheld. For statements 
to be accepted as meaningful, they must denote items of experience that can be 
investigated empkicaUy or rationaUy. Furthermore, such statements must be able 
to be conclusively confkmed or conclusively disconfkmed within specified 
margins of error. Therefore, uncertainty needs to be minimised if a statement is to 
be accepted as meaningfiil. Conversely, a statement needs to be dismissed as 
having inconclusive cognitive currency if the level uncertainty Ues outside 
acceptable margins of error. From this perspective, positivists and postpositivists 
must strive for uncertainty reduction, which ensures that uncertainty can be 
entertained as an issue in envkonmental education. 
Furthermore, the differentiation and acceptance of an kreducible 'scientific 
uncertainty' as opposed to the standard probabiUstic uncertainty, which can be 
reduced in principle through the careful control of parameters, has fiieUed 
considerable interest from beyond the scientific community, including 
envkonmental education (Ashley, 2000; Panel for Education for Sustainable 
Development, 1998; Scott, 2001). Scientific uncertainty "appUes to a condition 
under which there is confidence in the completeness of the defined set of 
outcomes, but where there is acknowledged to exist no theoretical or empirical 
basis for assigning probabiUties to these outcomes" (Stirling, 1999, para. 51). A 
great deal of certainty is embedded aU renditions of scientific uncertainty, which 
enables it to be admitted into positivist and postpositivist discourses. This form 
of uncertainty is of great interest to envkonmental education because it is 
frequentiy attributed to envkonmental and health issues. Thus, positivist and 
postpositivist envkonmental educators need to ensure that uncertainty has a high 
profUe and commit themselves to uncertainty reduction, whUst acknowledging 
that uncertainty is kreducible in certain ckcumstances. 
LiberaUsts do not exalt rationaUty as the means to setting the standard for 
certainty as positivists and postpositivists do. As ColUnson notes in the 
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introduction to Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. "It was his 
considered view that an over-zealous aUegiance to Cartesian rationaUst principles 
has attributed more to the power of reason than it could acmaUy achieve" (1998, 
p. xv). Locke emphasises this view repeatedly and he stresses the need to 
delineate the boundaries of certainty: "If we can find out how far the 
understanding can extend its view, how far it has faculties to attain certainty, and 
in what cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content ourselves with 
what is attainable by us in this state" (1690/1998, I. 1. 6). Locke fiirther argues 
that we can meaningfuUy experience that which Ues beyond the boundaries of 
certainty. Thus, Locke can be read as arguing that we can experience knowledge 
that is intrinsicaUy uncertain and we should respect that knowledge as being 
uncertain. Furthermore, Locke contends that the finimde of the reach of certainty 
enriches Ufe: "man [sic] would be at a great loss if he had nothing to dkect him 
but what has die certainty of tme knowledge (1690/1998, IV. 14. 1, Locke's 
emphasis). The loss to which Locke refers is the loss of the oppormnity to 
exercise judgement in the face of uncertainty. For Locke, the oppormnity to 
exercise judgement is intimately tied to freedom. Thus, it can be argued that for 
Locke and UberaUsts foUowing him, freedom is contingent, in part, upon 
uncertainty. Locke exhorts us, however, to rigorously map out the terrain of 
certainty so that we wiU not be duped by that which has merely the appearance of 
uncertainty and which ought to be properly designated as ignorance, which limits 
freedom. 
Like Locke, UberaUsts in envkonmental education contend that the power of 
rationaUsm is over-inflated and they are simUarly sceptical of the reach of 
empiricism. Thus, they argue that the privUege afforded to rationaUsm and 
empiricism in envkonmental education ought to be curbed and advance the 
necessity of acknowledging the importance of other ways of knowing, such as the 
emotional, the intuitive, and the spkimal (Barcena & Payne, 1995; Bowers, 2001; 
Selby, 1999; SterUng, 1993). Furdiermore, UberaUsts reject the reductionist 
epistemology of the rationaUst/empkical tradition and argue for a hoUstic 
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epistemology. The caU for a hoUstic epistemology is advanced and defended on 
the basis that a hoUstic framework provides a more appropriate means to 
meaningfiiUy apprehend the hoUstic namre of ecological and social processes and 
thek integration into ever-increasing complex wholes. 
The caU for a hoUstic epistemology is frequentiy coupled to a caU for the 
adoption of systems theory in envkonmental education (Barcena & Payne, 1995; 
Selby, 1999; SterUng, 1993) and it is through systems theory that the UberaUsts' 
interest in uncertainty is most pronounced. The 'source' of uncertainty is nuanced 
differentiy by the various proponents of systems theory, but the conjunction of 
complexity and uncertainty is a common theme. Sterling (2000), for example, 
argues that certainty can be envisaged only in contexts where a 'problem' has a 
'solution'. He then argues that: as 'problem solving' is ousted in systems theory by 
'system improvement', the possibiUty of unique and self-sufficient solutions no 
longer exists. Therefore, certainty is supplanted by uncertainty. He further 
contends that systems thinking and its inherent uncertainty is laden with 
educational potential that ought to be buUt upon in envkonmental education. 
Selby's account of uncertainty in complex systems differs sUghtiy from SterUng's. 
Nevertheless, Selby claims that uncertainty/confusion "should be embraced in aU 
its creative potential" (1999, p. 130). Thus, these UberaUsts share Locke's 
contentions that the reach of certainty is more limited than the reductionist 
empkical/rationaUst tradition claims and that uncertainty provides oppormnities. 
FinaUy, those who endorse critical theory can uphold uncertainty as an 
important issue in envkonmental education. Both education for sustainable 
development and critical education for the envkonment draw upon the critical 
theories of Marx and Habermas. Furthermore, they both incline towards 
Habermas' venture to "counter the positivism and economic determinism of 
Marx's latter writing and thus aUow a greater role for capable, reasoning actors in 
social developmenf (Huckle, 1993, p. 60). As May (1997, p. 5) notes, "die 
Critical Theorists from Germany, have considered themselves duty-bound to 
understand the holocaust and to prepare agamst ks return". This aspect of critical 
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theory finds expression in Habermas' work through his quest to "provide norms 
for non-dominating relations to others and a broader notion of reason" (Bohman, 
1995, p. 279). Thus, Habermas requkes that we think and act in anti-totaUtarian 
ways. Thinking in anti-totaUtarian ways entaUs the rejection of exhaustiveness and 
indubitabiUty as ideals. Hence, uncertainty must be embraced as a constimtive 
element of anti-totaUtarian thought. 
The 'common interest' in uncertainty in envkonmental education does not 
indicate a consensus regarding uncertainty per se. Uncertainty is configured 
differentiy and consequentiy the role attributed to it varies. Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to assert that interest in uncertainty can be justified within each of the 
major phUosophical positions that comprise envkonmental education, that each 
perspective admits that uncertainty is a significant issue that should be addressed, 
and that attentiveness to uncertainty ought to receive a high profile. 
POSTMODERNISM/POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
EDUCATION 
Numerous caUs are being increasingly heard for the introduction of 
postmodernist/poststmcmraUst perspectives into envkonmental education 
(CaUicott & da Rocha, 1996; Dreyfias et al., 1999; A. Gough, 1997, 1999; Gough, 
1993, 1994b, 1996, 1997, 1998b, 1999a; Littiedyke, 1996; Panel for Education > r 
Sustamable Development, 1998; Sauve, 1999; Sosa, 1996; Stables, 1996, 1997). 
Yet, despite the increasing number and frequency of these caUs and the ever-
widening forum from which they are being made, few postmodernist/ 
poststmcturaUst voices have been engaged Ui the field. This begs the question of 
why postmodernist/poststrucmraUst perspectives have received such Uttie 
attention. Before considering this question, however, it is necessary to examine the 
'postmodernist/poststmcmraUst' complex in the context of envkonmental 
education and this project. 
Most of the caUs for the introduction of postmodernist/poststmcturaUst 
perspectives into envkonmental education conflate postmodernism and 
poststmcturaUsm under the banner of postmodernism. This conflation foUows 
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the trend in the secondary Uteramre on postmodernist and poststmcturaUst 
phUosophy (Cahoone, 1996; Samp, 1989). Cahoone (1996, pp. 1-2) comments 
that: "Neither members of this famUy, nor thek critics, ought to be concerned 
with the label. Theoretical labels are nothing to be feared, they have a purpose as 
long as they are thought's servants, rather than its master". I do not share 
Cahoone's sentiment for several reasons, but I wiU advance only two reasons here. 
Fkstiy, Cahoone's rationaUsation discounts the constimtive role of language and 
the power that is invested in labels. Secondly, the conflation compels 
poststrucmraUsts to enter into the debate on Modernity (Toulmin, 1992). 
The competing characterisations of (post)modernity have dkect impUcations 
for this project. If the 'quest for certainty' is taken to be an exemplar of modern 
phUosophy, this dates Modernity to Descartes, Kant and Hegel and wiU 
minimaUsticaUy predicate (un)certainty as a quaUty of propositions. However, if 
the scientific/technological revolutions are taken to be paradigmatic of Modernity, 
then we must seriously consider the view that 'we have never been modern'. 
Thus, any claims regarding certainty must be regarded as misleading at best. 
These renditions of Modernity are conflated in envkonmental education 
(Robottom & Hart, 1993). Thus, theorisations of (un)certainty can traverse both 
of these theoretical landscapes. The concepmal frame adopted within this project, 
however, is aUgned with the former reading of Modernity and the associated 
reading of (un)certainty. Predicating (un)certainty in this way is a poststructuraUst 
move because it decentres the world as the ground of certainty. Thus, I view this 
project as a poststmcturaUst enterprise. I do not subscribe to the conflation of 
postmodernism and poststmcturaUsm under the banner of postmodernism 
because it suppresses difference. Nevertheless, I cannot ignore thek conflation in 
envkonmental education. I use the 'postmodernist/poststmcturaUst' complex to 
acknowledge this conflation and to distance myself from it. 
FoUowing this rider concerning the 'postmodernist/poststructuraUst' complex, 
it is possible to return to the question of why postmodernist/poststructuraUst 
perspectives have received so Uttie attention in envkonmental education. One 
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reason for the relatively indifferent response from envkonmental education 
theorists may be that envkonmental awareness is noticeable mainly in its erasure 
in contemporary French phUosophy. According to Shephard (1995, p. 195): 
"There is an arm chak or coffeehouse smeU about it. Lyotard and his feUows 
have no gUmmer of earth, of leaves or soU". Shephard contends that 
postmodernist/poststmcturaUst perspectives are simply krelevant to 
envkonmentaUsm and envkonmental education. This contention, however, is 
neither self-evident nor a logical conclusion. Instead, it is instantiated through 
"discursive tactics of containment and denegation" (ICamuf, 1991, p. ix). Shephard 
discursively forges a relevancy/krelevancy divide to aUenate envkonmentaUsms 
from postmodernisms/poststmcturaUsms. Furthermore, he marginaUses 
postmodernisms/poststrucmraUsms by nuancing this theorising as being merely 
the leisurely musings of a genteel few. This marginaUses postmodernisms/ 
poststrucmraUsms by containing thek putative reach and by soUciting the informal 
faUacy of 'appealing to the balcony', which presumes that the truth of a 
proposition is signaUed through its acceptance by the majority rather than the few. 
Thus, Shephard deploys rhetoric to entice the reader into uncriticaUy embracing 
an informal faUacy. 
A related disparagement of postmodernisms/poststmcmraUsms has been 
noted and rebutted by Conley (1997). She notes that protagonists draw on the 
erasure of any expUcit envkonmental awareness in contemporary French 
phUosophy to construct the argument that as the envkonment is out of sight and 
out of mind in postmodernist/poststmcturaUst thought, postmodernisms/ 
poststmcturaUsms are compUcit in the envkonmental crisis by omission. WhUst 
envkonmental awareness is not expUcit in postmodernist/poststructuraUst 
perspectives, this does not verify or justify any compUcity in absentia claims or 
Shephard's krelevancy claim. 
Instead of being subversive of, or krelevant to, envkonmentaUsms and 
envkonmental education, there are a number oi prima facie reasons why, in spite of 
thek apparendy obUque or peripheral relations to envkonmentaUsms, 
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postmodernist/poststructuraUst perspectives may be strategic aUies. For example, 
the patent concern for difference that theorises the 'other' as 'radicaUy other' 
problematises the binarisms that have dominated western phUosophy since Plato. 
These binarisms are commonly held responsible for attimdes and behaviours that 
lead to the subjugation, exploitation and despoilment of (the) envkonment. 
Furthermore, the postmoderiUst/poststmcturaUst rejections of the Platonic 
characterisation of truth as being transcendent, eternal, perfect, incorporeal and 
immutable oppose them to the devaluation of corporeaUty and change that 
Platonism entaUs. Plumwood clearly traces the conflicts between Platonism and 
envkonmental phUosophy and attests that "Platonic phUosophy not only devalues 
namre but is profoundly anti-ecological and anti-Ufe; it is truly a phUosophy of 
death" (1990, p. 525). Given that postmodernisms/poststmcmraUsms disaUgn 
themselves from this 'anti-ecological' and 'anti-Ufe' legacy, they are germane to 
envkonmental education theorising and may be of great strategic worth. 
A stronger reason for the fakly indifferent response to postmodernist/ 
poststmcturaUst perspectives in envkonmental education may arise from a 
perceived pejorative distinction between the 'word games' of continental 
phUosophy and the deadly serious nature of the envkonmental crisis in the 'real 
world'. This is certainly the view that Bowers (1993b) projects in the 
envkonmental education arena. For example, in relation to deconstruction, he 
asserts that "academic freedom is used to create a safe haven for inteUecmals to 
buUd professional careers promoting nUiiUsm and endless word games that can 
only strengthen the anomic form of individuaUsm upon which oxir consumer-
oriented society depends" (Bowers, 1993b, p. 201). In this brief statement: 
Bowers promulgates the misconception that deconstruction is nihiUstic, a position 
that has been repeatedly renounced within envkonmental education Uterature 
(CaUicott & da Rocha, 1996; Littiedyke, 1996; Sauve, 1999); he Unks 
deconstruction to the promotion of a purposeless, individuaUstic, consumer-
oriented society, which stands Ui stark opposition to the mandates of 
envkonmental education. Thus, Bowers participates ki the "discursive tactics of 
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containment or denegation that have flourished in the vicinity of deconstruction" 
(Kamuf, 1991, p. ix) by casting deconstruction as being antithetical to 
envkonmental education. 
Another disparagement of postmodernisms/poststmcmraUsms based on the 
distinction between the 'word games' and the 'real world' contends that portraying 
the envkonment as multiple, competing, social constructions is sociaUy and 
ecologicaUy kresponsible (Shephard, 1995). This notion of irresponsibUity is 
related to the intentional creation of a space in which it becomes vaUd to ask "If 
nature is only a social and discursive constmction, why fight hard to save it" 
(Hayles, 1995b, p.47)? This questioning, it is argued, has the potential to promote 
further envkonmental exploitation and degradation by furnishing vested groups 
with greater authorial leverage for access to power and resources. This line of 
argument is based on the perception that postmodernist/poststructuraUst 
perspectives lack normative elements and, thus, entaU rampant relativism. 
However, normative elements enabling the evaluation of interpretive possibilities 
exist in much postmodernist/poststmcturaUst theorising (Derrida, 1967/1978; 
Levkias, 1961/1991,1974/1991; Lyotard & Thebaud, 1985). 
Another criticism raised against the 'word games' of postmodernist/ 
poststmcturaUst theorising is that the constmction of reaUty through language is 
the most extreme manifestation of anthropocentrism. Given that 
anthropocentrism is regarded as highly culpable in (the) envkonmental crisis, 
envkonmental education theorists distance themselves from, and strenuously 
denounce anthropocentrism. Thus, it could be reasonably anticipated that 
envkonmental education theorists would recoU from phUosophical perspectives 
with anthropocentric affiUations. Yet the contention that postmodernist/ 
poststmcturaUst perspectives entaU such an affiUation is highly contestable and has 
been rebutted by postmodernist/poststmcturaUst theorists. For example, in an 
Uiterview with Richard Kearney (1984), Derrida unequivocaUy rejected the bleak 
interpretation of his work as an assertion that there is nothing outside language: 
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I never cease to be surprised by critics who see my work as a 
declaration that there is nothing beyond language, that we are 
imprisoned by language; it is in fact, saying the exact opposite. The 
critique of logocentrism is above aU the search for the 'other' and 
the 'other of language'. (Kearney, 1984, p. 123) 
WhUst characterisations of postmodernisms/poststmcturaUsms are 
problematic, since they seek to totaUse theorising that rejects totaUtarian thought, 
it would be uncontentious to state that concern for the 'other' is a common motif, 
although the 'other' that is aUuded to is not the same. This concern for the 
'other', then, predicates postmodernist/poststmcmraUst perspectives resonant 
with envkonmental education, rather than being an anthropocentric force of 
cormption. 
Given that the commonly ckculated criticisms of postmodernisms/ 
poststmcturaUsms can be countered, it is surprising that so few envkonmental 
education theorists have responded to the introduction of postmodernist/ 
poststmcturaUst perspectives. Those who have responded, however, include: 
Annette Gough (1997, 1999) who focuses on feminist poststmcturaUsms, but 
advocates the inclusion of poststructuraUst perspectives in thek diversity and 
signals "the possibilities for new dkections when poststmcturaUst pedagogies and 
research methodologies are used in envkonmental education" (A. Gough, 1999, p. 
143); Noel Gough who has explored poststructuraUst narrative approaches in 
education and deconstructed the notion of envkonmental agency (Gough, 1993, 
1994b, 1996, 1997, 1998b, 1998c); and Andrew Stables (1996, 1997) who 
advocates that envkonmental education should embrace the notion of (the) 
envkonment as text. 
None of these theorists, however, has embraced the notion of radical 
'otherness', or alterity, in thek projects. It wiU be argued ki this thesis that it is 
cmcial for postmodernist/poststmcturaUst perspectives of envkonmental 
education to be attuned to the utter excessiveness of the 'other', an utter 
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excessiveness that is irreducible and unassimUable. To deny the excessiveness of 
the other casts the other as the counterpart of the same; thus, the 'other' and the 
'same' form a totaUty creating the conditions for the logic of domination to be 
brought into play. Radical alterity perpemaUy disrupts the possibiUty of imposing 
logics of domination. Since envkonmental education denounces the logic of 
domination imposed on (the) envkonment, facing radical alterity is germane to 
envkonmental education. The works of Adorno (1966/1973), Derrida 
(1967/1978, 1972/1981, 1972/1982, 1977/1979, 1997/1999), Levkias 
(1961/1991, 1974/1991) and others wiU be used to theorise uncertainty in 
envkonmental education in the Ught of radical alterity. 
POSTSTRUCTURALIST (DIS)POSITIONS AND MOTIFS 
PoststrucmraUsms do not constimte a school of thought or a movement, but 
a complex set of relations in contemporary thought that cannot be gathered 
together under a set of unifying principles. This prompts the question of why 
diverse theories are labeUed under the banner of poststmcmraUsm. Butier (1992, 
p. 5) responds to this question with intriguing secondary questions: "Do aU these 
theories have the same structure (a comforting notion for the critic who would 
dispense with them aU at once)? Is the effort to colonize and domesticate these 
theories under the sign of the same, to group them syntheticaUy and masterfuUy 
under a single rubric, a simple refusal to grant the specificity of these positions, an 
excuse not to read, and not to read closely?" (quoted in St. Pierre, 2000b, p. 478). 
An important point to be gained from Buder's response is that the diversity of 
poststructuraUst thought compels close attention to be paid to the specificity of 
the positions used in projects such as this research and close readings of the 
stmcmral elements of the positions being presented. 
This project draws heavUy upon the works of Barthes (1957/1972, 
1968/1977, 1971/1977), Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987), Derrida (1967/1976, 
1972/1981, 1972/1982, 1993/1994, 1999) and Levmas (1961/1991, 1974/1991). 
Deleuze and Guattari's phUosophy is used to guide the methodology of this 
project, whereas the phUosophies of Barthes, Derrida and Levinas are used as 
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Stmcmral elements in constructing Unes of flight that depart from the theoretical 
terrain that envkonmental education has configured. The works of Foucault 
(1969/1988, 1980, 1994/1997) and Lyotard (1983/1988, 1984, 1992, 1985) are 
occasionally used for the purpose of elaboration; thek role is iUustrative rather 
than stmcmral. Preliminary readings of the key motifs deployed in the 
constmction of the arguments developed in this thesis are presented in the 
foUowing sections, with the exceptions of the critiques of origins. Death of the 
Author and Death of the Subject, which were announced earUer. Closer readings 
of aU these motifs are presented in later chapters. 
The stmcmral elements of the phUosophical arguments developed draw almost 
exclusively from EngUsh translations of primary sources. The arguments 
pertaining to the engagements of poststmcturaUst perspectives in envkonmental 
education draw heavUy on die work of Gough (1991, 1993, 1994b, 1995, 1997, 
1998a, 1998c, 1998d, 1999a) and Stables (1996, 1997; Stables & Bishop, 2001). 
WhUst the work of Gough and Stables constimte secondary sources for 
poststmcturaUsms, they are used solely as primary sources for envkonmental 
education's engagements with poststructuraUst thought. 
ALTERITY/OTHER 
The terms 'alterity' and 'Other' are used as per Adorno (1966/1973) and 
Levinas (1961/1991, 1974/1991) to dismpt the notion that there are or must be 
totaUties that are whoUy delimitable and whoUy knowable. Both Adorno and 
Levinas appeal to utter excess that exceeds identity to dismpt this totaUtarian 
mode of thought that can be traced to Plato. Each advances and defends the 
notion that this utter excess cannot be captured in concepts. Adorno, for 
example, argues in Negative Dialectics that "the concept does not exhaust the thing 
conceived" and that "the name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than 
objects do not go into thek concepts without leaving a remainder, that they 
contradict the traditional norm of adequacy" (Adorno, 1966/1973, p. 5). Levinas 
echoes this contention: the "ideatum surpasses its idea" (Levinas, 1961/1991, p. 49, 
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Levinas' emphasis). Both Adorno and Levinas draw upon notions such as God, 
mfinity, perfection and difference to argue that the thing conceived overflows the 
contours of the concept. Llewelyn elaborates that alterity does not 'exist' because 
"there always remaUis something more to be described, but because there always 
remains something that exceeds theoretical description" (1991, p. 268). 
Alterity/Other, then, is irreducible and inassimUable excess. 
Two further points warrant consideration here. Fkstiy, Levinas argues that the 
alterity of the Other is "refractory to every typology, to every genus, to every 
characterology, to every classification" (1961/1991, p.73). This notion of alterity 
distinguishes the Other from the other who is discursively marginaUsed or erased 
because the marginaUsed or erased can be reinscribed differentiy by 
deconstmcting the dominant discourse, that is by changing the typology. 
Secondly, the contention that alterity is an kreducible and inassimUable excess 
begs the question of how we can know and speak of alterity. This question is 
addressed as per Levinas in Chapter Four. 
LOGOCENTRISM 
Logocentrism, a term coined by Derrida (1967/1976), denotes the beUef that 
words, writing, ideas, systems of thought are vaUdated by a centre that is external 
to them whose truth they convey. Two sites commonly designated as centres for 
logos are the mind and the 'real' world. Derrida decentres the fkst of these two 
sites, the mind, through his deconstmction of Saussure's (1959) semiology. This 
deconstmction decentres the long-held beUef that people use words "to bring out 
thek ideas, and lay them before the view of others: words in thek primary and 
immediate sigiufication stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him [sic] that uses 
then/' (Locke, 1690/1998, III. 2. 1, Locke's emphasis). The deconstmction of die 
second commonly designated centre, the 'real' world, however, has more 
knmediate impUcations for envkonmental education. The deconstmction of this 
form of logocentrism does not constimte a denial of (the) material world, but k is 
a denial that there is transcendent meankig ki (die) world diat guarantees "die 
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movement of the text from the outside" (Derrida, 1972/1981, p. 65). This view is 
not unprecedented. WhUst the ardent empiricist Locke whoUy upholds the mind 
as the centre of language, he is cautious about grounding propositions in (the) 
world: "Men [sic] would not be thought to talk barely of thek imaginations, but of 
things as they usuaUy are, therefore they often suppose thek words to stand for the 
reaUty of things" (1690/1998, III. 2. 1, emphasis added). WhUst empkicism is 
held to be an indispensable source of envkonmental knowledge across aU the 
theoretical positions held in envkonmental education, Locke's cautionary stance is 
lost in aU except poststrucmraUst orientations: the notion of theory-ladeness, 
whUst influential in envkonmental education and elsewhere, tinkers at the edges of 
this problematic without squaring-up to the issue of language and reference. The 
upshot of denying logocentrism in envkonmental education is that it posits 
meaning within rather than beyond (con) texts, which are neither whoUy 
determining nor whoUy delimitable: "the finiteness of a context is never secured 
or simple, there is an indefinite opening of every context, an essential 
nontotaUzation" (Derrida, 1988, p. 137). This 'essential nontotaUsation' enables 
reinscriptions of (the) 'real' which precludes any notion of the finaUty of meaning. 
Thus, "we never encounter nature either in itself or as a whole; instead nature is a 
social phenomenon, whose meaning is always contested within particular local 
discourses" (Zimmerman, 1994, p. 139). This denial of logocentrism is also 
known as the critique of the metaphysics of presence. Both the term 
'logocentrism' and the expression 'critique of the metaphysics of presence' are 
used throughout this project. 
DIFFEKANCE 
Differance is unarguably Derrida's most famous neologism. Yet defming 
differance is problematic, given Derrida's insistence that it is neither a word nor a 
concept (1972/1982). However, Nuyen's reading provides some much-needed 
help when it comes to the difficult task of addressing differance: 
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Yet, there is a straightforward way in which differance is also a word 
and a concept. It is thus both a word and not a word, a concept 
and not a concept. As such, it creates a space for that which stands 
in the in-between, in the fissure, in the dehiscence, facing both 
dkections, Janus-like. As such, it "produces" difference. (Nuyen, 
1989, p. 65) 
Thus, it is not necessary to retreat into sUence when faced with the non-concept 
of differance. It is possible to address this non-concept without coUapsing into 
contradiction, although care is needed. 
Differance enshrines a difference that cannot be resolved into a positivity 
through a HegeUan dialectic. Derrida draws on Saussure's (1959) semiology which 
posits 'identity' as an effect of differences. According to Saussure, each word 
acqukes its 'identity' by vkme of being different to other elements in a set. This is 
an anti-logocentric manoeuvre because it severs 'identity' from correspondences 
between words and entities in the 'real' world. There are other aspects of 
Saussure's work, however, that undermine his break from logocentrism. Derrida 
exposes this retrograde aspect of Saussure's semiology and offers differance as a 
means to avoid the problem. 
Differance is a difference with a difference. Drawing on the French word 
difference, which means both to differ and defer, differance refuses to come to rest. It 
is a 'force' that 'produces' differences in a text and endlessly defers meaning. Thus, 
meaning is never immediately present; a whole can never be apprehended. This is 
not at aU the same thing as saying that there is no meaning or that meaning is 
impossible. On the contrary, "differance produces the differences, without which 
neither thought nor language would be conceivable" (West, 1996, p. 180). 
Meaning, which is possible only by vkme of the play of differance, cannot be fixed. 
It is instantiated through differences that cannot be unraveUed to reveal an origin 
because the differences are endless. 
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DECONSTRUCTION 
Deconstruction has been frequentiy misread and denounced as a destructive 
practice. As Nuyen notes: "critics complain that deconstruction breaks up the 
whole and leaves it at that, or leaves it to others to pick up the pieces" (1989, p. 
28). Bowers (1993b), CaUicott and da Rocha (1996), Huckle (1996), Littiedyke 
(1996), Payne (1999, 2000) and Sauve (1999) have denunciated deconstmction and 
promulgated this misreading in envkonmental education by opposing 
deconstmction to reconstruction, despite Derrida's insistence that "deconstmction 
is not opposed to reconstruction" (1999, p. 77). Rather than being a destmctive 
practice, deconstmction is concerned with the dismantling of centres that 
stmcmre texts in order to explore how texts could be constmcted differentiy. As 
Johnson comments in the Translator's Introduction to Dissemination: "If anything 
is destroyed in a deconstructive reading, it is not meaning but the claim to 
unequivocal domination of one mode of sigiufication over another" (Johnson, 
1981, p. xiv). 
Thus understood, deconstruction offers envkonmental education a strategic 
means to dismande and reconstmct envkonmental texts to make room for more 
sustainable narratives, under the proviso that such narratives must, in mrn, be 
deconstructed. This commitment to ongoing deconstmctive readings is based on 
the premise that "ecological problems cannot be solved by turning the 
envkonment into yet another metaphysical absolute, since doing so is motivated 
by the same control-impulse that animates aU centrisms, including those for social 
oppression" (Zimmerman, 1994,139). 
Another pertinent aspect of deconstmction for envkonmental education arises 
from Derrida's dual contention that text is not limited to "writings on the page" 
(1972/1981, p. 60) and that '"texf is not distinct from action or opposed to 
action" (1999, p. 65). This casts the notion of 'readkig texts' as the participation 
ki discourse. Therefore, deconstmction offers a way to rethUik, reconstimte and 
participate in "the surfaces Unkages between power, knowledge, kistimtions. 
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inteUecmals, the control of populations, and the modern state as these intersect in 
the functions of systems of thoughf' (Bove , 1990, quoted in St. Pierre, 2000b, p. 
485). Thus, deconstmction can be used as a means to pursue more 
envkonmentaUy sustainable practices. 
UNDER ERASURE (SOUS RATURE) 
The need, indeed the obUgation, to accede and commit to ongoing 
deconstmction arises from the impossibiUty of deconstruction to dialecticaUy 
supplant modernist concepts with 'tmer' alternatives. For such a possibiUty to 
arise it would be necessary to break free of contexts, to effect a transgression, 
which Derrida's critiques of logocentrism demonstrate as impossible: "There is 
not a transgression ... every transgressive gesture reencloses us ... within this 
enclosure" (Derrida, 1972/1981, p. 12). Thus, modernist words and concepts 
must continue to be thought, but in thek detotaUsed or deconstructed form. The 
notion of placing words or concepts 'under erasure', or sous rature, refers to the 
practice of continuing to use a word or concept whUst acknowledging its 
kremedial inadequacy. 
Derrida places key phUosophical concepts such as 'Being', 'Origin' and 
'Presence' under erasure and signifies this placement by crossing out the word 
with an 'X'. In this project, however, terms that have been placed under erasure 
wiU be signified by the use of inverted commas, as in the previous sentence. Key 
envkonmental education words and concepts that would be placed under erasure 
in deconstructive readings include 'envkonment', 'sustainabiUty' and 'agency'. It is 
not just key terms that should be placed under erasure, however. The power of 
less obtmsive words Ui the text - the definite article, prepositions, pronouns, 
conjugates of the verb 'to be' - to surreptitiously induce a particular readkig over 
another needs to be acknowledged. These terms cannot be discarded, even 
though they privUege identity over difference, because they are indispensable for 
grammatical coherence. Therefore, words such as 'the' and 'is' should be 
accenmated by placing them under erasure. These less obtmsive terms are 
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accenmated throughout this project by thek placement in parenthesis, for 
example, '(the) envkonment'. 
'AIMS' AMD 'OBJECTIVES' 
There is a problem here of framing, of bordering and delimitation, 
whose analysis must be very finely detaUed if it wishes to ascertain 
die effects of fiction. (Derrida, 1980/1987, p. 431) 
If we are to approach a text, it must have an edge. (Derrida, 
1977/1979, p. 83) 
These introductory quotations uphold the importance and necessity of the 
notion of border and the process of delimitation whUst indicating that neither is 
straight forward. If aims and objectives are read as discursive elements that set 
the scope of a project, then they are impUcated in the notion of the border and the 
process of delimitation and should be approached with great care. However, the 
notion of the border, or edge, is problematic within 'the neighbourhood of. It 
has been argued that the borders of 'the neighbourhood of are krepressibly fluid. 
Therefore, the notion of containing an area that exists in the immense relationaUty 
of 'the neighbourhood of is problematic. This problematic resonates with the 
fluidity diat Derrida (1977/1979) and Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) attribute 
to the text and the book, respectively. According to Derrida, a text (including a 
thesis) is "a differential network, a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something 
other than itself, to the other differential traces" (Derrida, 1977/1979, p. 84). 
SimUarly, Deleuze and Guattari argue that: 
A book [or a thesis] has neither subject nor object. ... To attribute a 
book to a subject is to overlook this working of matters, and the 
exteriority of thek relations. ... We wUl never ask what a book 
means, as signifier or signified, we wUl not look for anything to 
understand in it. We wiU ask what it functions with, in connection 
with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities ... A 
book exists only through the outside and on the outside. ... the 
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only question to be asked is which other machine the Uterary 
machine can be plugged into, must be plugged into in order to 
work, peleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, pp. 3-4) 
Here, both Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari oppose containment and accenmate 
exteriority. How can this be reconcUed with Derrida's contention that an edge is 
necessary in order to approach a text and Deleuze and Guattari's contention that 
there is a sense in which a book is a "signifying totaUty, or determination 
attributable to a subjecf (1980/1987, p. 4)? Derrida's deconstmction of the 
'parergon\ a frame that doesn't just divide inside from outside, is helpful here. 
Derrida concludes that: "Deconstruction must neither reframe nor dream of the 
pure and simple absence of a frame" (1978/1987, p. 73). This dioroughly 
problematises the notion of aims and objectives as framing devices. They are 
fiirther problematised by the Death of the Author. As outUned earUer, the Death 
of the Author does not invaUdate authorial intentions, but they no longer control 
the text. Thus, aims and objectives are not self-sufficient. 
It would take a very detaUed analysis to deconstmct the nature and role of aims 
and objectives in terms of these postmodernist/poststrucmraUst twists and mrns 
and this is not the place to give that task the attention that it requkes and 
deserves. I wiU settie instead on the simple statement that aims and objectives 
need to be placed under erasure {sous rature). In other words, aims and objectives 
must continue to be used as framing devices, but they must be recognised as being 
problematic. 
The aims and objectives advanced here are problematic in another sense that 
must be acknowledged. This project has undergone many mutations. Its original 
working tide was "Chaos, alterity and envkonmental values education" and aims 
and objectives were formulated within that context. The aims and objectives were 
re-formulated as the project mutated. However, the aims and objectives that are 
presented here undoubtedly bear traces of projects that were never written. This 
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fiirther iUustrates that aims and objectives are not self-sufficient and adds another 
dimension to the exteriority of the text. 
'AIMS' 
This project has two broad aims. Neither can be regarded as being the 
principal aim, but one does logicaUy precede the other. The fkst aim of this 
project, which is logicaUy prior to the second, is to theorise uncertainty in a 
manner that respects uncertainty as uncertain. As this aim has a seemingly 
tautological quaUty, its possibiUty is not assured. Therefore, exploring the 
(im)possibUity of this aim wUl form a significant component of the research 
project. In order to explore the (im)possibiUty of this aim, it is necessary to go 
beyond the concepmal resources avaUable in envkonmental education and the 
broader envkonmental education arena as they are inadequate for the task. 
Explorations into contemporary postmodernist/poststructuraUst phUosophy and 
Uterary theory are requked. As a result the (im)possibiUty of theorising uncertainty 
in a manner that respects uncertainty as uncertain may have relevance beyond 
envkonmental education and the broader education arena. This is not to say that 
the theorisation wUl be universal and, hence, imbued with some sense of certainty. 
Instead, the (im)possibiUty of multiple theorisations of uncertainty wiU be 
presented, which may connect variously with fields that express an interest in 
'postmodern' uncertainties. 
This project also aims to contribute to postmodernist/poststmcturaUst 
discourse in envkonmental education. SpecificaUy, it aims to articulate to and 
extend arguments that advocate the adoption of narrative theory (Gough, 1993, 
1994b, 1998b; Stables, 1996, 1997, 1998; Stables & Bishop, 2001), deconstmction 
(DiUon et al., 1999; N. Gough, 1999a) and poststmcturaUst feminisms (A. Gough, 
1997). It also aims to create resonances with those strands of critical theory that 
are selectively introducing postmodernist/poststructuraUst perspectives in an 
effort to mediate critical theory and (the) postmodern (Fien, 1993; Huckle, 1999, 
2002), although many formidable dissonances wiU arise ki the process. Many 
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dissonances wiU also be created between the arguments presented here and 
positivist, postpositivist and Gaianist orientations in envkonmental education. It 
is anticipated that proponents of these orientations wiU object strenuously to the 
central notions that empiricism is a narrative enterprise and that the envkonment 
does not constimte the ground of envkonmental Truths and Values. Thus, this 
project aims to contribute to the contestation that constimtes 'the neighbourhood 
of envkonmental education. It certainly does not aim to queU this contestation 
by offering dialectical resolutions. 
'OBJECTIVES' 
The objectives presented here are parergonal; they are frames that delimit the 
scope of the inquiry and can, therefore, be understood as external constraints that 
contain and legitimate the discourse, yet thek namre and legitimacy are 
systematicaUy and necessarUy produced within the discourse. This ambidextrous 
inscription compUcates, without lessening, the nature and role of objectives. 
The objectives of this project are: 
1. to draw on postmodernist/poststrucmraUst themes to theorise 
uncertainty in a manner that respects uncertainty as uncertain; 
2. to enact postmodernist/poststmcmraUst engagements with uncertainty 
in the context of envkonmental education; 
3. to articulate the postmodernist/poststmcturaUst theorisations of 
uncertainty to key themes in envkonmental education, with particular 
attention to envkonmental values education and engaging indigenous 
voices; 
4. to explore the plausibiUty of the hope that the Panel for Education ^ r 
Sustainable Development (1998) attaches to 'postmodern 
uncertainties'; 
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5. to Uivestigate whether the postmodernist/poststmcturaUst engagements 
with uncertaUity de-territoriaUse and re-territoriaUse existing 
engagements and to identify the existence, if any, of other sites in 
envkonmental education that have not been identified hitherto as sites 
in which to engage postmodernist/poststmcturaUst uncertainties. 
WRITING THE THESIS 
Writing a thesis that strives to respect uncertainty as uncertain presents a 
texmal chaUenge. To write with certimde about uncertainty is problematic even 
though certimde and uncertainty occupy different domains. Given that this thesis 
upholds Vance's contention that certimde is a "state of repose foUowing upon our 
assent to the tmth of a statemenf (1917, p. 217), writing with certimde conveys 
assent to the tmth of this theorisation of uncertainty. This creates tension because 
tmth is classicaUy constmed to be eternal and unchanging. It is not unreasonable 
to contend that if something is eternal and unchanging, then it is certain. 
Therefore, writing with certimde would texmaUy render uncertainty certain. 
Texmal violence would be infUcted despite the commitment to treat uncertainty as 
uncertain both phUosophicaUy and methodologicaUy. 
Care needed to be taken to dismpt a sense of certimde inhabiting the text, but 
this does not mean that the text is less than rigorous or less than scholarly. 
Indeed, this disruption of certimde is akin to criticaUy acclaimed feminist 
dismptions of author-ity. Several genres would have provided appropriate means 
to disrupt the text from conveying a sense of certimde. A poetic approach would 
have disrupted a sense of certimde by constmcting meaning through aUusion 
rather than denotation. Another approach would have been to constmct a richly 
layered text from which multiple meanings could be constructed by interacting 
with different layers of subtexts in different combinations. Unfortunately, both of 
these writing processes requke a creative Uterary talent that I lack; a different 
approach needed to be adopted. Instead, I have opted to trouble the text by 
weaving together many lines of thought to create a rich, but single layered text. 
Subtexts are assuredly embedded, but these subtexts have not been specificaUy 
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composed. In addition, I have played upon the ambiguity of language by 
choosing terms that osciUate between meanings, such as 'execute' and 'discipline'. 
This approach stiU enables multiple readkigs of the arguments presented. Thus, 
the text refuses to come to rest, to a fixed and final meaning that would purport to 
render uncertainty certain. 
Many sections have been rewritten repeatedly because this approach can 
swifdy scandaUse reason, resulting Ui umnteUigibUity. St. Pierre Uisists that "the 
researcher must learn not to baUc at the task of workUig bewUderment for aU it's 
worth" and advances the use of figurations in this task since thek "aim is to 
produce a most rigorous confusion as [they] jettison clarity in favour of the 
umnteUigible" (1997, p. 281). This 'bewUderment' and 'unkiteUigibUity' are not 
pursued for thek own sake, however. Instead, postmodernist/poststmcturaUst 
tiiought strives to deconstmct humanism in an effort to think differentiy, and 
thereby exist differentiy (Gatens, 2000). However, care is needed. Deleuze and 
Guattari warn agamst the danger of losmg oneself completely: "This is not 
reassuring because you can botch it. Or it can be terrifying, and lead you to your 
deadi" (1980/1987, p. 149). Therefore, a patii needed to be charted between 
obscurity and clarity. 
Pursuing dUs padi goes agaUist the advice offered by style guides which hold 
diat "a standard of so-caUed clarity of style is the fkst and mdispensable criterion 
of expository prose" (Kamuf, 1991, p. xU). However, die caU for clarity was 
resisted as stridendy as die lure of uninteUigibUity, aldiough tiie reasons differed in 
each case. The caU for clarity was resisted because it is premised on the 
assumption that language is a neutral and transparent means of conveying 
meaning. Postmodernist/poststmcturaUst theorists have thoroughly chaUenged aU 
aspects of this assumption, although only three points wiU be mentioned here. 
Fkstiy, postmodernist/poststmcturaUst theorists chaUenge the conjunction of 
clarity and the neutraUty of language. St. Pierre (2000b), for Uistance, argues that: 
"'Clarity' is always a distinction made through positions of power both to sanction 
what is legitimate (Popkewitz, 1997, p. 18) and to keep the unfamUiar at a distance 
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and Ulegitimate". Thus, clarity is far from neutral; it is contUigent upon the power 
of concealment, which leads to the ethical dUemma of inclusion/exclusion. 
Secondly, the conjunction of clarity and the transparency of language has been 
thoroughly chaUenged by Derrida's deconstmction of logocentrism (1967/1976). 
This transparency arises from the assumption that there are correspondences 
between words and 'things in the world', that words simply refer. However, 
deconstmction "foregrounds the idea that that language does not simply point to 
preexisting things and ideas but rather helps to construct them" (St. Pierre, 2000b, 
p. 483). This problematises the question of reference as Derrida notes in an 
interview with Richard Kearney: "the question of reference is much more 
complex and problematic than traditional theories suppose" (Kearney, 1984, p. 
123). The problematic namre of this complex question of reference and the 
wor(l)d does not admit the criterion of clarity. The logic that refuses to admit the 
criterion of clarity is simUar to that employed in the critique of speculative reason. 
Just as "reason cannot cast Ught on itself, since to do so is to move and stand stiU 
at the same time" (Nuyen, 1991, p. 207), the word cannot clearly shed Ught on the 
wor(l)d since the word is knpUcated in the constmction of the wor(l)d. From 
another angle, if one subscribes to the view that language is impUcated in the 
constmction of the wor(l)d, then one cannot subscribe to the caU for clarity 
because the wor(l)d can, by extension, be reinscribed differentiy. This multipUcity 
of inscriptions fmstrates the modus operandi of clarity, namely reduction. FinaUy, the 
caU to clarity was resisted due to the semantic conjunctions between clarity, 
certainty and certimde; to be 'clear' is to be "free from doubt; certain ... free from 
aU limitation, quaUfication, question, or shortcoming" (Oxford EngUsh 
Dictionary). 
Thus, pursmng a path between clarity and unintelUgibiUty is imperative 
theoreticaUy, methodologicaUy, poUticaUy and ethicaUy. Like St. Pierre, though, I 
"wonder sometimes whether I am writing my way into a catastrophe" (1997, p, 
405). Derrida insists, however, that some risks must be run (1972/1981). This is 
not a comforting thought, but the necessity to pursue the path between clarity and 
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unintelUgibiUty is theoreticaUy, methodologicaUy, poUticaUy and ethicaUy 
defensible. 
Another two feamres of the writing of this thesis need to be mentioned: 
gender bias and density of in-text citations. This thesis is mostiy free of biased 
language. However, gender biased language has been unchaUenged in some 
quotations and used purposely in the text in some places to designate and 
confront sociaUy constmcted standards that have been cast as universal. This is 
especiaUy the case in the conclusion where the term 'man' is retained to designate 
"a sociaUy constmcted, patriarchal standard of human behaviour appUed to both 
man and women" (Massumi, 1987, p. xviU). 
FinaUy, it is necessary to draw attention to the density of in-text citations used 
throughout this thesis. The traditional tiered distmction between data and 
theorising is not supported in this thesis because the data are constmcted from 
readings of postmodernist/poststmcmraUst themes in the work of Barthes 
(1957/1972, 1968/1977, 1971/1977), Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987), Derrida 
(1967/1976, 1967/1978, 1972/1981, 1972/1982, 1993/1994, 1997/1999, 1999), 
and Levinas (1961/1991, 1974/1991). Furdiermore, die data constmction is 
interwoven in the development of the arguments offered. The in-text citations 
have been minimised Ui order to prevent high density citations intermptUig the 
flow of the arguments. Citation detaUs are provided as works are mtroduced in 
each section, but they are omitted thereafter unless dkect quotes are used or when 
the argument moves between several texts by the same author ki the same section. 
CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
Chapter Two, Methodological (Dis)Positions and Methods, presents readings 
of two of the three research methods that were explored during the course of this 
project. The denouement of this project could be considered evolutionary, if the 
term 'evolutionary' is understood as a process in which relatively stable periods are 
puncmated by instabiUties that result in major transformations rather than a 
gradual, continuous and accretive series of minor modifications. This 
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evolutionary path led to dramatic deterritoriaUsations and reterritoriaUsations of 
the theoretical terrain. The three research methods explored were Drees' 
constmctive consonance (1988, 1990), Pekce's faUibiUsm (1931), and Deleuze and 
Guattari's rhizomatics (1980/1987). The readings presented in Chapter Two, 
however, are linUted to constmctive consonance and rhizomatics due to 
constraints on space. The inclusion of a research method that was turned aside 
may be considered unusual. However, Drees' constructive consonance offers a 
valuable framework for research projects in envkonmental education that are 
aUgned to either critical theory or to mediations of critical theory and 
postmodernism, as per Best and KeUner (1991, 1997), Gkoux (1988, 1990, 1992, 
1996) and McLaren (1995, 1997). Thus, whUst constructive consonance was not 
chosen for this particular project, its inclusion opens up a space for alternative 
theorisations of uncertainty from other perspectives in envkonmental education. 
Chapter Three, Tracing Uncertainty in Envkonmental Education, presents a 
reading of the existing engagements with uncertainty in envkonmental education 
and, in some instances, extends the akeady-said by foUowing the paths that the 
existing engagements preconfigure. This chapter constimtes the tracing section of 
Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatics; it portrays existing territories by delineating 
boundaries and the spaces enclosed. WhUst the number of engagements with 
uncertainty is relatively smaU in envkonmental education, the engagements are 
dispersed across diverse theoretical terrains. This chapter presents a reading of 
the scientific discourse of uncertainty and alUed concepts, such as risk, 
indeterminacy and ignorance, and positions envkonmental education engagements 
with uncertainty in relation to this discourse. 
Chapters Four and Five are the fkst two mapping chapters. As each chapter is 
discrete, they may be read in any order. Chapter Four, Face to Face with the 
Envkonment, draws a Une of flight from the educational dimension of 
'uncertaUity and precaution Ui action' proposed by the Panel for Education for 
Sustainable Development to Levinas' ethical relationship known as the 'face to 
face' (Levkias, 1957/1987, 1961/1991, 1962/1996, 1968/1996, 1974/1991, 
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1982/1985, 1984/1996). This Une of flight is enabled by die panel's attribution of 
pluraUty and a limitation of knowledge to uncertainty. This conjunction is central 
to Levinas' phUosophy. However, Levinas' formulation of the face to face 
relationship exclusively attends the realm of human sociaUty. This restriction 
would result in a highly anthropocentric ethics if appUed dkecdy to envkonmental 
education. However, it is argued that when Levinas' ethics is cross-read with 
Heidegger and others, as per Llewelyn (1991), an ethico-poUtical framework 
emerges that can inform envkonmental values education and envkonmental 
education's commitment to eco-poUtical agency. This framework disavows 
anthropocentrism and has an undeniably deep green orientation, but it avoids 
many of the criticisms leveUed at deep green approaches, such as apoUticism. This 
chapter anticipates and counters two Unes of resistance that could be raised 
against the introduction of a Levinasian eco-ethics in envkonmental education. It 
is concluded that the relendess provocations that Levinas' phUosophy presents 
would enable envkonmental education to engage uncertainty in a manner that 
maintains the conditions of uncertainty, rather than offering a condvdt to certainty, 
which would defeat the purpose of engaging Levinas from the outset. 
Chapter Five, Narrative Uncertainties, takes fUght from Vance's (1917) 
rendition of certainty. Envkonmental education has not been articulated to 
Vance's work previously. However, given that Vance formulated one of the 
earUest versions of critical reaUsm and given that critical reaUsm underpins many 
orientations in envkonmental education, his phUosophy is whoUy germane to 
envkonmental education. This chapter exploits the egress that Vance's rendition 
of certainty provides into narrative theory. After taking advantage of this egress, 
the chapter presents readings of the three major theories of truth - the 
correspondence, coherence and pragmatic theories of tmth - in order to anticipate 
and ward off possible resistance to the adoption of narrative theory in 
envkonmental education through arguments that could be used to discursively 
contain and diminish the theorising of narrative uncertainties that foUow. WhUst, 
Gough (1994b) has argued against such discursive containment of narrative 
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theory, he has presented arguments that undermine die fact/fiction dichotomy. 
The thorny issue of tmth has received scant attention in envkonmental education 
to date. As a matter of pmdence, the chapter also counters the misreadings of 
Derrida's deconstmction (1967/1976, 1967/1978, 1972/1981) as a denial of (die) 
material envkonment and as a destmctive and anti-envkonmental discourse. 
These misreadings have been appUed widely in envkonmental education and 
deconstmction has been subjected to discursive containment and denigration as a 
result (Bowers, 1993b; CaUicott & da Rocha, 1996; Littiedyke, 1996; Sauve, 1999; 
Sosa, 1996). FoUowing these precautionary denouements, this chapter formulates 
four forms of narrative uncertainty and discusses how these uncertainties can be 
engaged in envkonmental education. 
Chapter Six, Shifting Terrains, maps secondary lines of flight from the terrain 
constmcted in the previous two chapters. SpecificaUy, this chapter forges Unks 
between uncertainty and feminist theory, critical Uteracy and postmodernist/ 
poststmcmraUst ethics. These trajectories proUferate links with key motifs in 
envkonmental education, such as engaging indigenous voices, the construction of 
envkonmental subjectivities and eco-poUtical agency, and envkonmental values 
education. However, the arguments presented in the chapter cause these 
influential themes to resonate in unfamiUar tones. 
Chapter Seven, Decalcomania, enacts the final stage of rhizomatic analysis. It 
consists of laying the tracing of envkonmental education's currents engagements 
with uncertainty presented in Chapter Three over the maps constmcted in 
Chapters Four, Five and Six. The purpose of decalcomania is twofold. Fkst, this 
process of laying the tracing over the maps enables the identification of blockages 
and sUences in the akeady-said. Thus, this aspect of decalcomania has a decidedly 
deconstructive aspect. Second, laying the tracing over the maps enables an 
exploration of the effects that the maps can induce in the tracing. There is a risk 
of a power take-over in this second aspect of decalcomania. The map may be 
hegemonicaUy forced to conform to the tracing, thus sustaining the concepts and 
stmctures that configure the akeady-said. Thus, the analytical emphasis in this 
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chapter is that of 'plugging the map into the tracing' in order to minimise the risk 
of a power take-over. 
FinaUy, Chapter Eight, In-Conclusion - Becoming-Uncertain, invokes Deleuze 
and Guattari's figuration of 'becoming' as a means to both trouble the notion of a 
conclusion and frame the reflections upon the 'aims', 'objectives' and 'findings' of 
this project. It is argued that becoming-uncertain is an important objective and 
pedagogical venture for envkonmental education. Becoming-uncertain is not to 
be taken UteraUy; it does not designate the path to, or arrival of, incertimde. 
Instead, becoming-uncertain refers to the experience of thinking uncertainty 
differentiy, experiencing the capacity of uncertainty to affect and be affected, and 
experiencing the spaces that this opens up, transforms or forecloses. FoUowing 
Gatens (2000), I subscribe to the view that to think differentiy, is to exist 
differentiy. Therefore, mindful that the readers wiU assuredly draw thek own 
conclusions, I advance the simated and provisional conclusion that becoming-
uncertain can be read as an agentive strategy to exist differentiy and that by 
thinking and existing differentiy we can imagine and enact more sustainable 
fumres. The conclusion also identifies openings for fiirther research. In keeping 
with the rhizomatic nature of this project, numerous possible Unes of fUght are 
identified. 
60 
CHAPTER TWO - METHODOLOGICAL (DIS)POSITIONS AND METHODS 
INTRODUCTION 
The denouement of this research project can be described as evolutionary if 
the term 'evolutionary' is understood to sigiUfy a process in which relatively 
extensive periods of stabiUty are rupmred by short but intense periods that result 
in major transformations as opposed to a gradual but steady process of 
modification. The abmpt transformations of the foci, scope, and tenor of this 
project resulted in a nomadic wandering along fragmented paths. This compeUed 
concomitant shifts in methodological (dis)positions and methods. The search for 
theoretical framings that tracked the transformations that occurred en route was in 
no way subordinate or anciUary to the transformations themselves. Surveying the 
methodological (dis)positions and methods, and the probing of uncertainty per se 
were treated as co-enabling elements of the research that mumaUy inscribed the 
other's possibiUty. 
Three research methods/methodological framings were explored during the 
conduct of this project: constructive consonance, falUbUism and rhizomatics. 
Each of these framings is a form of pragmatism and, therefore, has relevance 
beyond envkonmental education theorising to the wider education arena. In 
addition, each addresses the issue of tmth which has been closely interwoven 
historicaUy with the issue of certainty. Therefore, each framing compels a 
rigorous examination of theories of tmth. This is an important feature for 
envkonmental education theorising as the issue of tmth has been neglected almost 
completely. 
WhUst the fkst two methods were abandoned during the denouement of this 
work, each has the potential to occupy a niche within the competing 
epistemological orientations that coUectively comprise 'the neighbourhood of 
envkonmental education. Constructive consonance engages transformative. 
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mterdiscipUnary dialogue Uito which die criteria of consistency, meanmg and 
relevance are embedded. These features have been variously identified as bekig 
necessary for postmodern curriculum theoriskig as per Littiedyke (1996), Sauve 
(1999) and Stone (1993). WhUst they may be necessary, which is contestable, they 
are Uisufficient because they can reside comfortably Ui a reaUst dialogue, which 
does not admit that language plays an active part in the constmction of reaUty. 
Constmctive consonance was discarded during the course of this project due to its 
adherence to critical reaUsm. Nevertheless, constructive consonance offers as 
valuable medium through which to envision critical education ^ r the envkonment 
and education^r sustainabiUty/sustainable development as per Fien (1993), Fien 
and TraUier (1993a, 1993b) and Huckle (1993,1996). 
Pekce's (1931) falUbUism was the second methodological (dis)position 
pursued. This framing dkecdy addresses ineradicable uncertainty in a normative 
rather than constimtive manner, that is, falUbiUsm is not concerned with what 
constimtes uncertainty but how thought and behaviour ought to respond to ever-
present uncertainty (Davis, 1972; Misak, 1991). This normative dimension is 
crucial to envkonmental education's recent emphasis on the inclusion of 
uncertainty as a key curriculum element (Panel for Education for Sustainable 
Development, 1998). This normative element is also whoUy consistent with the 
aim to theorise uncertainty non-violendy by asking questions such as, how should 
we position theory and practice in relation to uncertainty? Furthermore, Pekce's 
rejection of transcendence and the correspondence theory of tmth, and his 
development of the pragmatic theory of tmth resonate with elements of 
postmodernist/poststructuraUst theorising. However, his beUef in getting closer 
to tmth through the self-correction of knowledge was problematic for this project 
because it signifies beUef in the existence of a meta-narrative. 
Deleuze and Guattari's (1980/1987) rhizomatics was the thkd and final 
method to be explored and it was chosen for this project. Rhizomatics enables the 
seemingly tautological aim to respect uncertainty as uncertain to be pursued. This 
is possible because rhizomatics overmrns the Platonic mode of individuation by 
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locating identity in outward connections instead of enclosure. If the Platonic 
mode of individuation were retained, this project would not be possible; it would 
be locked in a hoUow tautology. Furthermore, rhizomatics enables 2. poststructuralist 
theorisation of uncertainty because Deleuze and Guattari uphold the constimtive 
role of language in the constmction of reaUty and emphasise the poUtical power 
of language in this construction: "The unity of language is fiindamentaUy 
poUtical" (1980/1987, p. 101). As a result, Deleuze and Guattari stress the need to 
introduce a stammering in order to render visible the artifice of the seemingly 
namral power of language. Rhizomatics can be read as a mode of stammering 
because it interrupts the seeming naturalness of dominant constructions by 
traveUing fragmented paths. This fragmented approach affronts the smooth 
trajectories that the dominant discourse pre-configures and legitimates. 
Furthermore, and more importandy, it enables counter constmctions to be 
mapped, which, in this instance, enables an exploration of the hope that the Panel 
for Education yor Sustainable Development (1998) has placed in the possibiUties 
that 'postmodern uncertainties' may afford for reaUsing more sustainable futures. 
This chapter offers readings of the fkst and last of these fratnings. It signals 
and analyses thek potential contributions to the wider field of envkonmental 
education theorising and probes thek strengths and Unoitations for this project. A 
reading of Pekce's (1931) falUbiUsm is not included due to the constraint of 
length. Its brief mention above, however, is to signal that it dkecdy addresses the 
issues of ineradicable uncertainty and pragmatic truth, and this conjunction is 
germane to envkonmental education. 
CONSTRUCTIVE CONSONANCE 
Constructive consonance was considered as a prospective methodology for 
this project because it was developed specificaUy to explore the impUcations of 
chaos theory at the science/theology interface. This attracted attention because 
uncertainty is a leading motif in chaos theory and because envkonmental 
education interfaces many disciplines, including science. The interest in 
constructive consonance grew because of its expUcit rejection of the 
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correspondence theories of tmth, which is a decidedly postmodern move. The 
adherence to critical reaUsm, however, renders constructive consonance as a 
modernist reading of postmodernism. Nevertheless, phUosophical criticism in 
envkonmental education may be enhanced by exploring the possibiUties presented 
by WUlem Drees' (1988, 1990) constructive consonance, especiaUy for those 
interested in mediations of critical theory and postmodernism. I would like to 
temporarUy suspend deconstmctive analysis and 'enter into' constmctive 
consonance in order to explore the theoretical terrain and to suggest conjunctions 
and disjunctions between Drees' project and projects that are designated as 
envkonmental education. 
Physicist/theologian Drees developed constmctive consonance as a method to 
pursue a constmctive and critical coherence between science and theology in a 
manner which did not compel theology to seek a binding correspondence with the 
results of science. Constmctive consonance, as Drees writes it, aims at estabUshing 
a meta-emergent dialogue that simultaneously transcends, but maintains the 
distinctive integrity of, interfacing disciplines. This transcendence shifts the 
organising principles away from the participant discipUnes to the dialogue and its 
interpretation. Drees' beUef in the possibiUty of pursuing critical coherence 
through transcendent dialogue stems from his ontological, epistemological and 
methodological positions, each of which is accordant with the phUosophical 
foundations of critical education for the envkonment. Thus, the potential of 
constmctive consonance warrants exploration within the research arena of 
envkonmental education. The primary purpose of this reading is to initiate this 
exploration. 
Concomitandy, this reading examines the correspondence, coherence and 
pragmatic theories of tmth, which are integral to a fuU appreciation of 
constmctive consonance, and relates these notions of truth to the critical 
orientation of education for the envkonment. This attention to the notions of 
tmth in the context of envkonmental education begins to redress a metaphysical 
void. The notion of truth has received Uttie attention in envkonmental education 
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Other than incidental coverage in relation to the impact of the positivist paradigm. 
This incidental, but almost exclusive association, casts notions of truth in a 
pejorative Ught. However, this reading argues that the notions of tmth have 
powerfiU epistemological and explanatory roles that are foundational to the 
transformative and emancipatory goals of critical pedagogy, and that these 
dimensions of tmth need to be engaged in critical discourse. 
FinaUy, this reading examines whether constmctive consonance may provide a 
medium through which poststructuraUst envkonmental education may be 
envisioned and concludes that it cannot, although it is argued that constmctive 
consonance provides a medium to mediate critical theory and postmodernism, as 
per Huckle (1999). 
CONSTRUCTIVE CONSONANCE - A READING OF THE ORIGINAL CONTEXT 
Physicist/theologian WiUem Drees devised and employed constmctive 
consonance in order to estabUsh a critical coherence between science and 
theology. This view of critical coherence involves the formulation of a theology 
that takes science seriously, but is not restricted to seeking a descriptive 
correspondence with the results of science. According to Drees (1988, p. 100), "it 
is not sufficient to make God-talk scientific talk and thus a superfluous 
dupUcation". Instead, Drees (1990, p. 180) seeks "a theology that is open to the 
results and methods of science and nonetheless maintains its critical possibiUties". 
The term 'constructive consonance' provides insight into the assumptions and 
purposes of the research method. The word 'consonance' signifies the 
assumption that some form of agreement, or inteUecmal accord, is possible 
between scientific and theological enterprises. When the word 'consonance' is 
coupled with the word 'constructive'. Drees' epistemological position begins to 
emerge. According to Drees, consonance is dialecticaUy constructed through 
interpretation, rather than found. Multiple levels of consonance are possible: 
correspondence of data, interpretation of data and metaphysical interpretation. 
Since Drees seeks a critical, rather than descriptive, coherence with science, the 
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fkst two levels of constmcting consonance are inadequate and, thus, rejected. 
Hence, constmctive consonance draws upon metaphysical interpretation as an 
avenue to pursue critical coherence. This leads to the fkst constmctive dimension 
of Drees' methodology, the construction of a world view through critical 
metaphysical interpretation. (The second constmctive dUnension, which involves 
the identification of pragmatic concerns, wUl be discussed later.) 
Drees' beUefs in the possibiUty of critical coherence and of its constmctive 
character stem from his ontological position of critical reaUsm. From this 
position, he argues that the 'genuine' distance that separates both science and 
theology from 'reaUty' provides a concepmal space in which to entertaUi a critical 
dialogue of possibiUties, and that engaging in metaphysical interpretation in order to 
constmct critical coherence may yield dialogues in which both the science and the 
theology are transformed^. This is a bold assertion, which Drees elaborates as 
foUows: 
I am not suggesting that theologians should be dkecdy involved in 
the development of science. There is ample ingenuity within the 
scientific community without them and, in any case, a serious 
contribution has to be based upon an understanding of the 
technical detaUs. What I mean is that there are within the scientist 
certain convictions - informed by a wider perspective, to which the 
'theology' of that person contributes - that occasionaUy play a role 
in the development of scientific theories. Not only in the context 
of discovery, but also in the choice of criteria. And people involved 
in 'science and reUgion' could make this role more visible and 
thereby much more open to analysis. (1988, p. 106) 
In order to construct a critical coherence between science and theology, Drees 
proposes three criteria to distinguish between authentic consonance and ad hoc 
' Whereas, striving for consonance at the level of data, or interpretation of the data, is most likely to result in an 
asymmetric interaction whereby the conceptual space is occupied by a monologue from science to theology. 
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constmctions: consistency, meaning and relevance. He maintains that whUst these 
three criteria do not guarantee the truth or credibiUty of a theology that takes 
science seriously, they perform a significant role in the assessment of credibiUty. 
Mumal consistency is a minimal requkement for the construction of coherence 
within, between and beyond differing enterprises. However, when used as a sole 
criterion, consistency may simply lead to erudite non-contradiction in absurd 
constmctions. Hence, Drees Unks consistency with meaning and relevance, 
which, in combination, lead beyond the minimaUst grammar of logic fiirnished by 
consistency. Numerous theories of meaning have been developed, each fiilfilUng 
different projects depending upon factors such as the conception of meaning and 
context. In the context of constmctive consonance. Drees maintains that a 
dialectical theory of hermeneutics is the most appropriate orientation for the 
constmction of meaning, FkiaUy, according to Drees (1990, p. 185) "the criterion 
of relevance makes the difference between science and theology". Drees relates 
the criterion of relevance to the existential flinction of reUgion and to his 
transformative eschatology of the present^, which he envisions as a theological 
counterpart to axiology. 
Drees positions the three criteria of consistency, meaning and relevance in 
relation to three historicaUy influential theories of tmth: the correspondence 
theory, the coherence theory and the pragmatic theory. Agreement does not exist 
in relation to a need for tmth (Schmitt, 1995). However, the relations that Drees 
distinguishes between the three criteria and the theories of truth presupposes 
interrelations between tmth, knowledge and meaning in a manner that closely 
resembles Armour's (1969, p. 243) contention that a "demand for a theory of 
tmth arises from the fact that the concepts of meaning and knowledge wiU not 
work independendy of the concept of tmth". Hence, the concept of tmth serves 
key ontological and epistemological fiinctions Ui constmctive consonance. 
^Striking similarities exist between Drees' transformative eschatology of the present and the transformative goals 
education^r the environment. These similarities will be discussed later. 
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The correspondence theory holds that a beUef (statement, sentence, 
proposition, etc.) is tme if it corresponds with the facts. WhUst this theory can be 
legitimately defended using both reaUst and ideaUst ontologies (Kkkham, 1992; 
Schmitt, 1995), its appUcation is limited and its substance is contested. General 
objections to the correspondence theory pertain to questions relating to the 
constimtion of 'facts' and the nature of 'correspondence' (Olen, 1983). However, 
in relation to Drees' project, these general objections may be bypassed as two 
specific objections conflict dkecdy with the assumptions that underpin 
constmctive consonance. Fkstiy, whUst the correspondence theory of tmth can 
be appUed discretely to both reaUst and ideaUst ontologies, it cannot be appUed 
within the context of critical reaUsm which interweaves elements of both. The 
distance that critical reaUsm ascribes between reaUty and humankind's knowledge 
of that reaUty mitigates against a correspondence theory of truth. WhUst critical 
reaUsm does not preclude the possibiUty of truthful correspondence, it does 
preclude recognition of such tmths. Secondly, and more forcefiiUy, the character 
of tmth according to the correspondence theory renders Drees' project of 
constmcting consonance false. According to Joachim, the correspondence theory 
of tmth holds that: 
Tmth is clearly independent. . . . Truth is discovered, and not 
invented; and its nature is unaffected by the time and process of 
discovery, and careless of the discoverer. (1906, p. 20) 
Joachim's account of the nature of tmth as constmed from a correspondence 
viewpoint invaUdates constructive consonance in two ways. Fkstiy, whUst Drees 
does not claim that constmctive consonance secures truth, the notion that tmth is 
discovered rather than constmcted diametricaUy opposes Drees' (1990, p. 6) 
conviction that consonance is "a constmction and not a discovery of any pre-
estabUshed harmony found Ui reaUty". And secondly, die notion diat tmdi is 
careless of the discoverer precludes the existential dimension of Drees' project. 
Therefore, constmctive consonance cannot be anchored Ui the correspondence 
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theory of truth and it is rejected in favour of the coherence and pragmatic theories 
of tmth. 
The coherence theory of tmth holds that a statement is tme if it coheres with the 
entke system (Armour, 1969; Joachkn, 1906; Kkkham, 1992; Olen, 1983; Schmitt, 
1995). Hence, the coherence theory of truth is aUied to an ideaUst ontology and 
has attracted criticisms reflecting the reaUst orientation. The coherence theory of 
tmth has been criticised for not 'connecting with the real world'. De Paul (1995, 
p. 134), for example, comments that coherentism, within which the coherence 
theory of tmth is embedded, "seems about as likely to succeed as a bucket brigade 
that does not end at a weU, but simply moves around in a ckcle". 
However, the objections relating to the lack of connection between the 
coherence theory of truth and the 'real world' bolster the critical reaUst 
assumption that underpins constmctive consonance by default, rather than 
causing agitation over inadequacy, iUusion or falsehood. Claims of this kind simply 
articulate the critical reaUst's conviction that whUst reaUty exists, humankind has 
no claim to dkect or tme access to that reaUty. This does not preclude the 
possibiUty of a true connection with reaUty, but it precludes recognition of any 
such possible occurrence. 
Another common objection to the coherence theory of tmth claims that a 
proposition may be tme in one coherent set of beUefs and false in another which 
invaUdates the very notion of truth. However, this objection is based on a 
fundamental misinterpretation of the coherence theory and, therefore, fataUy 
flawed (Joachkn, 1906; WaUcer, 1989). The coherence dieory of tmth holds diat 
each proposition entaUs aU others in the entire system and, according to Joachim, 
"there can be one and only one such experience" (1906, p.78, Joachim's emphasis). 
However, Joachim refers to this coherent whole as an Ideal Experience, not yet 
attained, perhaps unattainable by mere human experience. 
Notwithstanding Joachim's concession that the Ideal Experience may be 
unattainable by mere human experience, he contends diat conceivabUity provides 
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the pathway by which to strive for the Ideal Experience. To conceive according to 
Joachim (1906, p. 66) is to "think out clearly and logicaUy, and to hold many 
elements together in a connexion necessitated by thek several contents". Hence, 
the coherence theory of tmth, as Joachim construes it, holds a deep relation to the 
thinker. This contrasts starkly with minimaUst relation afforded to the thinker by 
the correspondence theory and when coupled with the notion of 'conceivabiUty' 
vaUdates Drees' project to develop critical coherence through constmctive 
consonance and supports the criteria of consistency and meaning. However, 
Joachim further concedes that in striving towards the Ideal Experience, partial 
wholes may not adequately convey the whole. This concession enables Drees to 
Uivoke of the pragmatic theory of tmth in order to satisfy the criterion of 
relevance. 
The fkst two theories of tmth pertained to 'the world' and to a system of 
propositions respectively. The pragmatic theory of truth concerns the thkd 
possible relation to truth, the person who teUs the tmth. According to the 
pragmatic theory, "an assertion is tme if it has the right kind of effect on its 
beUevers - if it is expedient, or useful, or solves problems" (Armour, 1969, p. 140). 
The kinds of effects that tmth may have on beUevers may be categorised as 
behavioural, cognitive or a combination of both. A sole emphasis on the 
cognitive dimension causes a regress to a variant simUar to the coherence theory 
of tmth (Schmitt, 1995), but it is the behavioural dimension that is most pertinent 
to the existential domain of Drees' constructive consonance. The pragmatic 
theory of truth provides a metaphysical arena within which to apply the criterion 
of relevance and to consider the pragmatic impUcations of a worldview (critical 
coherence) developed through constmctive consonance. 
Eclecticism regarding tmth is not unusual, but it is problematic. Rather than 
mitigating the traditional criticisms endemic to each of the classical theories, 
eclecticism may exacerbate the range of criticism by conflating mumaUy exclusive 
conceptions of tmth and kicompatible epistemological functions. Hence, each 
instance of eclecticism requkes scmtkiy ki order to disclose any inherent 
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paradoxes that may be generated. Dree's invocation of both the coherence and 
pragmatic theories of tmth creates an unsteady alUance between mumaUy exclusive 
conceptions of truth. This conflation both pluraUses and problematises truth in a 
manner that constimtes a generative source for on-going debate. The constructive 
potential of constimtive instabiUty has been promoted by Deutscher (1997, p. 196) 
who argues that "contradictions may be a vaUd, or inevitable, negotiation of a 
sound argument". In the case of constmctive consonance, the constimtive 
instabiUty promotes the dialectic nature of constmcting critical coherence. To do 
otherwise would contravene the epistemological premise that underpins 
constmctive consonance, imposing a perceived stability that renders the 
constmction of consonance as unambiguous and uncontroversial. 
In summary. Drees developed the methodology of constructive consonance in 
order to work towards a critical coherence between science and theology. 
Through constructive consonance, he strives to engage a meta-emergent dialogue 
that transcends interdisciplinary boundaries in a manner that values and respects 
the distinctiveness and integrity of the different enterprises involved. The notion 
of a dialogue is premised upon a critical reaUst ontology. He argues that the gap 
that the critical reaUst orientation interposes between reaUty and knowledge 
provides a concepmal space within which to engage a dialogue of possibiUties. 
Furthermore, he asserts that each of the participant enterprises represented in the 
dialogue is transformed. 
Drees envisions that the constmctive dimensions of constmctive consonance 
evolve through interpretation of this transformative dialogue. These constmctive 
dimensions involve the formulation of a worldview and the identification of 
pragmatic concerns resulting from this worldview. Three criteria are strategicaUy 
incorporated in order to provide a means of assessing credibiUty in this 
constmction of critical coherence through dialogue: consistency, meanmg and 
relevance. Furthermore, these criteria are positioned m relation to the coherence 
and pragmatic theories of tmth. This positionUig ascribes key ontological and 
epistemological roles to the concept of tmth ki a manner that sUnultaneously 
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problematises and pluraUses tmth. Thus, constmctive consonance promotes an 
on-going process of clarification and debate, rather than consensual closure. 
Constructive consonance, truth and environmental education 
Varying conceptions of coherence, meankig, Uiterpretation and tmdi, and of 
thek interrelations, exit withUi 'the neighbourhood of envkonmental education. 
Hence, consideration of the relevance and appUcabiUty of Drees' constmctive 
consonance to envkonmental education needs a clear focus as it is beyond the 
scope of this section to compare constmctive consonance to aU contemporary 
movements ki envkonmental education. Therefore, dus readkig wiU be Umited to 
the conjunctions and disjunctions between constmctive consonance and critical 
education^^rtiie envkonment, which, accordkig to Fien (1993), translates both the 
essence and intentions of the founding documents of envkonmental education. 
The Belgrade Charter (UNESCO-UNEP, 1976) and The Tiblisi Declaration 
(UNESCO-UNEP, 1978), kito practice. 
The issue of ideology is volatile m tiie general arena of envkonmental 
education research, with views rangmg from ambivalence (Disinger, 1993) to 
deeply held, but varykig, convictions (Fien, 1993; Huckle, 1983; Robottom, 1993; 
Robottom & Hart, 1993). At tiie 1990 symposium, "Contestmg Paradigms m 
Envkonmental Education Research", one of the few poUits upon which 
Marcinkowski (1993, p. 313) and Robottom (1993) concurred was diat "withm the 
reaUn of envkonmental education research, there are deeply divisive and 
problematic issues". Hence, it is pmdent to assess the potential to engage 
constmctive consonance Ui envkonmental education in ideological terms. 
Hucke (1993, p. 45) asserts that "die Uiterface between education and 
envkonmental problems is complex and can only be viewed reaUsticaUy with the 
help of different kinds of science". Huckle's expUcit reference to the interfacing 
of different disciplines in order to maxUnise the efficacy of envkonmental 
education necessitates the usage of research methods that have the capacity to 
transcend disciplinary boundaries. Constmctive consonance is, therefore, a 
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prospective candidate. Furthermore, constmctive consonance is a strong 
prospective candidate given that critical education for the envkonment and 
constmctive consonance are underpinned by the same ontological, 
epistemological and methodological assumptions. 
Critical education for the envkonment is premised upon a critical reaUst 
ontology, a subjectivist epistemology and a transformative, dialogic methodology. 
The distance that the critical reaUst orientation interposes between reaUty and 
knowledge of that reaUty, which Drees identifies as a concepmal space within 
which constmctive consonance may operate, is emphasised in envkonmental 
education theorising Ui a manner that demonstrates epistemological compatibiUty 
with constmctive consonance. SpecificaUy, criticaUy oriented envkonmental 
education theorists emphasise both the non-foundationaUst character of 
knowledge resultUig from this 'ontological gap' and the Uiterplay of historical, 
cultural and ethical norms in the constmction of knowledge within this gap. 
Furthermore, the sociaUy criticaUy oriented theorists actively advocate critique 
within this reaUn in order to expose "the contradictions and distortions within" 
(Robottom & Hart, 1993, p. 11). Hence, constmctive consonance may provide 
envkonmental education with a valuable medium to engage this critique. 
Further epistemological accord exists between critical education for the 
envkonment and constmctive consonance in the concepmaUsation of the 
dynamics of critique within critical reaUsm's ontological gap. According to Drees, 
constmctive consonance is premised upon the epistemological notion that 
consonance does not exist naturaUy and that there are always tensions between an 
acmal state of affaks and an ideal. This tension mkrors the critical theorists' 
notion of the tensions inherent in the pursuit of critical knowledge. Both Drees 
and critical envkonmental education theorists ascribe a dialectic quaUty to 
knowledge which entaUs a methodology of dialectic interplay. Hence, constmctive 
consonance is commensurable with critical education for the envkonment as a 
result of the ontological, epistemological and methodological accord they share. 
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The accord between constmctive consonance and critical education for the 
envkonment, however, extends beyond the general level of commensurabiUty to 
agreement with the three criteria used to assess credibility. The fkst two criteria of 
consistency and meaning are essential elements within any structured form of 
inquiry. However, the criterion of relevance, as Drees constmes it, is a vital 
component of the overt agenda of critical education for the envkonment (Fien, 
1993, 1997a). For Drees, the criterion of relevance addresses values and 
transformations. These may be regarded as the dual imperatives of critical 
education ^ r the envkonment, which aims to motivate and empower learners to 
become actively involved in the resolution of social injustice and envkonmental 
destmction (UNESCO-UNEP, 1976, 1978). Hence, k is essential for any 
methodology employed in criticaUy oriented envkonmental education research to 
StrategicaUy incorporate a criterion to assess existential efficacy. Constructive 
consonance satisfies this need through the criterion of relevance. 
FinaUy, an examination of the investigation in which Drees appUed 
constmctive consonance offers another perspective from which to assess the 
potential of constmctive consonance to inform envkonmental education, albeit 
vicariously. Drees' appUcation of constmctive consonance to develop an 
eschatology of the present is particularly pertinent to the imperative of education 
for the envkonment. An eschatology of the present involves an unusual 
juxtaposition of ideas since eschatology is typicaUy understood as "a theological 
imagining of the future, either of individuals beyond death or of the world" 
(Drees, 1990, p. 119). However, Drees emphasises the locus of eschatology in the 
present to motivate action, rather than promulgate complacent reUance on a 
fiimre salvation from present imperfection and mjustice. Drees (1990, p. 119) 
outUnes three components of this kind of eschatology: 
1. judgement on the present: it is not as it ought to be; 
2. appeal to action as a response to judgement; and 
3. consolation in tiie contexts of kijustice, faUure and suffering. 
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Envkonmental coroUaries of each of these three features can be located readUy 
in the seminal documents of envkonmental education. The Belgrade Charter A global 
framework for environmental education (UNESCO-UNEP, 1976) and The Tbilisi 
Declaration (UNESCO-UNEP, 1978), and in contemporary envkonmental 
education Uterature. Further accord with envkonmental education may be located 
in the caU for conversion which overarches eschatology of aU forms. The 
envkonmental education counterpart is the imperative to instil in learners deeply 
held and enduring envkonmental values. Hence, the dual compatibility that exists 
between the transformative goals of education^r the envkonment and (a) Drees' 
eschatology of the present and (b) the overarching caU for conversion, can be 
invoked as an indkect source of support for the adoption of constmctive 
consonance in envkonmental education research, and when viewed in conjunction 
with the previous points of agreement, this indkect support becomes more 
substantial. 
Despite the multifaceted accord between constmctive consonance and critical 
education for the envkonment outUned above, constmctive consonance offers a 
powerful chaUenge to envkonmental education by the relations that are 
presupposed between truth, knowledge and interpretation. The notions of 
knowledge and interpretation have been, and continue to be, seriously engaged in 
the envkonmental education arena. However, the concept of tmth has been 
largely overlooked. AUnost aU references to tmth in the context of envkonmental 
education have been incidental and linked to positivism, either dkecdy or 
indkectiy. However, Robottom and Hart (1993, p. 11) provide an exception to the 
Unk with positivism by aUuding to the pragmatic theory of tmth: "what counts is 
what changes, and tmth is whatever leads to the achievement of what is good, 
right, responsible and empowerUig of Uidividuals". This pragmatist aUusion Unks 
the pragmatic theory of tmth to the transformative goals of education for the 
envkonment. Schmitt (1995) has actively promoted dus connection in defence of 
the notion of tmth. He asserts diat a fakly widespread condemnation of the 
notion of tmth is based on die claUn diat tmdi kself "has been employed precisely 
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to maintain the stratification and domination of cvdtures" (Schmitt, 1995, p. 231). 
This contention is based on the argument that the dominant culture claims 
possession of the truth and uses this distortion as a source of coercive oppression. 
However, the source of this injustice is the coercion, not the notion of tmth, and 
just as a distorted projection of tmth can be used to oppress, tmth may be used to 
Uberate. Schmitt (1995, p. 232) proposes that "the notion of truth belongs to the 
category of knives and other useful but sometimes lethal tools". This dismissal of 
the condemnation that the notion of tmth has attracted exactiy corresponds to the 
dialectic process of transformation that Ues at the heart of critical education j^r the 
envkonment. Hence, engaging constructive consonance's chaUenge to criticaUy 
debate the notion of tmth may enrich theorising in envkonmental education. 
In conclusion, constmctive consonance may be invoked to inform 
envkonmental education. This assertion is based on: the general 
commensurabiUty that exists between the phUosophical assumptions that underpin 
both education for the envkonment and constmctive consonance; the strategic 
inclusion of the criterion of relevance which is fundamental to assessing the 
efficacy of envkonmental education theory and practice; the Uidkect support 
gained from the compatibiUty between Drees' original appUcation of constmctive 
consonance and the imperatives of envkonmental education; and the potential 
enrichment of envkonmental education theorising by accepting constmctive 
consonance's chaUenge to engage the notion of tmth in critical discourse. 
Constructive consonance, critical approaches to environmental education and postmodernism 
Drees' rejection of the correspondence theories of tmth is a decidedly 
postmodern turn. Nevertheless, there are elements of constmctive consonance 
that are more aUgned to critical dieory. SUnUarly, diere are elements of critical 
theory, as it is enacted Ui envkonmental education, that resonate with postmodern 
thought whUst bekig grounded m modernity. This has led some dieorists Ui 
education and beyond to suggest die notion of mediatUig critical theory and 
postmodernism. In envkonmental education, Huckle makitaUis diat (1999, p. 37) 
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"the critical theory and notions of participative action research that underpin 
critical education for sustainabiUty embrace a phUosophy of knowledge that Ues 
between modernism and postmodernism". However, the view that critical theory 
straddles the modern and the postmodern is contestable and I join with Payne in 
his conviction that: 
To be sure, postmodern-inspked thinking can contribute to refining 
those more estabUshed but somewhat contentious critical 
perspectives and practices of envkonmental education. ... 
However, barriers exist to reconciling critical modern and 
postmodern perspectives given that these 'views of the world' are 
often represented as a colUsion of competing 'ways of thinking'. ... 
[Nevertheless,] these two ways of thinking have much to learn from 
each other. (Payne, 1999, p. 7) 
In this section, I wiU identify areas of overlap and disagreement between 
constmctive consonance, critical approaches to envkonmental education and 
postmodernism. This could be read as support for mediating the two ways of 
thinking, although this is not a view that I share. This discussion wiU be stmcmred 
around the five prominent interrelated postmodern themes identified by Cahoone 
(1996): critiques of presence, origin, unity and transcendence, and analysis through 
constimtive otherness. 
For the purpose of this discussion the critiques of presence and origins can be 
addressed together. The critique of presence rejects the beUef that the objects of 
experience, concrete or abstract, are immediately present to consciousness. The 
immediacy of experience is rejected in postmodernist/poststmcturaUst thought Ui 
favour of the notion that aU experiences are mediated by texts/discourses, which 
are ambidextrously inscribed by specificities such as culture, class, race, ethnicity 
and gender. The critique of presence is upheld by constmctive consonance and 
critical education for the envkonment. In constmctive consonance. Drees 
maintains that "knowledge is a product, a constmction made by humans - widi 
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the concepmal apparams, in the mathematical and natural languages - in thek 
encounter with reaUty" (1990, p. 6). SknUarly in envkonmental education, Huckle 
maintains that critical education^r sustainabiUty "is prepared to accept the cultural 
mediation of reaUty" (1999, p. 37). In both cases, however, the support that is 
extended to the mediation of experience is undermined by support for origins 
rather than a critique of origins. 
Support for the notion of origin underpins inquiries that "attempt to see 
behind or beyond phenomena to thek ultimate foundation" (Cahoone, 1996, p. 
14). The quest for origins can take many different forms, such as the recuperation 
of an author's intended meaning, grounding tmth claims in the world beyond the 
text, and processes of self-discovery. Both constmctive consonance and critical 
approaches to education ^ r the envkonment are aUgned with the second form of 
support for origins, even though the rhetoric suggests otherwise. BeUef in an 
ontological reaUty beyond the text is not an anti-postmodernist/poststmcturaUst 
beUef However, the beUef goes against the grain of postmodernist/ 
poststmcmraUst thought if an ontological reaUty beyond the text is used 
logocentricaUy as a legitimating function to ground the tmth claims of 
text/discourses. WhUst Drees ardendy maintains that "reaUsm as a close 
correspondence between theories and reaUties seems too strong a claim", he 
proposes that "it seems a reasonable poUcy to treat the best theories as if they 
described reaUty accurately, and to consider the impUcations" (Drees, 1990, pp. 
185-186). Thus, Drees positions the 'best theories' as hypotheticaUy 
corresponding to a reaUty beyond the text from which to assess the impUcations 
of discourse. The fact that the 'best theories' are positioned as a hypothetical 
origin in no way weakens the support for the notion of origUi or the function that 
an origin is to serve. 
Drees' constmctive consonance can be fiirther read as being supportive of 
origins due to its unproblematic stance on subjectivity. WhUst Drees 
acknowledges the role of language in shapkig our view of reaUty, he does not 
reflexively acknowledge the role of language ki die constmction of subjectivities. 
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This is key postmodernist/poststmcturaUst motif that has been powerfiUly 
expressed by Eco in an interview with Rosso: 
Being does not speak itself through language. ... There is no Being 
that then speaks. There is a language that speaks Being. What 
being might be is always a hypothesis posed by language. But, 
despite coming fkst, it is always in front of us, with its laws, 
conventions, techniques, tactics, strategies. Interpretation is usuaUy 
concerned with these mechanisms. Being is an effect of meaning. 
Meaning is the effect of culture. The cultural universe is the 
labyrinth. It is this that we must interpret. (Rosso & Eco, 1991, p. 
251) 
It must be noted, however, that it is not defensible to assume that someone does 
not support a particular position simply because they do not openly acknowledge 
it. However, the postmodernist/poststmcturaUst view on the constimtive role of 
language in the construction of subjectivity is so at odds with modernist versions 
of subjectivity that those who hold this view usuaUy make it expUcit. Therefore, it 
can be claimed that constructive consonance is likely to uphold and promote the 
notion of a stable, utUtary subject, which endorses the notion of origin. 
Critical theorists in envkonmental education would problematise Drees' 
support for the notion of origin through the 'best theories' approach by raising 
issues such as poUtical power, access to funding, vested interests and 
disenfranchised groups. Critiqvdng these issues, however, can only serve to 
problematise Drees' quaUfier of 'best'. The critique does not and cannot 
simultaneously critique the notion of origin because the issue of 
reference/correspondence has not been engaged by critical theorists in 
envkonmental education. When viewed in this context, support for the social 
constmction of knowledge does not discredit or invaUdate the notion of origin. 
The only defensible claims that can be made are that access to origins is 
inequitable and/or that correspondence is skewed, both of which whoUy support 
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the notion of origins. The notion of origin is further upheld in critical approaches 
to education ^ r the envkonment through support for the notion of emancipation 
through the elimination of false consciousness. Thus, like Drees, critical theorists 
take an unproblematic stance on the constimtive role of language in the 
constmction of subjectivity. 
Postmodernist/poststmcturaUst critiques of unity emphasise the pluraUty of 
meanings that are inscribed in discourses/texts/language games. FoUowing 
stmcmraUsm, postmodernist/poststmcturaUst theories uphold that meaning is 
systemicaUy and constimtively related to what is sUenced. As a result, meaning is 
never "simple, immediate, or totaUy present, and no analysis of an)rthkig can be 
complete or final" (Cahoone, 1996, p. 15). The critique of unity entaUs that "there 
is no possibiUty that language games can be unified or totalized in any 
metadiscourse" (Lyotard, 1984, p. 36); unity is supplanted by kreducible pluraUty. 
Constmctive consonance can be read as a critique of unity on the basis that it 
involves transdiscipUnary dialogue in which the distinctiveness of the participant 
disciplines in not subsumed. SimUarly, the openness of critical approaches to 
envkonmental education and education for sustainabiUty to "a pluraUty of texts 
and voices, and the limits of grand narratives" (Huckle, 1999, p. 37) can be read as 
a critique of unity, although the support of these approaches for hoUsm then 
becomes deeply problematic. 
Both constructive consonance and critical approaches to education for the 
envkonment can be read as embracing the critique of transcendence in which 
"norms such as truth, goodness, beauty, rationaUty, are no longer regarded as 
independent of the processes that they serve to govern or judge, but are products 
of and immanent in those processes" (Cahoone, 1996, p. 15). When considering 
whether constmctive consonance invokes the notion of transcendence it is 
necessary to separate Drees' formulation of constructive consonance from his 
appUcation of it. This is necessary because Drees' appUcation of constmctive 
consonance involved an exploration of the science/theology interface. As a 
result, the issue of the Unmanence/transcendence of God received a high profUe. 
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At the methodological level, however. Drees' insistence that consonance is 
constmcted and does not involve the discovery of a pre-estabUshed harmony can 
be read as support for the notion of immanence. 
Critical approaches to education for the envkonment can also be read as 
rejecting transcendence, even though notions such as tmth and honesty, and 
specific envkonmental values are upheld and actively espoused. The rejection of 
transcendence in relation to these issues is usuaUy impUcit. However, Fien (1993, 
1997a; Fien & Trainer, 1993a) has been more expUcit than most in relation to 
these issues. He accenmates the immanence of notions, such as truth and 
honesty, by casting them as 'cultural universals', but it is in his treatment of 
envkonmental values that the strongest case against transcendence can be made. 
Fien impUcitiy emphasises the immanent namre of envkonmental values by 
grounding them in envkonmental ideologies. Thus, envkonmental values can be 
read as being sociaUy constmcted within different ideologies. There is always the 
risk of a power takeover, however, that would enable particular envkonmental 
values to be cast as transcendental. Fien's advocacy of committed impartiaUty 
could be read as a strategy to safeguard against this transcendental turn. This 
reading of critical approaches to education ^ r the envkonment as upholding the 
critique of transcendence is problematic, however. It is possible to argue, as per 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987), that the support that critical approaches to 
education ^ r the envkonment lend to the notion of ideology upholds the notion 
of transcendence. This issue wUl be explored more fiiUy in the second part of this 
chapter, which deals specificaUy with Deleuze and Guattari's phUosophy. 
FinaUy, constructive consonance and critical approaches to education for the 
envkonment can be read as being compatible with and supportive of the notion 
of constimtive otherness, respectively. The notion of constimtive otherness holds 
that culmral units are constimted and "maintaUied in thek apparent unity only 
through an active process of exclusion, opposition and hekarchization" (Cahoone, 
1996, p. 16). WhUst the appUcation of constmctive consonance involves the 
analysis of numerous contending positions, which may kiclude those that are 
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marginaUsed, its description neither acknowledges that those contending positions 
owe thek form to processes of exclusion, opposition and hekarchisation, nor 
nominates attention to sUenced discourses. However, an extension to include the 
notion of constimtive otherness is whoUy compatible with constmctive 
consonance. On the other hand, critical approaches to education for the 
envkonment expUcitiy uphold the notion of constimtive otherness through 
support for the notion of hegemony and the promotion of anti-hegemonic 
practices. 
In addition to analysing constmctive consonance with respect to the five 
prominent postmodern themes, as outUned by Cahoone, more general discussions 
of postmodern education enable constmctive consonance to be read as a 
postmodern approach. Engaging in dialogue, which constmctive consonance 
employs as a medium to constmct critical coherence, has been widely 
acknowledged as postmodern. According to Stone: 
The idea of conversations epitomizes postmodernity, based in 
language, relational to persons, locations and times, and 
"interpretive" and open-ended rather than explanatory and closed-
off. (Stone, 1993, p. 2) 
Furthermore, the contention that constmctive consonance can be read as a 
postmodern approach for envkonmental education can be strengthened by 
discussions in the envkonmental education research arena which, independendy 
of any consideration of constmctive consonance, foreteU its utiUty. Sauve, for 
example, asserts that: 
Postmodern constructive epistemology values dialogue among 
different forms of knowledge (scientific, experiential, traditional and 
so on), where discipline[s] are no longer the organizing principles 
and where criteria of vaUdity are relevant in Ught of the critical 
transformation of reaUties. (Sauve, 1999, p. 13) 
82 
CHAPTER TWO - METHODOLOGICAL (DIS)POSITIONS AND METHODS 
The elements that Sauve has identified correspond with the constmctive 
consonance's aim to engage meta-emergent dialogues that transcend 
interdisciplinary boundaries in a manner that values and respects the 
distinctiveness and integrity of the different enterprises, and endorses constmctive 
consonance's criterion of relevance as an essential element in the assessment of 
the efficacy of postmodern education theory and practice. 
In summary, there are resonances and dissonances between postmodernism, 
constmctive consonance and critical approaches to education^r the envkonment. 
Both constmctive consonance and critical approaches to education for the 
envkonment uphold the critique of presence through thek support for the cultural 
mediation of reaUty. This support is undermined, however, through thek support 
for origins. Constmctive consonance upholds the notion of origin by positioning 
'best theories' both within and beyond the text. Critical approaches to education 
for the envkonment, on the other hand, uphold the notion of origin through thek 
support for the Marxist beUef of achieving emancipation through the elimination 
of false consciousness. Both constmctive consonance and critical approaches to 
education for the envkonment can be read as supporting the critique of 
transcendence through the adoption of problematic stances toward norms: 
constmctive consonance problematises the notion of truth, whereas critical 
approaches to education ^ r the envkonment problematise normative issues such 
as sustainabiUty and envkonmental values. The stams that critical approaches 
afford to the notion of ideology, however, can be read as support for the notion 
of transcendence. Both constmctive consonance and critical approaches to 
education for the envkonment can be read as being supportive of the critique of 
unity through thek support for the pluraUty of discourses. However, the support 
that critical approaches to education for the envkonment lend to hoUsm then 
becomes problematic. Lastiy, constmctive consonance can be read as being 
compatible with support for constimtive otherness, whereas critical approaches to 
education^r the envkonment can be read as being a source of active support for 
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constimtive otherness through thek embrace of the notion of hegemony and the 
advocacy of anti-hegemonic practices. 
The resonances between critical theory and postmodernism are accenmated by 
those, such as Huckle (1999), who wish to mediate the modern and the 
postmodern, often under the banner of 'reconstructive postmodernism'. The 
dissonances, however, are discursively contained and subsequentiy dismissed 
through appeals to nihUism and relativism. This discursive containment denies, 
among other things, the constimtive role of language in the construction of 
knowledge and subjectivities. WhUst constmctive consonance does acknowledge 
the constimtive role of language in the constmction of reaUty, this is undermined 
by the support given to the notion of origin as a means to ground meaning 
beyond the text. Given that uncertainty has been minimaUsticaUy predicated in 
this project as a quaUty of propositions, the manner in which constmctive 
consonance undermines the constimtive role of language resulted in it being 
rejected as a methodology. 
CONCLUSION 
Constmctive consonance, a method of phUosophical criticism developed by 
physicist/theologian WiUem Drees, has the capacity to enrich phUosophical 
criticism for those who support mediating critical theory and postmodernism. The 
adoption of constmctive consonance would, however, chaUenge envkonmental 
education theorists to engage notions of tmth in critical discourse. WhUst notions 
of tmth have received Uttie coverage in envkonmental education Uterature to date, 
the existential dimension of critical education for the envkonment knpUcitiy 
embraces the pragmatic theory of tmth. In contrast, both education about the 
envkonment and education in the envkonment can be aUied to the 
correspondence theory of tmth, a position that proponents of critical education/or 
the envkonment must ardendy reject. These mumaUy exclusive conceptions of 
tmth contribute to much of die contestation withki 'the neighbourhood of 
envkonmental education, but thek bearing is tacit. Elevating tiie notions of tmdi 
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to the level of discourse, thus, rendering the competing conceptions of tmth more 
visible and more open to analysis would enrich the contestation within 
envkonmental education. Constmctive consonance's constimtive instabiUty, 
derived from its eclectic conception of tmth, offers a generative medium through 
which to explore the existential voice of critical education ^ r the envkonment in 
relation to truth. 
Constructive consonance was rejected as a methodology for this project, 
however, because its support for origins undermines the constimtive role of 
language in the constmction of reaUty and subjectivities. Acknowledging the 
constimtive role of language is an indispensable aspect of this project because 
uncertainty is predicated as a quaUty of propositions. Uncertainty, therefore, is 
posited as a dynamic element of language. Attention was briefly focussed on 
Pekce's falUbiUsm (1931) foUowing the rejection of constructive consonance. 
Pekce's rejection of transcendence and the correspondence theories of tmth, and 
his formulation of the pragmatic theory of truth resonate with 
postmodernist/poststmcturaUst theorising. However, his beUef in getting closer 
to the tmth through the self-correction of knowledge was problematic. Attention 
was then mrned to poststrucmraUst perspectives and the aim was refined from a 
general postmodern exploration of uncertainty to a poststrucmraUst theorisation 
that respected uncertainty as uncertain. Deleuze and Guattari's method of 
rhizomatics enabled this seemingly tautological aim to be pursued. 
RHIZOMATICS 
Deleuze and Guattari's theorising of thought enables explorations of 
uncertainty that treat uncertainty as uncertain. This is possible because thek 
phUosophical project seeks to overturn Platonism: "the task of modern 
phUosophy has been defined: to overturn \renverser\ Platonism" (quoted in Patton, 
1994, p. 143). Thus, Deleuze and Guattari would oppose the question, "What is 
uncertainty?", as it predicates identity upon a unique set of inner properties Ui 
contradistinction to aU other identities. It is this classical depiction of 
identification, which requkes the twofold processes of fbdng and 
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contradistinction, that has been referred hitherto to as the impulse to deprive 
uncertainty of the honour of its name. 
Instead of grounding identity in a unique and stable set of inner properties, 
Deleuze and Guattari render identity as being constimted through the act of 
making connections with other things. Thus, identity is not a stable manifestation 
of a fixed interiority; rather, it is a dynamic and fluid process that is animated by 
exteriority. This rendition of identity makes the question, "What is uncertainty?", 
pointiess. Rather, it becomes germane to ask what uncertainty fiinctions with, how 
it connects with other things, and what its capacity is to affect and be affected. 
These questions are pragmatic; they are "concerned with what can be done; how 
texts, concepts and subjects can be put to work, made to do new things, make 
new Unkages" (Grosz, 1994, p. 200). 
The subversion of Platonism that this mode of questioning strives for is 
essential for any theorisation of uncertainty that is committed to respecting 
uncertainty as uncertain. Indeed, such a project woiUd be impossible if the 
Platonic notion of representation were retained. If uncertainty were attributed to 
an essentiaUy elusive interiority, a paralysis would result from a principled refusal to 
violate that inner elusiveness through identification. No exploration would be 
possible. Any attempts would be thwarted from the outset, causing uncertainty to 
become inscrutable at the very least, possibly even sacrosanct. However, locating 
identity as an outwardly oriented, dynamic and flmd process perpemaUy fmstrates 
totaUsation. This enables explorations that respect uncertainty as uncertain whUst 
avoiding inscrutabiUty and/or idolatry. The anti-Platonic theory of thought 
formulated by Deleuze and Guattari enables the possibiUty of this research 
project. 
Theories of thought are not confmed by disciplinary boundaries; only the 
willingness or unwillingness of practitioners to engage them Umits thek reach. 
Therefore, Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatics is not confined to phUosophy, 
which Massumi notes ki the Translator's Foreword to A Thousand Plateaus: 
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the reader is invited to Uft a dynanusm out of the book entirely, and 
incarnate it in a foreign medium, whether it be painting or poUtics. 
The authors steal from other disciplines with glee but they are more 
than happy to remrn the favor. (Massumi, 1987, p. xv) 
However, the transdiscipUnary potential of theories of thought does not imply 
that they can or ought to be mobiUsed indiscriminately. Notwithstanding the 
assertion that Deleuze and Guattari's disruption of Platonic identification enables 
the possibiUty of respecting uncertainty as uncertain, it is necessary to discern and 
assess the conjunctions and disjunctions between Deleuze and Guattari's 
presuppositions and central concepts, and projects designated as envkonmental 
education. This requkes a closer reading of A Thousand Plateaus, especiaUy in 
relation to the notions of rhizomatics and Bodies without Organs. At this 
preliminary stage, these two notions appear to be of strategic value to the topic of 
uncertainty and the field of envkonmental education, respectively. Readings of 
these two notions are presented below, which enables a mapping of conjunctions 
and disjunctions between Deleuze and Guattari's project and envkonmental 
education. 
RHIZOMATICS 
Deleuze and Guattari introduce rhizomatics as a new image of thought that 
chaUenges and disturbs the representational/identitarian thought that has 
dominated Western metaphysics since Plato. They juxtapose the metaphor of a 
rhizome to the metaphor of the tree, which occupies an intensely symboUc 
position in both Western reUgious and secular thought. In addition to its 
charismatic influence in Western reUgion, it "dominates our descriptions of 
everything from the structural theories of linguistics to the design of economic 
models and international telephone systems" (Mansfield, 2000, p. 140). 
The communicative power of the tree metaphor is both visual and semantic 
and it dramaticaUy symboUses the assumptions and investments enshrined in 
representational/identitarian thought by drawUig upon both of these 
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communicative modes. The tree metaphor most strikkigly symboUses unity. This 
'apparent' unity is cultivated and sustained by the imposition of a hierarchical 
order that rests upon preordaUied differences. Thus, disparate elements are drawn 
together and arranged into a unified branching network. The movement of 
thought is cast as being continuous and travelling upon preset paths. Furthermore, 
these preset paths lUtimately lead to points of termination. Thus, notions of 
closure and totaUsation are cast as the 'natural' or 'self-evident' corollaries of unity 
and these notions may be deployed variously to support teleology, eschatology 
and determinism. Knowledge has been fixed since time immemorial and the 
exercise of thought enables a tracing of that which is inscribed in the tree. 
The rhizome image of thought also draws upon visual and semantic modes of 
communication. BotanicaUy speaking a rhizome is a subterranean stem that 
extends in every dkection forming an intertwined network in which upward 
growth may occur at any node. Thus, the rhizome criss-crosses a flat plane; there 
is no organisational centre; no section can be designated as foundational. Indeed, 
the notion of foundationaUsm loses aU efficacy; the rhizome "has neither 
beginning nor end, but always a middle [milieu\ from which it grows and 
overspiUs" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 21). Furthermore, rhizomes may 
mpture at any point, which leads to innumerable de-territoriaUsations and re-
territoriaUsations. The rhizome, then, is neither continuous nor stable, which 
perpemaUy frustrates totaUsation and nuUifies any notions of closure. 
From this it foUows that rhizomatic knowledge is (a) mapping, which Deleuze 
and Guattari describe as 'performance'. This knowledge as performance has an 
unsettling effect that cannot be brought to rest. Performance simultaneously casts 
knowledge as an action to be performed and a spectacle to be observed, which 
defies the resolution of subject and object. The actor and the act are 
indistinguishable, yet both are indispensable. This contrasts with the tracing yielded 
by arborescent thinking, which Deleuze and Guattari describe as 'competence'. 
There is no unsettUng effect here; competence involves mastery by a subject of a 
clearly deUneable and predetermined object. 
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A rhizomatic performance, then, does not foUow the hierarchicaUy ordered, 
preset paths that the tree-root metaphor both symboUses and prescribes. Instead, 
connections may be made, and broken, in any dkection creating resonances and 
intensities between seemingly disparate elements. This simpUstic opposition, 
however, is a naive misreading of Deleuze and Guattari. They do not cast the 
rhizome metaphor in complete opposition to the tree-root metaphor, as this 
would ratify the dichotomising logic that they strive to subvert. Instead of 
formulating yet another binarism that carves a stable and autonomous whole into 
stable, autonomous sub-units, relations exist between the two metaphors, making 
thek opposition partial: "There are knots of arborescence in rhizomes, and 
rhizomatic offshoots Ui roots" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 20). The 
absence of a complete and kreconcUable division into autonomous entities does 
not conform to the semantic code that the tree-root framework prefigures. This 
non-conformity results in the appearance of a 'flawed' binarism in which partial 
oppositions appear paradoxical and the semanticaUy troublesome binarism is 
classified as both a contradiction and faUacy. As a result, dichotomising logic 
dictates that re(de)finement is necessary to restore stabiUty and reveal the tmth. 
No amount of re(de)finement can or is requked to reconcUe the 
incontrovertible contradiction between the aforementioned quotation and 
Deleuze and Guattari's contention that the rhizome can uproot the tree. This 
contention casts the tree-root and rhizome metaphors as mumaUy exclusive. They 
are mumaUy exclusive and each inhabits the other. This is clearly a contradiction of 
binary logic, but it not is a contradiction that a critic might 'expose' as a weakness 
Ui Deleuze and Guattari's formulation. Instead, it is an entkely necessary 
contradiction; it is a constimtive instabiUty. 
This constimtive instabiUty is the manoeuvre through which Deleuze and 
Guattari overturn [renverser\ Platonism. To overturn is not to aboUsh or eradicate; 
nor are aboUtion and eradication unattaUiable ideals to be pursued despite some 
UnpossibUity. To overturn die bkiary logic of Platonism k is necessary to subvert 
the either/or operation. Only die kistaUation of eidier/and logic can achieve this 
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subversion. The complete and kreversible dissociation effected by the aboUtion 
or eradication of Platonism would unswervingly uphold the either/or logic that 
Deleuze and Guattari strive to subvert. In order to overmrn Platonism, then, it is 
imperative to displace rather than replace binary logic. The duaUsms of Platonism 
are "an entkely necessary enemy, the furnimre we are forever rearranging" 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 21). 
The tree's sway 
The tree of Ufe was also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of 
the knowledge of good and evU. Genesis, 2:9 
but of the tree of knowledge of good and evU, you shaU not eat, for 
in the day that you eat of it you shaU surely die. Genesis, 2:17 
Current commentators (Alvermann, 2000; Braidotti, 1994b; Grosz, 1994; 
Lather, 2000) highUght the images of connectedness, orderliness, Unearity and 
totaUty that the tree metaphor evokes and the influence that these motifs have 
exerted in shaping Western phUosophy. Without detracting from these 
commentaries, I wish to suggest that that the sway of the tree metaphor is greater 
than these commentators suggest. SpecificaUy, these commentators overlook the 
powerful and abiding explanatory and instmctive roles of the bibUcal figurations 
of the tree of Ufe and the tree of knowledge. I wiU argue that the power of these 
bibUcal figurations not only flows freely through contemporary envkonmental 
education, but that these figurations create the conditions of possibiUty for 
envkonmental education and legitimate its existence. 
The tree of Ufe and the tree of knowledge, which are separate and forbidden in 
Genesis 2:9, are interwoven in Proverbs 3:13-18. After partaking of the forbidden 
fruit of the tree of knowledge and acquiring the hitherto divine abiUty to discern 
good and evU, a series of transformations occur. Fkstiy, knowledge/)erj-^ is posited 
as good, the pursuit of knowledge is cast as a virme, and a knowledgeable person 
becomes vkmous and is rewarded with honour. In the second transformation, the 
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tree of knowledge becomes "the tree of Ufe for those who take hold of her. And 
happy are all vjho retain her" Proverbs 3:18 (emphasis in The New King James 
Version). FinaUy, for the purpose of this argument, knowledge becomes tmth, 
tmth is righteous and speaking the truth declares righteousness. 
The bibUcal figurations of the tree of Ufe and the tree of knowledge symboUse 
the grace of God which enables the attainment of virtues such as righteousness 
and honour, and states of flourishing such as peace and happiness. These 
figurations have exerted powerfiil influences beyond Judeo-Christian thought. 
WhUst the relation between God and knowledge is severed in Western secular 
thought, the rewards of God's grace are retained, but they are attributed to reason 
and knowledge instead. For example, the freedom prized by secular UberaUsts and 
even the emancipation prized by Marxists bear the grain of the trees of Ufe and 
knowledge. Thus the tree metaphor symboUses much more than the relatively 
impassive quaUties of knowledge such as connectedness, orderliness and linearity, 
which are highly but dispassionately valued. It also symboUses emotively charged 
quaUties attributed to knowledge that are highly prized, passionately guarded and 
fiercely defended. Commentaries to date notice the rationaUsm and allied isms 
enshrined in the tree metaphor; but the tree accommodates both poles of the 
rational/emotional binary, which strengthens its endurance to withstand 
onslaught. 
The current commentators of the tree metaphor (Alvermann, 2000; Braidotti, 
1994b; Grosz, 1994; Lather, 2000) accenmate that the root metaphor symboUses 
the phUosophical quaUties of connectedness, orderliness, linearity and totaUty, and 
psychoanalytical formulations of the unconscious as per Freud and Lacan. Again, 
without detracting from these commentaries, I wish to suggest that the root 
metaphor is also steeped with figurative meankigs of bibUcal origin. For example, 
Prvverbs 2:22 teaches that die wicked wiU be severed from the root and that die 
unfaithfiil wUl be uprooted, causkig bodi to famish. Thus the Uitegrity of the root 
is preserved since "the root of the righteous cannot be moved" Proverbs 12:3 and 
"die root of the righteous yields fruit" Proverbs 12:12 and diat fruit is tmdi. 
91 
CHAPTER TWO - METHODOLOGICAL (DIS)POSITIONS AND METHODS 
Current commentaries notice how the tree and root metaphors symboUse the 
properties of knowledge. This aspect of the metaphor highUghts epistemology, 
which is hardly surprisUig given that the tree-root metaphor is being used to Unage 
thought and knowledge. But the bibUcal figurations of the tree and root 
metaphors draw an entkely different aspect Uito view. Rather than focusing on 
the properties of knowledge, they highUght the moral vkmes and states of 
flourishing gakied through the acquisition of knowledge. Thus, the bibUcal 
figurations draw the field of vkme ethics into view. Put simply, vkme ethics may 
be distinguished from other systems of ethics in that it focuses on vkmes that are 
intimately connected, teleologicaUy, divinely, or deterministicaUy, to states of 
human flourishing; whereas other systems of ethics focus variously on what is 
obUgatory, permissible or wrong (Slote, 1997). 
The tree-root metaphor is deeply symboUc in reUgious thought, secular ethics 
and epistemology. Current commentators notice that the tree-root metaphor is 
ingrained in orthodox epistemology and note the strength that this lends to the 
metaphor's endurance in secular thought. However, the might of the tree-root 
metaphor in secular thought is greater than current theorising suggests. The 
entrenchment of the metaphor in secular ethics increases the tree's sway, not only 
into the phUosophy of ethics, but into any field that upholds vkme-based ethics. 
Theorising in envkonmental education thoroughly supports the secularisation 
of the bibUcal figurations of the tree-root metaphor through its endorsement of 
vkme ethics. Both this endorsement and the trace that it bears are unrecogiUsed 
in envkonmental education Uteramre, but the centraUty and importance ascribed 
to secularised vkmes and the conviction that these virmes are intimately 
connected to states of flourishing are indisputable as the foUowing quotation 
demonstrates. 
How do we create truly sustamable, ecologicaUy sound, resiUent and 
healthy systems and societies? If education is for anythUig, k has to 
be reoriented for this. We need to re-vision envkonmental 
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education, indeed aU education, so that today's young people - let 
alone tomorrow's — are sociaUy and envkonmentaUy aware, self-
reUant, critical, creative, confident, flexible, deeply empathetic to 
themselves, others and the envkonment, and empowered through 
appropriate skills, knowledge and values to create a better, greener, 
gender and self sustaining world. (Sterling, 1993, pp. 95-96) 
The cardinal vkmes of pmdence (practical wisdom), courage, temperance, and 
justice motivate envkonmental education and when coupled to the notion of 
states of flourishing they coUectively constimte both its global aim and 
justification. The cardinal vkmes, however, are known by different names. They 
have been rewritten and dispersed into critical thinking, eco-agency, eco-
conscience and precaution in action, and eco-justice, respectively. Competing 
groups within envkonmental education, then, advocate various combinations of 
these vkmes as providing the pathway to the ultimate state of flourishing -
envkonmental sustainabiUty. WhUst there is neither agreement regarding the 
namre of these vkmes nor how they ought to be pedagogicaUy cultivated, they are 
nevertheless deeply valued and fiercely defended. Indeed, commitment to these 
vkmes and faith that they are necessary for ecological flourishing/sustainabiUty 
delineate the contemporary field of envkonmental education. 
Given that envkonmental education whoUy supports the figuration of the tree, 
although this support is imrecognised, it woiUd seem unlikely that the rhizomatic 
subversion of the tree figuration would fUid support within envkonmental 
education. But this is not the case. On the contrary, many within envkonmental 
education regard the dominant mode of thought as being deeply impUcated ki the 
envkonmental crisis and they emphasise the necessity and urgency for new modes 
of thought (Robottom & Hart, 1993). The figuration of die tree, then, is 
simultaneously upheld and chaUenged ki envkonmental education. This wUl be 
explored fiirther in the section on tiie conjunctions and disjunctions between 
Deleuze and Guattari's project and envkonmental education. However, a readmg 
of Deleuze and Guattari's notion of Bodies widiout Organs wUl precede die 
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section on conjunctions and disjunctions. Like rhizomatics, the notion of Bodies 
without Organs draws previously unseen ambiguities into reUef. 
BODIES WITHOUT ORGANS 
Deleuze and Guattari borrow the phrase 'Bodies without Organs' (BwO) to 
designate the limit of extroversion that inevitably foUows from locating identity in 
outward connections as opposed to inner connections. The phrase is provocative 
and at fkst glance it may seem utterly inimical to envkonmental education. 
However, a closer reading of Deleuze and Guattari's designation of Bodies 
without Organs suggests that it may be of great strategic importance. Before 
exploring this possible strategic importance, however, it seems pmdent to 
confront two potential misreadings of the phrase 'Bodies without Organs' that 
have the potential to prejudice envkonmental education against Deleuze and 
Guattari's phUosophy. 
The fkst of these misreadings UnpUcates Deleuze and Guattari's thought with 
a repudiation of scientific knowledge. This would be a damaging misreading since 
envkonmental education reUes upon scientific knowledge to justify the promotion 
of pro-envkonmental behaviours and poUcies. Secondly, Deleuze and Guattari's 
rendition of Bodies without Organs could be misread as a devaluation of 
corporeaUty as per Descartes' formulation of mind-body duaUsm. This would be a 
damaging misreading since envkonmental education regards Cartesian thought as 
being deeply impUcated in the envkonmental crisis precisely due to its devaluation 
of corporeaUty. 
In response to the first possible misreading, Deleuze and Guattari do not 
repudiate scientific knowledge. The phrase 'Body without Organs' is not opposed 
to anatomy or any other branch of science. Deleuze and Guattari do not deny 
that higher-order, biological organisms possess organs, nor do they deny that the 
fiinctions of these organs are necessary for Ufe. They distance diemselves from 
such a misreading openly and often: "die BwO is not at aU die opposite of organs. 
The organs are not its enemies" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 158). Instead 
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of repudiating scientific knowledge, they deploy the phrase 'Bodies without 
Organs' to repudiate the Platonic notion that identity is grounded in internal 
stmcmre and the isolation that this introversion enforces: "Bodies are not defined 
by thek genus or species, by thek organs and fiinctions, but by what they can do, 
by the affects of which they are capable - in passion as weU as action" (Deleuze & 
Parnet, 1977/1987, p. 60). Identity is ecological. 
A biological Body without Organs definitely has organs, but Deleuze and 
Guattari contend that these organs are krelevant to identity. This is a blunt 
simpUfication, but it is provides an effective means to approach the second 
possible misreading of Deleuze and Guattari, which aUgns thek thought with that 
of Descartes. The contention that organs are krelevant to identity does not 
devalue corporeaUty; it simply locates identity in sociaUty. This is not at aU the 
same as Descartes' contention that: "it is certain that I am reaUy distinct from my 
body and that I can exist without it" (1641/1998, p. 62). This non-coincidence 
arises from at least two key differences between Descartes and the Deleuzian 
project. Fkstiy, Descartes arrived at this claim by imagining the most extreme 
isolation in order to avoid being deceived: "I convinced myself that there is 
nothkig at aU in the world" (1641/1998, p. 23), whereas Deleuze and Guattari 
imagine Umidess relationaUty. Secondly, the T to which Descartes refers is the 
human soul, whereas Deleuze and Guattari utterly reject the notion of a psychic 
interior and appeals to transcendent, extra-natural essences. Furthermore, they 
consider the notion of identity weU beyond the human realm. Thus, engaging with 
the phUosophy of Deleuze and Guattari cannot be constmed as an acceptance of 
Descartes' mind-body duaUsm or a devaluation of corporeaUty. Rather, engaging 
with Deleuze and Guattari constimtes an utter rejection of both of these elements 
of Cartesian thought. This is an important phUosophical consideration for 
envkonmental education theorising given that Cartesian thought is viUfied as 
being deeply impUcated in the envkonmental crisis. 
Repudiating each of these misreadings does not automaticaUy aUgn Deleuze 
and Guattari with envkonmental education theoriskig by defavdt. Rather it 
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indicates that there is no reason to foreclose fiirther inquiry on the basis of these 
possible misreadings. From here, it is necessary to ascertain and discern 
conjunctions and disjunctions between Deleuze and Guattari, and envkonmental 
education. This does not lead to a simple, reductionist reckoning of pros and cons. 
As Grosz notes (1994, p. 197): "not only are there possible conjunctions and 
interactions, but also possible points of disjunction, of disruption, and of mumal 
questioning that may prove as fruitfiil as any set of aUgnments or coaUtion of 
interests". The foUowing section attempts to chart the conjunctions and 
disjunctions between Deleuze and Guattari, envkonmental education and this 
particular research project into uncertainty. 
CONJUNCTIONS AND DISJUNCTIONS 
Much of the envkonmental education theorising in AustraUa (Fien, 1993; 
Gough, 1994a, 1998d; Robottom & Hart, 1993), England (Huckle, 1993, 1996, 
1999; SterUng, 1993, 1996) and Canada (Hart, 1993; Selby, 1999) can be read as a 
sustained chaUenge to Platonism; although PlatoiUsm is rarely, if ever, named. 
Instead, the chaUenge to Platonism is channeUed through attacks on positivism, 
postpositivism, behaviourism and thek translation into education. WhUst none of 
these movements or thek translations into education can be equated with 
Platonism per se, it is the Platonic elements within these movements that are the 
targets of attack. The arguments in envkonmental education trace these elements 
back to GalUeo, Descartes, Bacon and Newton without not(ic)ing that these 
prominent EnUghtenment figures instigated a whole-scale revival of Platonism 
couched in the language of modern science. The counter-EnUghtenment 
discourse in envkonmental education is simultaneously a counter-Platonism 
discourse. 
Deleuze and Guattari strive to overturn Platonism and the counter-
EnUghtenment discourse in envkonmental education is engaged in a sustained 
chaUenge of Platonism. Each strives to diverge from Platonism, but this does not 
constimte a partoership. A partoership would requke a common conception of 
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'overturning Platonism' at the very least and this is not the case here. Deleuze and 
Guattari overmrn Platonism through displacement, yet many in envkonmental 
education deske the (impossible) death of Platonism (Fien, 1993; Hart, 1993; 
Huckle, 1993, 1996, 1999; Robottom & Hart, 1993). Thus, Deleuze and Guattari, 
and envkonmental education do not travel in tandem, but this does not preclude 
encounters along the way. 
Concepts may migrate when such encounters occur, but this does not result in 
routine transactions that can be taUied in a ledger of concepts. Such a ledger 
would requke concepts to be discrete, contained within thek contours. A Platonic 
ledger would be requked and this is thoroughly inadequate to mark the transaction 
of concepts as per Deleuze and Guattari. This inadequacy arises from Deleuze 
and Guattari's formiUation of a concept in terms of its capacity to transform the 
field into which it enters. The concept is not marked by its content, but by its 
capacity to affect, to de-territoriaUse and re-territoriaUse zones of discernabiUty. 
The sceptic may object at this juncture and point out that concepts in Platonic 
form can reconfigure zones of discernabiUty and that they have often done so 
spectacvilarly. This is undeniable, but the distinction here is that in Platonism the 
concept is logicaUy prior to and therefore separable from the transformation, 
which is secondary and derivative. Deleuze and Guattari deny the division 
between the concept and its subject. Thus, this assessment of the conjunctions 
and disjunctions must focus on the dynamism that Deleuze and Guattari's 
concepts can exert within envkonmental education, rather than seek conjunctions 
and disjunctions between Deleuze and Guattari, and envkonmental education. It is 
a matter of comparing how Deleuze and Guattari's concepts transform 
envkonmental education (mapping) with what has akeady been laid out within the 
field (tracing). Although an exception to this approach is made in relation to 
Deleuze and Guattari's repudiation of ideology, which would suggest that there 
could be no more than a momentary encounter of repulsion between critical 
strands of envkonmental education, and Deleuze and Guattari. This wiU be 
addressed next in order to dispel any notion that such an encounter would be 
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fleeting, thereby enabling the remaining discussion to traverse aU the major 
movements within envkonmental education. 
Deleuze and Guattari displace binary logic rather than seek its eradication. 
They both constmct and dismande binarisms, "invok[ing] one duaUsm only in 
order to chaUenge another" (1980/1987, p. 20). In this way they chaUenge the 
'juridical' duaUsm (Gatens, 2000) that opposes a plane of immanence (experience) 
to a plane of transcendence (principle). They coUapse this duaUsm by embedding 
the plane of transcendence within the plane of immanence. Thus, Deleuze and 
Guattari utterly repudiate ideology: "There is no ideology and never has been" 
(1980/1987, p.4). 
At fkst glance this repudiation of ideology would appear to proscribe any 
engagement with Deleuze and Guattari by those who endorse critical theory 
within envkonmental education, given that supporters of critical curriculum 
theory assert that ideological critique is an indispensable element of envkonmental 
education. (Fien, 1993; Huckle, 1993). Further, some of these critical theorists 
(Fien, 1993; Huckle, 1993, 1999) actively promote the integration of the 
ecosociaUst ideology into the curriculum. Yet Deleuze and Guattari's repudiation 
of ideology turns on thek denial of transcendence. They insist that "it is on the 
plane of immanence that the other arises, working to block movements, fix affects 
and, organize forms and subjects" (Deleuze & Parnet, 1977/1987, p. 133). Given 
that envkonmental education appeals to the power of ideologies to block 
movements, fix affects and, organise forms and subjects in ways that result in 
either pro- or anti-envkonmental behaviours, any opposition to Deleuze and 
Guattari's repudiation of ideology would be an affkmation of transcendence. This 
seems to be a most unlikely scenario given that envkonmental education contends 
that dichotomising logic is deeply impUcated in the envkonmental crisis due to the 
pernicious effects that it has on envkonmental behaviour. Thus, advocates of 
critical theory in envkonmental education need not disaUgn themselves from 
Deleuze and Guattari on the basis of the latter's repudiation of ideology. 
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The proponents of ideological critique in envkonmental education (Fien, 1993; 
Fien & TraUier, 1993a; Huckle, 1993, 1996, 1999; Robottom & Hart, 1993) justify 
thek position, in part, on the basis that "envkonmental problems are a result of 
our world view of who we are, and efforts to rectify envkonmental problems 
requke fundamental change in our view of the reaUty of our existence" (Robottom 
& Hart, 1993, p. 29). Other groups in envkonmental education, such as those that 
advocate more hoUstic approaches (Sterling, 1993), simUarly defend the view that a 
new mode of thinking about (the) world and individuation is an imperative in 
envkonmental education. Identity is at stake here. 
Rethinking our view of reaUty changes our existence, as Gatens notes in her 
reading of Deleuze and Guattari through Spinoza: "to think differentiy is, by 
definition, to exist differentiy: one's power of thinking is inseparable from one's 
power of being and vice versa" (Gatens, 2000, p. 63). It foUows, then, that if the 
Platonic mode of thought is displaced by rhizomatic thought, identity is radically 
altered. It is not that rhizomatics merely provides an alternative description of a 
stable referent. Instead, identity is transformed: "TO BE IS TO CONNECT" 
(S0by, 1999, p. 93, S0by's emphasis). Indeed, this transformation is so great that 
the term 'identity' must be abandoned and 'the body' or 'Body without Organs' 
must be used instead. When the body is viewed in this manner, immediate links 
proUferate between key themes/issues in envkonmental education that are 
regarded as discrete insomuch as the relations between are seen to be derivative. 
Rethinking the body as a rhizomatic construction whoUy supports 
envkonmental education's motif of interdependence and extends it to heights and 
complexities that have not been engaged in envkonmental education, except 
dirough Gough's work (1993, 1994b, 1995, 1996). ThkikUig of tiie body as a 
complex that is constmcted by forgUig rhizomatic connections on the plane of 
immanence embeds the namral, social and symboUc domaUis (in) the body itself 
The interconnectedness of these domaUis is emphasised Ui envkonmental 
education, but not to dus degree. This degree of connectedness, however, can 
both assist and unsettie envkonmental education. 
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Embedding the namral, social and symboUc (in) the body itself assists 
envkonmental education to oppose the duaUsms that it holds as being deeply 
impUcated in envkonmental problems. The opposition to these duaUsms has, 
hitherto, placed envkonmental education in a double bind. WhUst envkonmental 
education sought to undermine these duaUsms through its insistence that the 
natural, social and symboUc domains are interconnected, it maintained that these 
duaUsms affected the body rather than constituted the body. This creates a 'distance' 
between the domains that enables transcendence to be upheld and it is precisely 
this transcendence that envkonmental education has sought to dismande. Thus, 
the plane of immanence offers envkonmental education a line of flight out of the 
double bind that it has otherwise been unable to escape. This line of fUght, 
however, is not created by the eradication of the duaUsms. As noted in an earUer 
section, Deleuze and Guattari do not dialecticaUy supplant duaUsms as this would 
ratify rather than displace Platonism. The duaUsms remain as texmal elements 
that requke ongoing negotiation. Deleuze and Parnet explain that: 
[The duaUsms are] very much a part of language. ... we must pass 
through duaUsms. ... it's not a case of getting rid of them, but we 
must fight, invent stammering, not to get back to a prelinguistic 
pseudo-reaUty, but to trace a vocal or written Une which wiU make 
language flow between these duaUsms. (Deleuze & Parnet, 
1977/1987, p. 34) 
The plane of immanence also offers chaUenges to envkonmental education. 
The constmction of the body across the ontological boundaries that 
transcendence configured renounces die ontological purity that deep green 
envkonmental education dieorists, such as Van Matre (1979), ascribe to die earth 
and namre. The chaUenges diat arise from die crosskig of ontological boundaries 
are not confined only to deep green strands of envkonmental education, however. 
The chaUenges traverse die whole field, for example, by creating die conditions 
for embeddkig technology in die definition of die body. Rhizomes create 
cyborgs, constmctions diat fiise technology widi die organic, tiiereby, 
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transgressing ontological boundaries and threatening to dismande discursive, 
systems of exclusion, opposition and hekarchisation that are buUt upon such 
ontological boundaries. 
Recasting identity through the fusion of technology and the organic poses a 
chaUenge to envkonmental education, given that envkonmental education adopts 
an uneasy posmre toward technology. This relationship arises from the conviction 
that whUst technological intervention may provide an effective solution to specific 
envkonmental problems, the use of such technological interventions is merely 
palUative because it faUs to redress the prevailing culmral, poUtical and economic 
miUeux that created the conditions for the problems to arise. Furthermore, 
envkonmental education advocates the adoption of a critical suspicion toward 
technological interventions in order to ascertain whether green oppormnism is at 
play. The promotion of nuclear power as a means to eliminate the problem of acid 
rain resulting from coal burning power stations is an example of such green 
oppormnism (Fien & Trainer, 1993b). Envkonmental education utterly opposes 
locating technology in a salvation narrative in which the 'happy ever after' is just 
'business as usual'. 
Other chaUenges to the inclusion of cyborgs in envkonmental education 
discourse may be drawn from the reservations expressed by femiiUst theorists, 
Uicluding Cuomo (1998) and Plumwood (1998). These reservations stem, in part, 
from the fact that technology is spawned from "the history of Western thought 
that perpemated, rationaUzed, and legitimated the erasure of women and women's 
contributions from cultural, sexual, and dieoretical Ufe" (Grosz, 1994, p. 190). 
Thus, whUst cyborgs transgress the boundary between the mechanic and the 
organic, an uncritical embrace of cyborgs may kiadvertentiy lend support to 
phaUocentrism. This may underpki one of the difficulties tiiat Gough has 
encountered (1995) when deployUig cyborgs as a texmal strategy Ui curriculum 
inquiry: 
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One persistent difficulty that arises from manifestUig cyborgs in the 
curriculum is the tendency for some popular stereotypical images of 
cyborgs (including most of the Arnold Schwartzene^er look aUkes 
and thek characteristicaUy violent behaviours) to be appropriated as 
ideological legitimators by both conservative humanists and naive 
technophUes. (Gough, 1995, p. 77) 
However, Gough has found deconstmction of the machineries of texts to be 
an effective means to confront the stereotypical images of cyborgs. This approach 
also provides a means to interrogate, respond to, accept responsibiUty for, and 
contest phaUocentrism. Thus, taking up Gough's conviction that "we need not 
only to manifest cyborgs in curriculum inquiry but also to proUferate them" 
(Gough, 1995, p. 80) offers envkonmental education a productive means of 
interrogating technological intervention into envkonmental problems. 
Deconstmcting the phaUocentrism inscribed in stereotypical representations of 
cyborgs is clearly an ethical and poUtical act. This ethico-poUtical dimension, 
however, is not unique to the topic of cyborgs or to the practice of 
deconstmction. Imaging the body as a rhizomatic construction casts the 
constmction of a Body without Organs as an ethico-poUtical act. Deleuze and 
Guattari emphasise the poUtical aspect of constmcting Bodies without Organs, 
but the ethical aspect is less pronounced. Perhaps one of the clearest references 
to the ethical aspect of constructing Bodies without Organs can be found in a 
rhetorical question posed by Deleuze and Guattari: shovdd we "love, honour, and 
serve degeneracy wherever it surfaces" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 152)? 
They reply that "we must define what comes to pass and what does not come to 
pass" (1980/1987, p. 152). Thus, forgkig the connections that constimte a Body 
without Organs is a selective process; we can exercise choice ki the formation of 
envkonmental subjectivities, poUcies and practices, instimtions and communities. 
Thus, Deleuze and Guattari's figuration of Bodies widiout Organs offers a means 
of affirming and interrogating envkonmental education's commitment to 
envkonmental values education and poUtical Uteracy. Furdiermore, die 
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contention that 'we must define what comes to pass and what does not come to 
pass' can be read as affkming the dkect teaching of particular values as per Fien 
(1993), and Deleuze and Guattari's warning against the dangers of 'microfascism' 
can be read as being paraUel to envkonmental education's response to the risk of 
indoctrination. 
Notwithstanding this support, there are significant differences in the 
theorisation of ethico-poUtical action between Deleuze and Guattari, and 
envkonmental education. Fkstiy, Deleuze and Guattari's sustained rejection of 
transcendence precludes appeals to transcendent values systems. Thus, whUst 
Deleuze and Guattari can be read as an affkmation of the dkect teaching of 
envkonmental values as per Fien's (1993, 1997a) formulation of critical education 
for the envkonment, they would reject his appeal to ecosociaUst ideology because of 
its link to transcendence. Secondly, whUst Deleuze and Guattari would insist that 
ecosociaUst values are embedded in the plane of immanence, they would reject the 
notion that ecosociaUst values hold the key to envkonmentaUy sustainable 
behaviour. This rejection mrns on thek denial that good and bad are immutable, 
given that immutabiUty could be achieved only through transcendence. Thus, 
Deleuze and Guattari assert that "good and bad are only the products of an active 
and temporary selection, which must be renewed" (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1980/1987, p. 10). Thkdly, whUst Deleuze and Guattari emphasise 
interconnectedness on the plane of immanence, they join with Lucretius in thek 
rejection of totaUty: "Nature is indeed a sum, but not a whole" (Deleuze, 
1969/1990, p. 266-267). Deleuze and Guattari arrive at this position by arguing 
that it is impossible to totaUse a process of becoming, unless one accepts a notion 
of eschatology, which they do not. Thus, they would oppose the promotion of a 
hoUstic phUosophy that is spreading throughout otherwise competing strands of 
envkonmental education (Fien & Trakier, 1993b; Selby, 1999; SterUng, 1993). 
The purpose of this section thus far has been to sketch the dynamism that 
Deleuze and Guattari's figurations might exert in envkonmental education; that is 
to discern how existing themes ki envkonmental education might be further 
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mobiUsed and to explore new Unkages that might develop. It has been argued that 
key themes and issues in envkonmental education are linked dkecdy, rather than 
derivatively, through the figurations of the rhizome and Bodies without Organs 
acting within the plane of immanence. Not only are these key themes and issues, 
such as interdependence, envkonmental values education and poUtical Uteracy 
education, affkmed and extended, they are seriously shaken as ambiguities and 
sUences are drawn into reUef. Thus, rhizomatics has a decidedly deconstmctive 
aspect. The dismptions that occur as a result of this deconstmctive aspect of 
rhizomatics are productive; they open up spaces that enable further lines of fUght 
to occur. These 'secondary' lines of flight have not been pursued here as they 
qmckly travel beyond the scope of this section. 
In addition to providing an alternative and strategicaUy generative mode of 
thinking that affkms, deconstructs, and extends key envkonmental education 
themes, rhizomatics enables this project to theorise uncertainty in a non-violent 
manner. To recapitulate briefly, rhizomatic thought makes it possible to theorise 
uncertainty in a manner that respects uncertainty as uncertain. This is possible 
because rhizomatics displaces the Platonic mode of individuation. Instead of 
deploying the reductive processes of limitative distribution and hekarchisation, the 
individuation of a concept (a text, a person or an instimtion) reUes upon the 
connections that can be forged. In other words, rhizomatic thought "does not 
immure itself in the edifice of an ordered interiority; it moves freely in an element 
of exteriority" (Massumi, 1987, p. xU). Relinquishing the notion that identity is a 
stable enclosed interiority fmstrates totaUsation, which would render uncertainty 
certain. Eco's incisive description of the rhizome, tendered in an interview with 
Rosso, succinctiy accounts for the impossibiUty of totaUsation and the possibiUty 
of this project to respect uncertainty as uncertain: the rhizome "is structurable but 
never definitely stmctured" (Rosso & Eco, 1991, p. 248). 
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Cartography 
Deleuze and Guattari's figuration of the rhizome is an image of thought and a 
research method. Various terms are used when the figuration refers to method: 
cartography, rhizoanalysis, nomadism, schizoanalysis, and micropoUtics. The term 
'cartography' wiU be used throughout this project, although alternative terms wiU 
appear in quotations and these alternative terms wUl be used in discussions around 
the quotations. 
Cartography involves three distinct processes: mapping, tracing and 
decalcomania. Mapping and tracing are metaphors for rhizomatic and arborescent 
methods of constructing knowledge, respectively. Mapping, then, refers to 
forging "connections between fields, the removal of blockages on bodies without 
organs, the maximum opening of bodies without organs onto a plane of 
consistency" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 12), whereas tracing refers to 
proceeding along the preset paths that the arborescent method of knowledge 
dictates. Deleuze and Guattari refer to the latter as the "oldest and weariest kind 
of thought" (1980/1987, p.5), but this in no way constimtes a denial of the rigour 
and expertise that may be requked to generate and understand arborescent 
knowledge Instead, thek opposition to tracing is based upon the oppormnities 
that the arborescent method forecloses. 
Cartography, however, employs both modes of thought. This is entkely 
consistent with Deleuze and Guattari's insistence that any manoeuvre to supplant 
the Platonic mode of thought unwittingly ensures its continuation. They displace 
the sovereignty of the Platonic mode of thought by drawing it into an 
asymmetrical partoership with rhizomatics. Both mapping and tracing are 
mdispensable to cartography, but tracing is subordinate to mapping. After maps 
and tracings have been constmcted, the tracing is put back over the map. This is 
die thkd phase of cartography, decalcomania. Laykig the tracUig over the map 
draws Unes of flight and blockages kito reUef This sets die stage for die 
generation of new knowledge radier tiian produckig a movement toward 
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"somethUig that comes ready-made" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 12). 
New knowledge may be produced by foUowing lines of fUght, removing 
blockages, or by grafting rhizomatic pathways to arborescent pathways so as to 
"put them to strange new uses" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 14). 
Yet the generation of new knowledge is not the only possible outcome when a 
tracing is placed over a map. A power takeover can result in the deformation of a 
map so that it conforms to a tracing. Nuyen's critique of the modernist version of 
tolerance, which is grounded in arborescent logic, is helpful in explaining this 
power takeover. 
Given the namre of reason, that is its intolerance to what eludes its 
rule, we are in fact encouraged to be intolerant towards the 
unreasonable, even the nonreasonable. Reason masks this 
contradiction by assuring us that what it cuts out is of no 
consequence. (Nuyen, 1997, p. 5) 
Deleuze and Guattari recognise the powerful but de facto normaUsing fiinction 
that reason, as per the Platonic tradition, exerts. In this case, reason encourages us 
to equate lines of fUght with flights of fantasy. Deleuze (with Parnett) strenuously 
repudiates this pejorative association by stating that: "The great and only error 
pies] in thinking that a line of flight consists in fleeing from Ufe; the fUght into the 
imaginary, or into art. On the contrary, to flee is to produce the real, to create Ufe, 
to find a weapon" (Deleuze & Parnet, 1977/1987, p.46). 
WhUst Deleuze and Guattari oppose the blockage of Unes of fUght by Platonic 
oppression, which deforms maps into conformity with tracings, they do not 
advocate the abandonment of restraint in foUowing Unes of flight. As noted ki the 
previous section, they emphasise the role of ethics in deciding whether to remove 
blockages. Forging connections in mapping is not a matter of chance; connections 
are selected. Therefore, map makUig is not a lawless enterprise, but it does not 
submit to Platonic law. 
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The three separate stages of cartography are clearly delineated in this thesis. 
The foUowing chapter traces the existing engagements with uncertainty in 
envkonmental education. Chapters Four, Five and Six are the mapping chapters in 
which new spaces and ways of engaging uncertainty are opened up. FinaUy, 
Chapter Seven enacts the last phase of cartography, decalcomania. There are two 
aspects to decalcomania and both are performed: fkstiy, the tracing is placed over 
the maps to identify blockages and discern sUences that constrain current 
theorising of uncertainty in envkonmental education; and secondly, the maps are 
'plugged into' the tracing to see what effects are induced in order develop new 
understandings of how envkonmental education can engage uncertainty. 
CONCLUSION 
Deleuze and Guattari's figuration of the rhizome, which is both a metaphor 
for the landscape of thought and a method, enables this project to theorise 
uncertainty in a manner that respects uncertainty as uncertain. This seemingly 
tautological aim is possible because concepts in Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatic 
logic are individuated by outwardly oriented, dynamic and fluid connections. 
Thus, rhizomatic logic avoids the violence of totaUsation, which in this instance 
woiUd render uncertainty certain. This avoidance is essential. Rhizomatic logic does 
not aboUsh totaUsation or the Platonic logic to which it belongs. Rather, it 
displaces totaUsation and Platonic logic. If rhizomatics were to aboUsh Platonic 
logic rather than avoid it, then rhizomatic logic would have upheld the 
dichotomising logic that it sought to dismpt. 
Despite the agreement between the akn of this project and rhizomatics, it 
cannot be assumed that rhizomatics, or any other logic, can be UidiscrimUiately 
transferred from one context to another. It was necessary to discern and assess the 
conjunctions and disjimctions between projects designated as envkonmental 
education and rhizomatics. This exploration argued that Deleuze and Guattari's 
rhizomatics affkms, deconstmcts, and extends key envkonmental education 
themes such as Uiterdependence, envkonmental values education and poUtical 
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Uteracy education. Moreover, leading envkonmental education theorists have 
argued that a new mode of thinking about (the) world and individuation is 
imperative. SpecificaUy, they defend the view that: to think differentiy, is to exist 
differentiy (Robottom, 1993; Selby, 1999;SterUng, 1993). The conjimctions and 
disjunctions identified between envkonmental education and rhizomatics suggest 
that rhizomatic logic may provide a means to thinking and existing in a more 
envkonmentaUy sustainable way. 
CONCLUSION 
The changing methodological (dis)positions and methods pursued throughout 
this project mark transformations that occurred as this project unfolded. Periods 
of StabiUty were dismpted by abmpt changes in dkection; phUosophical framings 
changed, which resulted in concomitant changes in foci, scope and tenor. The 
fkst method to be explored, constmctive consonance, has the capacity to enrich 
phUosophical criticism in envkonmental education, especiaUy for those who 
uphold the notion of mediating modernism and postmodernism, a stance that 
often goes by the name of 'reconstructive postmodernism'. 
Constmctive consonance and envkonmental education share many 
phUosophical assumptions and Drees' notion of an 'eschatology of the present' 
resonates with envkonmental education's overt ethico-poUtical agenda. However, 
whUst constructive consonance rigorously examines the namre and fiinction of 
tmth, the notion of tmth has received Uttie other than incidental coverage ki 
envkonmental education. Therefore, engaging constmctive consonance 
chaUenges envkonmental education to elevate notions of tmth to the level of 
discourse, thereby making its stams and role more visible to analysis. This would 
enhance contemporary debates Ui envkonmental education because the various 
arguments presented in diese debates uphold different theories of tmth, although 
the UnpUcation of theories of tmth is invariably tacit. 
Constmctive consonance was not chosen as tiie research mediod for dUs 
project, however, because of its support for die notion of origUi and because of 
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the unproblematic stance that it adopts toward the constimtive role of language, 
especiaUy with respect to the construction of subjectivity. As a resiUt, the 
phUosophical framing of this project shifted from a mediated version of 
postmodernism to poststmcmraUsm, which critiques the notion of origin and 
accenmates the constimtive role of language. This accenmation is imperative for 
this project given that uncertainty is minimaUy predicated as a quaUty of 
propositions. Furthermore, the poststmcturaUst contention that language plays a 
constimtive role in the constmction of subjectivity opens up subjectivity as a site 
to explore and theorise the play of uncertainty. The phUosophical shift to 
poststmcmraUsm concomitandy reshaped the aim from a general exploration of 
uncertainty to a commitment to respect uncertainty as uncertain. This shift 
resulted from the poststrucmraUst comnUtment to guard against the violence of 
totaUsing thought. 
Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatics, which is both a metaphor for the 
landscape of thought and also a method, was finaUy chosen as the epistemology 
and method for this project. The displacement of Platonism that rhizomatics 
effects enables a positive and non-violent theorisation of uncertainty. The term 
'positive' is taken to sigtUfy that rhizomatics avoids the paralysis that is frequentiy 
and erroneously attributed to postmodernist/poststmcmraUst thought. The 
figuration of the rhizome is also whoUy compatible with the figuration of 'the 
neighbourhood of . The two figurations are, in fact, almost identical in both the 
meanings that they invoke and the dynamics they convey. However, the 
figuration of 'the neighbourhood of accenmates notions of belongmg, dwelling 
and home. As these notions are deeply ingrained in envkonmental education 
discourse, the figuration of 'the neighbourhood of was not replaced by the 
rhizome; both figurations are used. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a reading of the theorisation of uncertainty within 'the 
neighbourhood of envkonmental education. This reading is a tracing, as opposed 
to a map, because it foUows the denouement of what has been laid out within the 
field. Tracings portray existing territories; they delineate botmdaries and the 
spaces enclosed. Tracings, then, are discursive. Maps, on the other hand, foUow 
Unes of flight that mpmre boundaries to reveal new vistas. Mappings of 
uncertainty occur in the foUowing three chapters. 
It has been noted earUer that the notion of uncertainty has become both 
popular and respected in envkonmental education. Uncertainty is increasingly 
being acknowledged Ui the envkonmental education Uterature, especiaUy in the 
Uterature from the United Kingdom and Canada. Most frequentiy, however, this 
acknowledgement is perfunctory. Thus, whUst much envkonmental education 
Uteramre refers to uncertainty, engagements with uncertainty are sparse. 
The sparsity of engagements with uncertainty restricts this trackig to the work 
of a smaU number of envkonmental education theorists. SpecificaUy, this tracing 
wUl be constmcted from die works presented by Adams (2001), Ashley (2000), 
Diduck (1999), Gough and Scott (2001), Hardy (1996, 1999a, 1999b), die Panel 
for Education for Sustainable Development (1998), Rosenbaum and Bressers 
(2000), and Scott (2001). Despite this Umited domain, considerable variation 
exists between these theorisations. 
The theorisations presented by Adams (2001), Diduck (1999), Gough and 
Scott (2001), Hardy (1996, 1999a, 1999b), Rosenbaum and Bressers (2000), Scott 
(2001) and the Panel for Education ^ r Sustainable Development (1998) relate to 
scientific uncertainty, but the impUcations that are drawn out for envkonmental 
education differ widely. These differences arise from varying pedagogical 
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commitments and from the identification of different target audiences. For 
example, both the Panel for Education^/" Sustainable Development and Diduck 
embrace critical pedagogy, but the fkst addresses learners in formal school 
settings, whereas the latter addresses informal adult education. Scott's work can be 
read as being alUed to both of these former projects, but he neither advocates 
critical pedagogy nor specifies an intended audience. Rosenbaum and Bressers 
provide an interesting contrast to each of the above in two ways. Fkstiy, thek 
input comes from beyond the conventionaUy recognised confines of 
envkonmental education. Rosenbaum is a professor of poUtical science who 
speciaUses in envkonmental and energy poUcy, and Bressers is a professor of 
poUcy smdies and envkonmental poUcy. Neither has contributed to the field of 
envkonmental education previously. Secondly, the model of envkonmental 
education that they envisage is a transmission model that is designed to redress 
what they perceive to be a knowledge deficit in the general popiUation. As Scott 
notes, the deficit model of education has been widely criticised in the social 
sciences. Thus, whUst Rosenbaum and Bressers take scientific uncertainty as thek 
starting point some aspects of thek work are incompatible with the other 
theorisations that adopted the same starting point. 
In contrast to this fkst grouping, Gough and Scott (2001) do not appeal to 
scientific uncertainty. Instead, Gough and Scott engage uncertainty within the 
framework of poststructuraUst narrative theory. Rather than asking what 
uncertainty is, they focus on the conditions that enable uncertainty and suggest 
how envkonmental education should respond to these conditions in terms of the 
processes of curriculum development. 
The variety of the approaches used to engage with uncertainty and the 
differing impUcations drawn out for envkonmental education result from the 
contrasting phUosophical assumptions embedded within the engagements. Several 
of the works within this contrasting array of phUosophical positions rely upon 
totaUsation, which has been expUcitiy resisted in the formulation and conduct of 
this research project. These works, especiaUy those presented by Diduck (1999) 
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and Scott (2001), seek to captore uncertainty in a concept and then proceed to 
carve up the interiority of this concept into a taxonomy in which some forms of 
uncertainty can be classified as being more intractable than others. 
The conflicts that arise between the phUosophical position adopted within this 
project and the phUosophical positions embedded in the readings presented here 
are not an issue for tracing existing engagements with uncertainty. Deconstmctive 
analysis can be temporarily suspended in order to 'enter into' these projects, to 
explore thek terrain and sketch thek contours. Tracings can also alter the tertain 
since existing contours and boundaries are hospitable to extensions the dkections 
that the akeady-said preconfigures. In Deleuze and Guattari's terms, the 
extensions are ingrained in the tree, awaiting articulation. This stretching of 
boundaries occurs in this tracing through the construction of arborescent 
connections both within and beyond the confines of envkonmental education. 
TRACING THE THEORETICAL TERRAIN 
Theorisations of uncertainty have a history that can be traced to Aristode's 
formulation of chance. However, whUst the theorisation of uncertainty has a long 
history, it is discontinuous. The episodic engagements with uncertainty have been 
intense, but brief, and the intervening periods have been marked by a distinct bias 
toward the generation of certain knowledge. The current revival is notable, 
however, because interest has been sustained for about forty years across the 
natural sciences, the social sciences and phUosophy. This duration and reach has 
ecUpsed aU interest since the decade of 1660 which marked the advent of 
probabiUty theory (Smithson, 1989). 
Envkonmental education's engagements with uncertainty have been most 
prominent since 1998. These engagements connect with either scientific 
discourses on uncertainty or with poststmcturaUst phUosophical/Uterary 
discourses. Given the incompatibiUty of the phUosophical assumptions that 
configure these discourses, there is very Uttie overlap between the two strands of 
theorising uncertainty in envkonmental education. However, it would be 
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misleading to consider them as being completely divorced as there are some 
convergences in the impUcations that they draw out for envkonmental education 
theory and practice. Nevertheless, the two strands differ sufficientiy to warrant 
deaUng with them separately. Prior to this, however, an interlude into scientific 
uncertainty and alUed concepts is requked. 
SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY AND ALLIED CONCEPTS 
As scientific discourse is founded upon Platonic thought, it employs a 
reductive approach to identification. Reductive identification reUes upon "the 
determination of the exclusive set of properties possessed by each term in 
contradistinction to the others" (Massumi, 1987, p. xi). By employUig this means 
of Umitative distribution, the exclusive set of properties that constimte uncertaUity 
can be ascertained. This, then, enables uncertainty to be set Ui contradistUiction to 
the aUied concepts of risk and ignorance, which, together with uncertaUity, can be 
placed in genealogical arrangement. 
FoUowing StkUng (1999), risk and uncertakity are alUed because it is possible 
to ascertain the fiiU set of outcomes Ui a given simation, but they can be 
distinguished by the abiUty or inabUity to assign probabiUties to the outcomes, 
respectively. Uncertainty and ignorance, on the other hand, are alUed because both 
preclude the aUocation of probabiUties, but they can be distUiguished because the 
fiiU set of possible outcomes is fiUfiUed for uncertakity, but not fulfiUed for 
ignorance. StkUng defines these three terms as foUows: 
pTjhe weU-estabUshed formal definition of risk is that it is a 
condition under which it is possible both to define a comprehensive 
set of aU possible outcomes and to resolve a discrete set of 
probabiUties (or a density fiinction) across this set of outcomes. 
(StirUng, 1999, para. 50) 
The strict sense of uncertainty, by contrast, appUes to a condition 
under which there is confidence in the completeness of the defined 
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set of outcomes, but where there is acknowledged to exist no 
theoretical or empirical basis for the assigning of probabiUties to 
these outcomes. (Stirling, 1999, para. 51) 
[Ignorance] appUes in ckcumstances where there not only exists no 
basis for the assigning of probabiUties (as under uncertainty), but 
where the definition of a fiiU set of outcomes is also problematic. 
In short, it is the acknowledgment of surprises. Here, it is not only 
impossible to rank the options but even thek fiiU characterisation is 
difficult. (StirUng, 1999, para. 52) 
Stkling's categorical formulation of risk, uncertainty and ignorance suggests 
that these terms and the relations between them are fixed and agreed upon. 
However, uncertainty and its allied concepts are cast differentiy in other 
taxonomies. Smithson (1989), for example, deploys a different set of criteria to 
constmct a taxonomy which casts uncertainty as a subset of ignorance. For 
Smithson, uncertainty is a specific form of ignorance that arises from the 
incompleteness of knowledge. At this level of generaUty, Smithson's rendition of 
uncertainty can be equated with Stkling's rendition of ignorance, and vice versa. 
Thus, terms switch when moving between taxonomies. However, they can also 
switch within taxonomies without any alteration to the criteria used to constmct 
the taxonomy. This switching of terms within taxonomies can result from 
questioning phUosophical assumptions. For example, if the assumption that 
totaUties can be known is questioned, then risk, uncertainty and ignorance 
converge. This chaUenge to the assumption that totaUties can be known does not 
need to step outside of scientific discourse; it can be questioned by raising the 
weU-worn arguments against inductive reasoning. 
The differences between taxonomies are relatively uninteresting as they can be 
dismissed as merely being disagreements that await resolution. This expectation 
can attend differences within taxonomies as weU, but not in this instance. This 
expectation is precluded because the differences arise from the questioning of 
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assumptions. Assumptions elude dialectical resolution toward tmth since the tmth 
of the assumption can never be any more than a regulative article of beUef Thus, 
it could be said that the flmdity that arises within taxonomies as a resvdt of the 
questioning of assumptions is an kreducible uncertainty (although the term 
'uncertainty' in this instance does not comply with either of the formulations given 
above). 
ENGAGING SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY IN ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 
Scientific uncertainty has been engaged by Adams (2001), Ashley (2000), 
Diduck (1999), Hardy (1999a), die Panel for Education for Sustakiable 
Development (1998), Rosenbaum and Bressers (2000), and Scott (2001). This 
array of engagements is unusual in that whUst each engages scientific uncertainty, 
each is discrete. None of these engagements draws on any other within the array 
in any way. Furthermore, none of these engagements even acknowledges the 
existence of the other works. There is no commonaUty other than the articulation 
of scientific uncertainty to envkonmental education. As a result, the engagements 
differ widely. 
Within this array of engagements, the works developed by the Panel for 
Education for Sustainable Development (1998) and Diduck (1999) have been 
developed into detaUed curriculum visions. They surpass the other works in this 
respect. The work by the Panel for Education for Sustainable Development has 
been adopted within formal education in the United Kingdom, and Diduck's 
project has been developed, triaUed and evaluated in a non-formal education 
setting in Canada (for detaUs of the evaluation process and the findings see 
Diduck and Sinclak (1997a, 1997b)). In contrast, the other projects sketch 
impUcations for engagements with scientific uncertainty in envkonmental 
education without integrating these impUcations within broader frameworks for 
implementation. Thus, the works developed by the Panel for Education for 
Sustainable Development and Diduck wiU be engaged more deeply than most of 
the other formiUations. However, my previous exploration of the potential of 
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chaos theory to inform envkonmental education (Hardy, 1996, 1999a) wiU also be 
explored in depth. The reason for this two-fold. The fkst reason is that the 
connections advanced between envkonmental education and scientific uncertainty 
differ markedly from those forged by the Panel for Education for Sustainable 
Development (1998) and Diduck (1999). The inclusion of this work in some 
depth, then, highlights the diversity of the engagements of scientific uncertainty in 
envkonmental education. The second reason for engaging this previous work in 
depth is that it enables the divergence of this current project to be accenmated. 
Comparisons between my earUer work and this current project are presented in 
Chapter Seven. 
The Report from the Pane I for Education for Sustainable Development 
The Panel for Education ^ r Sustainable Development (1998) has developed 
and organised global educational objectives for education for sustainable 
development around seven key themes: interdependence; citizenship and 
stewardship; needs and rights of fiiture generations; diversity; quaUty of Ufe, equity 
and justice; sustainable change; and uncertainty and precaution in action. The 
placement of 'uncertainty and precaution in action' as the last theme is significant. 
The panel contends that uncertainty and precaution in action are the logical 
consequence of engaging each of the other themes. Thus, acting with uncertainty 
and precaution may be regarded as the ultimate achievement in education for 
sustainable development. 
The conjunction of uncertainty and precaution in action has an 
unacknowledged supplementary fiinction; it commits the panel's curriculum vision 
to supporting scientific uncertainty. This support is unavoidable because the 
panel upholds and actively promotes the precautionary principle, which is 
incontrovertibly linked to scientific uncertainty. This link is most clearly and 
concisely expressed by Raffensperger and Tickner who state that "scientific 
uncertainty about harm is the fiilcrum of [the precautionary] principle" (1999, p. 
1). Notwithstanding this unequivocal assertion, it is widely acknowledged that the 
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precautionary principle is vague. In a recent trackig of the history of die 
precautionary principle, Jordan and O'Riordan comment that: "the precautionary 
principle stiU has neither a commonly accepted defiiUtion nor a set of criteria to 
guide its knplementation. ... WhUe it is applauded as a 'good thing', no one is 
quite sure what it means, or how to implement it" (1999, p. 22). This leads them 
to the grim conclusion that: "The Precautionary Principle is vague enough to be 
acknowledged by aU governments regardless of how weU they protect the 
envkonment" (Jordan & O'Riordan, 1999, p. 32). However, the vagueness to 
which Jordan and O'Riordan and others (Cameron, 1994; SantiUo, Johnston, & 
Stringer, 1999) refer arises from the usual inclusion of a cost-benefit clause. The 
relationship between the various formulations of the precautionary principle and 
scientific uncertainty, on the other hand, is not vague at aU. 
The most influential formulation of the precautionary principle for 
envkonmental education is that which appears \n. Agenda 21: 
In order to protect the envkonment, the precautionary approach 
shaU be widely appUed by states according to thek capabiUties. 
Where there are threats of serious or kreversible damage, lack of 
fiiU scientific certainty shaU not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent envkonmental degradation. 
(UNCED, 1992, principle 15) 
This formulation clearly aUows for economic eqmvocation concerning 
intervention for envkonmental protection, but the relationship to scientific 
uncertainty is clear. However, the manifest relationship between the 
precautionary principle and scientific uncertainty is rendered inconspicuous in 
envkonmental education discourse. The manner in which the precautionary 
principle has been paraphrased into envkonmental education discourse has 
resulted in the perennial problem in which simpUfication creates imprecision. The 
most extreme example of this occurs in the latest envkonmental education 
package from UNESCO, which maintains that: "The precautionary principle says 
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that thoughtfiil action should be taken to address a problem when there is 
reasonable evidence to indicate that the simation could get worse" (UNESCO, 
2000). The Unks to scientific uncertainty and economic cost-benefit analysis are 
both lost in this formulation. Other formulations in envkonmental education 
acknowledge the relationship between the precautionary principle and scientific 
knowledge, but in a way that erases the dkect relationship to scientific uncertainty. 
O'Riordan, for example, defines the precautionary principle as "thoughtfiil action 
in advance of scientific p roof (quoted in Ashley, 2000, p. 272). This formulation 
connotes that the precautionary principle is a response to a provisional absence of 
scientific proof. This is a gross misrepresentation because, as noted earUer, 
scientific uncertainty obtains when "there is confidence in the completeness of the 
defined set of outcomes, but where there is acknowledged to exist no theoretical 
or empirical basis for the assigning of probabiUties to these outcomes" (StkUng, 
1999, para. 50 ). The determination of an exhaustive set of outcomes and the 
determination that it is impossible to assign probabiUties to the outcomes requke 
rigorous proof 
The emphasis being placed here on the distorted paraphrasing of the 
precautionary principle into envkonmental education discourse does not signal 
pedantic foundationaUsm. I whoUy endorse the position that posits language as 
being dynamic and the conviction that terms can be criticaUy appropriated and put 
to entkely new uses. For the latter to occur, however, critical appropriation must 
involve a thorough examination of the metaphysical ba^age that accompanies the 
terms so that the assumptions that are inscribed in those terms can be accepted, 
modified or rejected. This has not occurred in envkonmental education with 
respect to the precautionary principle. Therefore, the scientific, economic and 
legal assumptions that are inscribed in the precautionary principle surreptitiously 
enter envkonmental education discourse. 
In Ught of the manner in which the precautionary principle is presented in 
envkonmental education discourse, it is not surprising that the link to scientific 
uncertainty is unacknowledged in the report from the Panel for Education for 
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Sustainable Development. However, the inescapable link that the panel has forged 
to scientific uncertainty through its embrace of the precautionary principle creates 
a deep tension within its curriculum vision. This tension arises from the panel's 
contention that smdents "should understand the concept of cultural change in the 
shift from the certainties of the modern age to the uncertainties of the 
postmodern age, and what oppormnities this may afford for reaUsing a more 
sustainable society" (Panel for Education ^ r Sustainable Development, 1998, p. 
11). WhUst the panel does not give any indication as to what it is designating as 
'postmodern uncertainties', it is reasonable to assume that 'postmodern 
uncertainties' defy the moderrust notions of metaphysical presence, totaUtarian 
thinking and closure. Yet, the panel's tacit support of scientific uncertainty, which 
obtains when aU possible outcomes have been disclosed, commits the panel to 
upholding the modernist assumptions that postmodern uncertainties woiUd 
renounce. In Ught of this kreconcUable contradiction, it does not seem 
unreasonable to suggest that not only is the panel's support of scientific 
uncertainty unacknowledged, it is unintended as weU. 
Interestingly, the panel's support of the precautionary principle, which leads to 
this modernist/postmodernist dUemma, prevents the panel's curriculum vision 
from being paralysed by the kreconcUable contradictions that emerge. Supporting 
the precautionary principle enables the panel's curriculum vision to move beyond 
the scientific/economic/legal discoxirse within which the precautionary principle 
is framed. As Jordan and O'Riordan (1999, p. 19) note, "if precaution Uivolves 
acting before the avaUabiUty of fiiU scientific information, then grounds other than 
"good science", such as ethical, moral, or poUtical, are requked to legitimate poUcy 
decisions". 
The contention that ethical, moral and poUtical considerations Ue beyond the 
province of science remains contentious and wiU not be entered into here, except 
to note that others within the scientific community who have undertaken 
extensive smdies Uito the relationship between science and the precautionary 
principle do not share the view diat Jordan and O'Riordan express. StkUng (1999), 
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for example, argues strongly against the creation of a 'dichotomy trap' which casts 
science and the precautionary principle in opposition. WhUst acknowledging 
potential tensions, he maintains that divisive manoeuvres risk foreclosing creative 
and productive thinking. The divisiveness that Stirling argues against arises if the 
scientific community is precluded from engaging in ethical, moral and poUtical 
discourses. However, accepting that the scientific community engages in these 
discourses does not posit ethical, moral and poUtical discourses within scientific 
discourse. 
FoUowing Foucault and Lyotard, we participate in many discourses or 
language games, each of which is configured by its own set of assumptions and 
rules. Implementing the precautionary principle as per Jordan and O'Riordan 
upholds the pluraUty of discourses. Adopting this approach is essential if the 
Panel for Education for Sustainable Development is to avoid paralysis resulting 
from the contradiction that emerges from its dual support for scientific 
uncertainty and 'postmodern uncertainties'. Thus, education for sustainable 
development can engage alternately with both scientific uncertainty and 
postmodern uncertainties by participating in different discourses. WhUst the panel 
acknowledges neither FoucaiUt nor Lyotard expUcitiy, the panel's support for 
cultural and social diversity can be read as a rejection of the modernist drive 
toward meta-narratives that both Lyotard and FoucavJt reject. Furthermore, the 
educational benefits that can be distiUed from the panel's educational objectives 
Usted under the key theme of 'imcertainty and precaution in action' sigiUfy an 
impUcit support for the pluraUty of discourses. The most notable educational 
benefits in this respect are: 
• an abiUty to learn from different voices; and 
• an understanding that different cultures and different beUef systems influence 
how the envkonment and resources are viewed/constmcted. 
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However, these educational benefits do not necessarUy indicate that the panel 
supports the postmodernist/poststmcturaUst rejections of totaUsing nartatives. 
These benefits could simply denote a beUef that the ultimate meta-nartative is stiU 
being written and that at present we can only work with the threads that are 
avaUable. 
In this context, movement between discourses is cast as an instrumental 
strategy that maintains the EnUghtenment ideals. Gondalez-Gaudiano refers to 
this approach as the 'interdisciplinary stitch', which he describes as an essentiaUst 
pretension that seeks to "use interdiscipUnarity as a seam, to close the gaps and to 
overcome the lacks and deficiencies of current disciplinary knowledge in a 
renewed attempt to give unity to the avaUable knowledge set" (2001, p. 158). 
Gondalez-Gaudiano ardendy argues against the adoption of this stance in 
envkonmental education. Rather than seeking unification and closure through 
interdiscipUnarity, he supports open-ended interdiscipUnarity as a cradle of 
possibiUties, which must be miUtiple if the term 'possibiUty' is to be authentic. The 
panel's report may be read as being aUgned with Gondalez-Gaudiano's rejection of 
the 'interdiscipUnary stitch' and with his promotion of authentic possibiUties. This 
aUgnment is most evident through the panel's contention that smdents should "be 
able to envision and criticaUy assess alternative scientific, technological, economic, 
poUtical and social futures" (Panel for Education for Sustainable Development, 
1998, p. 11). An acknowledgment of multiple fiitures does not necessarUy signal 
the rejection of meta-narratives. Meta-nartatives are more than capable of 
accommodating, promoting, and vaUdating multiple fiitures. What is of interest in 
this objective, however, is that these multiple fiitures are discrete. There is no 
suggestion of an 'interdisciplinary stitch'. Thus, it is possible to suggest that that 
the panel supports the postmodernist/poststmcturaUst notions of the pluraUty of 
discourses, which overcomes the modernist/postmodernist dUemma that was 
identified earUer. Therefore, the panel's report can support both scientific 
uncertainty and 'postmodern uncertaUities' without coUapsing Uito contradiction. 
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FinaUy, as noted previously, the panel places hope in the opportunities that 
engaging with 'postmodern uncertainties' may afford for reaUsing a more 
sustainable fumre. This optimistic stance is significant given that the panel's 
report aUns to translate and Unplement the recommendations of Agenda 21 into 
the local context of education in the United Kingdom. The significance Ues in the 
dkect opposition that the panel's report offers to the sentiment that Agenda 21 
expresses toward uncertakity. Agenda 21 casts uncertakity negatively; it portrays 
uncertakity as an encumbrance that needs to be reduced. This is expressed most 
dkecdy in its recommendation to the scientific community to make substantial 
improvements in using the precautionary principle in order to "gain more time for 
reducUig uncertaUity" (UNCED, 1992, para 35.6b). 
In summary, the Panel for Education^r Sustainable Development has engaged 
uncertainty deeply. It has conjoined uncertaUity with the precautionary principle 
to create an organising theme for education ^ r sustainable development and has 
proposed educational objectives within this theme. Furthermore, the panel has 
Usted this theme as the last of seven themes. This placement is important as the 
panel contends that the last theme is "a logical consequence of those that 
precede" (Panel for Education^/- Sustainable Development, 1998, p 4). Thus, 
engagement with uncertainty occupies a special position in education for 
sustainable development. 
The panel's report impUcitiy promotes engagement with scientific uncertainty 
and expUcitiy promotes engagement with 'postmodern uncertainties'. This has the 
potential to create deep tensions within the report. However, the panel's support 
for the precautionary principle can aUeviate this tension if the precautionary 
principle is read as a cue to engage different discourses in a manner that affirms 
the fragmentary nature of knowledge rather than as a pursuit of a meta-narrative. 
If the precautionary principle is read this way, education for sustainable 
development can engage 'postmodern uncertainties' through ethical, moral and 
poUtical discourses, without the metaphysical baggage of scientific uncertaUity. 
This is not at aU a rejection of scientific discourse, but it is a rejection of the 
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universaUty of scientific discourse. This positioning of scientific discourse is 
whoUy consistent with the recommendation from the National CurriciUum 
CouncU (UK) that schools "shoiUd encourage thek pupUs to question the often 
exaggerated view of the infaUibiUty of science as the only means of understanding 
the world, and of the equaUy exaggerated view of the inadequacy of reUgion and 
phUosophy" (quoted Ui Ashley, 2000, p. 272). 
Critical environmental assessment education 
Critical envkonmental assessment education is a detaUed curriculum theory for 
non-formal adult education developed by Diduck (1997a). It was developed in 
response to Sinclak and Diduck's (1995) finding that education is a crucial aspect 
of the pubUc involvement processes of envkonmental assessment. However, this 
smdy also indicated that the nature and role of education in pubUc involvement 
processes were poorly defined and underdeveloped. In response to these findings, 
Diduck undertook to clarify the role that education can play in envkonmental 
assessment by exploring theories of critical pedagogy and transformative learning. 
This led to the development of critical envkonmental assessment education, 
which Diduck (1997a, p. 85) describes as "a means to faciUtate and improve pubUc 
involvement [in resource management] and, thereby, empower local communities 
to take greater control of resource use decisions affecting thek Uves". 
Critical envkonmental assessment education was devised, developed and 
triaUed in the context of a resource assessment project. This project involved the 
development and implementation of a water supply scheme that woiUd supply a 
stable, long-term solution to water related problems in the Pembina VaUey, 
southern Manitoba, Canada. More specificaUy, the project was to supply potable 
water for municipal, industrial and agriciUtural use. With seven rural municipaUties 
and eight towns affected, there was scope for considerable pubUc involvement. 
Diduck's analysis of this pubUc Uivolvement yielded strong empirical support for 
the concepts of critical envkonmental assessment education (Diduck & SUiclak, 
1997a). 
123 
CHAPTER THREE - TRACING THE THEORETICAL TERRAIN 
Critical envkonmental assessment education takes change, complexity^, 
uncertainty and confUct as four enduring themes that impact upon resource and 
envkonmental management. In Diduck's curriculum vision, two-way 
relationships exist between envkonmental assessment education on the one hand, 
and risk, uncertainty, ignorance and indeterminacy on the other. Risk, uncertainty, 
ignorance, and indeterminacy create the conditions within which envkonmental 
assessment education must operate. Yet, Diduck argues that envkonmental 
assessment education also impacts upon each of these conditions. 
Like the report from the Panel for Education for Sustainable Development 
(1998), Diduck's curriculum vision positions itself in relation to scientific 
uncertainty. Although unlike the report from the Panel for Education for 
Sustainable Development, this positioning is expUcit. Diduck draws on Wynne's 
(1992) four categories of uncertainty: 
• risk - workings of the system are known and the probabiUty 
of various outcomes can be derived; 
• uncertainty — probabiUty of various outcomes cannot be 
determined, although key variables or parameters of the 
problem are apparent; 
• ignorance - impending ckcumstances escape recognition, 
i.e., the problem is not apparent; and 
• indeterminacy - cause and effect relationships are not 
apparent and understanding is not possible. (Diduck, 1999, 
p. 93) 
Wynne's dual use of the term uncertainty to signify both a broad condition and 
also a more specific subset of that condition creates a semantic obstacle that 
impedes discussions that address both senses of the term either simultaneously or 
in close connection. However, given that Wynne's more precise formulation of 
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uncertainty is equivalent to Stkling's formulation of scientific uncertainty, the 
expression 'scientific uncertainty wiU be deployed to refer to Wynne's more 
precise formulation of uncertainty in which aU possible outcomes are known but 
the respective probabiUties cannot be determined. In contrast, the term 
'uncertainty' wiU be deployed to refer to Wynne's broad formiUation of the term, 
which encompasses risk, scientific uncertainty, ignorance and indeterminacy. 
Diduck positions his curriculum vision in relation to both uncertainty and 
scientific uncertainty. Scientific uncertainty is, by defiiUtion, ineradicable and 
kreducible; whUst it is possible to define a comprehensive set of aU possible 
outcomes, there is no vaUd theoretical or empirical means to determine the 
probabiUties of the outcomes. Therefore, the relationship between scientific 
uncertainty and envkonmental assessment education is asymmetrical. Scientific 
uncertainty is a condition that impacts upon envkonmental assessment education 
conducted within the context of envkonmental resource management projects, 
but envkonmental assessment education cannot impact upon scientific 
uncertainty. Diduck recognises this and draws no impUcations from his 
curriculum vision for scientific uncertainty. 
He does, however, posit uncertainty and envkonmental assessment education 
in a two-way relationship. SpecificaUy he argues that whUst ignorance and 
indeterminacy impact upon the contexts in which envkonmental assessment 
education is implemented, envkonmental assessment education also has 'positive' 
UnpUcations for these conditions. The term 'positive' is used here to denote that 
engaging envkonmental assessment education can function in a corrective 
capacity. Diduck sees envkonmental assessment education as playing a sigiUficant 
role in the reduction of ignorance and uncertainty. In this respect he asserts that: 
Increased awareness can iUuminate unknown simations and help 
identify problems, thereby reducing ignorance. Discourse and 
interest analysis inherent in EA [envkonmental assessment] 
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education, can reveal 'causal' chains and, thereby reduce 
indeterminacy. (Diduck, 1999, p. 93) 
Diduck also notes that envkonmental assessment education can reveal further 
complexities, which results in the proUferation of uncertainty, but his notion that 
education acts as a corrective impUes that continued appUcations of envkonmental 
assessment education should vUtimately serve to resolve this simation. Diduck's 
commitment to the reduction of uncertainty aUgns his currictdum vision with the 
sentiment expressed toward uncertainty hy Agenda 2/(UNCED, 1992). 
Diduck makes several additional claims in relation to engaging uncertainty 
through education, which do not fare weU under close scmtiny. Fkstiy, Diduck 
(1999, p. 93) claims that engaging with uncertainty "confkms the value of the 
Frierean approach to education, with its emphasis on critical thinking, 
empowerment and problem solving". He justifies this claim on the basis that 
critical pedagogy is less reUant on the certainty and veracity of information than 
more didactic models. FoUowing this reasoning, engaging with uncertainty can 
confirm and affkm a variety of other approaches to education, such as those 
founded upon constructivist and poststmcturaUst pedagogies. Thus, Diduck's 
affkmation of critical pedagogy is unjustifiably nartow. 
Secondly, Diduck (con)fiises certimde and certainty. SpecificaUy, he contends 
that envkonmental assessment education "has impUcations for uncertainty 
because, when people are agents of change, they become more certain in thek 
actions as they drive change toward a desked fiiture" (Diduck, 1999, p. 93). Being 
certain of one's action is clearly certimde, which is a psychological state, whereas 
certainty is a quaUty of propositions. This distinction is argued in depth by Vance 
(1917) in his formulation of critical reaUsm. Given that Diduck is manifesdy 
operating within critical reaUsm, the terms certainty and certimde should be 
neither fiised nor confiised. Furthermore, given the definitions of uncertainty that 
Diduck expUcitiy adopts, it is clear that certainty and uncertakity are not 
126 
CHAPTER THREE - TRACING THE THEORETICAL TERRAIN 
symmetrical opposites. Therefore any claUn about the movement from 
uncertaUity to certainty needs to be argued in much greater depth. 
In summary, Diduck's curriculum theory of envkonmental assessment 
education engages uncertainty broadly, as per Wynne's (1992) categorisation, and 
also engages with scientific uncertainty as a specific subset of that categorisation. 
Envkonmental assessment education is designed as a component of the pubUc 
involvement processes of resource and envkonmental management, and has been 
implemented and evaluated in that context. The resvdtant empirical evidence 
yielded strong support for the concepts of envkonmental assessment education. 
Some claims made by Diduck, however, are unconvincing, but these are anciUary, 
rather than central, to envkonmental assessment education. 
There are numerous simUarities and differences between Diduck's project and 
the report presented by the Panel for Education for Sustainable Development 
(1998). The most significant of these in context of this tracing are that: whUst 
both engage scientific uncertainty, this is expUcit in Diduck's project, but impUcit 
in the panel's report; the panel's report chaUenges the negative portrayal of 
uncertainty in Agenda 21, whereas Diduck supports that negative sentiment and 
strives for the reduction of uncertainty; and whUst the panel strives to connect 
with 'postmodern uncertainties', Diduck does not acknowledge postmodernism at 
aU. 
Investigations of the potential of chaos theory to inform environmental education. 
Chaos theory excited the academic imagination within and beyond the 
mathematical and scientific arenas in the 1980s. Knodt (1995, p. xvi), for 
example, commented that developments such as chaos theory "are beginning to 
captivate the postmodern imagination, provoking an akeady ambiguous 
fascination with techno-science that combines post-structuraUst motives and 
poUtical-aesthetic impulses to form an explosive mixture". Many education 
theorists welcomed engagements with chaos theory, although thek justifications 
differed. Most education theorists welcomed engagements with chaos theory on 
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the basis that they might provide generative metaphors for the dynamics of 
education (DoU, 1993; Green & Bigum, 1993; MacPherson, 1995; Sawada & 
Caley, 1985). To anticipate a more dkect appUcation, according to MacPherson, 
"would be taking the mathematics of chaos too seriously" (1995). Others, 
however, have sought more dkect appUcations, especiaUy with respect to 
educational leadership (SungaUa, 1990). 
The polarisation within the broader education arena is reflected in 
envkonmental education by the positions presented by Gough (1998d) and Hardy 
(1996, 1999a, 1999b). Gough explores chaos theory for its heuristic value in 
animating curriciUar and pedagogical discussions. He stands opposed to more 
dkect Unks between chaos theory and envkonmental education due to the 
conflation that such an approach compels between 'natural' and 'social' realms. 
SpecificaUy, he contends that: 
If chaos and complexity theories provide us with generative 
metaphors for thinking about organizational behavior it is because 
we make them so not because they appear to describe 'natural' 
behavior. (Gough, 1998d, p. 64, Gough's emphasis) 
Hardy, on the other hand, forges closer links with education and chaos and 
complexity theories. Thus, Hardy engages more dkecdy with the possible 
impUcations of scientific uncertainty for envkonmental education. As a result, this 
section wiU concentrate on Hardy's work; however, Gough's work is engaged 
extensively in the chapter dealing with narrative uncertainties. 
Hardy's work probes relations, both associative and dissociative, between the 
phUosophical impUcations of chaos theory and envkonmental education. In order 
to expUcate the phUosophical impUcations of chaos theory. Hardy traces the 
development of chaos theory in contemporary mathematics and also explores 
findings from the appUed natural sciences which demonstrate that chaotic 
behaviour is not restricted to ideaUsed mathematical systems. Chaotic systems can 
demonstrate a variety of behaviours; the behaviour that is of key interest for this 
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discussion, however, is self-organisation. This can be defined as a process in 
which abmpt and often dramatic changes spontaneously occur in systems that are 
far from equilibrium. Both the timing and the outcome of self-organisation are 
unpredictable and given that this unpredictabiUty arises within deterministic 
systems; self-organisation provides a context for scientific uncertainty, as per 
StirUng (1999) and Wynne (1992). 
Given that there is a vast body of Uterature that provides evidence of self-
organisation in envkonmental processes, it is whoUy appropriate that 
envkonmental education engages this aspect of scientific uncertainty through 
science oriented components of envkonmental education programs. This wotdd 
aUgn Hardy's articulation of envkonmental education and scientific uncertainty 
with the projects developed by Diduck (1997a) and the Panel for Education ^ r 
Sustainable Development (1998). It would also aUgn Hardy's project with 
Ashley's (2000) and Scott's (2001) advocacy for the inclusion of risk Uteracy in 
envkonmental education. However, Hardy does not pursue this Une of inquiry, 
although it would be a logical extension of her work. Instead, she explores links 
between self-organisation and learning itself. This line of inquiry takes its lead 
from research in the fields of neural physiology and social behaviour. SpecificaUy, 
Hardy draws on neurological research that contends that learning foUows self-
organising processes (AUman, 1993; S. J. A. Kelso, 1997; Tillmann, Bharucha, & 
Bigand, 2000). 
The contention that uncertainty attends learning is hardly new to educators. 
Educators are constantiy faced with the emergence of unexpected learning 
outcomes in the complex milieux of education. The interplay of external and 
internal factors constantiy impact upon learning. However, the uncertainty that 
education theorists explore through engagements with chaos theory is an 
uncertaUity of a different order. Viewing learning as a self-organising process 
posits uncertainty as being constitutive of learning. Hardy goes on to propose that 
educators should stimulate learning by driving "the stable state of [the learners'] 
inner non-equilibrium to a highly sensitive, far-from-equUibrium state 'which can 
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be a new source of order whenever the flucmations that constimte it can no 
longer be absorbed within a particular regime' (SungaUa, 1990, p. 8)" (Hardy, 
1999a, p. 130). This argument also maintains that educators need to create the 
'essential tension' to prevent self-organising processes erupting into chaos. In 
keeping with the notion of self-organisation. Hardy emphasises that "specific 
educational objectives cannot be foreseen in self-organising educational settings" 
(1999a, p. 131), wherein Ues the link to uncertainty. 
In order to develop specific curriciUar impUcations for envkonmental 
education. Hardy draws upon DoU's transformative postmodern curriculum vision 
which translates the abstractions of science and mathematics into concrete 
education concepts. Hardy examines the conjunctions and disjunctions between 
DoU's curriculum vision and Fien's (1993) formulation of critical education^r the 
envkonment and concludes that DoU's vision offers both a powerfiil permrbative 
influence from which new understandings may emerge to enrich and promote the 
current curricular debate in envkonmental education and a means to ampUfy the 
performative aspect of uncertainty in the process of learning. IronicaUy, however. 
Hardy crosses the metaphor/correspondence divide by drawing on DoU's work. 
In summary, Hardy's exploration of the possible impUcations of chaos theory 
for envkonmental education posits uncertainty as being constimtive of learning. 
Articulating uncertainty and envkonmental education in this manner differs 
markedly from the articulations presented by Diduck and the Panel for Education 
for Sustainable Development, both of which view uncertainty in relation to 
envkonmental outcomes of sustainable/unsustainable practices. Furthermore, 
Hardy does not posit uncertainty per se as being 'good' or 'bad', as the Panel for 
Education ^ r Sustainable Development and Diduck advance, respectively. Hardy 
does, however, imply that creating conditions that promote uncertainty is right on 
the basis that this is likely to promote learning, although uncertainty can be 
promoted without appeals to chaos theory. 
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Uncertainty as environmental education 
This provocative subheading is borrowed from Rosenbaum and Bressers 
(2000) who engage uncertainty and envkonmental education from beyond the 
envkonmental education arena. Neither Rosenbaum nor Bressers is an education 
theorist; Rosenbaum is a professor of poUtical science, and Bressers is professor 
of poUcy smdies and envkonmental poUcy. In thek article entitied "Uncertainty as 
envkonmental education", they engage many of the themes that have emerged 
independendy from explorations of uncertainty in the envkonmental education 
arena. These points of intersection, which include the inevitabiUty of uncertainty, 
the need for continuous learning, and the need for genuine dialogue and trust, are 
raised in the context of promoting adult 'civic envkonmental education'. 
Rosenbaum and Bressers focus on the importance of civic envkonmental 
education for the successful implementation of envkonmental poUcies. 
Rosenbaum and Bressers do not propose a detaUed curriculum vision; they 
leave this to the education sector. They do, however, note the need for civic 
envkonmental education to provide reUable, current data for use in decision 
making and the necessity of an ethical dimension to frame envkonmental decision 
making. As thek project is not curriculum development, they do not explore 
epistemological and pedagogical issues that would be relevant to the civic 
envkonmental education that they have in mind. They do, nevertheless, offer a 
gUmpse of thek pedagogical orientation, which is antithetical to current 
envkonmental education theorising and to the broader realm of education. 
SpecificaUy, Rosenbaum and Bressers exhibit a condescending attimde to those 
who wotdd be the recipients (rather than participants) of civic envkonmental 
education: 
It has been conventional wisdom among risk management 
professionals in the United States and other nations where pubUc 
attimdes to risk have been elaborately smdied that the pubUc is 
badly misinformed and almost neuroticaUy reactive about the health 
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and safety risks associated with various hazards. It is thus 
encouraging that Halfacre and her coUeagues found evidence that 
the pubUc is capable, at least sometimes, of transcending narrow 
self-interest to seek a more sociaUy inclusive "communitarian" 
conception of risk management. (Rosenbaum & Bressers, 2000, p. 
670) 
There is no hint of satire in Rosenbaum and Bressers' article; they are not 
satiricaUy suggesting that the pubUc is more deserving than they are given credit 
for. Thek attimde is condescending through and through. This condescending 
attimde toward those who might participate in civic envkonmental education is 
not raised here as an object for scorn or ridicule. Rather it is raised to highUght 
that attimdes that may be regarded as antiquated or even bygone by those in the 
education arena are not as antiquated as we might like to beUeve, that they stiU 
ckculate and stiU hold some currency in certain ckcles. Rosenbaum and Bressers 
demonstrate a manifest lack of respect for the potential 'recipients' of civic 
envkonmental education, yet at the same time they speak about the need to 
actively cultivate genuine dialogue and tmst. Flagrant disregard of the conditions 
necessary for mumal respect, such as that demonstrated by the foregoing 
quotation, seriously bUght attempts to engage in genuine dialogue, and trust is 
clearly impossible (given that trust does not admit of degree, although it can be 
modulated by scope). This has important impUcations for envkonmental 
education, given that aU engagements with sustainable development highUght the 
importance of enhancing participatory decision making across disciplines and 
across sectors of society, especiaUy when faced with simations that involve 
uncertainty. 
Notwithstanding the above criticism of Rosenbaum and Bressers' pedagogical 
orientation, there are other aspects of thek work that articulate, in a non-hostUe 
manner, to current theorising of uncertakity through envkonmental education, 
like Diduck, Rosenbaum and Bressers seek to reduce uncertaUity: "analysUig our 
way out of uncertainty wiU be a contUiual process" (Rosenbaum & Bressers, 2000, 
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p. 668). Yet unlike Diduck, Rosenbaum and Bressers emphasise the positive 
outcomes that working with uncertainty compels. In this respect, they refer to the 
'benefience of uncertainty' (Rosenbaum & Bressers, 2000, p. 669). The beneficial 
outcomes that they attribute to working under conditions of uncertainty include: 
• the creation of new multi-national instimtions, founded upon stmctural and 
administrative transformations, for the management of envkonmental 
problems; 
• a democratisation of administrative processes that has broadened the 
participation of the pubUc and non-government organisations in decision 
making; 
• the emergence of epistemic communities that organise, conduct and poUticaUy 
propagate envkonmental research within international communities; 
• the generation of new or significandy revised envkonmental poUcies in 
response to the problematic nature of scientific data avaUable for 
characterising various conditions; and 
• the growth of formal and non-formal envkonmental education, not only for 
the general pubUc, but also for poUcy makers. 
Thus, whUst Rosenbaum and Bressers share Diduck's commitment to strive 
for the reduction of uncertainty, they also share the optimistic attimde to working 
in the face of uncertainty expressed by the Panel for Education for Sustainable 
Development. 
A POSTSTRUCTURALIST PHILOSOPHICAL/LITERARY ENGAGEMENT WITH 
UNCERTAINTY 
There are fewer poststmcturaUst theorisations of uncertainty in envkonmental 
education than engagements with scientific uncertainty. To date only two 
poststmcturaUst engagements could be located: one that I wrote (Hardy, 1999b) 
and the other by Gough and Scott (2001). My postmodernist/poststmcturaUst 
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engagement with uncertainty. Fractal Alterity, can be read as simply an extension of 
my previous work on the possible impUcations of chaos theory for envkonmental 
education with a postmodernist/poststmcturaUst twist. As such, it can be 
considered to be an engagement with scientific uncertainty and wiU not be 
covered here on that basis. Therefore, this section wiU present a reading of 
Gough and Scott's engagement only. 
Gough and Scott's theorisation of uncertainty is embedded within thek 
analysis of the relations between curriculum development and sustainable 
development. FoUowing thek analysis of these relations, they propose a model to 
guide the process of curriculum development. Uncertainty is not an overt element 
of this model, although thek poststructuraUst theorisation of uncertainty, in 
conjunction with other considerations, shaped the model. Thus, Gough and 
Scott's articulation of envkonmental education and uncertainty differs from the 
other readings presented both in terms of its phUosophical stance and in the 
specific connection that it forges with uncertainty. None of the other 
theorisations has articulated uncertainty to the processes of curriculum 
development. 
Gough and Scott's theorisation of envkonmental uncertainty is dkecdy linked 
to Uterary theory. Thek theorisation turns upon reading (the) envkonment as text, 
a position that is exerting an increasing influence in envkonmental education 
foUowing Gough's promotion and use of nartative theory (Gough, 1993, 1994a, 
1994b, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 1999a), and Stables' formulation and 
promotion of envkonmental Uteracies (Stables, 1996, 1997, 2001a, 2001b; Stables 
& Bishop, 2001). SpecificaUy, Gough and Scott adapt Strain's (2000) formulation 
of uncertainty, which foUows the poststmcturaUst notion of the Death of the 
Audior as per Bardies (1968/1977), Derrida (1972/1981) and Foucault 
(1969/1988). According to poststmcturaUst notions of the Death of the Author, 
meaning is problematised by shifting the locus of meankig from the author to the 
reader and by shiftUig the time of meanUig from the past to the present. 
Therefore, "every text is being rewritten here and nou^' (Barthes, 1968/1977, p. 145, 
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Barthes' emphasis). Thus, meaning can no longer be held as a pre-given, stable 
and self-sufficient feamre of text. 
Drawing on these themes, Gough and Scott present a two pronged argument 
for the emergence of a "new kind of uncertainty" (Gough & Scott, 2001, p. 144). 
Deploying Barthes' conviction that text is rewritten with each reading, Gough and 
Scott argue that each time that (the) envkonment is read, the less it actually is (the) 
envkonment that we began reading. Furthermore, this rewriting of (the) 
envkonment is proUferated given that (the) envkonment wiU be rewritten 
differentiy according to the grammar of the particular discourse that the reader is 
operating in. Biologists and economists, for example, wiU rewrite (the) 
envkonment differentiy. This proUferation is further ampUfied given that we each 
operate in multiple discourses. Thus, rewriting (the) envkonment precludes the 
condition for certainty as a quaUty of propositions. 
The other prong to thek argument deepens thek argument. SpecificaUy, 
Gough and Scott draw attention to changed notions of 'self, which have shifted 
from notions of a unitary, stable self to notions of the self as being multiple and 
fluid. This dynamic portrayal of the self can be linked to Barthes' (1971/1977) 
notion that rewriting the text simultaneously rewrites the self. Thus, Barthes casts 
the self as text. WhUst Gough and Scott do not make this connection, it is a 
whoUy consistent extension of thek argument. Thus, the reading/writing of (the) 
envkonment and the reading/writing of (the) self are mumaUy enfolded. This 
mumal inscription defies the discrete resolution of subject and object, which in 
turn precludes the conditions for estabUshing certainty. 
Gough and Scott use this 'new kind of uncertainty' to argue against top-down 
curriculum development and offer an alternative. Numerous arguments have 
been raised against top-down curriculum development in envkonmental 
education, but Gough and Scott have presented a new argument. Furthermore, 
thek Uterary theorising of envkonmental uncertainty clearly has relevance for 
other envkonmental education themes, such as envkonmental agency. The 
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poststmcmraUst ideas that they have drawn on are explored further in Chapter 
Seven. 
CROSS-READING UNCERTAINTY IN ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 
AND BEYOND 
Uncertainty is valued in envkonmental education. This claim can be upheld at 
the most general level on the basis that: in order to be noticed, something must be 
deemed to be worthy of attention. Noticing is normative. However, the 
normative aspect of envkonmental education's engagement with uncertainty goes 
weU beyond this broad view of value theory. The existence of the engagements 
from which this tracing is constmcted indicates that in addition to noticing 
uncertainty, detaUed explorations of uncertainty have been judged to be 
worthwhUe. These explorations fiirther affkm the value of engaging uncertainty by 
advocating the articulation of uncertainty to major structural components of 
envkonmental education, namely, the subject matter (Adams, 2001; Ashley, 2000; 
Diduck, 1999; Panel for Education for Sustainable Development, 1998; Scott, 
2001), theories of learning (Hardy, 1996, 1999a) and the process of curriculum 
development (Gough & Scott, 2001). 
Within these articulations, some theorists posit uncertainty as being either 
'good' or 'bad'. The Panel for Education^r Sustainable Development (1998), for 
instance, casts uncertainty as 'good'. The positive value that the panel assigns to 
uncertainty is instmmental rather than intrinsic given that the panel casts 
uncertainty as 'good' on the basis that it may afford oppormnities for reaUsing a 
more sustainable society. In contrast to the panel's stance, both Diduck (1999) and 
Rosenbaum and Bressers (2000) seek to reduce uncertainty. Thus, Diduck and 
Rosenbaum and Bressers assign a negative value to uncertainty. However, 
Rosenbaum and Bressers also refer to the beneficence of uncertainty. This 
description refers to the positive outcomes that attend working in the face of 
uncertainty. Thus, Rosenbaum and Bressers assign both a negative Uitrinsic value 
and a positive instrumental value to uncertainty. 
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In addition to this broad aUocation of value, the majority of projects that 
engage with uncertainty in relation to the unpredictabiUty of the effects of human 
activity upon envkonmental processes (Ashley, 2000; Diduck, 1999; Panel for 
Education for Sustainable Development, 1998; Rosenbaum & Bressers, 2000; 
Scott, 2001) deepen the normative aspect of thek work by promoting the 
inclusion of risk Uteracy into envkonmental education and by emphasising that 
this risk Uteracy must be coupled to ethical and moral decision making. Each of 
the projects that articulate uncertainty and envkonmental education in this 
manner emphasises that interdisciplinary participation in ethical decision making is 
imperative. However, Adams' (2001) smdy is the exception; it does not make 
expUcit links to moral education or interdiscipUnarity. 
The caUs for dialogue and ethical decision making in an interdisciplinary fomm 
in order to translate the precautionary principle into practice accord with Drees' 
(1988,1990) formulation of constmctive consonance. To recapitulate briefly from 
the previous chapter. Drees' constmctive consonance strives to engage a meta-
emergent dialogue that transcends interdisciplinary boundaries in a manner that 
values and respects the distinctiveness and integrity of the enterprises involved. 
The nature and purpose of this dialogue are configured by Drees' metaphysical 
convictions. SpecificaUy, Drees upholds a critical reaUst ontology and a dialectical, 
constructivist epistemology. These metaphysical convictions enable him to 
interpose a 'gap' between knowledge and reaUty, which provides a concepmal 
space within which to engage a dialogue of possibiUties. Drees emphasises the 
existential capacity of such dialogue and he positions his notion of an 'eschatology 
of the present' within this forum. 
An eschatology of the present involves an unusual juxtaposition of ideas since 
eschatology is associated with notions of fiUfiknent, perfection and 
consummation, etc., beyond death or beyond the world. Drees' formulation of an 
eschatology of the present, then, strives to motivate action toward a better Ufe 
sooner rather than later. It is dUs aspect of Drees' project, which is embedded 
within an UiterdiscipUnary fomm of dialogue and ethical decision makkig, that can 
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contribute to the works developed by Ashley (2000), Diduck (1999), the Panel for 
Education ^ r Sustainable Development (1998), Rosenbaum and Bressers (2000) 
and Scott (2001). Each of these projects shares Drees' metaphysical convictions. 
They share his existential conviction as weU, albeit in a secular form. Drees' 
eschatology of the present is inextricably tied to an overarching caU for 
conversion. So too are these envkonmental education engagements, each of 
which seeks a conversion toward sustainable practices. 
In addition to the resonances between translating the precautionary principle 
into action and Drees' eschatology of the present. Drees' formulation of 
constmctive consonance offers a chaUenge to envkonmental education, which if 
met, can enhance envkonmental education's contribution to implementing the 
precautionary principle. This chaUenge involves criticaUy engaging notions of 
tmth in envkonmental education. Constmctive consonance embraces both 
coherence and pragmatic theories of tmth. This eclecticism creates instabiUties 
that mkror critical reaUst engagements with scientific uncertainty and the 
precautionary principle. Given that coherence theories of tmth hold that a 
proposition is tme if it coheres with the whole system and pragmatic theories of 
tmth hold that a proposition is true if it is expedient, or useful, solves problems 
(Armour, 1969; JoachUn, 1906; Kkkham, 1992; Schmitt, 1995), the identification 
of scientific uncertainty is alUed to the coherence theories of tmth (or the 
correspondence theories, see previous chapter) and the implementation of the 
precautionary principle invokes pragmatic theories of truth. Thus, if 
envkonmental education engages with Drees' constmctive consonance, it can not 
only employ a thoroughly researched and fiiUy developed program that is whoUy 
suited to implementing the precautionary principle, it must elevate its 
engagements with tmth to the level of discourse. Hitherto, aU envkonmental 
education engagements with tmth have been either tacit or incidental. But critical 
engagements with ethical inquiry requke expUcit engagements with truth, and 
especiaUy with the pragmatic theories of tmth. 
CONCLUSION 
138 
CHAPTER THREE - TRACING THE THEORETICAL TERRAIN 
The purpose of this chapter has been to constmct a tracing of the engagements 
of uncertainty in envkonmental education. Tracing is not sknply a reiteration of 
what has akeady been laid down within the field. Tracings may extend the akeady-
said by foUowing the logic that has been deployed. In other words tracings may 
foUow the paths that existing engagements have preset in order to extend existing 
terrains. Furthermore, these extensions may result in articulations between 
domains that have been hitherto regarded as separate. Both types of extensions 
have been deployed frequentiy within the constmction of this tracing. The 
expUcation of the impUcit support for scientific uncertainty that the Panel for 
Education for Sustainable Development compels through its support of the 
precautionary principle is an example of the fkst kind of extension. Whereas, the 
possible articulation of the report presented by the Panel for Education for 
Sustainable Development to Foucault's theorisation of discourse and Lyotard's 
theorisation of language games are examples of the second kind of extension. The 
latter extension is purely speciUative given the limited information provided by the 
report in relation to this matter. However, this type of extension need not be 
speculative. The connection forged between Gough and Scott's theorisation of 
uncertaUity and Barthes' notion of reading/writUig the self is not speculative given 
the claritj^ of the path that Gough and Scott preset Ui this dkection. 
This process of tracing has drawn diverse terrains into reUef from a very smaU 
number of engagements. Those projects that focus on scientific uncertainty 
articulate envkonmental education to the uncertainty of envkonmental processes, 
especiaUy, although not exclusively, in relation to the unpredictable consequences 
of human activity. From this platform, they argue for curricular Uiclusions such as 
risk Uteracy into envkonmental education. Further to this, they emphasise the 
Unportance of dialogue and ethical decision makkig Ui an interdiscipUnary forum 
in order to translate the precautionary principle Uito practice. Engaging widi 
Drees' project of constmctive consonance may enhance this process. Not only 
does Drees' notion of an 'eschatology of tiie present' mkror tiie translation of 
precautionary principle in practice, it chaUenges envkonmental education to 
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elevate engagements with tmth to the level of discourse. This is an important task 
for envkonmental education because aUying oneself to the pragmatic theories of 
tmth is indispensable when engaging the precautionary principle. 
An exception to articulation of scientific uncertainty to the unpredictabiUty of 
envkonmental processes and the subsequent caU for precautionary action is to be 
found in Hardy's work. WhUst this work is whoUy compatible with this Une of 
thought. Hardy has taken a different path which led to an exploration of 
uncertainty as a constimtive aspect of learning. This argument draws on the 
findings of chaos theory and cognitive biology/psychology, which together posit 
learning as a self-organising process in which unexpected outcomes emerge in 
whoUy deterministic systems. Hardy articulates these findings to DoU's 
postmodern vision of a transformative curriculum, which he developed in 
response to a metaphorical engagement of chaos theory. This leads Hardy to 
argue that envkonmental education should engage pedagogical strategies that are 
likely to promote uncertainty and, thereby, promote learning. 
Lastiy, Gough and Scott's engagement with postmodernist/poststmcturaUst 
Uterary theory articulates uncertainty to the notion of the fluidity of texts. 
SpecificaUy, Gough and Scott draw on the poststmcturaUst notion of the Death of 
the Author to support the ever-changing, social constmction of (the) 
envkonment. Viewing (the) envkonment as text and accepting that text is 
rewritten with each reading precludes fixed points of reference from which to 
begin to search for certainty. Reference points are constantiy being forged and 
dismanded, which highUghts the groundlessness of attempting to privUege a 
particular set of reference points Ui the quest for certaUity. This theorisation of 
uncertainty is 'deepened' by the reflexive manoeuvre that problematises the self in 
die same manner. Thus, Gough and Scott can be read as equatUig uncertainty with 
flux, and they embed this theorisation of uncertaUity Ui thek model of curriculum 
development. 
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The diverse array of positions developed from such a smaU number of 
engagements with a particular theme within the same field is quite extraordinary. 
There is one thread of commonaUty within these engagements, however. Each of 
these engagements articulates uncertainty and envkonmental education 
normatively, although the particularities of the normative positions differ. Some 
of the engagements assign a positive value to engaging uncertainty as a result of its 
generative capacity, whereas other engagements assign a negative value to 
uncertainty and strive for its reduction. Some projects go beyond this broad view 
of value theory and expUcitiy argue for the need to engage ethical inquiry in 
response to uncertainty. Envkonmental education's engagement with uncertainty 
is normative through and through. This common thread, however, frays in many 
dkections. 
No mention has been made of rhizomes or Bodies without Organs whUe 
tracing envkonmental education's engagements with uncertainty. This is because 
these figurations attend the second aspect of Deleuze and Guattari's cartography, 
namely mapping. Both tracings and mappings forge connections, but tracings 
forge connections that are preordained and utterly constrained by Platonic logic. 
Mappings, on the other hand, forge connections that ignore the blockages and 
mpture the boundaries imposed by Platonic logic. 
Whereas the purpose of this chapter has been to constmct a tracing, the 
foUowing two chapters provide Unes of flight from which to constmct maps. 
These lines of flight forge Unks between envkonmental education, Levinas' ethics 
of responsibUity for the Other and narrative theory. These chapters can be read in 
any order as they are discrete. The thkd mappUig chapter. Shifting Tertains, forges 
connections between the two Unes of flight and these connections are linked to 
major themes in contemporary envkonmental education discourse. The tracUig 
that has been constmcted Ui dUs chapter wiU dien be superimposed upon these 
maps in order to discern the sUences and blockages that constraUi the contours of 
this tracing and to open up new spaces within which to experience the concept of 
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uncertainty differentiy. This final stage of cartography is undertaken in Chapter 
Seven. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This fkst mapping chapter forges a line of flight from envkonmental 
education to Levinas' ethics of responsibiUty for the Other. Emmanuel Levinas 
has been acclaimed as "one of the most significant ethical thinkers of the 
twentieth cenmry" (Kearney & Rainwater, 1996, p. 122), as "the greatest moral 
phUosopher of this cenmry" (Bauman, 1992, p. 41) and as one whose thought 
"can make us tremble" (Derrida, 1967/1978, p. 82). These outstanding accolades 
from leading figures in contemporary phUosophy foUow assiduous engagements, 
both critical and interpretive, with Levinas' ethics of responsibiUty for the Other 
(1961/1991, 1974/1991). Attention to Levmas' thought has not been confmed to 
the phUosophy arena, however. Levinas' thought has attracted transdiscipUnary 
attention and Levinas' influence is beginning to be felt in education. 
WhUst the number of engagements with Levinas in education is Umited to 
date, three distinct foci can be discerned: the conduct of educational research 
(ChUd, WUUams, Bkch, & Boody, 1995; Dykeman, 1993); die dynamics of die 
teacher-smdent relationships (Biesta, 2003; Chinnery, 2003; Safstrom, 2003; Todd, 
2001); and phUosophy of education (Biesta, 2003; Chinnery, 2003; Nuyen, 2000; 
Safstrom, 2003; Simon, 2003; Todd, 2003a, 2003b) In each of diese Unes of 
inquiry, Levinas' thought is being linked to interpersonal practices in education. 
This focus on interpersonal practices is not surprising given that Levinas' ethics of 
responsibiUty specificaUy attends the realm of human sociaUty. In this chapter, 
however, I introduce a fourth line of Uiquiry that affiUates Levinas' thought with 
envkonmental education's curticulum Uiterests in both 'postmodern uncertainties' 
(Panel for Education for Sustamable Development, 1998) and envkonmental 
values education. This chapter explores tiie plausibiUty of this affUiation by 
examining of some aspects of Levinas' phUosophy that enable this affiUation to be 
suggested, raises some of die possibUities and chaUenges diat this affUiation could 
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introduce into envkonmental education, and concludes by considering how 
envkonmental education could engage with Levinasian eco-ethico-poUtical action. 
RESONANCES BETWEEN LEVINAS AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
EDUCATION 
The report presented to the Department for Education and Employment 
(DfEE) and the QuaUfications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) by the Panel for 
Education ^ r Sustainable Development in the Schools Sector (1998) contributes 
to the current National Curriculum Review in the United Kingdom and to 
international debates in education for sustainabiUty and envkonmental education. 
This report identifies uncertainty as an intrinsic element of sustainable 
development and includes uncertainty as one of seven dimensions that are 
indispensable for education^r sustainable development. 
The report assigns two meanings to the term 'uncertainty'. In the section 
that introduces the seven principles or dimensions of sustainable development, 
uncertainty is described in terms of "limits of knowledge" (Panel for Education^r 
Sustainable Development, 1998, p. 4). Yet an additional sense of uncertainty is 
clearly articulated in the statements of specific learning outcomes at key stages 
within the dimension on uncertainty. For example, the report stipulates that at the 
end of key stage two, pupUs should be able to: "Understand that people may have 
different views on sustainabiUty issues and that these may often be in confUct" 
(1998, p. 8). 
This objective clearly links uncertainty to pluraUsm. Statements that 
acknowledge and affkm pluraUsm are standard in education documents. 
TypicaUy, thek Uiclusion serves to signify a commitment to social justice by 
respectUig the diversity of human experiences. This statement is noteworthy, 
however, because it is conjoUied to an epistemological stance on uncertakity. 
Simultaneously viewing uncertaUity as pluraUty and the Umitation of knowledge 
enables the possibUity of affUiatUig envkonmental education with the phUosophy 
of Emmanuel Levinas. 
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UNCERTAINTY AND PLURALITY 
Statements such as the previously quoted objective may be read as appeals to 
promote the vkme of tolerance. But tolerance is a troubled term. According to 
Marcuse (quoted in Nuyen, 1997, p. 1), "what is proclaimed and practised as 
tolerance today [in our advanced industrial society] is ... serving the cause of 
oppression". This oppression results from the form of tolerance that recogiUses 
both difference and sameness, but which seeks to find and accenmate simUarities 
that can tolerandy unite differences. This is violence. The subordination of 
difference to sameness, which ultimately aims to erase difference under the banner 
of tolerance, deforms. This violence deforms not by: 
injuring and annihilating persons [but by] interrupting thek 
continuity, making them play roles in which they no longer 
recogrUse themselves, making them betray not only comnUtments 
but thek own substance, making them carry out actions that wiU 
destroy every possibiUty for action. (Levinas, 1961/1991, p. 21) 
Many commentators accenmate that this violence privileges the dominant 
point of view (Burbules, 1997; Nuyen, 1997). If envkonmental education is to 
successfiiUy conjoin uncertainty and pluraUty it must stridendy resist viewing 
difference from the dominant point of view as this eradicates any possibiUty of 
uncertainty. The phUosophical thought of Emmanuel Levinas is whoUy relevant to 
this conjunction since his thought is underpinned by the question: "What meaning 
can community take on in difference without reducing difference" (Levinas, 
1961/1991, p. 154)? 
The possibiUty of a non-violent engagement with difference occurs in the 
relationship that Levinas caUs the 'face to face'. This relationship is also germane 
to the other mode of uncertainty that appears in the report from the Panel for 
Education for Sustainable Development in the Schools Sector, namely the 
limitation of knowledge. Levinas argues that the exposure to the utter 
excessiveness that occurs in the face to face relationship defies concepmaUsation 
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and thematisation. Hence, there is an kreducible residue that defies being 
capmred in concepts and conveyed by language. This kreducible residue imposes 
an unbreachable limitation on knowledge. 
The foUowing section presents a brief reading of the face to face relationship 
in a manner that focuses on its constimtive ethical character. This announces a 
thkd resonance between Levinas' thought and envkonmental education since 
envkonmental education is characterised by its commitment to an overt affective 
agenda. 
THE FACE TO FACE - A MORAL SUMMONS 
Levinas' ethics draws on Descartes' formulation of the infinite both as 
exceeding the idea of infinity and preceding the finite to introduce a new ethical 
relationship into phUosophy. Infinity, the notion of an idea in me that exceeds 
me, that overflows me, ruptures the notion of a self-sufficient, knowing subject. 
The utter excessiveness of the idea in me that exceeds me defies totaUsation which 
would result in its being brought into my knowledge and understanding, into my 
possession. The idea that exceeds me is the Stranger; it is kreducible and 
inassimUable alterity; it is the other (lAutre). How, then, can I know and speak of 
this that exceeds me? Levinas argues that I know and can speak of it through my 
exposure to it, through what it says to me, the 'saying' (/^  Dir^, rather than my 
thematisation, the 'said' (/^  Dit). 
Exposure to the utter excessiveness of one's feUow human being, the 
neighbour, the Other (lAutrui), radicaUy decentres the subject, disclosing a 
relationship prior to the constimtion of the knowing subject. Levinas employs the 
term 'transcendence' to refer to this relationship with the Other that does not 
reduce the Other to the same. According to Levinas (1961/1991, p. 41), 
"[t]ranscendence designates a relation with reaUty that is infinitely distant from my 
own reaUty, yet without this distance destroying this reaUty and without this 
relation destroying the distance". Furthermore, Levinas argues that as this 
relationship precedes concepmaUsation, transcendence precedes ontology. 
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This transcendent relationship is an ethical encounter with Levinas' 
formulation of the 'face'. The face is the revelation, or 'epiphany', of the Other 
who exceeds "the idea of the other in me" (Levinas, 1961/1991, p. 50, Levinas' 
emphasis). Levinas argues that the epiphany of the face is an ethical encounter 
because the face simultaneously appeals and summons me to not comnUt murder. 
This is a simultaneous appeal / summons to respect alterity. It is an ethical 
invocation to resist both concepmaUsation which excises the otherness of the 
Other in order to capmre it within a concept and thematisation, which offers "the 
world to die Other in speech" (Levkias, 1961/1991, p. 209). As ChUd et. al. (1995) 
have noted, the simultaneous appeal / summons to resist thematisation resounds 
in the voice of beU hooks^: 
I am waiting for them to stop talking about the "Other", to stop 
even describing how important it is to be able to talk about 
difference. It is not just important what we speak about, but how 
and why we speak. ... Often this speech about the "Other" 
annihUates, erases: "No need to hear your voice when I can talk 
about you better than you can speak about yourself. No need to 
hear your voice. Only teU me about your pain. I want to know your 
story. And then I wiU teU it back to you in a new way. TeU it back 
to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own. Rewriting 
you I write myself anew. I am stiU author, authority. I am stiU the 
colonizer, the speaking subject, and you are now at the center of my 
talk." Stop, (hooks, 1990, pp. 151-152) 
ConcepmaUsation and thematisation dispossess the Other of otherness and 
displace the Other, now the Same, faceless into the world of the same. From the 
EnUghtenment perspective, this extends the autonomous freedom of the thinker 
by extendUig the landscape of the known. More specificaUy, concepmaUsation and 
diematisation promote autonomy as they provide a means "through which to 
' bell hooks does not adhere to the convention of capitalising the first letters in her name. 
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comprehend others; to render them intelligible; to respond to them; whUe also 
neutraUsing thek threat to my autonomy" (ChUd et al., 1995, p. 172). But 
according to Levinas, the possibUity of freedom is presented by the plea of the 
Other to resist concepmaUsation and thematisation. Levinas argues that: 
[t]he being that expresses itself imposes itself, but does so precisely 
by appealing to me in its destimtion and nudity — its hunger -
without my being able to be deaf to that appeal. Thus in expression 
the being that imposes itself does not Umit but promotes my 
freedom, by arousing my goodness. (1961/1991, p. 200) 
Facing the Other creates the possibiUty for freedom. This possibiUty of 
freedom is heteronomous, but not in the famiUar connotation that associates 
heteronomy with tyranny and oppression. Instead, facing the Other creates the 
possibiUty for freedom through an ethical relationship that resists the tyranny and 
oppression of concepmaUsation and thematisation. 
The possibiUty of freedom that the face to face encounter offers has another 
dimension that is inextricably linked to the plea / summons of the Other, The 
invitation from the Other to enter into a transcendent relationship restrucmres 
subjectivity. To become a complete T in the metaphysical sense, I have to Usten 
to the Other. This is only possible by resisting concepmaUsation and 
thematisation which annihUate the otherness of the Other. It is necessary "to 
avoid and forestaU the instant of inhumanity" (Levinas, 1961/1991, p. 35) in order 
to achieve fuU subjectivity. This is only possible by accepting ethical responsibUity 
for the Other. Consequentiy, "this responsibiUty is something that I, as an I in its 
fiiU subjectivity, cannot shkk" (Nuyen, 1999, p. 46). 
Both the possibiUty of freedom and the fiUfillment of ethical subjectivity are 
inextricably interwoven in the heteronomy of the face to face. Levinas clearly 
signals the impUcations that this new relationship has for education by asserting 
repeatedly that to face the Other is to be taught. 
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THE OTHER AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
Levinas' ethics of responsibiUty specificaUy attends the realm of human 
sociaUty. However, the question - Who is the Other? - has been asked repeatedly 
in readings, re-readings and cross-readings of Levinas. Can the Other be God? the 
feminine? animals other than humans? Uving organisms in general? the 
envkonment? An extension of the realm of the Other is necessary if Levinas is to 
be engaged within envkonmental education as a basis for ^^o-ethico-poUtical 
action. It may be argued that an imperative for such an engagement has been set 
in World Conservation Strategy by the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature, in coUaboration with the United Nations Envkonment Program and the 
World WUdUfe Fund (lUCN, UNEP & WWF): 
Ultimately the behaviour of entke societies towards the biosphere 
must be transformed if the achievement of conservation objectives 
is to be assured. A new ethic, embracing plants and animals as weU 
as people, is requked for human societies to Uve in harmony with 
the namral world on which they depend for thek survival and 
weUbeing. The long term task of envkonmental education is to 
foster or reinforce attimdes and behaviour compatible with this 
edUc. (lUCN UNEP WWF, 1980, Section 13) 
This statement may be read variously, however. If the 'new ethic' desked is 
simply an extension of human ethics into the non-human realm, an extension of 
the Other is unnecessary. This seems to be Levinas' position. During an interview 
in which he was asked whether we have ethical obUgations towards animals, he 
repUed that: "It is clear that, without considering animals as human beings, the 
ethical extends to aU Uving beings. ... But the proto-type of this is human ethics" 
(Wright, Hughes, & Ainley, 1988, p. 172). WhUst Levinas ckcumspecdy signaled 
the possibiUty of the extension of the Other beyond the human reaUn when 
questioned fiirther in die same interview, dUs extension was severely restricted. 
But the possibUity that the Odier may be extended Ui a whoUy envkonmental 
sense that embraces aU Uvkig organisms and die non-Uving components of 
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envkonments has been developed and defended by Llewelyn (1991). This 
constimtes an extension of the realm of the Other and it accords more with the 
notion of 'transformation' caUed for by lUCN, UNEP and WWF than an 
extension of human ethics which carries ecocoloniaUst connotations. 
In cross-reading Levinas, Heide^er and others, Llewelyn develops an eco-
ethics that embraces the non-human Other. This eco-ethics is developed and 
justified from an identification of the needs of the Other in the non-human realm. 
This is achieved by drawing upon Heidegger's fourfold space, which consists of 
four regions - Sky, Earth, Mortals and Gods - that are infinitely and internaUy 
related. The internal relatedness of the fourfold provides a matrix in which the 
four regions are connected by an ecological interdependence. This entaUs a 
mumaUty of needs, which is central to the development of Llewelyn's eco-ethics. 
SpecificaUy, he argues that this needfiilness is sufficient to endow me with 
responsibiUty: "no specific characteristic other than its in someway needing me is 
requked in order that I should be dkecdy responsible for another thing" 
(Llewelyn, 1991, p. 254)). 
The responsibiUty endowed by the needfiilness of the Other signals a link to 
the exigent need of the Other that is expressed in the appeal / summons to not 
commit murder. But this is not sufficient to estabUsh a dkect Unk between this 
eco-ethics and the face to face. For this, it is necessary to estabUsh that the 
encounter is transcendent in Levinas' sense. That is, it is necessary to show that 
this responsibiUty is pre-ontological, beyond being. This chaUenge is met by 
introducing the notion of non-quaUtative difference. Non-quaUtative difference 
cannot be thematised or concepmaUsed. It is, therefore, alterity. The non-
quaUtative difference of a thing being other than me announces a transcendent 
encounter Ui which "the naked alterity of a finite vulnerable thing suffices to put 
me under dkect responsibUity toward it" (Llewelyn, 1991, p. 254, p. 255). This 
forges the Unk between Llewelyn's eco-ethics and the transcendence of Levinas' 
face to face. The face may express kself from any region of die fourfold: "k is not 
only with another human bekig diat I can be face to face" (Llewelyn, 1991, p. 
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256). The face may be another animal, a plant or an inanimate object such as a 
cUff face. 
Through this cross-reading of Heidegger and Levinas, Llewelyn extends the 
ethical realm of the face beyond the human realm, rather than extending human 
ethics into the faceless realm of the non-human, in a manner that retains the 
integrity of Levinas' formulation of the face. As Llewelyn (1991, p. 246)) notes 
"no one has it in his [sic] power to move the limits of the employment of a word 
anywhere he likes and stiU be sure of being able to get that word to do aU the jobs 
that it used to do". In this case, a redefinition of the face would remove Levinas' 
ethics from the argument before it had even begun. Therefore, in order to extend 
the realm of the face and preserve its integrity, Llewelyn extends the 'source' of 
alterity that the face expresses by deploying the notion of non-quaUtative 
difference. 
THE THIRD PARTY AND ECO-POLITICAL AGENCY 
Levinas' ethics of responsibiUty and Llewelyn's cross-reading, as they have 
been read so far, present the face to face encounter as a relation between 
unmediated singulars. But this condition of unmediated singularity is dissolved by 
the epiphany of face: the thkd party {le tiers) is always present. The unwavering 
'copresence' of the thkd party interrupts the transcendence of the face to face, 
causing a movement from ethics to justice and poUtics. It is this vital movement 
effected by the thkd party that enables the possibiUty of engaging with Levinasian 
ethics in envkonmental education. The foUowing discussion outlines the 
inseparabUity of the Other and the thkd party, the aporia that this inseparabiUty 
creates, the movement that this aporia effects from ethics to justice and poUtics, 
and the possibiUty of appropriating this movement to inform envkonmental 
education via Llewelyn's cross-reading of Levinas. 
The primordial responsibUity of the face to face is an "unlimited ethical 
demand" (Levkias, 1982/1985, p. 114). It is "an offering of oneself (Levkias, 
1974/1991, p. 54), a substimtion to the point of taking "the bread out of one's 
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own mouth, to nourish the hunger of another with one's own fastUig" (Levinas, 
1974/1991, p. 56). It is hardly surprising, Ui Ught of the foregoing quotations, that 
Levinas' ethics has been charged with utopianism (Levinas, 1982/1985; Wright et 
al., 1988). However, such charges obtain only when the face to face occurs as a 
relation between unmediated singulars. Only then can the face to face entaU the 
absolute self-sacrifice of the I. But the face to face enigmaticaUy demands and 
dissolves the condition of unmediated singularity, within which the summons for 
ultimate self-sacrifice arises, since the Other {lAutrui), whom I face, "is both the 
singularity of every human being and the singularity of every human being" 
(Llewelyn, 1991, p. 41, Llewelyn's emphasis). A thkd party unwaveringly inhabits 
the face qua face and prevents the self-sacrifice of the I by protecting the I from 
the "violence potentiaUy unleashed in the experience of the neighbor and of 
absolute unicity" (Derrida, 1997/1999, pp. 32-33). 
The thkd party is the Other's Other who "looks at me in the eyes of the 
Otiier" (Levinas, 1961/1991, p. 213). As the Odier's Odier, the thkd party does 
not represent a numerical increase in the number of Others whom I face 
simultaneously. Rather, the thkd party is other than the Other. The manifestation 
of die dUrd party, who is diere "from die first" (Levkias, 1974/1991, p. 157), 
shatters the transcendence of the face to face as it compels the comparison of 
incomparables within the pre-concepmaUsing and pre-thematising relationship. An 
aporia is created that instantiy shatters the transcendence of the face to face. But 
as the thkd party is there from the fkst, the epiphany, or revelation, of the face is 
simultaneously manifested and shattered. 
Is, then, the 'event' (Nuyen, 1999) of Levinas' ethics a non-event? (a)an 
(non)event neutraUsed by its own (Un)possibiUty? In the typical conception of 
diachrony as a continuous temporal flow, this would necessarily be so: as "this 
Uitermption of the ethical knmediacy, is itself immediate" (Derrida, 1997/1999, p. 
32), the ethical relationship faUs from the fkst. But Levinas argues that the 
diachrony of the otherwise than being is on the hither side of the temporal flow, "a 
diachrony that is refractory to aU synchronization, a transcendent diachrony" 
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(Levinas, 1974/1991, p. 9). Hence, the epiphany and dissolution of the face 
concur in an unpresentable 'moment' as a trace, "a past that was never present" 
(Levinas, 1974/1991, p. 161). This 'event' marks "the bkth of the question: What 
do I have to do with justice" (Levinas, 1974/1991)? The dissolution of the face to 
face through the 'Contra-Diction' (Derrida, 1997/1999, p. 30) of the thkd heralds 
the movement from the ethical relationship of the Saying to justice and poUtics in 
the Said. The responsibility of the face to face is abmptiy transformed to response 
ability in the world. Furthermore, "there is also justice for me ... [m]y lot is 
important" (Levinas, 1974/1991, p. 159-161). This justice for me is not a means 
of /^^preservation [conatus essendi) that arises oppormnisticaUy from the reversion 
from the Saying to the Said. Rather, responsibiUty and justice for me are 
bestowed, from the fkst, by the Other's Other, from the thkd party. 
The movement from the Saying to the Said that the thkd party compels, 
together with Llewelyn's extension of the realm of the face, enables explorations 
of Levinas' ethics of responsibiUty and eco-poUtical agency from an kreducible 
platform of envkonmental ethics. As Llewelyn's argument has been presented 
thus far, his deployment of the notion of non-quaUfiable difference precludes any 
notion of hierarchisation, or comparison of incomparables in Levinas' terms. This 
results in unconditional bioequaUty and problems of distributive justice foUow. 
For example, Llewelyn notes that the primordial responsibiUty of the I extends to 
a cancer virus as weU as the person whose body it may be destroying. In the 
absence of any consideration of the thkd party, this aporia results in paralysis, a 
paralysis caused by incomparable and inassimUable responsibiUty. But the entry of 
the thkd party mptures the transfixity of this aporia. 
It is crucial to emphasise at this juncture that neither Levinas nor Llewelyn 
advocates the abandonment of hierarchisation and prioritisation. Llewelyn "does 
not say that what we are seeking, absurdly, is incomparabiUty Ui the sphere of the 
human in comparison with the human or non-human beUig, or kideed 
UicomparabiUty where the class of comparison is anknals or other non-human 
beings" (1991, p. 250). What Levkias and Llewelyn do say is diat we should not 
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confiise the ethical with the poUtical. Both Levinas and Llewelyn simate 
comparisons in the political realm. Therefore, they can uphold unconditional 
equaUty in the ethical face to face encounter, which in Llewelyn's formulation 
leads to a biocentric ethics. The unwavering presence of the thkd party, however, 
shatters the transcendence of the face to face, effecting a movement from the 
ethical realm to the poUtical realm, where problems of distributive justice can be 
tackled. 
For Levinas the unwavering copresence of the thkd in "the epiphany of the 
face qua face opens humanit/ ' (Levinas, 1961/1991, p. 213). In Llewelyn's cross-
reading, then, the thkd party opens the matrix of ecological interdependence, 
indeed even the matrix of cosmological interdependence. The questioning look of 
the thkd party jolts the I from the pre-concepuaUsing and pre-thematising state of 
the face to face by forcing attention to questions such as: "What are the other and 
the thkd for one another? What have they done to one another? Which passes 
before the other?" (Levinas, 1974/1991, p. 157) and "Who passes before the other 
in my responsibUity?" (Levinas, 1984/1996, p. 168). This breach of transcendence 
effected by the thkd party necessitates that the "Saying is fixed in the Said, is 
written, becomes a book, law and science" (Levinas, 1974/1991, p. 159). In 
Llewelyn's cross-reading, the questions that assaU the I within the ecological 
matrix of interdependency requke heedfiilness of ecological principles. 
SpecificaUy, Llewelyn states that: 
If the responsibiUty that such a green ethic entaUs is to give rise to 
practical poUcies heed must be given to the findings of ecological 
science understood as the smdy of the relations between organisms 
and thek envkonment and to the technologies by which those 
poUcies are put into effect. (Llewelyn, 1991, p. 269) 
Therefore, the form of eco-poUtical agency tiiat arises from a relation witii die 
non-quaUtative difference, or kreducible and UiassknUable alterity, of die Odier is 
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neither soUpsistic nor relativistic as may, perhaps, be expected. It is accessible to 
either deconstmction or critique. 
To state that envkonmental values education and eco-poUtical agency should 
be heedful of ecological principles and conducive to critique is hardly news in 
envkonmental education. But, this discussion has not simply arrived at a 
platimde. When ecological science is conceived from the perspective that 
acknowledges the otherwise than being, the nature and stams of envkonmental 
science differ radicaUy from the perspectives that t5^icaUy ckculate in 
envkonmental education. Envkonmental science cannot fuUy elucidate ecological 
relations, not because "there always remains something more to be described, but 
because there always remains something that exceeds theoretical description" 
(Llewelyn, 1991, p. 268). The smdy of ecology shaU always be a partial description 
of relations due to the reduction of the Saying when it is fbced in the Said. 
In addition to imposing an kreducible limitation on knowledge, fixing the 
Saying into the Said suggestively signals possible Unks between Levinas' ethics and 
viewing knowledge within the frame of narrative theory. However, Levinas' 
deployment of these terms is both unique and precise which prevents a simple 
transition from ethics to narrative theory. But this is a transition that can and 
must be made if Levinas' ethics is to inform action in the world and Levinas 
provides numerous clues to this necessary transition. Perhaps the most 
unequivocal link can be drawn from a rhetorical question posed by Levinas 
foUowing the presentation of Transcendence and Height: "But, aU things considered, 
what is the empkical? The purely empkical is that which receives signification, not 
that which gives it" (Levkias, 1962/1996, p. 22). This rhetorical question provides 
a basis from which to constmct a credible argument that posits the fbdng of the 
SayUig into the Said as a narrative enterprise which "must not be taken for an 
anonymous law ... governing an Unpersonal totaUty" (Levinas, 1974/1991, p. 
161). From this, k may be argued diat die field of ecology is a storied domaUi as k 
is constructed within the realm of the Said. 
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Linking Levinas' thought to narrative theory enables the possibiUty of forgUig 
further links within postmodernist / poststmcturaUst thought. For example, when 
Levinas' notion of kreducible and UiassimUable alterity is viewed in Ught of 
narrative theory, resonances form between Levinas and Lyotard, especiaUy 
Lyotard's conviction that "it should be made clear that it is not up to us to provide 
reality but to kivent iUusions to what is conceivable but not presentable" (Lyotard 
et al., 1992, p. 24) in an effort to wage a war against totaUty. Furthermore, Levinas' 
denial of anonymity and impersonaUty resonate with the Foucauldian type of 
questions posed by Mazel in relation to envkonmental issues: 
What has counted as the envkonment, and what may count? Who 
marks off the concepmal boundaries, and under what authority, and 
for what reasons? Have those boundaries and that authority been 
contested, and if so, by whom? With what success, and by vkme of 
what strategies of resistance? (Mazel, 1996, p. 143) 
Drawing on the thoughts of Levinas and Llewelyn, within the frame of 
narrative theory, enables the advocacy of a critical form of eco-poUtical agency 
within envkonmental education that can draw on a complementary, but by no 
means univocal, repertoke of postmodernist / poststructuraUst thought. The 
point to be emphasised at this stage, however, is that the assertion made earUer -
that the heedfiilness of ecological principles that engaging Llewelyn's cross-
reading of Levinas requkes - is not simply a repetition of an 'accepted fact' in 
envkonmental education since the argument that led to this concurrence and the 
line of thought that foUows differ radicaUy from the nature and stams afforded to 
envkonmental science within the majority of envkonmental education theorising. 
There are some exceptions, however. Both Noel Gough (1993, 1994a, 1997, 
1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d) and Andrew Stables (1996, 1997, 2001b), for 
example, have strongly advocated viewing both envkonmental science and 
envkonmental education from a narrative framework. These works provide 
contemporary envkonmental education sources from which support may be 
drawn for the position presented here. However, the two positions are not 
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synonymous with the position being presented here, as neither Gough's nor 
Stables' position entaUs commitment to radical alterity as a constimtive element. 
CHALLENGES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 
If a positive response is to be made to the increasing caUs for the introduction 
of postmodernist / poststmcturaUst perspectives into envkonmental education 
(CaUicott & da Rocha, 1996; A. Gough, 1997, 1999; Littiedyke, 1996; Sosa, 1996), 
then postmodernist / poststmcturaUst ethics must be engaged by virme of 
envkonmental education's commitment to envkonmental values education. 
Llewelyn's eco-ethics offers a lens through which to theorise postmodernist / 
poststmcmraUst envkonmental values education and its coroUary of eco-poUtical 
agency. Any such engagement with Levinas, via Llewelyn, wiU abound with 
constimtive tensions and these tensions must be welcomed in keeping with the 
commitment to uncertainty and pluraUty. This section anticipates two tensions 
that could receive high profiles in envkonmental education. The fkst of these 
tensions involves the impossibiUty of developing an eco-ethics from Llewelyn's 
cross-reading of Levinas. This would and must be an unrelenting chaUenge. The 
second chaUenge is a non-chaUenge. It concerns possible disparagement of 
engaging with Levinas and Llewelyn, by linking thek ethics to the famiUar 
criticisms of deep ecology that reverberate within envkonmental education. 
UnUke the essential endurance of the fkst chaUenge, the second chaUenge can be 
dispensed readUy. 
^4N ECO-ETHICS VIA LEVINAS AND LLEWELYN IS IMPOSSIBLE 
Llewelyn's eco-ethics, via Levinas, wiU not provide envkonmental education 
with an eco-ethics. It wiU not and cannot fiUfUl the task of envkonmental 
education, as conceived by lUCN, UNEP & WWF, to provide the "new ethic, 
embracUig plants and anUnals as weU as people" (lUCN UNEP WWF, 1980, 
Section 13) if this new ethic is expected to be embodied as a code of ethics. This 
impossibiUty arises from a (con)fiision of the term 'ethics'. For Levinas, ethics is a 
pre-ontological relationship rather than an ontological code of ethics. Derrida 
accenmates this distinction in Violence and Metaphysics by referring to Levinas' 
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ethics as the "Ethics of Ethics' and notes that 'this Ethics of Ethics can occasion 
neither a determined ethics nor determined laws without negating and forgetting 
itself (Derrida, 1967/1978, p. 111). 
Any hope for the development of a code of eco-ethics via Levinas and 
Llewelyn is at best misguided and at worst a betrayal. Such hope is a betrayal if it 
arises from a beUef that a code of ethics would 'accompUsh' Levinas' ethics since a 
deske for accompUshment concomitandy strives to render the face to face 
relationship redundant. This deske for a code of ethics violates the summons/plea 
of die Other: "Thou shah not commit murder" (Levkias, 1982/1985, p. 89). 
Instead of respecting and welcoming the alterity of the Other, approaches that 
hope for a code of ethics wittingly, or unwittingly, scheme to exUe the Other, 
hook's (1990, p. 152) characterisation of the coloniser echoes here: "No need to 
hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak yourself. 
The hope for a code of ethics is sknply misguided, however, if it arises from a 
(con)fusion that could be remedied by a clarification of terms. The movement 
from the ethical relationship with the Other to justice and poUtics does not occur 
via an intermediate code of eco-ethics; instead, the transition is a dkect bridge 
from the kreducible ethical transcendence of the face to ethico-poUtics. If this 
concepmal shift from a code of eco-ethics to eco-ethico-poUtical action is 
compatible with the lUCN, UNEP, and WWF's aspkation to a 'new ethic', then 
the lUCN, UNEP, and WWF has prepared the way for the engagement of 
Levinas' ethics in envkonmental education via Llewelyn's cross-reading. 
However, just as there is not an ethics, Levinas notes that "there is no 
poUtics for accomplishing the moral but there are certainly some poUtics which are 
fiirther from it or closer to it" (Wright et al., 1988, p. 177, emphasis added). Two 
important points can be drawn from Levinas' statement. Fkstiy, the ethico-poUtics 
is an ideal. This does not impede or devalue striving toward an ideal as Levinas 
notes: "This utopianism does not prohibit you from condemning certaUi facmal 
states, nor from recognizing the relative progress that can be made" (Wright et al., 
1988, p. 178). The pursuit of an unattainable ideal is not fiitile and the pursuit of 
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an ethico-eco-poUtics in envkonmental education can be assisted and supported 
by the work of others in the consteUation of postmodernist / poststmcmraUst 
thought, such as Lyotard and Foucault, as noted earUer. The other point to note 
is that there is an undeniably pragmatic dimension in Levinas' thought. This 
pragmatic dimension can both affkm and provide a positive means of 
interrogating envkonmental education's commitment to its overt affective agenda 
in the pursuit of eco-ethico-poUtical action. 
DEEP ECOLOGY AND ECO-ETHICS VIA LEVINAS AND LLEWELYN 
The unconditional biocentric equaUty that the deployment of non-quaUtative 
difference brings to Llewelyn's eco-ethics, when combined with the restructured 
notion of subjectivity that is expUcit in Levinas' work and impUed in Llewelyn's, 
leads to what may appear to be another problem for engaging Levinasian eco-
ethics in envkonmental education. Biocentric equaUty and the restmcturing of 
subjectivity signal links between Llewelyn's eco-ethics and deep ecology. This 
signals a chaUenge as the criticisms of deep ecology reverberate within 
envkonmental education. 
One of the most concise and vitrioUc summaries of these criticisms has been 
provided by Stark (1995, p. 275-276), who views deep ecology as postmodern 
envkonmentaUsm. SpecificaUy, he asserts that: 
The phUosophical foundations of deep ecology are abundantiy clear, 
whoUy unpromising, and logicaUy indefensible. ... In its rejection of 
reason (SUorski, 1993), postmodern envkonmentaUsm renders 
questions of knowledge, ethics, and poUtics utterly unresolvable... 
Postmodern envkonmentaUsts claim to do away with real problems 
by phUosophicaUy ignoring them and by appeaUng to spkimal, 
intuitive claUns. They offer us metaphors (Gardkier, 1990) Uke 
"ecocentrism," "non-anthropocentrism," "bioregional diversity," 
"biospherical egaUtarianism," devoid of any content, rich in 
emotional appeal to tack knowledge (BotwUUck, 1993) and fraught 
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with retrograde poUtical impUcations. ... The issue imposed by 
postmodern envkonmentaUsm is not the fate of the planet. What is 
at issue is the fate of reason in radical envkonmentaUsm. (Stark, 
1995, pp. 275-276) 
In summary, Stark's objections to deep ecology stem from what he perceives 
to be its rejection of reason, knowledge, ethics and poUtics, and its embrace of 
spirimaUty. However, any chaUenges that may be anticipated for theorising 
envkonmental education through Llewelyn's eco-ethics, via Stark's objections, are 
non-chaUenges. None of Stark's objections can be upheld in relation to Levinas' 
ethics of the face to face or Llewelyn's eco-ethics. Each of Stark's objections wUl 
be addressed in mrn in relation to the ethics of Levinas and Llewelyn, excepting 
the claims regarding the rejection of ethics and poUtics. The need to address these 
criticisms has been forestaUed by the previous readings of Levinas' and Llewelyn's 
ethico-poUtics. 
In response to Stark's fkst objection that deep ecology rejects reason, neither 
Levinas nor Llewelyn underestimate reason or its aspkation to universaUty. 
Neither works denounce rationaUty nor advocate non-rationaUty or krationaUty. 
Instead, they emphasise that the movement of reason is self-referentiaUy confined 
to the realm of the said. Reason cannot venture beyond the realm of the said into 
the realm of the saying because reason's reason for existence - concepmaUsation -
is annuUed by alterity. As a consequence, the cutting edge of reason annuls 
alterity: "reason is a sharp instrument that can cut ruthlessly" (Nuyen, 1997, p. 5). 
Both Levinas and Llewelyn emphasise reason's violence toward the other and its 
capacity to mask this violence. This does not constimte a rejection of reason. 
Romantic-thinker is thinker-romantic. 
Stark's objection that deep ecology rejects knowledge cannot be sustained in 
relation to Levinas' face to face either. In a simUar vein to the response to Stark in 
relation to reason, Levinas' position is that knowledge is confined to the world of 
the same/said and it must, therefore, forever be kicomplete: "knowledge is a 
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relation of the Same with the Other in which the Other is reduced to the Same and 
divested of its strangeness" (Levinas, 1996, p. 91, Levinas' emphasis). Knowledge 
is immanent: it is welded to the metaphysics of presence. This does not constimte 
a rejection of the notion of knowledge, and it does not mean that meaning cannot 
be constructed, ckculated and transformed within the world of the same. But it 
does curtaU any aspkation to Absolute knowledge. 
FinaUy, Stark's objection to deep ecology based on the claim that it invokes 
spkimaUty cannot be transferred to Levinas' face to face or Llewelyn's eco-ethics. 
The non-quaUtative difference, the naked alterity, that Llewelyn invokes to 
provide his eco-ethics with the transcendent character of the face to face does not 
involve imbuing namre with a psychic dimension. Therefore, this eco-ethics is not 
panpschyic. It is not pantheistic either as non-quaUtative difference does not 
embody God in namre. 
None of Stark's objections can be upheld as a disparagement of engaging 
Llewelyn's cross-reading of Levinas in envkonmental education. There is, 
however, another objection to deep ecology that Stark has overlooked that must 
be raised and explored. This objection concerns the misanthropy that is 
promoted by some individuals and groups within the deep ecology movement. 
The most extreme position of misanthropy is proclaimed by VEHMENT - the 
Voluntary Human Extinction Movement. Dryzak (1997, p. 157) notes that "these 
extreme forms of misanthropy are not at aU representative of deep ecology in its 
entirety, and so many take pains to distance themselves from the misanthropes". 
Such a distance must be clearly delineated here as weU due to the resonances 
between Llewelyn's eco-ethics and deep ecology. Any hint of a su^estion of 
linking education and misanthropy would be dke indeed for the position 
presented here since education is constmed to be a 'positive' process across the 
broad spectmm of ideological perspectives. Thus, education and misanthropy are 
diametricaUy opposed. 
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As outlined earUer the face to face is an "unUmited ethical demand" (Levinas, 
1982/1985, p. 114) which potentiaUy entaUs self-sacrifice of the I under the 
condition of unmediated singularity. But the unwavering copresence of the thkd 
party prevents any instance of unmediated singularity; the "relationship with the 
thkd party is an incessant correction of the asymmetiy" (Levinas, 1974/1991, p. 
158) of the face qua face. Through this correction of asymmetry, the thkd party 
bestows responsibiUty and justice to me, and I "become an other like others" 
(Levinas, 1974/1991, p. 161). The bestowal of responsibiUty and justice for me is 
as a gift from the thkd party. A gift, of course, can be refiised or thrown away 
later, but this does not annul the giving. The gift from the thkd party is, in part, a 
disavowal of altruistic self-sacrifice. In terms of Llewelyn's cross-reading, then, the 
thkd party's gift forbids the misanthropic intentions promoted by some 
individuals and groups within the deep ecology movement. Whether or not this 
prohibition is heeded is a different matter. The misanthropes can choose to refiise 
or throw away the gift from the thkd party if they wish. But a positive response to 
engaging with Levinas via Llewelyn in envkonmental education requkes the 
acceptance of the thkd party's gift through an utter rejection of misanthropy. 
ENGAGING LEVINAS IN ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 
None of the objections leveUed at deep ecology can be upheld as a 
disparagement of engaging Levinas in envkonmental education, yet given that 
Llewelyn's cross reading furnishes neither an eco-ethics nor the eco-poUtics it may 
appear that Levinasian eco-ethics has nothing tangible to offer to envkonmental 
education. But this lack, this 'essential poverty' (Derrida, 1999), is precisely that 
which can actively add to, rather than detract from, envkonmental education. 
Indeed, this lack is entkely necessary to engage Levinasian eco-ethics. 
The lack of a code of eco-ethics arises from the aporia that the thkd party 
creates in the face to face. The copresence of the thkd party in the face to face 
relationship compels the I to compare Uicomparables. The plea of the Other is 
urgent, but the I is transfixed by kreducible uncertaUity: I have a responsibility...This 
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responsibility is mine and mine alone.. .1 cannot shirk or delegate this responsibility.. .1 must 
decide.., J must act... The ethical moment is an ordeal of hesitation. 
An ordeal of ethical hesitation is not unique to Levinas. Kierkegaard and 
Derrida have described such ordeals, but the unconditional bioequaUty of the 
ordeal of hesitation as per Llewelyn's cross reading of Levinas bears dkect 
relevance for envkonmental education. The ordeal of hesitation is invoked 
krespective of the Other's predicates. This disavows a priori exclusivity and 
prejudice that favour human beings. Therefore, anthropocentrism is impossible 
when the non-human enters the realm of the face to face. It is important to 
emphasise again that this ethical ordeal, which arises from the impossibiUty of 
prioritising the needs of the Other and the thkd party, does not preclude 
processes of hierarchisation. It does, however, simate such processes in the 
poUtical realm. Levinas excludes hierarchisation from the ethical realm. 
WhUst anthropocentrism is ardendy renounced in envkonmental education, it 
is unlikely that the argument thus far would convince theorists within the field of 
Levinas' relevance to envkonmental education. Attention needs to be turned to 
the issue of individuaUsm. This is a highly contentious issue in envkonmental 
education and those committed to critical theory could be expected to be 
extremely sceptical of any Unk between Levinas and envkonmental education 
based on his exclusive use of fkst person in the theorisation of the face to face. 
The face to face is indeed asymmetrical; whUst the whole of humanity may 
face the I through the eyes of the Other, the I is always singular. The face to face 
is an individual ordeal. The ethical responsibiUty is individual. But with the 
dissolution of the face to face the responsibility of the I becomes response ability in the 
world. This dissolution marks the movement from ethics to poUtics. It forces 
attention to the multipUcity of subjectivities ki which " a sharp distmction must 
remain between the etiiical subject and the civic one" (Derrida, 1997/1999, p. 32). 
This movement from the ethics to civics also marks the UftUig of the UidividuaUsm 
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that the face to face imposes on the I. The individuaUsm that is constimtive of the 
ethical relation of the face does not automaticaUy flow into the poUtical reakn. 
Envkonmental values education operates within the poUtical realm when 
viewed from the Levinasian perspective. Thus, engaging with Levinas' ethics does 
not prescribe individuaUsm in envkonmental values education; it does not 
proscribe individuaUsm either. Therefore, any argument leveUed against engaging 
Levinas in envkonmental values education on the basis that the face to face is 
inherentiy individuaUstic misses the mark because the mark is elsewhere, beyond 
being. The individual ordeal of the face to face precedes envkonmental values 
education. 
Levinas emphasises that facing the Other "is to be taught" (Levinas, 
1961/1991, p. 50). This simple statement carries a double meaning. On the one 
hand, facing the Other is to be taught by the Other in the ethical relationship. On 
the other hand, the act oi facing the Other is to be taught by educators. Both of 
these nuances have pedagogical impUcations. The fkst reading, to be taught by the 
other, is to "receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I" (Levinas, 
1961/1991, p. 51, Levinas' emphasis). The utter excessiveness of the pedagogical 
encounter in the face to face places the I in a position of vulnerabiUty and 
precludes any certainty regarding the meanings that smdents may constmct. Thus, 
teachers need to be sensitive and receptive to both the vulnerabiUty of the 
smdents and the unforeseeable meanings that they may construct. In order for 
this simation to occur, however, teachers need to provide smdents with learnUig 
experiences that promote receptivity to difference. This is the second nuance. 
Both of these nuances have dkect relevance for education generaUy (see Todd, 
2001). The second nuance, however, has a special relevance for envkonmental 
education sUice the face to face encounter with the non-human Other marks the 
site of Levinasian eco-ethics as per Llewelyn. Thus, envkonmental educators need 
to provide smdents with learnkig experiences diat promote a receptivity to tiie 
difference of the non-human Odier. This alone, however, is Uisufficient. As 
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discussed earUer, the presence of the thkd party shatters the transcendence of the 
face to face by compelling the I to compare incomparables. This both jolts the I 
from the singularity of the face to face encounter and appeals to the I to engage in 
ethico-poUtical action amid the teeming sociaUty of the world. Thus, 
envkonmental educators need to help learners to become sensitive to the moment 
of hesitation that shatters the transcendence of the face to face. This does not 
mean that educators shotdd promote hesitation as a virme. Rather, educators 
ought to encourage learners to chaUenge the myth of seamlessness in which 
hesitation can be disparagingly equated with weakness, inexperience and 
incompetence. 
Educators can assist learners to chaUenge the myth of seamlessness by 
accenmating the fractured movement from of the ethical to the poUtical. In the 
broad arena of education these ethical encounters are most likely to be 
interpersonal: smdent-smdent or smdent-teacher. The realm of these ethical 
encounters would be broadened in envkonmental education to include face to 
face relationships with the non-human as weU. 
CONCLUSION 
The notion of uncertainty, as the Panel for Education for Sustainable 
Development in the Schools Sector (EfDSS) presents it, arises from the 
conjunction of pluraUty and the limitation of knowledge. This conjunction is 
exempUfied in Levinas' formulation of the face to face relationship. Therefore, 
Levinas' thought is whoUy relevant to envkonmental education's engagement with 
uncertainty. Linking uncertainty to pluraUty can be successful only if the difference 
that pluraUty emphasises is approached as difference. If the pluraUsm is 
approached otherwise, that is from the violent form of 'tolerance' that emphasises 
sameness, uncertainty is eradicated and the conjunction dissimulated. The face to 
face exempUfies approaching difference as difference. The face to face also 
exempUfies the conjunction of uncertainty and the Umitation of knowledge sUice 
die exposure to the utter excessiveness of difference that occurs Ui the face to face 
relationship defies concepmaUsation and diematisation. Therefore, the face to face 
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exposes an kreducible residue that defies being captured in concepts and 
conveyed by language. This kreducible residue imposes a limitation on knowledge 
that cannot be transgressed. 
It has been noted, however, that engaging Levinas via Llewelyn furnishes 
neither an eco-ethics nor the eco-ethico-poUtics, The inabiUty to provide an eco-
ethics results from Levinas' unique deployment of the term 'ethics' to designate 
the pre-ontological relationship with the face. The face to face cannot be 
'packaged into' a code of ethics. Instead, the movement is from the ethical 
relationship of the face to face to eco-ethico-poUtical action. Levinas' denial of the 
ethico-poUtics mrns on the impossibiUty of attaining the "ideal of saintUness" 
(Wright et al., 1988, p. 177). The impossibiUty of attaining an ideal, however, in 
no way impedes or devalues the pursuit of it. To engage Levinas is to undertake 
the pursuit. Thus, the inabiUty to provision an eco-ethics or the eco-ethico-poUtics 
is not an example of the negative response that ChUd et al. (1995) and others note 
that many educators confront when they turn to postmodernist / poststmcturaUst 
theories. Levinas positively signals what ought to be pursued. 
In envkonmental education this pursuit involves going beyond Levinasian 
eco-ethico-poUtical abstraction toward Levinasian eco-ethico-poUtical action. This 
pursuit does not admit the stance of 'anything goes' that is frequentiy, and 
erroneously, attributed to postmodernist / poststmcturaUst thought. There is an 
unmistakably pragmatic dimension in Levinas' thought. This does not ease the 
relendess chaUenge that engaging Levinas in envkonmental education would 
entaU, but drawing upon the consteUation of postmodernist / poststmcturaUst 
thought, including that of Lyotard and Foucault, can support the task. 
SpecificaUy, the task Uivolves providUig learning experiences that promote 
receptivity to difference and accenmatmg the ordeal of ethical hesitation. It also 
Uivolves accenmatUig the fractured movement from the edUcal reaUn to die 
poUtical reaUn. By engaging these UnpUcations of Levinas' thought, envkonmental 
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education can highUght the mythical aspect of seamlessness, which pejoratively 
Unks hesitation to notions of weakness and incompetence. 
Accepting the invitation to pursue Levinasian eco-ethico-poUtical action 
enables the participants of envkonmental education to operate within a frame that 
maintains the conditions of uncertainty. It does not offer a conduit from 
uncertainty to certainty, which would defeat the purpose of engaging with Levinas 
in the fkst instance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The rhizomatic method adopted in this project stands in opposition to 
arguments that trace linear trajectories. Linear arguments designate a point of 
origin from which to proceed in an accretive process. In contrast, rhizomatic 
approaches deny the efficacy of designating a point of origin. According to 
Deleuze and Guattari: "Perhaps one of the most important characteristics of the 
rhizome is that it has multiple entryways" (1980/1987, p. 12). This chapter maps 
another 'entryway' for engaging uncertainty in envkonmental education. The 
argument presented here does not develop what the previous chapter 
preconfigured; instead, it forges another line of flight into narrative theory. 
In one of the earUest formulations of critical reaUsm, Reality and Truth: A 
Critical and Constmctive Essay Concerning Knowledge, Certainty and Truth, Vance (1917, 
p,217) casts certainty as "a quaUty of propositions". This positioning dissociates 
certainty from perspectives that logocentricaUy locate certainty in the world. This 
dissociation is operationaUsed here. Vance's rendition of certainty enables 
explorations that depart from the logocentrism of critical reaUsm, which (cl)aims 
to estabUsh truth or vaUdity from beyond text (Derrida, 1967/1978). Thus, Vance 
provides an egress to explore notions of certainty and uncertainty from 
stmcturaUst and poststructuraUst perspectives of narrative theory. This is 
significant for envkonmental education since many of the orientations that 
comprise this contested field embrace critical reaUsm (Fien, 1993; Huckle, 1993; 
Robottom & Hart, 1993). Hence, the possibiUty of this egression, ^^ 2^ ^ Vance, is 
germane to a broad spectmm of envkonmental educations. 
Narrative theory and narrative approaches have received high profUes in 
education theorising throughout the last decade. Thek appUcabiUty and possible 
UnpUcations for education are a source of ongoUig contestation that hinges, Ui 
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part, on multiple perspectives regarding the scope of narrative theory. According 
to Knoepsel (1991, p. 101, emphasis added), "narrative theory invites us to think 
of <«//discourse as taking the form of a story". This is the position that is adopted 
in this chapter. However, many education theorists dispute the inclusiveness of 
this stance and endorse restrictions on the domain of narrative theory and 
approaches by appeaUng to either classical notions of truth or to a fact/fiction 
dichotomy (Fenstermacher, 1997, 1994; PhilUps, 1997). Arguments that appeal to 
a fact/fiction dichotomy as a means to dismiss or restrict narrative perspectives 
have been rebutted in the envkonmental education arena by Gough (1994b) and 
in the broader arena of social science by Haraway (1989). These rebuttals 
chaUenge the supposed polarity of fact and fiction by demonstrating thek 
interrelations, thereby predicating narrative as availing knowledge and supporting 
Stoicheff s view that: 
Our worldly narratives, through which we construct what we think 
of as reaUty, are themselves the tissue of previous narrative texts 
with which they blend and clash, and which we ought to interpret in 
various ways. Whatever we caU reaUty it is revealed to us through 
the narratives we compose. (Stoicheff, 1991, p. 95) 
This chapter wiU not reiterate arguments that support the potential of narrative 
theory for envkonmental education by opposing a fact/fiction dichotomy, since 
this dimension of narrative has been engaged by Gough (1994b). However, the 
other line of argument that critics deploy against an inclusive perspective of 
narrative knowledges, namely opposing narrative and tmth, wiU be explored since 
this aspect of the narrative debate has not been engaged in envkonmental 
education to date. SpecificaUy, this wiU be addressed in relation to the 
correspondence, coherence and pragmatic theories of truth (Armour, 1969; 
JoachUn, 1906; Kkkham, 1992; Schmitt, 1995; WaUcer, 1989). From 
poststmcturaUst perspectives, the disparagement of narrative through appeals to 
these classical theories of tmth are, to borrow a phrase from Rorty, examples of 
"scratch[ing] where k does not itch" (quoted Ui Wolfe, 1998, p. 48.9). 
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Nevertheless, sidestepping the issue would be imprudent. The thorny issue of 
tmth must be confronted in order to forestaU criticisms of the explorations of 
narrative uncertainties from the platform of truth versus narrative. 
The issue of tmth is the fkst topic to be addressed in this chapter. This 
discussion, which recapimlates and extends the discussion of truth that was 
prerequisite for the reading of constmctive consonance in Chapter Two, 
demonstrates that disparagements of poststrucmraUst narrative inquiries that 
appeal to the issue of truth cannot be sustained. When this discussion is viewed in 
conjunction with Gough's rebuttal of the declamations against narrative inquiry 
based on the fact/fiction dichotomy, it would appear that poststructuraUst 
narrative inquiry could be advanced as a legitimate means of availing knowledge in 
envkonmental education. It would be naive, however, to expect that these 
arguments would be sufficient to incline many in envkonmental education toward 
narrative approaches. Other issues can be anticipated to emerge foUowing the 
rebuttals of arguments that appeal to truth and the fact/fiction dichotomy. One 
possible issue concerns the perceived inabiUty of poststmcturaUsms to be 
deployed in projects committed to notions of improvement. This issue has 
impUcations for envkonmental education as it raises the question of whether 
poststmcmraUst narrative inquiries can provide a medium for ethico-poUtical 
envkonmental agency. Gough beUeves that this is possible (1994b), but he does 
not provide a justification for this beUef MacLure (1994), on the other hand, does 
not beUeve that notions such as betterment are possible within poststructuraUst 
perspectives and she provides a justification for her claim. The second section in 
this chapter examines the issue of whether poststmcturaUst narrative inquiries can 
contribute to ethico-poUtical agency and concludes that this is possible without 
resorting to modernist manoeuvres. 
Another issue that is anticipated to emerge arises from Derrida's famous 
remark that "there is nothing outside of the texf (1967/1976, p. 158, Derrida's 
emphasis). This statement has been widely read as a denial of concrete existence. 
This charge was leveUed at ideaUsm prior to Derrida's formulation of 
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deconstruction and Derrida's proclamation was taken as unequivocal confirmation 
of this reading of ideaUsm, However, this is a misreading of both ideaUsm and 
Derrida, yet it is accepted without chaUenge within anti-deconstructioiUst spheres 
and is largely ignored by proponents of deconstruction. The faUure of critics and 
proponents alike to examine this misreading has not only enabled its endurance, 
but also elevated it to the stams of orthodoxy among anti-deconstructionists. 
This misreading has the capacity to suppress support for poststmcturaUst narrative 
approaches in envkonmental education. This chapter wUl demonstrate that 
Derrida's famous proclamation can be embraced in envkonmental education 
without relinquishing beUef in the materiaUty of (the) envkonment. 
Confronting and countering the existing and anticipated disparagements of 
poststmcturaUst narrative approaches does not create an entrance for 
poststmcturaUst narrative approaches in envkonmental education, Gough, (1993, 
1994b, 1998a, 1998d) and Stables (1996, 1997, 2001a, 2001b; Stables & Bishop, 
2001; Stables & Scott, 1999) have advocated and employed poststructuraUst 
narrative approaches in envkonmental education for almost a decade. 
Furthermore, they have addressed many key obstacles that face narrative theory in 
envkonmental education, such as the privUege afforded to scientific discourse. 
However, they have not explored in any depth the resistance through appeals to 
tmth, the perceived inabiUty of poststmcturaUsms to contribute to projects 
committed to notions of betterment, and the denial of concrete existence. Nor 
have they addressed narrative theory in terms of uncertainty. Thus, the themes 
that are addressed in this chapter strengthen and advance the role and stams of 
narrative theory in envkonmental education by chaUenging further lines of 
resistance, and by exploring how narrative theory can support envkonmental 
education's engagement with uncertainty, respectively. 
In order to explore how envkonmental education can engage uncertakity 
tiirough narrative, this chapter probes narrative theory from both stmcturaUst and 
poststmcturaUst perspectives and formulates from tiiese four forms of narrative 
uncertainties. The first form of narrative uncertaUity is subjunctive uncertaUity, 
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which attends the openness and pluraUty of narratives. Subjunctive uncertainty has 
the capacity to promote the utopianism of envkonmental education's 
commitment to transformation. The second form of narrative uncertainty is 
decentred uncertainty, which arises from the loss of transcendental signifiers. This 
form of uncertainty confronts the widely accepted logocentric perspectives in 
envkonmental education theorising, which treat (the) envkonment as a 
prediscursive given. The thkd form of narrative uncertainty is aUegorical 
uncertainty. This uncertainty arises in a conservative form from clashes that may 
occur between denotative and connotative readings of narratives and in a radical 
form from the anti-identitarian position that meaning overflows words and 
concepts, FinaUy, the fourth form of narrative uncertaUity, which is related to the 
thkd, is poietic uncertainty. This uncertainty arises from the motif of the Death of 
die Audior as per Derrida (1967/1978), Bardies (1968/1977) and Foucault 
(1969/1988). These four forms of narrative uncertainties are not mumaUy 
exclusive; numerous interrelations play between these formulations. Furthermore, 
these formulations are not exhaustive; they are not tendered as a means of 
encapsulating narrative uncertainties. This disclaimer regarding the lack of 
exhaustiveness is not grounded in beUef that uncertainty is too complex or 
multifaceted to summarise; it arises, instead, from the conviction that uncertainty 
defies closure. 
NARRATIVE VERSUS T R U T H 
Approaching education research as a storying endeavour has attracted a great 
deal of attention lately, with several journals devoting special editions to narrative 
inquiry. The attention has not aU been positive however. Several critics have 
denounced narrative inquiry by appealing to the vkme of truth. Dennis PhilUps 
(1994, 1997), who stands out as perhaps the most vocal critic of narrative inquiry, 
raises a banner for the tmth, the whole tmth, and nothing but the tmth. He 
recentiy proclaimed that in education "we do not want to be fobbed off with a 
credible fiction ... we want the true account, the r«?^/reasons" (PhiUips, 1997, p. 
107, Phillips' emphasis). He then continued to cast narrative inquky in a mUieu of 
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fiitiUty by asking "if there are just more-or-less engrossing narratives, none of 
which can be said to be tme or false - why would one bother to expend the 
energy to carry out rigorous inquiries" (PhiUips, 1997, p. 166)? When this claim is 
supplemented by others from beyond the education arena, the prospects for 
narrative inquiry seem bleak indeed. Take for instance Schmitt's (1995, p, x) 
comment that "it is now common among Uterary theorists, sociologists of science, 
anthropologists, educational theorists and others to deride classical theories of 
tmth". He continues: "I don't suppose people who declaim such ancient vkmes 
as truth and consistency ought (if they are consistent!) to care much about the 
accuracy of thek claims". 
But what is tmth? It is clearly not a univocal concept and many critics in 
education do not stipulate thek affiUations when it comes to his question. Dennis 
PhilUps is no exception. In Telling the Truth about Stories, he appeals to truth as an 
intuitive given; he does not stipulate what his conception of tmth is. 
Nevertheless, given that PhiUips (1999, p. 246) describes himself as "unrepentantiy 
modernist" and his restricted references to Popper, it may be inferred that he 
endorses a correspondence theory of tmth. 
The correspondence theories of tmth, which have attracted the support of 
notable thinkers from Plato and Aristotie to Bertrand RusseU and Karl Popper, 
hold that a statement is true if it corresponds with the facts or the state of affaks. 
HistoricaUy, the correspondence theories of tmth have been associated with reaUst 
ontologies. However, they are not solely confined to reaUst positions; 
correspondence theories of tmth can be upheld within certain versions of ideaUsm 
(Kkkham, 1992; Schmitt, 1995), Perennial objections to correspondence theories 
of tmth, of either reaUst or ideaUst orientation, pertain to questions involving the 
constimtion of 'facts' and 'the state of affaks', and the nature of 'correspondence'. 
Each of these general objections has been augmented in recent tknes by the 
emergence of poststmcturaUst perspectives. PoststmcturaUst perspectives reject 
the notion that the reach of a proposition extends aU the way down to the 'thing 
itself, the referent. Thus, they reject reaUst notions of correspondence. 
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Furthermore, poststructuraUst perspectives reject the symmetry between signifier 
and signified that is essential to ideaUst versions of correspondence. Given that 
correspondence cannot obtain in asymmetrical systems, poststmcturaUst 
perspectives must reject ideaUst versions of the correspondence theories of tmth. 
FoUowing the rejection of reaUsm and the nature of the critiques of ideaUsm, 
poststmcmraUst narrative theories cannot accommodate any versions of the 
correspondence theories of tmth. Therefore, any criticism of poststmcturaUst 
narrative theory that appeals to the correspondence theories of tmth is as hoUow 
as criticising red for not being blue. 
The coherence theories of truth cannot be accommodated either. The 
coherence theories of truth hold that a statement is tme if it coheres with the entke 
system (Armour, 1969; Joachkn, 1906; Kkkham, 1992; Olen, 1983; Schmitt, 1995). 
Hence, the coherence theories of tmth are alUed to an ideaUst ontology and have 
attracted criticisms reflecting reaUst orientations. Armour, for example, notes that 
the coherence theory of tmth has been criticised for not 'connecting with the real 
world': 
The proponent of the coherence theory . , , goes about comparing 
propositions and begins buUding himself [sic] a world of 
propositions as a substimte for whatever world there is. It must 
seem then that his substimte world can be huffed down by any 
passing wolf of a reaUst who troubles to point out what the problem 
of tmth is aU about, (Armour, 1969, p. 20) 
Dennis PhilUps may, perhaps, aspke to beUig this wolf of a reaUst in the 
education arena. However, these objections relatUig to the lack of connection 
between the coherence theories of tmth and the 'real world' bolster 
poststmcturaUst critiques of metaphysical presence by default, rather than causUig 
agitation over inadequacy, iUusion or falsehood. These clakns sknply articulate 
and advance poststmcturaUst convictions that whUst reaUty may exist, humankind 
has no claim to dkect or tme access to that reaUty, 
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Another common objection to the coherence theories of truth claims that a 
proposition may be tme in one coherent set of beUefs and false in another which 
invaUdates the very notion of tmth. On the surface, this objection may seem to 
support poststrucmraUst commitments to multiple and competing readings of 
texts and the celebrations of instabiUty, fluidity and contradiction, via Nietschze 
and others. However, this objection's appeal to the principle of non-contradiction 
(which is not upheld by the paraconsistent logicians' recognition that both p and 
~p can both be tme) is based on a fundamental misinterpretation of the coherence 
theories and, as such, cannot inform any stance at aU (Joachim, 1906; Walker, 
1989). The coherence theories of tmth hold that each proposition entaUs aU others 
in the entire system and, according to Joachim (1906, p. 78, Joachim's emphasis), 
"there can be one and only one such experience". Joachim refers to this coherent 
whole as an Ideal Experience. This beUef in the existence of an Ideal Experience 
constimtes a beUef in the existence of The Greatest Story Ever Told - The 
Ultimate Meta-Narrative. FoUowing Lyotard (1984), aspkations of The Ultimate 
Meta-Narrative are antithetical to poststructuraUst perspectives and so any 
criticism aimed at narrative inquiry for failing to strive toward the univocal tmth 
of The Ultimate Meta-Narrative misses the point and does no damage. 
Having briefly outlined why neither the correspondence theories nor 
coherence theories of tmth may serve as anchors for poststrucmraUst narrative 
inquiry, only one more major class of theories wiU be considered here. This is the 
class of pragmatic theories of truth. According to the pragmatic theories, "an 
assertion is tme if it has the right kind of effect on its beUevers - if it is expedient, 
or usefiU, or solves problems" (Armour, 1969, p. 140). Allegations of 
indoctrination and propaganda Ue waiting to be sprung and Dennis PhiUips has 
aimed these (de)vices dkecdy at narrative inquiry, as advocated by PoUdnghorne 
(1995), and PhilUps is worth quoting at some length on this issue. He argues that: 
the narratives told by racists to justify discrimination or even 
genocide certainly seem to satisfy the subjective needs of thek 
audiences, and these stories do not chaUenge any prior convictions 
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but are fuUy compatible with the racist assumptions held by 
members of the audience. Are we to say that because these 
narratives meet PoUdnghorne's desiderata that they are satisfactory 
explanations of genocide? Apart from thek moral bankruptcy, 
racist narratives are not true; they make use of faulty notions of 
genetic superiority and of race, they refer to the mythical vkmes of 
blood and breeding; and they often contain distortions of history. 
They do not stand up to critical empirical and theoretical scrutiny, 
and so they are defective explanations, (PhiUips, 1997, p. 107, 
PhilUps' emphasis) 
WhUst, like PhilUps (1997), members of the envkonmental education 
community would be expected to recoU from racist narratives due to 
envkonmental education's overt commitment to social justice, the pragmatic 
theory of tmth is endorsed within some sectors of envkonmental education, 
Robottom and Hart (1993, p, 11), for instance, maintain that "what counts is 
what changes, and tmth is whatever leads to the achievement of what is good, 
right, responsible and empowering of individuals". Should Robottom and Hart 
(1993), and those who share thek conception of truth, disaUgn themselves from 
the pragmatic theory of tmth on the basis of the link that PhilUps (1997) impUcitiy 
suggests between the pragmatic theories and atrocities such as genocide? The 
answer to this question is a resounding NO, PhilUps' (1997) narrative faUs to 
exercise the theoretical scrutiny that he champions. Therefore, it is he who has 
produced a defective and coercive explanation, the type of explanation that he so 
openly deplores. These are strong claims to level at an accompUshed and a 
respected education theorist. But I contend that in this instance they are 
warranted on the basis that PhilUps (1997) su^ests that in the absence of tmth as 
he constmes it, we are duty bound to guUibiUty, that is we are duty bound to 
uncriticaUy accept any narrative that comes our way. This stance is premised upon 
die dual misconceptions that normative elements do not exist in poststmcturaUst 
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perspectives and that poststmcmraUsms reject notions of tmth. Yet neither of 
these claims can be upheld. 
The fkst misconception, which holds that normative elements do not exist in 
postmodernist/poststructuraUst theorising, ignores the normative elements in the 
works of Derrida (1967/1978), Levkias (1961/1991, 1974/1991, 1982/1985) and 
Lyotard (1984, 1985) just to name a few. These normative elements enable the 
evaluation of interpretive possibiUties. Thus, PhilUps' suggestion that narrative 
inquky compels gulUbiUty cannot be sustained within the sphere of 
poststmcturaUst narrative inquiry. The second misconception, which holds that 
postmodernisms/poststmcmraUsms reject truth, cannot be sustained either, 
Postmodernist/poststmcmraUst theorising does not and cannot reject truth. Such 
a stance is a logical impossibiUty; to argue that tmth is an iUusion or invaUd 
requkes an impUcit commitment to the notion of Tmth, Yet 
postmodernist/poststmcturaUst theorising is not simply resigned to the 
intractabiUty of tmth. Instead, notions of truth are expUcitiy supported. Foucault, 
for example, maintains that "tmth is a thing of this world" (Foucault, 1980, p. 
131) and that it is "something that can and must be thought" (Foucault, 1985, p. 
7). For FoucaiUt the central question is not what is true, but how tmth is produced, 
ckculated, transformed and used. Likewise, Derrida insists on the necessity of 
tmth: 
it goes without saying that in no case is it a question of a discourse 
against truth or against science. (This is impossible and absurd, as is 
every heated accusation on this subject.) ...we must have [ilfaut] tmth 
... we must recognise in tmth "the normal prototype of the fettish". 
How could we do widiout it? (Derrida, 1972/1981, p. 105, 
Derrida's emphasis) 
PoststmcmraUsms, then, are vindicated of the kind of declamations leveUed by 
PhilUps (1997) and Schmitt (1995), which presume an ambivalence toward, or 
rejection of, tmth. Far from rejectUig notions of tmth, many poststmcturaUst 
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theorists exhort the necessity of truth. Further, poststmcturaUst narrative inquiry 
avoids the crippling relativism which constimtes a major component of PhilUps' 
sweeping objections to narrative inquiry. This is avoided by the presence of 
normative elements that enable the evaluation of interpretive possibiUties. This 
does not, however, vindicate aU forms of narrative inquiry from the objections 
raised by PhilUps; it vindicates only poststmcturaUst narrative inquiry. This is an 
important distinction as the support for the pragmatic theories of tmth, which 
PhilUps indkectiy condemns through his denunciation of narrative theory, arises in 
envkonmental education mainly among those committed to critical theory. Thus 
positioned, these theorists must adhere to classical versions of the pragmatic 
theories of tmth which maintain that the effects that tmths have on thek beUevers 
have a prediscursive, objective, facmal basis (which has led to interesting debates 
regarding the utiUty of false beUefs). Thus constmed, pragmatic tmths are usefiU 
and incontestable 'givens' in the world. In the absence of the normative elements 
embedded in poststrucmraUst perspectives, analytical narrative inquiries need to 
heed PhilUps' warning of the potential for evU that lurks in the pragmatic theories 
of tmth. 
Before leaving the topic of narrative versus tmth, another declamation leveUed 
against both poststmcturaUsms and narrative theory warrants exploration since it 
tacitiy appeals to envkonmental tmths. Many within the broader arenas of eco-
phUosophy and eco-criticism reject the notion of envkonment as text on the basis 
that it is sociaUy and ecologicaUy kresponsible (KeUert, 1995; Sessions, 1996/97; 
Shephard, 1995; Snyder, 1996/97; WaUer, 1996/97). This notion of 
kresponsibiUty relates to the intentional creation of a discursive space in which it 
becomes vaUd to ask "If nature is only a social and discursive constmction, why 
fight hard to save it" (Hayles, 1995a, p. 47)? This questionUig, it is argued, has the 
potential to promote further envkonmental exploitation and degradation by 
fiirnishing vested groups with fake authorial leverage for access to power and 
resources. This position was used ki an unsuccessfiU attempt to dissuade editors 
Michael Soule and Gary Lease (1995b) from pubUshkig Reinventing Nature? 
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Responses to Postmodern Deconstmction, even though most of the chapters declaim 
deconstruction for the same reason. Editor Soule (1995, pp. 158-159), for 
example, maintains that "[i]f poUcy makers were to accept these postmodern 
myths they might become even more accommodating to invasive or destmctive 
practices, beUeving that 'nature isn't namral anyway'". This position is reiterated 
more forcefiiUy in the special issue of Wild Earth, which is devoted to 'Opposing 
WUderness Deconstmction' (WUiter 1996/97), 
This line of argument is odd at the very least due to its appeal to pragmatism. 
These opponents of envkonment as text support the notion of objective facts 
whose tmth content may be grounded in either the correspondence or coherence 
theories of tmth. These opponents then support the notion that when faced with 
the tmths/facts, informed and responsible decision-making can occur. Yet 
neither the correspondence nor the coherence theories of tmth, within which 
these 'truthful facts' reside, entaUs that tmth is good, or proper, or responsible; 
neither theory charts (the) moral high ground. The 'authentic' authorial leverage 
over the good, the proper, and the responsible that these opponents presume 
exists in the Ught of the tmth/facts is self-appointed. In other words, responsible 
envkonmental decision-making is not a function of the truth content of the facts. 
Instead, the crux of this decision-making process is the self-appointed authorial 
leverage that these opponents wish to deny to those whose phUosophical 
perspectives differ from thek own. These opponents undermine thek own 
argument the moment that they advance it. This line of opposition faUs from the 
start. 
The above discussion demonstrates that any attempt to repudiate 
poststmcmraUst narrative knowledges on the basis that they faU to uphold classical 
theories of tmth misses the mark, PoststmcmraUsms openly reject the classical 
theories of tmth, but they cannot and do not disavow notions of tmth per se. 
WhUst they utterly reject notions that tmth is eternal, universal and immutable, 
they posit tmth as historical, simated and fluid. When dUs discussion is viewed 
alongside Gough's rebuttal of repudiations that appeal to the fact/fiction 
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dichotomy, the criticism of poststmcturaUst narrative theory as per PhilUps is 
dispensed. Yet it is unlikely that these arguments alone would result in widespread 
endorsements of poststmcturaUst narrative theory in envkonmental education. It 
is more likely that as these issues recede others would take thek place. Two such 
issues might include the perceived inabiUty of poststmcturaUsms to contribute to 
projects that are committed to notions of betterment and the misreading of 
Derrida which claims that deconstmction denies the existence of (the) material 
envkonment. The foUowing two sections address these issues. 
NARRATIVE UTOPIANISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 
Narrative approaches have much to offer envkonmental education due to thek 
utopianism. The loaded word 'utopianism' is being used here both purposely and 
provocatively. The term 'utopianism' invokes suspicion and disparagement from 
both analytical and poststmcturaUst perspectives, although the reasons differ. 
Utopianism is received scepticaUy within analytical spheres due to a multimde of 
pejorative connotations such as delusion, escapism, and denial; whereas in 
poststmcturaUst spheres, scepticism and distrust arise in response to the 
resonances between utopianism and notions such as progress, Uberation and 
emancipation (MacLure, 1994). 
The etymology of 'Utopia' suggests, however, that these aversions to 
utopianism need not be warranted. 'Utopia' was coined by Thomas More in 1516 
as a neologism from the Greek terms eutopia (happy place) and outopia (no 
place). Utopia is the imaginary place of consummate perfection. If the pathway 
to Utopia could be imagined, it would avoid other pathways of improvement that 
offer less than perfection. Utopianism, on the other hand, focuses on the pursuit 
of improvement rather than the perfect destination. As McCracken (1998, p. 104) 
notes, utopianism "offers no place in particular. Instead, it defines a sense of lack 
that stimulates a 'deske for a better way of beUig'". 
PoststmcmraUst diought highUghts fiirther the aspect of 'no place' Ui 
utopianism. The rejection of identitarian tiiUUdng, as per Adorno (1966/1973), 
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Derrida (1972/1982) and Levkias (1961/1991, 1974/1991, 1982/1985) disavows 
the capmring of perfection in a concept since this would mke perfection through 
its subordination to the concept. Thus, perfection overflows any concept of it. 
The term 'utopianism' is being deployed here in a manner that dissociates it from 
any concepmaUsation of Utopia in favour of an insatiable deske for a better way 
of being. 
The deske that utopianism embodies is constimtive of envkonmental 
education, yet utopianism is ardendy renounced by O'SulUvan (1999). O'SulUvan's 
objection to utopianism is twofold: fkstiy, he endorses the wariness from the 
analytical arena by construing utopianism as naivete; and secondly, he views 
utopiarUsm as being solely in the service of the dominant ideology as a hegemonic 
(de)vice. Engaging utopianism through poststructuraUst narrative theory, 
however, avoids both of these aspects that O'SulUvan strenuously distances 
himself from. 
Naivete is neither the basis nor outcome of narrative theory. As Haraway 
(1989, p, 8) notes, "story telling" or narrative "is a serious concept, but one 
happUy without the power to claim unique or closed readings". Therefore, story 
telling or narrative provides a medium through which to resist the annulment of 
utopianism by Utopian/totaUsing meta-narratives. Thus, Gough's (1994b, p. 196) 
conviction that narrative fiirnishes a medium through which "we can ask if some 
intertexmal "readings" of the world are better or worse than others in 
predisposing us to act in ecopoUtical ways" may be read as an appeal to 
utopianism. Gough's statement also UnpUcidy draws into reUef a distinction 
between what may be coined naive and critical utopianism. Naive utopianism is 
shaUow: it faUs to acknowledge the possibiUty of adverse consequences 
accompanying transformative intentions. At best, naive utopianism could be 
considered to be unbridled optimism; whereas, pessimistic readings lead to 
charges of escapism and denial. Critical utopianism, however, acknowledges and 
takes seriously the prospect that transformative Uitentions can create and unleash 
dystopian outcomes. Critical utopianism is, dierefore, a deUberative endeavour. In 
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Ught of this distinction, naivete and utopianism do not inevitably coincide as 
O'SuUivan and others from analytical spheres suggest. However, the earUer 
statement that 'the deske that utopianism embodies is constimtive of 
envkonmental education' needs revision to 'the deske that critical utopianism 
embodies is constimtive of envkonmental education' 
SimUarly, O'SulUvans' (1999) claim that utopianism operates exclusively as a 
hegemonic device in the service of the dominant ideology can be contested from 
poststrucmraUst perspectives. O'SuUivan's account of utopianism's capacity to 
perform this fiinction by being unwittingly propeUed toward to the dominant 
ideology's projection of Utopia is not disputed, but the denial that utopianism can 
act in other ways is disputed. The limitation that O'SuUivan's account places on 
the reach of utopianism mrns on a perceived inseparabiUty of utopianism and 
Utopia. Thus Unked, utopianism grasps for Utopia as an idea(l), an idea(l) that 
O'SulUvan maintains is hegemonicaUy pre-determined. However, utopianism and 
Utopia were dissociated here from the outset; furthermore, utopianism was cast in 
a manner that emphasised outopia (no place). This dissociation and the 
subsequent emphasis cast utopianism as embodying an insatiable yearning 
between deske and fiUfiUment. Therefore, utopiarUsm is not exclusively bound 
into the service of the dominant ideology. WhUst it is inescapably contingent upon 
its simated narrative present, struggles over meanings enable possibiUties of 
'transgression'. This does not imply that utopianism is intrinsicaUy transgressive; 
the possibilities of 'transgression' arise from the relationships between utopianism 
and the social context within which it emerges. When these relationships invoke 
'transgression', that is stm^les over meanings, uncertainty supplants certainty as 
per Vance (1917). Critical narrative utopianism embraces and fosters uncertaintj^ 
when operating beyond the restricted domain depicted by O'SulUvan. 
Countering O'SulUvan's second objection to utopianism partiaUy defuses the 
scepticism and distmst from poststmcturaUst spheres, although again for different 
reasons. PoststmcturaUst rejections of the notion of utopianism stem from the 
resonances it has with progress, Uberation and emancipation. These redemptive 
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meta-narratives appeal to prediscursivity, to sancmary beyond the reach of the 
Unguistic mrn, to a "state of linguistic grace, where language might be purified of 
ideology, plural meanings and konic relations with reaUty" (MacLure, 1994, p. 
287). However, utopianism does not necessitate a commitment to prediscursivity. 
This wUl be discussed further in the section on 'decentred uncertainty', but 
another aspect of the distmst of the notions of progress, Uberation and 
emancipation, namely 'betterment', wiU be addressed here. 
Critics of poststmcmraUsms often promulgate the misconception that 
privUeging difference creates rampant and crippling relativism by requiring 
commitment to the notion of 'anything goes' (Boghossian, 1996). This 
misconception is based on the beUef that normative elements do not exist in 
poststmcturaUst theorising and has resulted in an acute wariness of 'betterment' in 
poststmcturaUst perspectives in education theorising (MacLure, 1994; Stronach & 
MacLure, 1996). But normative elements do exist in poststmcturaUst thought. 
This was noted in the previous section on tmth and wiU be elaborated here. 
The misconception that poststmcturaUst theorising is devoid of normative 
dimensions in not surprising; as Nuyen (1998, p. 61) notes: poststmcmraUst 
theorists "rarely expUcitiy draw out the normative impUcations of thek 
metaphysical positions". Derrida and Lyotard, however, are amongst the 
exceptions. Derrida (1967/1978, p. 130), maintaUis that "die least violence, [is] the 
only way to repress the worst violence" of totaUsing discourses. SknUarly, 
Lyotard's (1984, p. 82) proclamation - "Let us wage war on totaUty." - justifies the 
exclusion of terrorist/totaUtarian activities since "they preclude others, thek 
victims, from playUig diek own games" (Nuyen, 1998, p. 72). Critical utopianism, 
then, which deUberatively strives for betterment, is not antitiietical to 
poststmcturaUst theoriskig since notions of betterment can be upheld as per 
Derrida, Lyotard and odiers (such as Levkias (1961/1991, 1974/1991, 
1982/1985)). 
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This seemingly provocative claim requkes closer examination. For the sake of 
brevity, however, this closer examination wiU be confined to a reading of Derrida. 
According to Derrida, one must deploy a lesser violence in order to repress 
greater violence. This is clearly an ethical imperative. The lesser violence to which 
Derrida refers is the violence infUcted upon identity by differance, (the) supplement, 
(the) trace. This violence perpemaUy interrupts the process of totaUsation which 
would otherwise proclaim that identity is displayed in its fuU glory. Derrida casts 
totaUsation as the worst violence as its modus operandi is the annihUation of 
difference'^ . The ethical imperative, then, is to choose the interruption of identity 
over the annihUation of difference. When this line of thought is appUed to the 
notion of Utopia, it becomes clear how poststmcmraUsm, as per Derrida, not only 
embraces the notion of betterment, but also demands it. 
Applying the lesser violence proscribes capmring Utopia in a concept. Thus 
the thought of Utopia can never be immediately and dkecdy present to 
consciousness. This does not imply that there is no meaning or that meaning is 
impossible. Rather, it renders meaning provisional and necessitates a commitment 
to unending interpretation. Caputo is helpfiU in understanding how this unending 
process of interpretation supports the notion of betterment via utopianism: this 
endless process of interpretation does "not leave us in despak and distress at the 
prospect of never getting where we want to go, but precisely the opposite, to 
make sure that we are never complacent with where we are, that we are always 
astir with a deske to go where we cannot go, that we never mistake the present 
state of things with what is to come" (2000, para. 39). In the case of utopianism, 
or betterment, this means that we must never confuse the present utopianism with 
that which is yet to come. There is no end to utopianism. The signifier 
'utopianism', or 'betterment', becomes a sigiUfier for a process that is Uitensely 
contested, in a continuous state of negotiation, and ever elusive. Betterment is 
••Similarly, Levinas (1961/1991; 1974/1991) and Lyotard (1984; 1985) insist that totalisation ought to be resisted as an 
ethical imperative. Their justifications also turn on the conviction that totalisation arises firom the annihilation of 
difference. Beyond this, the details of their projects differ, but arguments can be constructed that demonstrate their 
support the notion of betterment as it is formulated here. 
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Uisatiable. It is a signifier that cannot be brought to rest by any signified(s). This is 
not the same as a meaning changing over time. Changing meaning over time 
involves a progression Ui which relations are broken and new relations form, thus 
creating episodic rests. As betterment can never rest, its destination is the outopia 
of utopianism. 
Thus it possible for postmodernist/poststmcturaUst discourses to embrace 
betterment. Critics who oppose this stance typicaUy deploy a two-pronged 
chaUenge to it. Fkstiy, they maintain that notions of betterment gymnasticaUy 
manoeuvre postmodernist/poststmcmraUst projects back into critical/ 
emancipatory projects, which aspke to prediscursivity, but the commitment to 
unending interpretation proscribes any notion of prediscursivity. Secondly, they 
deny the normative dimensions of postmodernist/poststrucmraUst projects. 
According to MacLure's (1994, p. 297) reading, such nimble mrns/rescues are 
impeUed by "poststmcturaUsm's denial of its covert value position ... [thus] value 
always reinserts itself behind the back of the antifoundationaUst rhetoric". But the 
embrace of postmodernist/poststmcturaUst betterment foregrounds value. This is 
essential for the possibiUty of postmodernist/poststrucmraUst ethics and, hence, 
the possibiUty of postmodernist/poststmcturaUst envkonmental education. 
DERRIDA AND (THE) WOR(L)D 
PoststrucmraUst thought and deconstmction in particular have been widely 
read as anti-envkonmentaUst discourses that "can be just as destmctive to nature 
as buUdozers and chainsaws" (Soule & Lease, 1995a, p. xvi). The charge of anti-
envkonmentaUsm is largely based on the misreading of Derrida's famous 
statement that "there is nothing outside of the texf (1967/1976, p. 158, Derrida's 
emphasis), which has been widely misread as a denial of embodied existence 
widUn (the) material world. As a result, poststmcturaUst diought and 
deconstmction have been subjected to recrimUiations from envkonmentaUsts who 
strive to redress the perceived postmodernist/poststmcturaUst attacks upon 
Nature (Sessions, 1996/97; Shephard, 1995; Snyder, 1996/97; Soule, 1995; Soule 
& Lease, 1995b). Postmodernist/poststmcturaUst discourses, however, receive a 
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less hostUe reception Ui envkonmental education. Indeed, there is considerable 
support for thek inclusion, yet some advocates single out deconstmction and 
brand it as inappropriate (Littiedyke, 1996; Orr, 1992; Sauve, 1999). This 
denunciation of deconstmction, then, compels a close reading of envkonment 
through Derrida's work in order to ascertain whether the denunciation of 
deconstruction in envkonmental education is warranted. 
The misreading of Derrida's famous statement has ckculated without 
contestation for so long among those committed to reaUst envkonmentaUsm that 
it has become orthodoxy within that arena. Beyond that arena, however, the claim 
has been seldom acknowledged. This sUence from those committed to 
deconstmction could be misread as a tacit acknowledgment of the 'truth' of the 
claim that deconstmction denies the existence of (the) material world beyond the 
text. Derrida, however, insists that we should not rest in sUence on this matter. 
SpecificaUy, he asserts that: 
we must avoid having the indispensable critique of a certain naive 
relationship of the signified or the referent, to sense or meaning, 
remain fixed in suspension, that is, a pure and simple suppression, 
of meaning or reference. (Derrida, 1972/1981, p. 66) 
Notwithstanding this assertion that the relationship concerning signifieds/ 
referents and sense/meaning ought not to be fixed in suspension, Derrida has 
been quite reticent in addressing this relationship when 'matter' is concerned. He 
acknowledges this reticence openly and accounts for it on the basis that 'matter' 
has been so heavUy invested with logocentric values (1972/1981). Thus, this 
reading of (the) envkonment through Derrida asks the question "Is it possible to 
support the existence of (the) material envkonment without resorting to 
logocentrism?" 
Caputo (2000) is one of the few who has not been sUent on this question. 
However, Caputo addresses this question through a cross-reading of Derrida and 
Levinas. Caputo develops an Uinovative argument for the existence of (the) 
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material world both withki and beyond the text through this cross-reading, but the 
Levinasian aspect of Caputo's reading Uitroduces a tone of deep reverence Ui 
relation to (the) material world. This dimension may be of particular interest to 
those wishing to pursue postmodernist/poststructuraUst ecospirimaUty in 
envkonmental education. However, given that this reverence that does not 
emerge when Derrida's works are read without Levinas, this discussion can 
address envkonmental education more broadly by focusing mainly on Derrida's 
works, although the less Levinasian aspects of Caputo's reading are appUcable as 
weU. 
Derrida has insisted repeatedly that the statement that there is nothing beyond 
the text does not deny the existence of (the) world (Derrida, 1999; Derrida in 
Kearney, 1984). This denial may appear to be an kreconcUable contradiction, but 
with Derrida things are seldom as simple as they may fkst appear. For this denial 
to be an utter contradiction two presuppositions are requked: the separation of 
(the) world and the text, which is reducible to the opposition of 
materiaUty/ideaUty or sensibiUty/inteUigibiUty, and a simple opposition between 
interiority and exteriority. Given that Derrida has unceasingly problematised these 
presuppositions, they cannot and should not be uncriticaUy invoked in order to 
advance a claim of contradiction. In regard to the fkst, Derrida insists "on the 
fact that "writing" or the "text" are not reducible either to the sensible or visible 
presence of die graphic or die "Uteral"" (Derrida, 1972/1981, p. 65). Thus, (die) 
world and the text cannot and should not be placed in simple opposition when 
reading deconstmction. Secondly, Derrida's work on the Umit problematises any 
simple opposition of inside/outside. Indeed, Derrida maintains that he is "not 
even sure that there can be a 'concept' of an absolute exterior" (Derrida, 
1972/1981, p. 64). Thus, any reading of (the) envkonment through Derrida must 
accept that there is nothing beyond the text and that this does not deny the 
existence of (the) world. To do otherwise would be to disengage Derrida from 
the outset. 
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The contention that there is nothing beyond the text and that this does not 
deny the existence of (the) material world becomes problematic in the Ught of the 
opposition of the intelUgible and the sensible. And it is precisely this opposition 
that leads to misreadings of Derrida's statement by envkonmentaUsts and others, 
who claim that the statement that there is nothing outside the text must result in a 
denial of concrete existence. This misreading rests upon two previous 
assumptions that are seldom acknowledged: fkstiy, that sensibiUty and 
inteUigibiUty are opposed; and secondly, that Derrida supports this opposition and 
then renounces sensibiUty, which leaves only inteUigibUity or the text. These 
assumptions are not simply mistaken; they are the antithesis of Derrida's work; 
they articulate what Derrida is working against. 
Derrida's projects consistentiy expose the untenabiUty of opposing 
inteUigibiUty and sensibiUty, ideaUty and materiaUty. These oppositions are the 
mainstays of logocentrism, which Derrida unceasingly seeks to overturn. One way 
that Derrida demonstrates this untenabiUty is through spacing. Derrida's 
provocative use of spacing — writing in columns, quotations in boxes, pages 
bottom heavy with foomotes — makes "expUcit the role of the materiaUty of space 
within the act of understanding ...[and thereby] demonstrate [s] the untenabUity of 
the logocentric distinction between the sensible and the intelUgible" (Johnson, 
1981, p. xxviU-xxix). 
Critics could argue, however, that the written marks on the page and thek 
spacing constimte such a special niche in materiaUty that, whUst the argument 
might obtain in this instance, it should not be brought to bear in the case of (the) 
envkonment without additional support. Derrida's deconstruction of Saussure can 
provide a more generaUsed argument. The paradox of the Proper name provides 
an expedient entry into Derrida's deconstmction of Saussure. The Proper name is 
a name for one particular thing as distinct from every other. The Proper name is 
unique to each thing; nothing else can claim it. Thus the Proper name can 
purportedly forge a dkect and immediate link to the material world as Bennington 
notes: "the proper name ought to Uisure a certaUi passage between language and 
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the world, in that it ought to individuate a concrete individual, without ambiguity, 
without having to pass through the ckcuits of meaning" (BennUigton & Derrida, 
1993, p. 104). Yet the Proper name can refer to the thing in its absence, even 
after its death or destmction. Thus the Proper name does not refer to the thing. 
Instead, it signifies the concept of the thUig. The Proper name is not proper; there 
is no Proper name; language does not commune with the world. 
The dissolution of Proper names announces the entrance of Saussure's notion 
of the linguistic sign, which "unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a 
sound-image" (Saussure, 1959, p. 66). Derrida's entrance closely foUows 
Saussure's and Derrida's work is intimately linked to it. Derrida recognises and 
acclaims the "absolutely decisive critical role" (1972/1981, p. 18) of Saussure's 
work against the grain of Western metaphysics. Yet Derrida's deconstmction of 
Saussure's formulation of the sign demonstrates that Saussure's formulation both 
works against and confkms Western metaphysics (1967/1976,1972/1981). 
Derrida's deconstmction of Saussure's stmcmraUsm is multifaceted and wiU 
not be addressed here in fuU. The aspect that is most pertinent to the question 
posed at the beginning of this section is Derrida's deconstruction of the link that 
Saussure posits between the signifier and the signified. According to Saussure, the 
signifier and signified are discrete, but indissociable from each other, a double-
sided unity. This indissociabUity is, according to Derrida, one of the most decisive 
and critical manoeuvres that Saussure executes against the grain of Western 
metaphysics, but it is a double bind. Derrida demonstrates that "Saussure could 
not not confkm this tradition" through this aspect of his semiology (1972/1981, 
p. 18). 
Derrida continues to demonstrate that despite Saussure's insistence on the 
indissociabUity of the signifier and the signified, his stmcmraUsm supports the 
possibiUty of signifieds without sigiUfiers. Derrida states that "the maUitenance 
of the rigorous distinction [between signifiers and signifieds] ... mherentiy leaves 
open the possibiUty of thinking of a concept signified in and of itself (1972/1981, p. 
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19, Derrida's emphasis). The 'concept of a signified Ui and of itself is what 
Derrida refers to as a 'transcendental signified'. It is a pocket of meaning that 
exists independendy of the play of the text; is pure meaning; it is outside the text. 
Thus, Saussure "must renounce drawing aU the conclusions from the critical work 
he has undertaken" (1972/1981, p. 19). 
In Derrida's reconstruction of Saussure's stmcmraUsm, he replaces the 
signifier/signified binarism with signifier/signifier. This prevents the possibiUty 
of transcendental signifieds, toward which logocentrism grasps. Derrida also 
posits a relationship of difference between signifiers, but it is a relationship of a 
different order than that of Saussure's. Instead of being a difference based on 
absence, it is differance^. Differance, meaning both 'to differ' and 'defer', makes 
Derrida's poststmcmraUsm both temporal and dynamic, whereas Saussure's 
StmcmraUsm is static. These temporal and dynamic quaUties make it impossible to 
arrive at final meanings. This is not the same as saying that there is no meaning or 
that meaning is impossible. Instead, it renders meaning provisional. This 
perpemaUy disrupts any notion of a smooth and simple flow from signifier, to 
concept, to reference. Detours and delays are introduced; the flow, however, is 
not dam(m/n)ed. In an interview with Richard Kearney, Derrida remarked: 
It is totaUy false to suggest that deconstmction is a suspension of 
reference. ... deconstruction tries to show that the question of 
reference is much more complex and problematic than traditional 
theories suppose. (Kearney, 1984, p. 123). 
This comment can serve as a cue to return to the question with this section 
began: "Is it possible to support the existence of (the) material envkonment 
without resortUig to logocentrism?" Clearly, the statement that there is nothing 
beyond the text cannot be taken to claUn that there is no reference. As Caputo 
5 Whilst Derrida uses the term 'trace' in this context, I take my cue to use the more familiar term 'differand from the 
Translator's Preface to Of Grammatologf in which Spivak writes: "For "trace" one can substitute "arche-writing" ("archi-
ecriture") or "differance", or in fact quite a few other words that Derrida uses in the same way" (Spivak, 1996, p. JCV). I 
acknowledge that Derrida insists that these terms are 'nonsynonymic' and that in more detailed analyses this 
substimtion may be detrimental. 
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comments: "reference is a much more sUppery affak, caught up in the sUppage of 
signifiers that contUiuaUy sUp into each other, producing effects within 
preconstimted chains of differential spacing, which makes reference possibli^ (2000, 
para. 28, emphasis added). Instead, the statement that there is nothing outside the 
text is a denial of meaning outside the text. It is not a denial of (the) material 
world, but it is a denial that there is transcendent meaning in (the) world that 
guarantees "the movement of the text in general from the outside" (Derrida, 
1972/1981, p. 65). There is no recourse to an acontexmal world. 
The upshot of Derrida's deconstmction of Saussure for envkonmental 
education is that meaning is not located in the envkonment in and of itself If the 
play of signification were to coUapse in a heap, there would be no meaning in (the) 
envkonment standing taU against the ruins. This argument cannot be refuted by 
appeals to perception. The loss of transcendental signifieds does not deny that 
external stimuU trigger perceptions, but it does deny that perceptions in and of 
themselves are meaningful. For perceptions to be meaningful, they must receive 
signification otherwise they are consigned to unintelUgibiUty and cannot be noticed. 
There cannot be any acontexmal identification of perception. There are neither 
precepts nor percepts that are 'anterior' to the text; the envkonment does not 
control the movement of envkonmental discourse. Rather, envkonmental 
discourse is governed by the differential play of chains of signification. 
Rather than dispossessing envkonmental education of its reason for existence, 
deconstmction affkms and furthers the role and importance of both 
envkonmental education and education in general. Deconstmction of the 
envkonment "does not rob it of reaUty; it merely robs what presentiy lays claim to 
reaUty to any claim of finaUty" (Caputo, 2000, para. 40). Given the absence of 
finaUty there can be no end to inquiry. The role of envkonmental education, then, 
is to motivate and support smdents in intertexmal interpretations of 
envkonmental issues. This engagement must be reflexive as weU. Just as smdents 
cannot rest in complacent certimde, neither can the field of envkonmental 
education. 
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Deconstmction is not an anti-envkonmental discourse as Soule (1995), Soule 
and Lease (1995a, 1995b) and odiers (Sessions, 1996/1997; Shephard, 1995; 
Snyder, 1996/1997) claim. Rather than denying the existence of (the) material 
envkonment, deconstmction exhorts us to push our understanding fiirther in 
order to "know as much as possible in order to ground our decision[s]" (Derrida, 
1999, p. 73), whUst "offering a salutary and cautionary bit of advice about not 
exaggerating our success or inflating our results" (Caputo, 2000, para. 13). 
NARRATIVE UNCERTAINTIES 
The preceding sections have demonstrated that both the present and envisaged 
declamations of poststmcturaUst narrative theory are highly contestable, even 
difficult to sustain. When these arguments are added to those addressed by 
Gough (1994b, 1998c, 1998d) and Stables (1996, 1997), diey strengdien die 
platform from which to advocate the use of narrative theory in envkonmental 
education. This strengthened platform provides a justification for exploring 
narrative uncertainties and thek possible role in envkonmental education. 
This section formulates four forms of narrative uncertainty: subjunctive 
uncertainty, decentred uncertainty, aUegorical uncertainty and poietic uncertainty. 
The fkst of these forms of uncertainty can arise in either strucmraUst or 
poststmcturaUst narratives, whereas the remaining formulations attend 
poststmcmraUst narratives only. A tracing of the play of these uncertainties in 
current envkonmental education theory and practice foUows in the final section of 
this chapter. 
SUBJUNCTIVE UNCERTAINTY 
According to the Oxford EngUsh Dictionary, the subjunctive "denotes an 
action or a state as conceived (and not as fact) and therefore used to express a 
wish, command, exhortation, or a contingent, hypothetical, or prospective event". 
The subjunctive, then, expresses that which is uncertain, or possible, or desked, 
and bears a deep relation to the thinker. Thus, uncertaUity and embodied 
utopianism concur in the subjunctive. Considerations of the subjunctive, then, are 
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germane to discussions of uncertainty in envkonmental education, but the 
subjunctive is aUeged to be moribund. 
The subjunctive realm is vanishing due to a pronounced linguistic bias toward 
the indicative, which expresses matters of (disembodied) fact. In 1913, Urquhart, 
noted that: 
Very few forms of the subjunctive mood are left to us and Uttie use 
is made of those forms that do remain: it is becoming more and 
more common to use indicative forms of the verb where the 
subjunctive ones reaUy should be used. ... The indicative is thus 
encroaching on the domain of the subjunctive... (Urquhart, 1913, 
p. 64) 
The continued encroachment of the indicative was noted in 1931 by Fowler 
and Fowler (1973, p. 166) who commented that "an experienced word acmary [Dr 
Henry Bradley] puts thek expectation of Ufe at one generation". Today, the use of 
subjunctives as syntactical devices conveying uncertainty, possibility, or deske is 
almost completely obsolete. Any occasional usage seems odd and triggers word 
processors to signal a grammatical error. 
The loss of the subjunctive to which Urquhart and Fowler and Fowler refer 
attends the micro- or syntactical- level, that is the verb level. At the micro-level 
uncertainty, possibiUty, and deske are being rewritten in terms of certainty, 
probabiUty and 'reaUstic' expectation. But the medium of narrative enables the 
subjunctive mood to survive at the macro-level, as Le Guin notes: 
The indicative points its bony finger at primary experiences, at the 
Things; but it is the subjunctive that joins them, with the bonds of 
analogy, possibUity, probabiUty, contingency, memory, deske, fear 
and hope: the narrative connection. (Le Guin, 1989, p. 44) 
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Advocating the subjunctive uncertainty of narrative in envkonmental 
education is not a matter of trying to rescue the subjunctive from the invasion of 
the indicative. The importance attached to the subjunctive, via narrative, lacks 
such sentimentaUty. Instead, the advocacy of subjunctive uncertainty is grounded 
in envkonmental education curriculum documents. 
Uncertainty has been designated as a key concept in education for 
sustainabUity, and generic learning outcomes within the key concept of uncertainty 
have been drafted by the Panel for Education ^ r Sustainable Development in the 
Schools Sector (1998). These include: 
• understand [ing] that people have different views on 
sustainabiUty issues, and that these may often be in confUct; 
• Usten[ing] to, criticaUy evaluat[ing], and learn[ing] from 
different voices and opinions on sustainable development 
issues; and 
• understand [ing] the concept of culmral change in the shift 
from the certainties of the modern age to the uncertainties 
of the postmodern age, and what opportunities these may 
afford for reaUsing a more sustainable society. (Panel for 
Education^r Sustainable Development, 1998, pp. 7, 8,11) 
The conjunction of multivocaUty and critical utopianism that these objectives 
convey under the aegis of uncertainty makes consideration of subjunctive 
uncertainty whoUy relevant to discussions of uncertainty in envkonmental 
education. Subjunctive uncertainty arises, in part, from narrative's denial of 
indubitabiUty and exhaustiveness. Thus, subjunctive uncertainty welcomes 
different voices without reducUig difference, thereby maUitaUUng the possibiUty of 
uncertainty. Closure is supplanted by perpemal openness. This openness is also 
whoUy consistent with utopianism as it has been cast here; openness concords 
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with the kremedial inadequacy of the concepmaUsation of perfection, even as an 
idea(l). 
However, narrative theory can be recruited into the service of the regular 
emancipatory pedagogy of education for the envkonment and education for 
sustainabiUty which, by logocentricaUy appealing to the reaUty 'out there', cast 
subjunctive uncertainty in a totaUy different Ught. Such logocentric rescues of 
Vance's (1917) rendition of certainty render the subjunctive as a transitional stage 
in a progression towards indicative closure. Narratives that blend and clash are 
not regarded as contested knowledges, but as nascent knowledge. Narratives are 
reduced to competing stories about the world. 
Depicting narratives in this manner enables thek stams and function(s) to be 
cast variously. Within the envkonmental education arena, Huckle (1993, p. 45), for 
instance, regards "incorrect reading[s] of reaUty" as manifestations of false 
consciousness; for Munson (1994), they are tenacious, but innocent, 
misconceptions. Both of these viewpoints render multivocaUty instrumentaUy as a 
productive/Uberal/emancipatory means of disclosing the tme story dirough 
processes of elimination and refinement. Thus constmed, univocaUty subjugates 
multivocaUty, rendering subjunctive uncertainty as a provisional problem rather 
than an enduring and constimtive aspect of knowledge. Furthermore, it reverses 
"the shift from the certainties of the modern age to the uncertaUities of the 
postmodern age" advanced by the Panel for Education for Sustainable 
Development. Clearly, such manoeuvres diametricaUy oppose the objectives 
proposed by the Panel for Education^r Sustainable Development. 
These manoeuvres are not confUied to envkonmental education. According 
to MacLure (1994, p. 289), the "tendency for poststmcturaUsms to be recruited 
into emancipatory/critical projects, or rescued by them, is a characteristic 'turn' ki 
recent education theorizing". The jargon of envkonmental education, however, 
does promote the ease widi which such logocentric rescues may occur. For 
Uistance, expressions such as education about the envkonment, education in the 
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envkonment, and education for the envkonment, insinuate a tangible, concrete, 
pre-given envkonment. This view that the envkonment undergkds our percepts 
and concepts dominates envkonmental education and is vicariously ratified by the 
privUege afforded to scientific discourse. However, both historical antecedents 
and contemporary theorisUig within the scientific arena chaUenge the notion of 
envkonment in a manner that disavows logocentric appeals to the 'reaUty out 
there'. This is discussed in the foUowing section and it has the potential to 
prevent the forced curtaUment of subjunctive uncertainty. 
DECENTRED UNCERTAINTY 
The notion of a pregiven envkonment reUes upon three assumptions: we 
inhabit a world with particular properties; we recover these properties through 
representation; and a separate 'we' does these things. But these assumptions and 
the notion of the pregiven envkonment that they enable have been subjected to 
intense phUosophical debate since the EnUghtenment revival of empiricism. 
Ardent empiricist Locke, for example, denies the surety of such an epistemology 
through his conviction that "men [sic] would not be thought to talk barely of thek 
imaginations, but of things as they reaUy are, therefore they often suppose thek 
words to stand for the reaUty of things" (Locke, 1690/1998, p. 258, emphasis 
added). In the contemporary debate, Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1993) reject 
the thkd assumption. FoUowing Lewontin (1983), they uphold the view that "our 
central nervous systems are not fitted with some absolute laws of nature, but to 
laws of nature operating within a framework created by our own sensuous 
activity" (quoted in Varela et al., 1993, p. 202). By deploying this ckcularity thek 
argument then diverges from Lewontin's defense of critical reaUsm (Levins & 
Lewontin, 1985) by demonstrating the untenabUity of the other two assumptions. 
Thus, they utterly reject the positions of reaUsm and objectivism, even Ui thek 
fUtered, critical formulations. In thek place they propose and defend 'die enactive 
approach of embodied action', which takes a middle path between ideaUsm and 
reaUsm. According to the enactive approach, "cognition is not the representation 
of a pregiven world by a pregiven mUid but radier is die enactment of a world by a 
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mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world 
performs" (Varela et al., 1993, p.9). 
The enactive approach denies the separabiUty of the thinker and the world. 
Envkonmental education theorising also emphasises inseparabiUty by promoting 
"a hoUstic view of the envkonment as a totaUty of the interdependent 
relationships between namral and social systems" (Fien, 1993, p. 55). But this is 
an inseparabiUty of a different order from that proposed by Varela, Thompson 
and Rosch. It maintains the separabiUty of the thinker and the world through the 
notion of 'interdependence' which has purchase only in the Ught of separabiUty. 
Thus, it is possible to appeal to the other. This admits the logocentric rescues 
discussed Ui the previous section. It stiU admits the conviction that "the stmctures 
and processes that govern the namral world are given and unchanging" (Huckle, 
1993, p. 44). 
The inseparabiUty that Varela, Thompson and Rosch propose, however, does 
not admit the dichotomy that envkonmental education stUl sanctions. Instead, 
they claim "that organism and envkonment are mumaUy enfolded" (Varela et al., 
1993, p. 202). This precludes the notion of interdependence because organism 
and envkonment are one. It is impossible to appeal to the other, which renders 
logocentric rescues both impossible and unthinkable. In Varela, Thompson and 
Rosch's words (1993, p. 11) "we cannot avoid as a matter of consistency the 
logical impUcation that by this same view any such scientific description, either of 
biological or mental phenomena, must itself be product of the structure of our 
own cognitive system". Thus, Varela, Thompson and Rosch's enactive approach is 
a discursive genre: the "'pre-given' is not the object's or subject's existence or 
sensation of it, but the way in which the workings of language make us think that 
there subjects, objects, and sensations at aU" (Baker, 1999, p. 376). 
This UiabiUty to locate authority, vaUdation or tmth from 'outside' disaUows 
logocentric curtaiUnent of subjunctive uncertakity. MultivocaUty and openness 
prevaU over uiUvocaUty and closure. Furthermore, openness is expanded. The 
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inabiUty to ground (the) authority, vaUdation or tmth of our envkonmental 
knowledge from (the) 'outside' envkonment dislodges the envkonment as the 
centre of our envkonmental knowledge, as per Derrida's reading of centre: 
it has always been thought that the center, which is by definition 
unique, constimted that very thing within a structure which whUe 
governing the structure, escapes structuraUty. This is why classical 
thought concerning structure could say that the center is, 
paradoxicaUy, within the stmcmre and outside it. The center is at 
the center of totaUty, and yet, since the center does not belong to 
the totaUty (is not part of the totaUty), the totaUty has its center 
elsewhere. The center is not the center. (Derrida, 1967/1978, p. 
279) 
Thus decentred, envkonmental knowledge loses "a fundamental immobiUty 
and a reassuring certimde" (Derrida, 1967/1978, p. 279). But decentrUig does not 
stop foUowing the instaUation of a different centre; decentring does not rest. 
Thus, reassuring certimde is not restored. Decentred uncertainty, then, is the 
uncertainty that arises from successive determinations of centres. This results in a 
proUferation of the narratives that can emerge as centres shift. This proUferation 
is not infinite, however, as centres control play by limiting the field. As centres 
change, so too do the playing field and the 'rules'. It is important to stress at this 
stage that this is not an example of the cynical maxim: if you can't win, shift the 
goal posts. The successive determination of centres is not a matter of competition; 
it is not about winning. Furthermore, the transgressions that dislocating centres 
effect defy the determinism of this cynicism. Subjunctive uncertainty is ampUfied 
by decentred uncertainty. 
ALLEGORICAL UNCERTAINTIES 
At the broadest level, aUegory says one thing and means another; beyond 
agreement at this level, disparities proUferate (Van Dyke, 1985). The notions of 
aUegorical uncertainties are formulated and presented withki this broad layer of 
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agreement. Two forms of aUegorical uncertainty are formulated: the fkst is 
somewhat conservative, the second, more radical. 
A rather conservative form of aUegorical uncertainty may be drawn from the 
annulment of authority, vaUdation and tmth that decentring effects. The denial of 
the outside as being the ultimate court of appeal beyond language rescinds the 
notion that words refer, "that words make present to the reader or hearer 
ascertainable, decipherable meanings, that is, they contain 'presence' or presences 
from outside or beyond themselves" (Cunnigham, 1993, p.584). This dismption 
of the normative assumption that words refer cascades into fiirther dismptions 
and disarrangements, which include smearing the akeady blurry distinction 
between denotation and connotation. Thus the distinction that aUegory says one 
thing and means another loses efficacy. This is the source of a conservative form 
of aUegorical uncertainty. 
TypicaUy, denotation refers to fundamental meanings, meanings that are free 
of ideological influences, to objectivity; whereas connotation refers to the 
imposition of secondary meanings over fundamental meanings through ideological 
investments (Barthes, 1961/1977). Thus, denotation requkes an underlying reaUty 
that is represented by words, and the distinction between denotation and 
connotation requkes the namral/social dichotomy in which the privUeging of the 
natural invests denotation with corrective power through its perceived lack of 
ambiguity. Within this frame, the mismatch between denotative and connotative 
meanings is kony as per La Bossiere (1993, p. 572): "Irony ... is inherentiy 
corrective and unambiguous, normative and referential: spoken statements are 
dominated by intended meanings, falsehoods by tmths, surface appearances by 
underlyUig reaUties". Thus understood, kony serves a stabiUsing fimction; it 
forecloses multivocaUty by procuring the closure of text through foundationaUsm. 
Uncertainty is repressed/suppressed by the reduction/degradation of the 
ambiguous to kony. 
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WhUst denotation is assumed to refer beyond text, to referents, it could be 
argued that the focus can be shifted such that denotation refers to fakly 
uncontentious shared constmctions since there must be a minimum level of 
agreement for discourse to occur. Shared understanding is essential to create the 
conditions for expectation and uncertainty. This shift disavows the ideologicaUy 
free character of denotation, blurring the seemingly clear distinction between 
denotation and connotation. Denying the polarity that logocentrism countenances 
robs kony of its mode of, and reason for, existence, and instaUs a conservative 
mode of aUegorical uncertainty in its place. This form of aUegorical uncertainty 
differs from kony insomuch as it is non-corrective; it welcomes rather than 
forecloses multivocaUty; it supports openness rather than procures closure. These 
feamres, which distinguish this mode of aUegorical uncertainty from kony, 
resonate with critical utopianism. 
A more radical form of aUegorical uncertainty may be formulated from the 
rejection of identitarian thinking as per Adorno (1966/1973) and Derrida 
(1967/1976, 1967/1978, 1972/1981, 1972/1981, 1972/1982). These rejections 
denounce the notion that "the 'presence of the word' is equivalent to its meaning" 
(Hartman, 1977, p. viU) by arguing that meaning overflows the word (Adorno, 
1966/1973) or by arguing that meaning is perpemaUy disseminated through chains 
of substimtions perrida, 1967/1976, 1967/1978, 1972/1981, 1972/1981, 
1972/1982). Thus, the word bears within it an kreducible absence or 
indeterminacy that creates an kreversible asymmetry between signifier and 
signified. Thus, each text means more than it says. This non-coincidence of the 
signifier and (the) meaning is aUegory. 
AUegorical uncertainty arising within the intertexmal space between meaning 
and word differs from the other mode of aUegorical uncertainty in at least two 
fiindamental and cmcial ways. Fkstiy, this form of aUegorical uncertakity arises in 
the 'event' rather than after the 'event'. This shift Ui temporaUty conconUtandy 
introduces an ethical dknension by shifting responsibUity for meaning. This is an 
important consideration for envkonmental education in relation to the 
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pedagogical approaches used to promote its ethico-poUtical objectives and closely 
aUgns this formulation of radical aUegorical uncertainty with the foUowing 
formulation oipoietic uncertainty. Secondly, the intertexmal space transforms the 
pluraUty of narrative. WhUst the more conservative form of aUegorical uncertainty 
yields multiple narratives, they are discrete and controUed as per Fish's (1980) 
communicative communities. This form of pluraUty is reducible to a coUection of 
co-existing singular narratives. However, the more radical form of aUegorical 
uncertainty, which arises from the kreducible excess of the meaning, traverses the 
sayable and the unsayable, thus weaving a continuous space that defies reducibUity 
and in which cross-overs (chiasms) may occur spontaneously, rather than at nodes 
in a network. Thus, radical aUegorical uncertainty is constimtive of 'Text' as per 
Bardies (1971/1977). 
POIETIC UNCERTAINTY 
Poietic uncertainty (Gr. Poiesis = creative production) emerges in a simUar 
manner to aUegorical uncertainty. Just as aUegorical uncertainty arises from 
problematising meaning by renouncing either the primary meaning of denotation 
or the symmetrical coincidence of word and meaning, poietic uncertainty arises 
from problematising meaning by renouncing the beUef that texts convey intended 
meanings that can be attributed to the author(s). Thus, ^ o/^ /?V uncertainty emerges 
from the motif of the Death of the Author as per Barthes (1968/1977), Derrida 
(1972/1981) and Foucault (1969/1988). 
BeUef in the decipherment and recuperation of an author's intended meaning 
posits reading texts as a passive process insofar as it does not engage the reader in 
the construction of meaning. Meaning is cast as a pre-given, stable and self-
sufficient 'thing' that is intrinsicaUy contained in language, and the reader is cast as 
a disposable recipient who acqukes meaning vicariously through texts. The reader 
is the target rather than the site of meanUig. The motif of the Death of the 
Author, however, dismpts this notion by rescheduUng both the temporaUty and 
locus of meanUig. The temporaUty is shifted from die past to die present: "diere 
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is no time than that of enunciation and every text is eternaUy rewritten here and 
non/' (Barthes, 1968/1977, p. 145, Barthes' emphasis). This shift predicates 
meaning as a perpemal process of construction, poiesis, rather than the 
decipherment and recuperation of a past constmction. This temporal 
rescheduUng of meaning concomitandy shifts the locus of meaning from the 
author to the coupling of the reader and the work into "a single signifying 
practice" (Bardies, 1971/1977, p. 162). 
The temporal rescheduUng of meaning has a profound Unpact on Vance's 
(1917) rendition of certainty as a quaUty of propositions because it denies that 
propositions convey intrinsic meaning. Instead, meaning resides in the reception 
of a proposition. When meaning is located in a perpemal process of creation or 
becoming, certainty cannot be ascertained because meaning must be estabUshed 
logicaUy prior to the attribution of (un)certainty. In other words, when the 
constmction of meaning is perpemaUy located in the present, the attribution of 
certainty would requke one to both UteraUy get ahead of oneself whUst remaining 
steadfastiy grounded in the present. This is both impossible and utterly absurd. 
Thus, the Death of the Author perpemaUy defers the attribution or denial of 
certainty. Poietic uncertainty draws this perpemal postponement clearly into reUef 
and this aspect of uncertainty suffuses each of the other formulations of 
uncertainty as weU. Concomitantiy, this perpemal postponement disavows 
surrendering certainty. Therefore, statements that proclaim postmodernism/ 
poststmcturaUsm as the 'Age of Uncertainty' cannot be read as signalling the 
'death of certainty'. Uncertakity presages certaUity's possibiUty, not its epitaph. 
Thus, uncertainty intermpts the totaUtarianism requked to oust or cmsh certainty. 
Poietic uncertainty and the shifts from which it arises have enormous 
impUcations for the affective agenda of envkonmental education. These wiU be 
explored the foUowUig section after die trackig of the four formulations of 
uncertaUity in die works of Gough (1993, 1994a, 1997, 1998a, 1998c, 1998d) and 
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Stables (1996,1997, 2001b; Stables & Bishop, 2001), each of whom advocates and 
employs the use of texmal strategies in envkonmental education. 
NARRATIVE UNCERTAINTIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 
As noted earUer, narrative theory has occupied a niche in envkonmental 
education for close to a decade. This niche has been carved out, promoted and 
sustakied predomUiately by die work of Gough (1993, 1994a, 1997, 1998a, 1998c, 
1998d) and Stables (1996, 1997, 2001b; Stables & Bishop, 2001). WhUst neidier 
of these theorists addresses narrative uncertainties per se, this section wiU probe 
thek arguments for any stances adopted impUcitiy in relation to the four 
formulations of narrative uncertainties developed here. This section, then, traces 
the paths that have been laid out in the field and lays the tracing over the maps to 
discern what effects the maps can induce in the tracing. This enacts the thkd 
phase of Deleuze and Guattari's (1980/1987) cartography, namely decalcomania. 
However, the thkd phase is enacted more comprehensively in Chapter Seven. 
Stables (1996, 1997, 2001b; Stables & Bishop, 2001) has been an ardent 
proponent of texmal approaches in envkonmental education. The main thmst of 
Stables' argument in his earUer work draws on the motif of the Death of the 
Audior as per Barthes (1968/1977), Derrida (1972/1981) and FoucauU 
(1969/1988). FoUowing consideration of the problems of the author in relation to 
landscapes. Stables argues that envkonmental education should go beyond 
superficial "texts about the envkonment and should embrace the notion of 
landscapes as texts" (1997, p. I l l , Stables' emphasis). This approach posits the 
envkonment as mediated by complex ckcuits of meanings; our knowledge of (the) 
envkonment is constmcted by language and even our perceptions are meaningless 
unless they gain expression through language. Thus, we never encounter the 
envkonment-in-itself; that is, we never encounter an acontexmal envkonment. 
Treating (the) envkonment as text admits the play of aU four forms of 
narrative uncertaUities. However, Stables (1996, p. 193) forecloses die play of 
narrative uncertainties through the disclaUner that treatUig envkonment as text 
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"does not indicate that a disciplinary approach to envkonmental smdies which 
does not regard envkonment as text is invaUd". Thus, for Stables it is vaUd for 
(the) envkonment to both be and not be text. This aUeged freedom to step in and 
out of text creates a loophole through which to effect logocentric rescues by 
giving primacy to narratives that do not regard (the) envkonment as text. 
Furthermore, Stables uses this logocentric loophole to 'ground' his later work 
(2001b) on texmaUty in envkonmental education and he disparages 'ungrounded' 
texmal approaches as 'thoroughgoing relativism'. Thus, Stables creates the 
conditions for engaging the play of narrative uncertainties in his earUer works, but 
he arrests this play in his later work by supporting the objective/subjective 
dichotomy. As a result of this logocentric turn, the remainder of this section wiU 
focus on Gough's work orUy. 
Gough's work may be read as an active promotion of subjunctive uncertainty, 
which arises from the pluraUty and openness of narrative. This claim is based on 
Gough's consistent emphasis of the importance of the pluraUty of discrete 
narratives. A key feature in the promotion of the pluraUty of discourses in 
envkonmental education is the displacement of the scientific narrative that 
dominates the field. This is not at aU a rejection of scientific discourse, nor is it a 
devaluation of the knowledge that scientific discourse generates. Rather, it is 
repudiation that scientific discourse can claim the authority to arrest the play of 
other discourses. 
Gough does more than simply proclaim the merit of proUferating narratives; 
he has deployed a variety of unconventional genres, such as science fiction (1993, 
1995,1998b, 1998c) and autobiography (N. Gough, 1999b), to frame conventional 
envkonmental education issues. Through these genres, Gough has rewritten 
conventional envkonmental education issues, such as the problematic relationship 
between envkonmental education and technology (Gough, 1995, 1997), Ui a 
manner that multipUes meanings and opens up new Uiterpretive possibiUties, This 
enables Gough to argue that narrative theory "is 'usefiU to us' as a means of 
posUig options and alternatives for connecting 'present reaUties' with past and/or 
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fiimre possibiUties in curriculum Uiquiries" (Gough, 1998c, p, 93). This 
proUferation of meanings and possibiUties supports the coupling of subjunctive 
uncertainty and utopianism that was advanced earUer. 
However, it was noted earUer that the play of subjunctive uncertainty can be 
constrained by logocentric rescues. This can occur in several ways, the fkst of 
which is to refer to the reaUty 'out there' as the yardstick against which to test the 
veracity of our narratives. Gough has successfiiUy blocked this logocentric turn by 
his deconstmction of the fact/fiction dichotomy in which he demonstrated that 
both facts and fictions are texmal constructions. This deconstmction, then, 
precludes any notion of transcendental meaning that governs the movement of 
the text from the outside. 
Another logocentric manoeuvre can occur if narratives are recruited into the 
service of critical emancipatory projects. Gough's contention that: "Narrative 
Uiquiry is intended to be emancipatory" (1998a, p. 121) suggests that such a 
logocentric manoeuvre may be afoot. Emancipation is typicaUy understood to 
denote a Ufting of false consciousness to reveal a prediscursive reaUty. However, 
Gough avoids this logocentric turn through his problematisation of the self as per 
Davies and Banks (1992): "subjectivity is formulated through discourses, given 
substance and pattern through storyline and is deployed in social interaction" 
(quoted in N, Gough, 1999a, p, 46), This notion of the self as a texmal being 
precludes the possibiUty of coupling emancipation to prediscursivity, 
FinaUy, Gough's contention that that narrative theory can be 'usefiU to us' 
could be read as an overture to logocentrism. The determination of whether 
something may or may not be 'usefiU to us' may be read as an endorsement of a 
detached vantage point In this context, a detached vantage pokit would Ue 
beyond the text, which estabUshes the condition for logocentrism. However, the 
problematisation of the self as a texmal being utterly precludes any overture to a 
detached vantage poUit, Thus, for Gough, judging narrative theory as beUig 'usefiU 
to us' is a choice, but not a detached choice that can resort to logocentrism. 
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Gough's work on narrative also connects with the notion oipoietic uncertainty 
formulated here. Gough consistentiy refers to the intercontexmal constmction of 
meaning, where he takes intercontexmaUty to refer to the way in which meaning is 
constmcted through the interweaving of texts. FoUowing the poststmcturaUst 
notion of the Death of the Author, the meaning of one narrative alone - if such 
an experience were possible - depends upon the meaning generated by the reader, 
not that intended by an author. Thus, the meaning is uncertain until the time of 
reception. This uncertainty proUferates when intertexmaUty is brought into play. 
This has impUcations for educators, for as Gough notes: "We need to remember 
that, as adults, our fracmred postmodernist identities are not constimted from the 
same stories of those young people we teach" (1994b, p,207). By constmcting 
meanings within different intercontexmal fields, poietic uncertainty is ampUfied 
further. 
This proUferation of poietic uncertainty has educational significance for 
envkonmental education's commitment to developing eco-ethico poUtical agency. 
As Gough notes, one of the educational possibiUties resulting from the 
constmction of intertexmal meanings "is to support learners as they 'play out' the 
meanings and impUcations of thek transactions ... so that they can rehearse the 
consequences of Uving in these stories, and of Uving with others' stories, in 
sustainable (or at least noncatastrophic) ways" (1994b, p. 210). This educational 
possibiUty clearly connects poietic uncertainty, subjunctive uncertainty and critical 
utopianism to the affective agenda of envkonmental education, which seeks to 
promote eco-poUtical agency. This ethical aspect could sUnultaneously include 
addressing "ethical questions about what it means to generate and transmit 
narratives, and to knpUcate, transform, or force persons who participate Ui them" 
(Newton, 1995, p, 7). Gough does not specificaUy address this reflexive mode of 
ethical questiotUng, but it is a whoUy consistent extension of his work. 
In summary, the play of narrative uncertainties, as they have been formulated 
here, can be identified as processes operatUig Ui die texmal approaches advocated 
and employed by Stables and Gough. However, die roles of diese uncertaUities 
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are not brought into clear reUef, which is not surprising given that thek projects 
do not address uncertainty per se. Nevertheless, there is sufficient reUef for this 
tracing to suggest that each theorist responds to narrative uncertainties in very 
different ways. Stables strives to arrest the play of narrative uncertainties through 
logocentric manoeuvres, especiaUy in his later works. Gough's work, on the other 
hand, can be read as adopting a positive stance toward uncertainty insomuch as 
uncertainty provides the condition for the fluidity of intertexmal readings from 
which the possibiUty of ethical engagements emerge. Given that Gough's project 
does not specificaUy address uncertainty, however, the educational impUcations are 
underdeveloped. Further educational impUcations wiU be mapped in Chapter Six. 
THOUGHTS WITHOUT CLOSURE 
According to Cooke (1995, p. 523, quoting Smith, 1968), "closure is produced 
by a text when it creates a sense of "appropriate cessation" for it's reader, when it 
"announces and justifies the absence of fiirther development"". This notion of 
closure clearly undermines the themes that have been juxtaposed here under the 
aegis of narrative uncertainties. Closure seeks to curtaU the openness of 
subjunctive uncertainty, casts the reader as a disposable recipient of pregiven 
meaning rather than the site of meaning, and simultaneously announces the end of 
interpretation and the arrival of certainty. Offering thoughts without closure, 
however, is "a deference to uncertainty. It is a sideways step that is cmcial ... to 
the open-ness, the free play, the oppormrUties for further conversation" (Baker, 
Ng, & Tucker, 1998, p. 173). Furthermore, offering thoughts without closure 
upholds the conviction that underscored ;:)o/^ A> uncertakity, namely that the locus 
of meaning resides with the reader rather than the author. Thus, I choose to trace 
the themes that have been juxtaposed here, whUst ardendy denying fmaUty, 
The cue to juxtapose narrative tiieory and uncertakity arose as a result of 
Vance's (1917) contention tiiat certaUity is a quaUty of propositions. However, the 
Une of Uiquky that has been pursued Ui this chapter is undoubtedly pace Vance, 
rather than as per Vance, Vance undoubtedly would not agree with die 
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poststmcmraUst themes that have been invoked. For instance, Vance definitely 
would not agree with the poststmcturaUst critiques of metaphysical presence, 
given his assertion that: 
Just as you cannot doubt that you are doubting, whUe you are 
doubting; so also you cannot doubt that if things are, they are what 
they are, ... Granted for the moment that things distinctiy are not 
what we think them to be, they are at least what they are. (Vance, 
1917, p. 89, Vance's emphasis) 
A beUef in essences clearly underscores this rendition of identity and notions of 
essences are ardendy rejected in postmodernist/ poststructuraUst perspectives. Yet 
Vance provides the means to reject the beUef in essences by positing certainty as a 
quaUty of propositions as opposed to a quaUty of 'things as they are'. Thus, 
Vance's formulation of critical reaUsm bears within it a contention that not only 
dismandes its ontological assumption, but also provides a defensible passage to 
postmodernist/poststmcturaUst theorising in general and to postmodernist/ 
poststmcmraUst narrative theory in particular. This is significant for 
envkonmental education, given that many of the orientations that comprise this 
contested field embrace and fiercely defend critical reaUsm. 
WhUst it is whoUy defensible to argue that Vance's formulation of critical 
reaUsm logicaUy dkects a shift to poststructuraUst narrative approaches, the hostUe 
reception that narrative theory has received from some theorists in the wider 
education arena has the potential to adversely affect engagements with narrative 
theory in envkonmental education. The disparagement of narrative theory within 
the wider education arena is two-pronged. SpecificaUy, narrative theory is 
disparaged on the grounds that it putatively: requkes an ambivalence toward, or 
rejection of, tmth (PhUUps, 1994, 1997, 1999); and leads to crippUng relativism as 
a result of the absence of normative elements to guide Uiterpretive possibUities. 
Neither of these objections can be upheld with respect to postmodernist/ 
poststmcturaUst narrative theory. Many postmodernist/poststmcturaUst theorists 
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botii exhort die necessity of tmdi perrida, 1972/1981, 1999; Foucault, 1980, 
1985) and embed normative elements within thek theorisations (Derrida, 
1967/1976, 1999; Levkias, 1961/1991, 1974/1991; Lyotard, 1984, 1985). Thus, 
the disparagements of narrative theory in the wider education arena do not 
withstand scmtiny and ought not to impede an engagement of uncertainty 
through postmodernist/poststmcmraUst narrative theory in envkonmental 
education. 
As these disparagements recede, however, it is possible that other objections 
might be raised in thek stead. Two such objections may be based on the 
nUsconceptions that postmodernist/poststmcmraUst perspectives cannot 
accommodate notions of 'betterment' (MacLure, 1994; Stronach & MacLure, 
1996) and that, foUowUig Derrida (1967/1976), postmodernist/ poststmcturaUst 
perspectives deny the materiaUty of (the) envkonment. Neither of these 
objections withstands scmtiny either. It has been argued that Derrida (1967/1976, 
1999) supports the notion of 'betterment' through his ethical imperative to 
undertake unending interpretation in order to avoid the annihUation of difference 
through totaUsation. SimUar arguments can be constmcted from the works of 
Levmas (1961/1991, 1974/1991) and Lyotard (1984, 1985). Widi respect to the 
second misconception, it has been argued that Derrida's famous remark that "there 
is nothing outside of the texf (1967/1976, p. 158, Derrida's emphasis) does not 
constimte a denial of embodied existence within (the) material envkonment. Thus, 
it is argued that there is no reason not to theorise uncertainty through narrative 
theory in envkonmental education. 
Four forms of narrative uncertainty were formulated from key motifs in 
StmcturaUst and poststmcturaUst Uterary theory and phUosophy, and each was 
shown to be germane to contemporary curricular and pedagogical issues in 
envkonmental education. The first form of narrative uncertainty is subjunctive 
uncertainty, which attends the openness of narratives. Subjunctive uncertainty has 
the capacity to promote the utopianism of envkonmental education's 
commitment to envkonmental/sustaUiable transformation. The second form of 
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narrative uncertainty is decentred uncertainty, which arises from the loss of 
transcendental signifiers. This form of uncertainty confronts the widely accepted 
logocentric perspectives in envkonmental education theorising, which treat (the) 
envkonment as a prediscursive given. The thkd form of narrative uncertainty, 
aUegorical uncertainty, can occur in conservative and radical forms. The 
conservative form arises from the rejection of the denotation/connotation 
binarism, which serves a 'corrective' fiinction by upholding the notion of Tmth, 
which can then be used hegemonicaUy to support privUeged social constmctions 
of (the) envkonment. In contrast, the radical form of aUegorical uncertainty draws 
on the deconstmctive notions that multiple meanings are inscribed in texts and 
that the meanings of texts are instantiated differentiaUy through relations with 
other texts. FinaUy, the fourth form of narrative uncertainty, which is related to 
the thkd, is poietic uncertainty. This uncertainty arises from the motif of the Death 
of die Audior as per Derrida (1967/1978), Bardies (1968/1977) and Foucault 
(1969/1988), As such, this form of narrative uncertainty obtains from the 
rejection of the notion that texts convey pre-given meanings. The constmction of 
meaning is cast as an active process that involves the reader/writer. This has 
important impUcations for envkonmental values education and eco-poUtical 
agency because it accenmates the ethico-poUtical aspects of reading/writing (the) 
envkonment. The links to envkonmental values education and eco-poUtical 
agency are developed fiirther in Chapters Six and Seven, 
The formulation of each of these forms of uncertainty demonstrates that 
uncertainty is constitutive of narrative theory, rather than being a consequence of 
narrative theory. In other words, narrative theory does not create uncertainty. This 
is significant; if it were otherwise, that is if narrative theory were to create 
uncertainties, then narrative theory would be logicaUy prior to and therefore free 
from uncertainty. These formulations, in contrast, posit uncertainty as a 
constimtive aspect of what we caU 'reaUty', rather than an aberration that arises 
from a particular manner of 'documenting' ReaUty, Thus, narrative theory embeds 
uncertakity as a constimtive aspect of experience rather than positUig uncertainty 
210 
CHAPTER FIVE - NARRATIVE UNCERTAINTIES 
as an inevitable aspect that subordinates Uved experience in relation to ideal 
experience. These formulations of narrative uncertainties provide an explanatory 
frame through which to engage uncertaUity in envkonmental education in a 
manner that neither glorifies nor subordinates uncertainty, 
WhUst narrative theory has been advocated and engaged by Gough (1993, 
1994a, 1997, 1998a, 1998c, 1998d) and Stables (1996, 1997, 2001b, Stables & 
Bishop, 2001), neither has addressed narrative uncertainties ^ ^rx^. An examination 
of thek projects, however, demonstrated that each responds tacitiy to the narrative 
uncertainties that operate within his work. Furthermore, Gough and Stables 
respond in opposite ways. Whereas, Stables seeks to stabUise his work, especiaUy 
his later work, by invoking logocentric manoeuvres to dampen the impact of 
narrative uncertainties, Gough develops strategies that conform to the fluidity that 
arises from the play of uncertainties. However, given that the play of narrative 
uncertainties is not brought into clear reUef in Gough's work, the potential to 
engage uncertainty through narrative theory is underdeveloped. The role(s) of 
narrative uncertainties can be developed further. This fiirther development wiU be 
undertaken in the next chapter, which includes discussions of: the potential of 
subjunctive uncertainty to disrupt patriarchal discourse and the strategic value that 
this may have for feminist orientations in envkonmental education and engaging 
indigenous voices; the constimtive role of uncertainty in deconstmctive 
envkonmental Uteracy; and the impUcations of the temporal shift that poietic 
uncertainty effects for envkonmental values education. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The preceding two chapters were lines of flight as per Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980/1987). Each chapter used an aspect of theorising uncertainty as a launching 
point from which to take the argument into unfamiUar terrain, where there were 
resonances with envkonmental education, but the resonances had an unfamiUar 
inflection. The fkst line of flight blazed a traU from the rendition of 'postmodern 
uncertainties' advanced by the Panel for Education ^ r Sustainable Development's 
(1998) to Levinas' postmodernist/poststrucmraUst ethics of responsibiUty for the 
Other (Levmas, 1961/1991, 1974/1991), whereas tiie second Une of flight blazed 
a traU from Vance's (1917) rendition of certainty within critical reaUsm to narrative 
uncertainties. Thus, these two Unes of fUght were seemingly discrete, despite the 
common interest in uncertainty. However, secondary Unes of fUght can be 
proUferated from these trajectories and it is possible that resonances may form 
between them and between envkonmental education. 
This chapter is principaUy concerned with secondary lines of fUght that 
connect with envkonmental education. Some envkonmental education 
impUcations were noted whUst the trajectories of these lines of flight were being 
mapped. However, the in-depth development of these impUcations together with 
an examination of the relations between them was postponed untU this chapter. 
This postponement was chosen to prevent any impediment to the Unes of fUght 
by digressions along the way. The development of these impUcations and thek 
interrelations is a continuation of the mapping process that the lines of flight 
initiated. This mapping forges links between uncertainty and feminist theory, 
critical Uteracy and postmodernist/poststmcmraUst ethics. 
FURTHER MAPPING 
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SUBJUNCTIVE UNCERTAINTY AND FEMINISMS 
The play of narrative uncertainties is not expUcitiy acknowledged by those in 
envkonmental education who advocate narrative theory. I wiU argue, therefore, 
that narrative uncertainties are underdeveloped and underused concepmal and 
explanatory resources. Moreover, I wiU argue that narrative uncertainties, as they 
have been formulated here, both affkm and promote major themes in 
envkonmental education, some of which expUcitiy articulate engagements with 
uncertainty and others that do not. The arguments presented here do not confine 
narrative to the narrow sense of story telUng, rather the arguments are 
underpinned by the broader sense of reading and writing as per Derrida 
(1972/1981) which posits reading and writing as engagement within systems of 
signification. Thus narrative theory is understood here as Uved experience within 
discourses. Narrative theory is not simply viewed as telling, Ustening to, reading 
or composing stories; it is aU of these things and Uving within them. Text is 
action. 
Perhaps the most immediate Unk to be forged between narrative uncertainties 
and other areas of inquiry is between subjunctive uncertainty and feminisms. As 
noted in Chapter Five, the subjunctive creates the narrative "bonds of analogy, 
possibiUty, probability, contingency, memory, deske, fear and hope" (Le Guin, 
1989, p. 44). The most conspicuous link to feminism Ues in the fact that these 
'narrative bonds' are the subordinate poles of binarisms that are stereotypicaUy 
assigned to (the) feminine: correspondence/analogy, acmaUty/possibUity, 
certainty/probabiUty, surety/contingency, satisfaction/deske, courage/fear, wiU/ 
hope. In short, these attributes of narrative can be read as the metaphysical 
essentiaUsms that undergkd the stereotypical gender constmction of feminine 
(absence) as opposed to masculine (presence). Furthermore, the subjunctive/ 
indicative binarism highUghts that these narrative bonds are consigned to the 
subordinate poles by patriarchal discourse. 
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The patriarchal role can be drawn Uito reUef by examining the role of the 
indicative mood, which states "a relation of an objective fact between the subject 
and the predicate (as opposed to a relation merely conceived, thought of, or wished, 
by the speaker)" (Oxford EngUsh Dictionary, emphasis added). Thus, the 
indicative attends the production of fixed and final meaning. Truth. The link 
between patriarchy and the production of fixed and final meaning has been 
demonstrated repeatedly through diverse feminist projects such as Irigaray's 
theorisation of a 'female imaginary' (1977/1980), Kristeva's theorisation of 
'abjection' (1980/1982) and Derrida's theorisation of'phaUogocentrism' (1975). It 
is beyond the scope of this section to review the complex intricacies of these 
arguments and thek interrelations. Instead, it wiU simply be noted that these 
criticaUy acclaimed theorisations support the Unk advanced here between the 
indicative and patriarchal discourse. In short, the privUege that patriarchal 
discourse affords to the indicative consigns the subjunctive bonds of narrative to 
the subordinate poles of binarisms: "the incongruous, jarring, asymmetrical, 
arbitrary and unfinished become terms of criticism, not praise" (Mansfield, 2000, 
p. 70). 
Thus, engaging subjunctive uncertainty through narrative theory offers a 
means to disrupt patriarchal discourse. This does not mean that either narrative 
theory or subjunctive uncertainty is inherentiy 'transgressive'. Indeed this would 
be an utterly patriarchal inference because the very notion of 'transgression' 
presupposes the existence of a fixed and stable field. Rather, engaging subjunctive 
uncertainty through narrative theory can disrupt patriarchal discourse by 
highUghting that subjunctive narrative bonds have been rendered subordinate 
rather than being namraUy, logicaUy or Uievitably positioned in this manner. 
It is uncontentious to assert that dismpting patriarchal discourse is a central 
concern for feminisms. More particularly, it is uncontentious to assert that the 
subordinate poles of narrative binarisms are a concern for feminisms, given the 
compUcity of these bUiarisms Ui shaping society and its instimtions and practices 
in a manner that does not afford women equaUty of opportunity and participation. 
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However, the contention that links may be forged between subjunctive 
uncertainty and feminisms is problematic and the assertion requkes elaboration 
the moment that it is advanced. This elaboration is imperative given that there is 
not a monoUthic area of inquiry that can claim the singular tide of feminism. 
Feminisms vary in thek phUosophical underpinnings, thek aims and thek 
strategies; thus, whUst some feminisms would affkm and support subjunctive 
uncertainty as it has been formulated here, others would not. 
Given that subjunctive uncertainty has been designated as the uncertainty that 
arises as a result of the pluraUty and openness of narratives, it cannot be associated 
with essentiaUst and/or deterministic/teleological feminisms. Associations with 
essentiaUsing feminisms are precluded on the basis that they restrain the play of 
subjunctive uncertainty by generaUsing the experience of women. Thus, 
essentiaUsing feminisms curtaU the difference that gives rise to subjunctive 
uncertainty by failing to be attentive to differences such as class, race and culture. 
Deterministic and teleological feminisms also curtaU subjunctive uncertainty, but 
the mechanism differs. In this case, subjunctive uncertainty is suppressed by a 
commitment to finaUty, either as an achievable goal or as an ideal. Thus, the link 
proposed between subjunctive uncertainty and feminisms needs to be narrowed to 
strands such as poststructuraUst, postcolonial and multiculmral feminism, which 
resist the closure that results from essentiaUsm and/or commitments to finaUty. 
Thus, subjunctive uncertainty can be linked to thkd wave feminisms rather than 
fkst or second wave feminisms, which perpemate certain essentiaUst and 
deterministic/teleological aspects of patriarchal discourse. 
The narrowing of the field of feminisms to these thkd wave perspectives stiU 
yields an enormous field of inquiry within which there are many contested views, 
especiaUy on the issue of difference, which is of central importance to the 
argument being presented here. It is, however, beyond the scope of this section to 
review the variety of theorisations of difference and assess the respective support 
for, or hostUity toward, the notion of subjunctive uncertakity. Instead, I wiU 
present a postmodernist/poststmcturaUst readkig of Lynda Stone's (1995) 
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theorisation of as if friends, as a framework within which to engage subjunctive 
uncertainty in envkonmental education. 
AS IF FRIENDS 
Stone refers to her formulation oi as if friends as an 'attimde' and it is an 
attimde that has powerfiU ontological, epistemological and pedagogical 
impUcations, There are multiple points of agreement, or at least overlap, between 
Stone's formulation of as if friends and the formulation of subjunctive uncertainty 
that is presented here. The fkst point of overlap Ues in the fact that both 
subjunctive uncertainty and the attimde of as if friends arise in relation to narrative 
theory. Subjunctive uncertaUity is presented as a constimtive element of narrative 
constmctions of reaUty and the attimde of as if friends is both an affkmation and 
example of the use of narrative in phUosophy of education research. Clearly these 
two projects occupy the same domain, but need not agree. However, given that 
the phrase ^as if friends' is a subjunctive expression it is not unreasonable to 
anticipate resonances between this formulation and subjunctive uncertainty. 
Looking at both projects in more detaU yields considerable agreement, but there 
are tensions as weU. This section wiU examine both the resonances and tensions. 
Fkstiy, as noted above, subjunctive uncertainty is cast as the uncertainty that 
arises from the pluraUty and openness of narrative constmctions of reaUty. Thus, 
the play of subjunctive uncertainty rides upon difference. SimUarly the attimde of 
as if friends rides upon difference. This is demonstrated most clearly in Stone's 
composition of the attimde of as if friends in a fictional letter to the late Senegalese 
feminist Mariama Ba: 
Dear Ms Ba December 1992; January 1994 
As you began a fictional letter, I now begin one to you. "I take a 
deep breath" because I too am speculating. I take a chance with 
this letter to seek reception as if we might have been friends, with 
no assurances of either reception or friendship. My letter is in the 
tradition of western feminisms; it is as personal and poUtical as it is 
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academic and educational. It has poUtics just as your work. In my 
understanding I have you as feUow author, and your fictional 
friends, Ramatoulaye and Aissatou, as models, I take heart and 
continue, 
I begin by positioning us — may I caU you Mariama? - as authors. 
You are identified as a "pioneer of women's rights" committed to 
the eradication of inequaUties between women and men in Africa, I 
am a white. North American academic and educator, I as you, have 
taught school; we are both middleclass in our respective societies. 
We are in times of change but ones with important distinction: 
African nations continue to throw off the residues of an external 
coloniaUsm, and to move for better or worse from traditional into 
modern/postmodern times. North American nations, it might be 
said, retain some internal coloniaUsm against minorities as times 
become postmodern. In spite of some simUarities, we are to my 
mind, significandy different. This is the difference that I want to 
retain yet communicate across. (Stone, 1995, p. 175) 
WhUst Stone acknowledges both simUarities and differences, she accenmates 
the differences. She envisages a relationship that does not admit the violent form 
of tolerance that reverses this priority and privUeges the simUarities over 
differences. Thus, essentiaUsm is eschewed in the attimde as if friends. As a result, 
indubitabiUty and exhaustiveness are denied; different voices engage in a 
community that does not reduce difference, thereby maintaining the possibiUty of 
uncertainty. 
This resistance to the attenuation of subjunctive uncertaUity through the 
reduction of difference also precludes the other mode of foreclosing subjunctive 
uncertainty, namely seeking closure through a commitment to finaUty. These two 
means of closure are closely interlinked. The commitment to closure simply 
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postpones the reduction of difference to some future time, although the 
mechanism differs. Rather than a reduction of difference in the present, which 
homogenises through the dual process of accenmating simUarities and overlooking 
differences, closure through the commitment to finaUty renders difference as a 
provisional aberration that attenuates as narratives are refined and converge 
toward univocal Tmth, Accenmating difference, however, supports perpemal 
openness by sustaining and encouraging multivocaUty. Rather than leading to 
convergence, as if friends, like subjunctive uncertainty, at a minimum preserves 
pluraUty and may lead to dispersion. 
It is important to emphasise at this stage that the perpemal openness 
promoted by the attimde as if friends does not mean that if a task is undertaken, it 
cannot be completed. If this were the case, the attimde of as if friends would be 
deemed to have Uttie or no relevance to the realm of practical affaks, such as the 
practice of envkonmental education Rather the perpemal openness of as if friends 
attends the condition under which a task is undertaken rather than the task itself 
It is the distance between the participants that resists closure, not the tasks 
undertaken. This is one of the great strengths of Stone's formulation; it enables 
purposeful activity within a non-foundationaUst frame. 
The other point of overlap between Stone's attimde of as if friends and this 
project is that Stone's formulation expressly addresses uncertainty; Stone 
addresses the uncertainty that she maintains attends women's Uves. She argues 
that the "uncertainty of women's action in the world devolves from two realms, 
one of experience and one of explanation" (Stone, 1995, p. 179). Given that 
subjunctive uncertainty was formulated within the broad sense of narrative as the 
participation in discourses rather than the narrow sense of story teUkig, the realms 
of experience and explanation are taken to be mumaUy inscribing rather than 
discrete. Therefore, it can be advanced that the play of subjunctive uncertainty 
traverses each domain. However, this view cannot automaticaUy be transferred to 
Stone's formulation of as if friends. Instead, it is necessary to discern whether these 
two domaUis are discrete, as the above quotation suggests. 
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Clearly the action in the world that devolves from explanation is texmal, 
although action in the world that devolves from the realm of experience need not 
be designated as texmal. Stone does not take a clear stance in relation to the 
texmaUty of experience, although in her introduction to the composition of as if 
friends she does acknowledge such a poststructuraUst perspective by quoting, 
HeUbmn (1988): 
We can reteU and Uve by the stories we have read and heard. . . . 
[They are] Uke the murmurings of our mothers, telling us what 
conventions demand . . . [and] they are what we must use to make 
new fictions, new narratives . . . [and new Uves]. (quoted in Stone, 
1995, p. 186) 
Given that Stone augments HeUbmn's quote to the effect that new narratives 
constmct new Uves, it seems reasonable to assert that Stone is not opposed to 
poststmcturaUst perspectives that cast Uved experiences as texmal experiences. 
Thus, resonances can be claimed between the uncertainty that underpins the 
attimde of as if friends and subjunctive uncertainty. Stone's contention that 
"uncertainty means accepting as namral the tentativeness, ambiguity, fluidity of aU 
Ufe and particularly of the beUefs and deskes, knowledges, and actions of persons" 
(1995, p. 184) can be read as the uncertainty that constimtes embodied, narrative 
existence. 
Despite this broad agreement between subjunctive uncertainty and as if friends 
in terms of Uved experience as a narrative enterprise, a deep tension arises in 
relation to essentiaUsm, This is problematic because essentiaUsm texmaUy erases 
difference by accenmating sameness, WhUst Stone's insistence on foregrounding 
the differences between women is a sincere rejection if essentiaUsm, she reverts to 
essentiaUsm at times: 
A founding kony: That uncertainty names the present era of 
postmodernism may mean that females - as they are used to 
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uncertainty, tentativeness and ambiguity - may be able to Uve 
psychologicaUy better today than some (most?) of thek male 
counterparts. If the norm of certainty is replaced with a norm of 
uncertainty, the question of who best fits the time takes on new 
meaning. (Stone, 1995, p. 176) 
Three problems emerge as a result of this view. By essentiaUsing women's 
experiences as being characterised uncertainty. Stone undermines her otherwise 
proclaimed accent on differences such as class, race and culture. This effectively 
masks the compUcity that these factors may have in imposing adverse 
uncertainties in women's Uves. This is a reversion to the oppressive state of affaks 
that Stone hopes to work against through the attimde as if friends. Secondly, by 
essentiaUsing the experiences of men as being characterised by certainty, she 
sUences the voices of those men affected by uncertainty by rendering those men as 
Other. This process of exclusion is itself oppressive and it is doubly oppressive if 
those men are adversely affected by uncertainty. Thkdly, given that Stone strives 
to resist essentiaUsing women, with exception of the example just mentioned, and 
given that she does not resist essentiaUsing men, it would appear that the attimde 
of ^j" if friends exclusively attends the realm of women's sociaUty. 
It is important at this point to compare whether subjunctive uncertainty 
simUarly leads to such essentiaUsms and thek attendant problems. This requkes a 
brief review of the conjunction advanced between feminisms and subjunctive 
uncertainty. This conjunction was advanced on the basis that the narrative bonds 
of possibiUty, probabiUty, contingency, memory, deske, fear and hope are 
StereotypicaUy assigned to (the) feminine. Furthermore, it was noted that these 
narrative bonds are consigned to the subordinate poles of binarisms that are 
compUcit in shaping society and its instimtions and practices in a manner that 
does not afford women equaUty of opportunity and participation. Thus, engaging 
subjunctive uncertainty through the use of narrative theory provides a means to 
dismpt patriarchal discourses. In contrast to Stone, subjunctive uncertakity does 
not invoke essentiaUsm. Instead of essentiaUsUig women's and men's experiences 
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as being characterised by uncertainty and certainty, respectively, subjunctive 
uncertainty casts patriarchal discourses as being characterised by certainty and 
counter-patriarchal discourses as being characterised by uncertainty. 
The essentiaUsing aspects of Stone's argument and thek attendant problems 
offer sufficient reason to veer away from the formulation of as if friends as a means 
to engage subjunctive uncertainty in envkonmental education. Given that 
subjunctive uncertainty avoids such problems, it seems inteUecmaUy reckless to 
create the possibiUty for the introduction of these problems. However, given that 
the above quotation is so conspicuously at odds with the convictions that shaped 
as if friends, this feminist attimde should not be discarded hastily. The essentiaUsms 
mentioned above undoubtedly constimte a retrograde move in Stone's 
formulation and presentation of as if friends and they ought to be acknowledged as 
such rather than perceived as a constimtive weakness that causes the formulation 
to coUapse. The former stance can be justified on the grounds that: Stone rejects 
essentiaUsm at the outset in order to develop the attimde of as if friends; the 
formulation is fkst and foremost an ethical stance that seeks to overcome the 
oppressions of essentiaUsm rather than perpemate them; and, given that 
feminisms are concerned with how gendered roles shape society and its 
instimtions, femiiUst projects concern both men and women. Thus, the feminist 
attimde as if friends can be advocated as a means to engage subjunctive uncertainty 
in envkonmental education, provided that the attimde as if friends is read as an 
attimde that does not exclusively attend the realm of women's sociaUty and that it 
does not requke the essentiaUsing of women's or men's experiences. 
In summary, the narrative bonds of possibiUty, probabiUty, contingency, 
memory, deske, fear and hope Unk subjunctive uncertakity to stereotypical 
constmctions of (the) feminine. Furthermore, these bonds are consigned to the 
subordinate poles of bUiarisms that are compUcit Ui shapUig society and its 
Uistimtions and practices in a manner that does not afford women equaUty of 
oppormnity and participation. Thus, attentiveness to subjunctive uncertainty 
simultaneously results ki attentiveness to femkUst concerns. However, given that 
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subjunctive uncertainty obtains in the openness and pluraUty of narratives, Unks 
can be forged to only those forms of feminism that resist closure through 
essentiaUsm and/or commitments to finaUty, This postmodernist/ 
poststructuraUst reading of Stone's formulation of as if friends presents such a 
feminist project. WhUst the attimde of as if friends is a rejection of essentiaUsm, 
Stone does revert to an essentiaUsing mode in the presentation of it. This reversion, 
however, is not a constimtive aspect of the formulation. Thus, it would be 
possible to engage subjunctive uncertainty through the attimde of as if friends 
without entering into these essentiaUsing reversions and thek attendant problems. 
The foUowing section demonstrates that there is an acknowledged need in 
envkonmental education that as if friends can satisfy and then explores how 
envkonmental education could engage subjunctive uncertainty through this 
attimde. 
WORKING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION THROUGH AS IF 
FRIENDS 
Recent envkonmental education theorising and curriculum documents 
emphasise the need to adopt inclusive approaches in order to adequately address 
envkonmental chaUenges, where 'inclusive approaches' designates, among other 
things, the representation of different voices^. Many reasons can be used to justify 
inclusive approaches. Most commonly, it is argued that inclusive approaches are 
necessary because envkonmental issues are a complex mix of social, scientific, 
economic, poUtical and cultural factors. In this line of argument, an 'inclusive 
approach' designates interdisciplinary approaches that draw on the knowledge and 
expertise of different fields. The driving force for the estabUshment of such 
interdisciplinary task forces is a commitment to piece together the 'big picture' in 
order to (aUegedly) ensure that aU the stakeholders receive fak and accurate 
representation. 
' The representation of different voices that environmental education is striving to develop indicates a commitment to 
social justice through inclusiveness. It does not indicate phonocentrism (Derrida, 1967/1976), which privileges speech 
over writing on the basis that the spatial and temporal immediacy of speech purportedly provides direct access to 
authoritative meaning. 
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This 'big picmre' approach exempUfies a commitment to grand narratives. 
The inclusion of different voices is an attempt to present comprehensive accounts 
in which different voices come together to create coUage-Uke, theoretical 
descriptions in which, ideaUy, there are no gaps. The different voices that are 
being used to fiU the gaps, however, are voices from within the dominant 
discourses: scientists, economists, lawyers, poUticians and colonial landholders, 
Envkonmental education affkms and promotes such integrated speciaUst 
approaches. The most recent national envkonmental education statement in 
AustraUa, for example, contends that it is necessary "to estabUsh better 
communication between those people working on, or learning about, simUar or 
related envkonmental issues, but who come from different professional or 
disciplinary backgrounds" (Envkonment AustraUa, 2000, p, 4), Yet envkonmental 
education also contends that "speciaUst discipline-based knowledge, whUe 
contributing criticaUy, is no longer adequate by itself (Envkonment AustraUa, 
2000, p, 4), Thus, whUst envkonmental education values speciaUst discipUne-
based knowledge, it denies it the stams of a redemptive meta-narrative 
Two reasons are usuaUy invoked to support the limit that envkonmental 
education assigns to the reach of speciaUst discipUne-based knowledges and these 
reasons reflect the ambiguity of the term 'discipline', Fkstiy, envkonmental 
education recognises that these speciaUst voices are products of, and 
governed/disciplined by, the social, economic, poUtical and cultural miUeu that has 
precipitated 'the envkonmental crisis'. Thus many advocate the inclusion of other 
narratives on the basis that "by [solely] reproducing modern industriaUsed 
societies' high stams forms of knowledge (such as science, technology and 
economics) in envkonmental education curricula, we are exacerbating many of the 
problems that we are attempting to resolve" (Gough, 1991, p, 3), Secondly, 
envkonmental education highUghts that disciplinary knowledge is created by vkme 
of exclusionary practices that excommunicate other discourses. Both 
envkonmental education theorising and curriculum documents draw attention to 
the erasure of marginaUsed groups in the big pictures constmcted by experts and 
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emphasise that the marginaUsed are invariably those who suffer the most as the 
result of envkonmental exploitation and degradation. Thus, both epistemological 
and ethical imperatives underpin envkonmental education's advocacy of 
inclusionary approaches. This has led to a widespread, but not universal, 
commitment to deprivUeging totaUsing speciaUst discourses. This does not 
constimte a rejection of the speciaUst knowledges, but a rejection of thek self-
professed author-ity to excommunicate other discourses. This deprivUeging of 
SpeciaUst discourses simates speciaUst knowledges as one form of knowledge 
among odiers that have been typicaUy sUenced, 
The need to include the voices of women and indigenous peoples is prominent 
in the caUs to engage alternative discourses in envkonmental education, Fien, for 
example, states that: 
Reorienting education towards sustainabiUty requkes a new view of 
science. ... Women's needs have often been overlooked by science, 
,,. and the knowledge that women traditionaUy hold has been 
under-valued, ,.. Aboriginal views and uses of science have also 
been neglected. ... These old views of science have contributed to 
envkonmental exploitation and have marginaUsed many people. 
(Fien, 2001, p. 18) 
This and other caUs are weU grounded in epistemological and ethical arguments 
drawn variously from critical theory and femiiUst and postcolonial theorising, 
which demonstrate the interrelatedness of the sUencing of women and indigenous 
peoples. Litde has been done, however, to relate these perspectives to 
envkonmental education curricula or pedagogies. The limited engagements that 
have occurred to date focus mainly on the inclusion of women's voices by re-
writing envkonmental education theory and practice through critical feminism (Di 
Chko, 1987a, 1987b), poststmcmraUst fenUnism (A. Gough, 1997, 1999) and 
ecofeminism (Fawcett, 2000; Fry, 2000). Engagements that expUcitiy link the 
inclusion of indigenous voices to envkonmental education curricula and 
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pedagogies are yet to be undertaken. According to Annette Gough (1997, p. 152), 
"meeting this chaUenge is definitely a task for the future in envkonmental 
education, particularly with respect to providing more opportunities for 
Aboriginal perspectives to be heard". Furthermore, she acknowledges the 
potential role that feminisms can have in this regard. FoUowing this lead, I wUl 
use the feminist attimde of as if friends as a means to explore how the voices of 
indigenous persons can be engaged in envkonmental education and how this 
embodies a specific example of engaging subjunctive uncertainty. The 
development of this case smdy for subjunctive uncertainty wiU also respond to the 
chaUenges that the more general caUs for the inclusion of indigenous voices have 
identified. Accordingly, I wUl also address the thorny issues concerning the naive 
appropriation of indigenous knowledges and the 'romantic turn' that some 
envkonmental education theorists invoke. Furthermore, I wiU argue that both of 
these invocations may be read as colonial attempts to procure certainty in 
envkonmental education. 
The preservation of difference, which is the crux of as if friends, provides the 
means to resist naive appropriations of indigenous knowledges, the invocation of 
'romantic turns' and the certainty that each strives to secure. Several objections 
can be leveUed at the deske to appropriate indigenous knowledges. The fkst 
objection attends the naive lack of efficacy associated with such an intention/hope 
(Bonnett, 1999; Gough, 1991; Stables & Scott, 2001). This objection based on a 
lack of efficacy is not related to the attimde of as if friends, but it is such an 
elementary objection that it warrants inclusion here. Key national and 
international envkonmental education documents (Envkonment AustraUa, 1999, 
2000; UNCED, 1992) advocate the inclusion of indigenous knowledges in the 
hope that such information could be usefuUy integrated into the existing body of 
scientific knowledge in order to enhance both the formulation of envkonmentaUy 
sustainable poUcies and practices, and to shed new Ught on the resolution of 
existing envkonmental problems. WhUst it is patentiy obvious that indigenous 
peoples, who have managed to preserve traditional existences, must be employing 
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envkonmentaUy sustainable practices, there is no defensible reason to suppose 
that indigenous ecologies, cosmologies and mythologies can be integrated into the 
poUcies and practices of modernist. Western cultures or assist in the resolution of 
envkonmental problems that have arisen as a result of modernist. Western 
practices. 
The second objection to the appropriation of indigenous knowledges is 
dkecdy related to the preservation of difference through the attimde of as if friends. 
The attimde of as if friends is founded upon: a non-foundationaUst epistemology 
which holds that knowledges are produced within fragmented discourses/ 
narratives that do not combine to form a totaUty; and poststrucmraUst theories 
that posit subjectivity as a discursive formation. The former proscribes the 
appropriation of indigenous knowledges on epistemological grounds and the 
latter, as an ethical imperative. In other words, the attimde of as if friends opposes 
the appropriation of indigenous knowledges because the formulation expUcitiy 
rejects both the epistemological legitimacy of meta-narratives and the violence that 
the constmction of meta-narratives infUcts upon the Other. With respect to the 
latter, entering into a relationship of as if friends involves a commitment to refrain 
from dispossessing others of thek difference. Clear resonances occur here 
between Levkias' (1961/1991, 1974/1991, 1982/1985) edUcal formulation of die 
face to face relationship in which the Other beseeches/commands us not to 
commit murder by dispossessing the Other of his/her otherness, and hooks' 
(1990) postcolonial plea to stop coloniaUst practices in which the coloniser 
sUences the colonised: 
"No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than 
you can speak yourself No need to hear your voice. Only teU me 
about your pain. I want to know your story. I wiU teU it back to you 
in a new way. TeU it back to you in such a way that it has become 
mine, my own. Rewriting you I write myself anew. I am stiU 
author, authority. I am stUl the colonizer, the speaking subject, and 
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you are now at the center of my taUc." Stop! (hooks, 1990, p. 151-
152) 
The driving force for the appropriation of indigenous knowledges is grounded 
in the patriarchal commitment to meta-narratives, which is indissociable from 
coloniaUsm. The appropriation of indigenous knowledges, then, is driven by the 
impulse to create a broader panorama of knowledge, which, according to Agenda 
21 (UNCED, 1992) and Diduck (1999, 1997b), serves ki a corrective capacity to 
reduce uncertainty. Furthermore, the constmction of this 'multiculmral' panorama 
surreptitiously deepens coloniaUsm's discipUnary power by integrating/subsuming 
indigenous knowledge into a framework where the concepts and stmctures that 
sustain the legitimacy of meta-narratives are assumed to be universal and remain 
unchaUenged (Suchet, 2002), The attimde of as if friends utterly opposes and offers 
a means of resistance to the erasure of difference that the construction of meta-
narratives entaUs and the claim to certainty that meta-narratives profess. 
Furthermore, the attimde of as if friends provides a strategic means to resist the 
violence infUcted by the 'fantasy of White MulticulmraUsm', which Hage (1998, p. 
99) describes, in part, as a paradoxical exclusionary/inclusionary "discourse 
embodying a fantasy of neatiy positioned otherness" that is subsumed by and 
bolsters the stams quo. 
The commitment to non-foundationaUsm also leads to a rejection of the 
'romantic turn' that some envkonmental education theorists invoke in thek 
advocacy of the inclusion of indigenous voices (Bowers, 1993a). The expression 
'romantic turn' is taken here to signify a revival of the major theme of nineteenth 
century romantic Uterature, which sought to subvert scientific rationaUsm by 
positing God/Truth in Nature. Thus, romantic turns uphold the binarisms of 
Eurocentric discourse, but reverse the power relations by valorising subordinate 
poles (Suchet, 2002). This reversal of poles in envkonmental education's romantic 
turns results in a valorisation and glamorisation of indigenous ecologies, 
cosmologies and mythologies. This valorisation and glamorisation are premised 
on the argument that: as indigenous peoples are 'closer to' and more 'attuned to' 
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Nature, they are, therefore, 'closer to' and more 'atmned to' God/Tmth. A 
logocentric manoeuvre is at play here. Grounding the Word of God/Truth in 
Namre is an expUcit appeal to a meta-narrative that grounds the play of discourses 
and provides a benchmark against which the certainty of propositions can be 
ascertained. Fragmented discourses and the uncertainties that they yield, then, are 
cast as provisional and iUusionary, This appeal to a meta-narrative that wiU 
ultimately dissolve difference is antithetical to the attimde of as if friends. Thus, 
engaging as if friends in envkonmental education curricula and pedagogies requkes 
an utter rejection of romantic turns. 
Both the appropriation of indigenous knowledges and romantic mrns 
perpemate meta-narratives, although each approach nuances meta-narratives 
differentiy. The impulse to appropriate indigenous knowledges seeks Tmths that 
transcend fragmented discourses, whereas romantic mrns seek primordial Tmths. 
In both cases, the Truths are sought to unite fragmented discourses into a meta-
narrative that serves a corrective function to reduce the uncertainty that attends 
multivocaUty. 
Appropriating indigenous knowledges and resorting to romantic turns both 
requke some sort of straightforward encounter. The encounter that is as if friends, 
however, is far from straightforward. As a relation that preserves difference, it 
involves proximity across kreducible distance. Therefore, as if friends occurs in a 
paradoxical space where separation and proxknity coincide, without the proximity 
destroying the separation and without the separation destroying the relation'''. This 
is, to borrow an expression from Cronon (1995), 'uncommon ground'. This 
'uncommon ground' is an intersubjective and intertexmal space. Furthermore, an 
'uncommon struggle' occurs on this 'uncommon ground', where the 'uncommon 
' There is a striking resonance here between as if friends and Levinas' formulation of the transcendence of the face to 
face: "Transcendence designates a relation with reality that is infinitely distant from my own reality, yet without this 
distance destroying this re^ty and without this relation destroying the distance" (Levinas, 1961/1991, p. 41). I will 
refrain from a close cross-reading of Stone and Levinas, however, on the basis that a major intention of this section is 
to demonstrate a link between subjunctive uncertainty and third wave feminist theories. For a feminist reading of 
Levinas see Irigaray (1991, 1994/2000) and for cross-readings of feminism and Levinas see Howitt (2001, 2002) and 
Howitt and Suchet-Pearson (2003). 
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stmggle' signifies the problematisation of community through the accent on 
difference. This uncommon stmggle on uncommon ground is rich with 
significance for both the inclusion of indigenous knowledge in envkonmental 
education curricula and pedagogies, and engagements with uncertainty. 
The uncommon ground of intertexmaUty and intersubjectivity is a site where 
the subject, signification and socio-historical cultural practices intersect, but not in 
terms of a simple coincidence. Rather, each mumaUy inscribes the other. As a 
result, it is not possible to think of stable, unitary, autonomous subjects as logicaUy 
preceding or dissociable from 'thek' stories. This uncommon ground is inhabited 
by 'discursive selves' and haunted by the Death of the Author, The term 
'haunted' is not being used here merely as a rhetorical flourish. Rather, it is being 
used as per Derrida (1993/1994) to signify that the author is between presence 
and non-presence. This spectral quaUty of the author has twofold significance for 
envkonmental education's hope to welcome indigenous voices. It both refiites 
and upholds the notion that alternative narratives can be engaged in 
envkonmental education without resorting to the totaUsing HegeUan dialectic in 
which contradictions/antinomies are resolved/sublated in a higher 
vsiivf /Aufhebung. 
The spectral quaUty of the author, as per Derrida, makes it possible to 
continue to think of storytelUng in the famiUar sense, whUst acknowledging that 
the famiUar sense is neither sufficient, straightforward nor innocent. The very 
notion of welcoming indigenous voices in envkonmental education requkes that it 
be possible to engage this famiUar sense of stor)^elling in which the subjects and 
stories of indigenous persons be individuated on the stage of socio-historical 
culmral practices. In other words, it is vital to entertain the notions of authors and 
portable stories. This famiUar sense enables the possibUity of entertaUiing the co-
existence of multiple stories, from which subjunctive uncertainty obtaUis. 
Furthermore, it enables the development of pedagogical prUiciples that can guide 
implementation of as if friends as a means to engage alternative discourses in 
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envkonmental education. These pedagogical impUcations draw out the 
psychological and sociological dimensions of as if friends. 
FoUowing Stone, the attimde of as if friends requkes openness and humiUty, 
each of which is multidimensional. Openness requkes the dimensions of 
receptivity, Ustening, tolerance and suspension of judgement. In envkonmental 
education, receptivity involves opening oneself up to unfamiUar discursive 
constmctions of (the) envkonment, resources and sustainable futures through 
discourses of other generations, races, classes, genders and cultures. Active 
Ustening must foUow receptivity if alternative discourses are to be engaged. The 
Ustening needs to be active in two senses, Fkstiy, active Ustening dissociates the 
mode of Ustening requked from passivity and ambivalence. Secondly, the 
descriptor 'active' signifies the ongoing commitment and energy that must be 
expended in order to maintain both the proximity and the separation that coincide 
in the attimde as if friends, each of which threatens to destroy the other. This 
involves adopting a vigUant stance against the seductiveness of totaUsation which 
can either assimUate the difference of other discourses into the dominant 
discourse or excommunicate the discourse of the other and mask the violence that 
this involves by appealing to the tenets of the dominant discourse. Thkdly, non-
violent tolerance is requked. This is related to active Ustening in that it requkes a 
tolerance of difference rather than an accenmation of sameness so that the 
unfamiUarity of other discourses is not lost. Embracing these differences within a 
mode of non-violent tolerance admits and permits the engagement of 
contradictory views on envkonmental issues that may be antithetical to one's own, 
without the disabling effects of a sense of betrayal. FinaUy, a suspension of 
judgement is necessary. This is not an assertion that judgements or resolutions 
cannot or should not be sought when alternative discourses are engaged in 
relation to envkonmental issues. Rather, it is a caU to suspend judgements that 
would foreclose the engagement of alternative discourses. A suspension of 
judgment supports the possibiUty of adopting the attimde as if friends as a means to 
pursue particular tasks through to thek (provisional) closure. Furthermore, the 
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'closure' of these tasks may result in the deployment of unexpected and iimovative 
judgements as a result of being open to, Ustening to, receptive and tolerant of 
unfamiUar discourses. 
The other quaUty requked to support the attimde of as if friends when 
storyteUing is understood in the famiUar, unproblematised sense is humiUty. 
HumiUty is also a multidimensional quaUty. Expressing humiUty toward one's 
own views involves scepticism, ego-distancing and playfulness. Each of these 
dimensions of humiUty has pedagogical impUcations for engaging alternative 
discourses in envkonmental education. To genuinely engage other discourses 
involves adopting an attimde of scepticism toward one's own discourse. This is 
not a renunciation of that discourse. Instead, it is the recognition that one's own 
discourse is shaped and limited by the particular ontological and epistemological 
assumptions upon which it is founded. Thus, scepticism involves the 
understanding that stories within one's own discourse may not be capable of 
representation in different discourses and vice versa, or that one's own stories may 
be rewritten in an entkely different form in other discourses. An acceptance of 
the fluidity of representation requkes ego-distancing, that is, it requkes us to 
separate the storyline of our narratives from our emotional investment in them. 
This ego-distancing provides the condition for the thkd dimension of humiUty, 
playfulness. This involves exploring the power that different stories have in the 
creation of knowledges, subjectivities and societies. This dimension of playfulness 
resonates with Annette Gough's (1997, p. 171) conviction that: "AU learners 
should be encouraged to teU stories from the perspectives of others, and reinvent 
themselves as others, of other races, classes, genders, cultures and species". Thus, 
playfulness provides a powerful means to envision alternative pathways to 
sustainable fiitures, where the notion of a 'sustainable fiiture' is problematised. 
These pedagogical impUcations emerge clearly when the notion of storytelUng 
is understood Ui the famiUar, reductionist sense, that is, when authors and stories 
are individuated unproblematicaUy. Postmodernist/poststmcturaUst theorisUig, 
however, problematises authors, stories and the socio-historical, culmral practices 
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Upon which they purportedly stand Ui this unproblematised view. From 
postmodernist/poststrucmraUst perspectives each of these three domains, 
authors, stories and thek backdrops, mumaUy inscribe each other. This does not 
invaUdate the pedagogical impUcations advanced above, but it does mean that they 
are not as straightforward as the above account suggests. Greater rigour needs to 
be brought to bear on these pedagogical impUcations and this results in more 
complex pedagogical experiences. 
The postmodernist/poststmcmraUst motif of the Death of the Author 
relocates the construction of meaning both temporarUy and spatiaUy, FoUowing 
the Death of the Author, meaning can no longer be attributed to authors and 
stories can no longer be understood as simply the medium of that meaning. 
Instead, the site of meaning is shifted to the reader and the time of the 
constmction of meaning is shifted to the present. Thus, engaging with stories 
from alternative discourses does not involve a recuperation of an author's 
meaning, which is embedded within the text. Rather, the reader is cast as an active 
participant in the construction of meaning in the present. This constmction of 
meaning is an intertexmal process, it occurs by reading texts within and against 
other texts. This creates hybrid instead of pure meaning and it problematises the 
notion of Ustening to the stories of others. 
What, then, can it mean to Usten to indigenous stories? What are the 
impUcations of the Death of the Author for indigenous voices? It is helpful to 
recoUect that these questions are posed on uncommon ground that is haunted by 
the Death of the Author. The spectre of the author is between presence and 
absence, both present and absent, neither present nor absent. As the author is 
beyond/between binary oppositions, the author is other. Therefore, encounters 
with the author are ethical through and through. On the uncommon ground of 
intersubjectivity and UitertexmaUty, the author can be neither forsaken nor 
wrenched Uito fuU presence. In concrete terms, this means that the author's 
meaning is never fiiUy or dkecdy present. Rather, the meaning of stories is caught 
up in elusive chains of signification, RespectUig and Ustening to indigenous 
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voices, then, carries the responsibility of refiising to accept the meanings of 
indigenous stories as fixed and fUial Ui the relationship of as if friends. This also can 
be seen as part of the uncommon stmggle on uncommon ground. 
The pedagogical impUcations outlined above provide clear guidelines for 
adopting the attimde of as if friends as a means to engage alternative discourses in 
envkonmental education in a manner that enables purposefiU activity in a miUeu 
of uncertainty and concomitandy avoids the problems of appropriation of other 
discourses and romantic returns. Other issues emerge, however, as the issues of 
appropriation and romanticism recede. Perhaps the most difficult issue to tackle 
arises from the rejection of essentiaUsm. The impUcations of this rejection are 
wide reaching, but for the purpose of this argument, envkonmental educators 
need to recognise that it is cmcial to avoid essentiaUsing indigenous 
peoples/persons. Even if engaging with the stories of a smaU *weU defined' 
indigenous group, as if friends requkes that essentiaUsm be denied. Attention needs 
to be given to differences such as age, gender and social standing (Howitt, 2001). 
Curriculum documents need to highUght the importance of avoiding tokenism, 
which simply and surreptitiously inserts micro-essentiaUsm. It is not possible to 
specify the range and number of voices that should be included to prevent 
tokenism from occurring. IdeaUy, the chaUenge would involve engaging a diverse 
range of indigenous voices without swamping the learners. The more likely 
scenario, however, would probably involve the inclusion of a severely limited 
range of voices due to time and financial constraints, whUst recognising that this 
limited range flkts with tokenism. In either case, the recognition of the risk of 
tokenism is the issue and it is an issue that educators can respond to positively. 
Educators can respond to a linUted range of voices by encouraging smdents to 
be attentive to the sUences and encouraging them to construct stories from 
sUenced perspectives. Educators can also reduce the risk of tokenism by 
deploying a variety of media through which learners engage with different voices. 
Howitt's (2001) experiences of UicludUig Uidigenous voices Ui tertiary geography 
classes is Uistmctive here. Howitt contends that "usUig texts [ki the narrowly 
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defined sense] alone is too restricting, but having a guest speaker or two give a 
lecmre in a lecture series just wiU not do either" (Howitt, 2001, p. 155), In 
response to this problem, Howitt and his coUeagues developed a programme for 
visiting Indigenous Teaching FeUows in which indigenous scholars presented 
lectures, undertook thek own projects, and worked with other researchers and 
smdents. Like Howitt, I contend that a 'balance' needs to be found between the 
vicariousness of texts (in the narrow sense) and the sociaUty of personal 
interactions, although the delimitation of texts should not simply be grounded in 
vicariousness. Texts (and lectures) are invariably configured by the dominant 
discourse, thus they serve as coloniaUsing forces. This is not to suggest that they 
be abandoned when engaging indigenous voices, but that they should be dismpted 
by other media such as traditional and contemporary song, dance, poetry, and 
storytelling. Further, engaging learners with voices that expUcitiy dismpt 
essentiaUsm provides a powerful means of confronting tokenism. An exemplar of 
a dismptive text is Leah PurceU and Sean Mee's dramatisation of Black Chicks 
Taking (2002) in which four very different indigenous women, who come from 
different mobs and different places, as far flung as the sophistication of Sydney to 
the tribal community of Buccaneer Archipelago in Western AustraUa, weave a 
complex picmre of thek Uves through theatre, storytelling with traditional 
indigenous and contemporary dance, Thek stories blend and clash in this meeting, 
dismpting essentiaUsm, Thus, whUst practical considerations may increase the 
potential for tokenism and essentiaUsm by limiting the range of indigenous voices 
that can be engaged, powerful measures to counter tokenism and essentiaUsm can 
be taken at the pedagogical level. These measures are, however, seriously 
compromised by the present necessity to constmct meaning within the play of the 
dominant language. This is an intractable problem, although high profile 
education poUcy documents suggest otherwise by valorising the diversity of 
languages without any mention of the pernicious problems that attend translation 
(MCEETYA, 1999), 
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In summary, this section has demonstrated that envkonmental education can 
explore and engage the "uncertainties of the postmodern age ,,, [and the] 
oppormnities this may afford for reaUsing a more sustainable society" (Panel for 
Education ^ r Sustainable Development, 1998, p, 11) through postmodernist/ 
poststmcturaUst feminisms. Stone's formulation of as if friends was used for 
iUustrative purposes, but the sole use of this formulation should not be taken to 
signify that as if friends provides the only means to engage the conjunction of 
uncertainty and feminist thought in envkonmental education The link between 
uncertainty and feminism has not been theorised, hitherto, in envkonmental 
education and the theorisation of uncertainty ji)^ rj"e has received a very low profUe 
in feminisms. Thus, the arguments developed here constimte a significant 
contribution in both arenas. 
The theorisation of subjunctive uncertainty, in particular, enables the link to be 
forged between poststmcmraUst feminism and uncertainty. The openness and 
pluraUty of narratives, from which subjunctive uncertainty obtains, are central 
motifs in postmodernist/poststrucmraUst feminisms, which oppose the 
subordination of difference to sameness through essentiaUsm. However, the 
openness and pluraUty of narratives alone provides only a loose link between 
subjunctive uncertainty and feminisms. The link is secured, however, because the 
subjunctive creates the narrative "bonds of possibiUty, probabiUty, contingency, 
memory, deske, fear and hope" (Le Guin, 1989, p. 44), which have been 
designated as the subordinate poles of binarisms that are stereotypicaUy assigned 
to (the) feminine: correspondence/analogy, acmaUty/possibUity, certainty/ 
probabiUty, surety/contingency, satisfaction/deske, courage/fear, wiU/hope. The 
exploration of as if friends drew the play other narrative uncertainties into reUef as 
weU. The play of decentred uncertainty emerges from the refusal to admit the 
legitimacy of meta-narratives in as if friends. The commitment to respect and 
preserve a pluraUty of voices through the privUeging of difference prevents 
logocentric manoeuvres that centre texts. Furthermore, the focus on the 
intertexmal construction of meaning accenmates the play oipoietic uncertainty. 
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Engaging these narrative uncertainties in envkonmental education dirough 
feminist thought provides a strategic means to dismpt patriarchal discourse. The 
need to disrupt patriarchal thought through envkonmental education has been 
long argued by ecofeminists and envkonmental education theorists on the basis 
that patriarchal thought is held to be deeply impUcated in (the) envkonmental 
crisis, Ruether (1975), for instance, argues that: 
,,, the roots of the language of domination of nature [are] in social 
domination ,,, the 'master of nature' is imaged as a patriarchal 
despot whose subjugation of nature is expressed in the language of 
domination over slaves ,,, 
The language is both that of despotism and that of sexual 
aggression. Nature is picmred as a fecund female slave whose 
'chUdren' are to be used by rulers by reducing her to a condition of 
total submission ... the ecological crisis and the coUapse of faith in 
scientific technology in the twentieth century ... [are] the results of 
this relationship of 'use' of nature to social domination ... The 
productivity that resulted from the appUcation of instmmental 
science to nature was fed into a magnification of the structures of 
social domination, rather than providing the basis for a postscarcity, 
egaUtarian society, (quoted in Di Chko, 1987b, p, 30) 
Dismpting patriarchal discourses opens up spaces for voices that have been 
sUenced, such as the voices of women and indigenous persons/peoples. The need 
to create the conditions for such sUenced voices to be heard has been recognised 
and advocated not only by feminist theorists in envkonmental education (Di 
Chko, 1987a, 1987b; A. Gough, 1997), but by government poUcy (Envkonment 
AustraUa, 1999, 2000) and curriculum documents (MCEETYA, 1999 ; Panel for 
Education j&r Sustainable Development, 1998), both in AustraUa and overseas. 
Furthermore, the need to create spaces to engage the voices of women and 
indigenous voices in conjunction has been advanced by Fien (2001) and Annette 
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Gough (1997), The argument developed here, however, does not simply reiterate 
these convictions. Rather, it provides an additional explanatory dimension that 
demonstrates the constimtive role of uncertainty in the disruption of patriarchy 
through poststrucmraUst feminisms and narrative theory. 
If patriarchy is to be dismpted by the inclusion of sUenced voices, however, it 
is imperative that these voices are not appropriated into a meta-narrative because 
meta-narratives are configured and legitimated according to the modernist project, 
which is enabled by, upholds and perpemates patriarchy. The creation of meta-
narratives strives to procure certainty through the subordination of difference to 
the dominant discourse. This is violence, but this violence can be averted though 
fracmred relationships, that is relationships that occur across kreducible 
separation, such as Stone's as if friends. This enables envkonmental education to 
engage 'postmodern uncertainties' through the inclusion of different voices, as per 
the objectives formulated by the Panel for Education^r Sustainable Development 
(1998). 
CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL LITERACY 
The curricular and pedagogical impUcations of the postmodernist/ 
poststmcturaUst reading of as if friends in the previous section engage texmaUty as 
per Derrida (1972/1981), that is, they can be read as specific examples concerning 
how a text constructs and configures meaning rather than what a text means. 
Thus, these curricular and pedagogical impUcations connect with the broad corpus 
of critical Uteracies. Furthermore, these curricular and pedagogical impUcations 
could read as examples for an argument that posits uncertainty as a condition for 
deconstmctive critical Uteracies. The sociological dimensions of openness and 
scepticism enable this link to deconstmctive critical Uteracies. Opening oneself up 
to unfamiUar discursive constmctions of (the) envkonment, resources and 
sustainable fiitures through the discourses of other generations, genders, classes, 
races and cultures requkes adopting an attimde of scepticism founded on the 
recognition and acceptance that one's own discourse is shaped and limited by the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions upon which it is founded and the 
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constimtive blindnesses that these assumptions impose. Thus, the dimensions of 
openness and scepticism compel the renunciation of logocentric manoeuvres to 
ground envkonmental discourses in the envkonment. The attimde of as if friends is 
not staged on the envkonment. Rather, the texmaUty of Uved experience extends 
beyond the realm of human sociaUty to (the) envkonment. It is necessary to posit 
(the) envkonment as text when engaging the attimde of as if friends and this forges 
the Unk to deconstmctive critical Uteracies. This section wiU draw on Derridean 
themes to demonstrate that uncertainty provides the condition for a conception of 
deconstructive critical envkonmental Uteracy. 
The kreducibiUty of critical Uteracies to a fixed and singular notion of critical 
Uteracy (Green, 2003; Kamler & Comber, 1996; Knobel & Healy, 1998) means 
that this discussion is entering into contested ground. Given that envkonmental 
education is also characterised more by contestation than consensus, it would be 
possible to constmct and defend multiple competing formulations of critical 
envkonmental Uteracy, This would seem to suggest multiple starting points for any 
discussions that conjoin critical Uteracies and envkonmental education. However, 
there is one shared feamre of critical Uteracies and envkonmental education that 
provides not only an expedient entry point but also a logical starting point from 
which constructions of critical envkonmental Uteracy, whether acmal or possible, 
then diverge. This starting point is the notion that critical Uteracies are critical 
social practices. When isolated from the numerous phUosophical contexts in 
which this statement has been made, the statement is almost meaningless, yet it 
StiU conveys a cmcial dimension of critical Uteracies, namely action. Furthermore, 
this action is more than the 'arm chak' or sedentary action that is typicaUy 
associated with narrow conceptions of Uteracy, which limit texts to linguistic 
unities such as written texts. The phrase 'critical social practices' aUgns texts and 
Uteracy and with discourses and ways of being in (the) wor(l)d, respectively. 
The conjunction of Uteracy and ways of being in (the) wor(l)d certainly 
resonate with the aims and objectives in envkonmental education. The issue of 
UUteracy/Uteracy has been continuously addressed in envkonmental education. 
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from the fkst official formulation of envkonmental education (UNESCO-UNEP, 
1976) to current theorising. Singh (1998, p, 341), for example, maUitains that 
"given that envkonmental educators regard critical awareness-raising and 
empowerment as necessary attributes of education^r envkonmental sustainabiUty, 
then critical Uteracy has an important role to play in such work", SimUarly, Stables 
and Bishop maintain that "the development of a strong conception of 
envkonmental Uteracy ,,. has the potential to result in a stronger conception of 
care for the world in a way that conventional envkonmental education alone 
cannot" (2001, Stables and Bishop's emphasis). However, Singh, and Stables and 
Bishop theorise critical envkonmental Uteracy from critical theory and 
poststmcturaUst theory, respectively. As a result, the respective formulations of 
critical envkonmental Uteracy differ significandy. 
The differences in present approaches to critical envkonmental Uteracy 
continue a history of competing and conflicting formulations of envkonmental 
Uteracy, spanning the twenty-five year period in which envkonmental education 
has been formaUy recognised as a field of education. Initial attentions to 
(U)Uteracy give no indications to suggest that (U)Uteracy is conceived beyond the 
narrow view of text as Unguistic unities (UNESCO-UNEP, 1976). WhUst these 
early formulations also advocate action in the form of active participation in the 
resolution of envkonmental issues, they cast Uteracy as vital adjunct to action 
rather than casting action as Uteracy. As envkonmental education theorising of 
Uteracy developed, however, Uteracy was cast as a developmental process that 
culminated in action. This conjunction fkst emerged when Roth (1992) advanced 
the tiered notion of environmental htetacies. Although, Stables and Bishop note that 
as Roth's formulation does not connect with broader theoretical or phUosophical 
theorising, "he is unable to be very clear on issues such as whether envkonmental 
Uteracy involves or merely stimulates (or might stimulate) action for the 
envkonment" (2001, p, 90-91), Furthermore, Roth's formulation of 
envkonmental Uteracies draws upon the narrow conception of texts. Thus, Roth 
posits the envkonment as an unproblematised stage upon which envkonmental 
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Uteracies are enacted. Stables and Bishop (2001), however, has re-framed Roth's 
taxonomy of envkonmental Uteracies by drawing upon post-critical Uteracy 
theorising and postmodernist/poststructuraUst phUosophy, Thus, Stables and 
Bishop posit (the) envkonment as text and cast envkonmental Uteracy as an 
embodied semiotic engagement with (the) envkonment. 
Stables' theorisation of critical envkonmental Uteracy (Stables, 1996, 1997, 
1998; Stables & Bishop, 2001) is whoUy compatible with the position that is 
advanced here. However, the position that is presented here is not compatible 
with the position that Stables presents in Who Drew the Sky? Conflicting assumptions in 
environmental education (2001b), In this article. Stables undermines much of his 
critical and decisive earUer work by deferring to common misreadings of 
postmoderrUst/poststrucmraUst thought. In particular. Stables defers to the 
misreadings that postmodernist/poststmcturaUst thought "renders futUe the quest 
for tmth" (2001b, p, 247), that the envkonment is not 'there', that the world 
"simply cannot be 'known'" (2001b, p, 250), that Derrida's thought leads to 
"thoroughgoUig relativism" (2001b, p, 248) and that "there is no logic to 
[poststmcturaUst thought] at aU" (2001b, p, 250)^, FoUowing his deferral to these 
misreadings of postmodernist/poststmcturaUst thought. Stables aUgns himself 
with 'post-foundational' thought which, he maintains, avoids the pitfaUs 
(misreadings) of postmodernisms/poststmcmraUsms by "retain[ing] a degree of 
reaUsm" (2001b, p, 249), The position that is presented here does not support 
Stables' rendition of post-foundationaUsm or his acquiescence to the misreadings 
of postmodernist/poststmcturaUst thought. Nevertheless, as stated at the outset, 
the position presented here is whoUy compatible with Stables' earUer works. The 
major point of agreement is that each position supports (the) envkonment as text, 
from which other points of agreement foUow, such as support for the 
postmodernist/poststructuraUst motif of Death of the Author. WhUst Stables 
draws on Barthes and this argument draws on Derrida, both Barthes and Derrida 
uphold the theme of the Death of the Author and thek responses to it are sknUar, 
' As each of these misreadings and others were rebutted in Chapter Five, the rebuttals will not be reiterated here. 
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The notable difference between the discussion here and Stables' earUer works on 
critical envkonmental Uteracy is that this discussion draws out the constimtive role 
of uncertainty, 
CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL LITERACY, DECONSTRUCTION AND UNCERTAINTY 
A fkm link exists between critical Uteracies and Derrida's phUosophical/Uterary 
projects, especiaUy deconstruction. As noted above, both critical Uteracies and the 
objectives of envkonmental education conjoin Uteracy and action as the condition 
for enacting 'critical social practices'. This conjunction and thek expression figure 
prominendy in Derrida's works. The conjunction is demonstrated in Derrida's 
insistence that what he caUs "the 'text' is not distinct from action or opposed to 
action" (Derrida, 1999, p. 65) and the caU for thek expression is demonstrated by 
Derrida's advocacy of 'close reading'. Indeed, Derrida's formulation of close 
reading can be read as a caU for the development of critical Uteracies: 
to read does not mean to spend nights in the Ubrary; to read events, 
to analyse the simation, to criticize the media, to Usten to the 
rhetoric of demagogues, that's close reading, and it is requked more 
today than ever. So I would urge poUticians and citizens to practise 
close reading in this new sense, and not simply to stay in the Ubrary. 
(Derrida, 1999, p. 67) 
WhUst this quotation can be read as an affkmation of the importance of 
critical Uteracies, it seems to limit the reach of critical Uteracies to the linguistic 
realm of human sociaUty. However, when this quotation is read alongside 
Derrida's famous remark that there is nothing beyond the text and the discussion 
in Chapter Five, which argued that this remark does not constimte a denial of the 
materiaUty of (the) world, it becomes defensible to assert that Derrida's notion of 
close reading can inform both broad conceptions of envkonmental Uteracy in 
241 
CHAPTER SIX - SHIFTING TERRAINS 
which (the) envkonment is posited as text, as weU as narrower conceptions of 
Uteracies which solely attend the linguistic realm of human sociaUty^. 
Linking Derrida's thought to a conception of critical envkonmental Uteracies 
enables the constimtive role of uncertainty to be foregrounded. The notion of 
critical Uteracy as a means of probing how a text works is dkecdy linked to the 
notion of deconstruction. This assertion of a 'dkect link' is seemingly 
problematic, however, given that Derrida refuses any claims to fixed and final 
meanings. This begs the question, how can a link to deconstmction be claimed, 
when deconstruction, like so many of Derrida's terms, cannot be 
unproblematicaUy individuated? However, this is not as problematic as it may 
appear to be. Certainly, deconstmction is not a delimitable entity and Derrida has 
consistentiy indicated this by refusing to cast deconstruction as a method, or as a 
school of thought. But Derrida does signify deconstruction as an endless process. 
That there is no end to deconstmction krevocably obstructs any attempt to 
logocentricaUy wrest deconstmction into fiiU presence, but the process can be 
described. One description in particular indicates how deconstruction is dkecdy 
linked to the notion of critical Uteracy as a means of probing how a text works. In 
an interview with Mortiey (1991), Derrida described deconstruction as: 
a matter of gaining access to the mode in which a system or 
structure, or ensemble, is constructed or constimted, historicaUy 
speaking. Not to destroy it, or demoUsh it, nor to purify it, but in 
order to accede to its possibiUties and its meanings; to its 
construction and its history. (Mortiey, 1991, p.97) 
This description of deconstruction could be summarised as probing how a text 
constmcts and configures meaning. 
' It should be noted here that the term 'narrower' is not being used in a pejorative sense to indicate that those literacies 
that solely attend the linguistic realm of human sociality are somehow impoverished. 
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Adopting deconstmction as a basis for critical Uteracies not only draws the 
constimtive role of uncertainty in critical Uteracies into reUef, it demonstrates that 
uncertainty provides the condition for critical Uteracies and that the engagement of 
critical Uteracies is a mode of positively responding to uncertainty. Indeed, if 
uncertainty were not the crux of the issue, what would we need critical Uteracies 
for? Critical theorists might smart at the audacity of this question, but given that 
aU strands of critical theory embrace self-reflexivity, critical theory rides on change 
which at the very least problematises any appeal to certainty. The relationship of 
critical theory to (un)certainty is an issue that deserves close critical examination 
and this is not the place to give that thesis the attention that it requkes and 
deserves. The issue was raised, however, to indicate that the provocative question 
that 'if uncertainty were not the crux of the issue, what would we need critical 
Uteracies for?' cannot be summarily dismissed by appeals, say, to the eUmination 
of false consciousness. The emancipation that critical theorists proclaim foUows 
the elimination of false consciousness cannot be equated with the advance or 
arrival of certainty. 
The four forms of narrative uncertainties, which were formulated in Chapter 
Five, are foregrounded when deconstmction is adopted as a basis for critical 
envkonmental Uteracy. Deconstmction necessitates a broad view of 
envkonmental Uteracy in which (the) envkonment be treated as text. This 
necessity arises from Derrida's repudiation of transcendental signifiers, which 
disavows that meaning exists outside of chains of signification. In other words, 
adopting a deconstmctive approach concomitantiy requkes acceding to the view 
that (the) envkonment is that which receives signification, not (that) which gives 
it. Therefore, the envkonment cannot be used to ground (the) authority, vaUdity 
or tmth of envkonmental knowledge, either UteraUy or figuratively. This inabiUty 
to ground (the) authority, vaUdity or tmth of envkonmental knowledge from (the) 
outside dislodges the envkonment as the centre of our envkonmental knowledge. 
According to Derrida, centres have been invested with the organisational power of 
stmctures, Refiising to invest the envkonment with the organisational power to 
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Stmcmre and stabiUse our envkonmental knowledge, then, removes the 
envkonment as the benchmark against which to assess the certainty of 
propositions. Thus, the envkonment is decentred, but as Derrida argues, decentring 
does not rest. The uncertainty that results from the decentring of the 
envkonment does not regain equiUbrium through the instaUation of an alternative 
centre. Deconstruction, then, results in decentred uncertainty that arises from the 
successive determination of centres. Decentred uncertainty does not attenuate 
over time. 
The impUcations of decentring the envkonment present numerous chaUenges 
and oppormnities to envkonmental education and only a limited number of these 
can be entered into here. Perhaps the most chaUenging impUcation to 
envkonmental education in terms of its scope is the repudiation of critical reaUsm, 
Treating the envkonment as text does not deny the materiaUty of (the) 
envkonment. Rather, it means that there is no meaning in (the) envkonment itself, 
that there is no acontexmal knowledge of (the) envkonment. Given that there is 
no meaning in (the) envkonment itself, no discipline can claim to be able to tap 
into envkonmental meaning. This displaces scientific knowledge from the 
privUeged position afforded to it in much envkonmental education discourse. 
The need to displace the centraUty of scientific discourse is supported by critical, 
hermeneutic and postmodernist/poststmcturaUst perspectives in envkonmental 
education. Much of this support finds expression through advocating the need to 
respect differing social and cultural interpretations of envkonmental issues. 
However, reducing envkonmental issues to simply matters of social and cultural 
interpretation has the capacity to surreptitiously reinsert the envkonment as the 
centre of envkonmental knowledge. In addition to recognising differing social and 
cultural understandings, the texmaUty of (the) envkonment and envkonmental 
issues needs to be highUghted. This texmal manoeuvre is crucial because it 
prevents social and cultural differences being degraded to equivocation about the 
envkonment, which would simultaneously reinstaU the envkonment as the centre 
of envkonmental knowledge and restore the privUeged position of scientific 
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knowledge that was to have been displaced by the acknowledgement of social and 
culmral differences. 
Clearly, poUtics is at stake here. The surreptitious restoration of scientific 
knowledge demonstrated in the previous example highUghts disciplinary power 
and the poUtics of representation. Developing a critical envkonmental Uteracy 
that engages (the) envkonment as text enables the surreptitious to be rendered 
expUcit, Rendering disciplinary power and the poUtics of representation visible is 
clearly of strategic value when unraveUing envkonmental problems and issues. 
The poUtical agenda in envkonmental education has a high, but contested, profUe 
for this reason. The poUtical dimension of envkonmental education, however, is 
typicaUy expressed in terms of batties between binary poles: Left/Right, 
Green/Red, Irrespective of how these binaries are orchestrated, the orchestration 
presumes a fixed and stable bottom Une. Engaging the poUtics of representation, 
however, deconstructs the bottom line. Johnson's description of deconstruction 
is helpful here: "What deconstmction does is teach you to ask: What does the 
constmction of the bottom Une leave out? What does it suppress? What does it 
disregard? What does it consider unimportant? What does it leave in the 
margins?" (quoted in Green, 1997, p. 238). This interrogation of the bottom line 
expands the scope of poUtical Uteracy in envkonmental education and enables the 
recognition and acknowledgement of the kreducible uncertainty that attends the 
poUtics of representation. The scope of poUtical Uteracy is expanded, because in 
addition to evaluating the agendas promoted by the competing poles in the 
Left/Right and Red/Green binaries, deconstmction demonstrates that these 
binaries are not self-evident by dkecting attention to constimtive blindnesses that 
enabled the construction of the (apparent) bottom line positions. Drawing 
attention to constimtive blindness also highUghts the kreducible uncertainty that 
attends the poUtics of representation. As a matter of consistency, one must 
recognise and acknowledge that the 'insights' gained through deconstruction are 
systematicaUy related to what is not seen. Thus, there is no 'revelation' in the sense 
that revelations disclose that which is krefiitably certain. The 'insights' of the 
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poUtics of representation, of deconstmction, ride on uncertainty, which prevents 
deconstruction from coming to rest. 
Thus far, it has been posited that decentring the envkonment reveals that a 
ubiquitous uncertainty attends aU envkonmental knowledge. The ubiquity of this 
decentred uncertainty arises from the repudiation of the logocentric rationaUsm 
that posits the envkonment anterior to the text, controlling the movement of the 
text from the outside. From this, it foUows that no discipline can claim to reach 
beyond the text, to the envkonment. This renders scientific knowledge as one 
fiction among others that write (the) envkonment, each of which can and does 
have effects on (the) envkonment. Reading (the) envkonment as text and 
acceding to the multipUcity of readings that the text may signify with varying 
degrees of expUcitness provides an oppormnity to examine the nature of 
envkonmental issues that are being foregrounded as opposed to those that are 
being marginaUsed, and to ask: what justification is being used to partition and 
position those issues? under what authority is this partitioning and positioning 
being conducted? and whose interest does it serve? Thus, in addition to 
highUghting the ubiquitous and constimtive uncertainty of envkonmental 
knowledge per se, decentring the envkonment dkects attention to issues of 
disciplinary power and the poUtics of representation, which discursively instantiate 
differing envkonmental issues. Probing the instantiating capacity of disciplinary 
power and the poUtics of representation draws essential bUnd spots into reUef and, 
as a matter of consistency, inqukers must acknowledge that the instantiation of 
thek 'insights' is also systematicaUy related to bUnd spots. Thus, decentred 
uncertainty is both ubiquitous and endless. This endlessness results from the 
impossibiUty of closure, which coincides with one of the dimensions of 
subjunctive uncertainty, namely openness, which reinforces that the narrative 
uncertainties that were formulated earUer are not mumaUy exclusive. 
It is necessary, however, to dismpt this rather triumphant tone. The movement 
from deprivUeging scientific knowledge to inquiries into disciplinary power and 
the poUtics of representation is not assured. Decentring (the) envkonment in 
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envkonmental education also signals the loss of reassuring certimde that 
logocentric discourses promote. Losing a reassuring certimde places persons in a 
position of vulnerability, possibly despak. Clearly, there are ethical impUcations 
here. A cmcial role of critical envkonmental Uteracy, then, is to equip participants 
in envkonmental education with means to respond positively to this loss. Given 
that decentring does not rest, it would be entkely unethical to ease the loss of 
reassuring certimde with yet another centre, which would, in turn, be dislodged. 
Another response altogether is needed. Perhaps surprisingly, one way of 
pedagogicaUy responding to this ethical responsibiUty is to pursue the other form 
of uncertainty that arises from the chaUenge to logocentrism through the motif of 
the Death of the Author, numely poietic uncertainty. 
The formulation of poietic uncertainty, in the Chapter Five, was derived from 
die motif of the Death of the Author, as per Barthes (1968/1977) Derrida 
(1972/1981) and Foucault (1969/1988). To recapitulate briefly, ^oMr uncertaUity 
arises from the repudiation of the logocentric position that texts convey intended 
meanings that can be attributed to the author(s). This logocentric position posits 
reading as a passive process insofar as it does not involve the reader in the 
construction of meaning. The reader is, thus, a disposable recipient of vicarious 
meaning. The motif of the Death of the Author, however, disrupts this notion by 
rescheduUng the site and temporaUty of meaning, FoUowing the Death of the 
Author, the site of the constmction of meaning is shifted from the author to the 
reader and the tkning of the constmction of meaning is shifted from the past to 
the present. 
Accenmating the motif of the Death of the Author in critical envkonmental 
Uteracy can have both a motivational and empowering effect. The motivational 
effect can be derived from the formulation oi poietic uncertainty. The temporal 
shift of meaning that the Death of the Author necessitates problematises certainty 
in a manner that ensures its possibiUty. When the construction of meaning is 
posited as an ever-present process, the attribution or denial of certainty is 
perpemaUy fmstrated because meaning must be estabUshed logicaUy prior to the 
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attribution of certainty. Thus, as argued earUer, the attribution of certaUity 
requkes one to UteraUy get ahead of oneself whUst remakUng steadfastiy grounded 
in the present, which is both impossible and utterly absurd. Thus, whUst the 
Death of the Author immerses the reader in uncertainty, it concomitantiy 
disavows surrendering certainty. The Death of the Author then exhorts us not to 
complacentiy accept our present readings of the wor(l)d and not to mistake the 
present state of affaks with what is yet to come. The empowering effect Ues, then, 
in shifting the focus from a loss to a gain. In other words, accenmating the Death 
of the Author shifts the attention from a perceived loss of reassuring certimde 
that reUed upon receiving meaning vicariously from texts that claimed author-ity 
to one's active role in the construction of meaning. Thus, participants in 
envkonmental education ought to be encouraged and supported to constmct 
meanings by teasing counter constmctions from texts and to read texts with and 
against one another. 
The empowerment that can arise from shifting the constmction of meaning 
from the author to the reader is not unconditional. The locus of responsibiUty 
shifts as the constmction of meaning moves from the author to the reader, 
Constmcting texts is an ethico-poUtical enterprise, krespective of who is 
accredited with thek constmction. In the interpersonal arena, ethico-poUtical 
questions attend the inclusion/exclusion and transformation of individuals or 
groups as narratives are constructed (there are clear Unks with postcolonial and 
feminist theory here). Beyond the interpersonal arena, ethico-poUtical questions 
attend how (the) envkonment is constmcted, and ethico-poUtical questions attend 
intertexmal readings of these two types of narratives. Green's comment made 
within the broader arena of critical Uteracies highUghts this ethico-poUtical 
dimension in a manner that resonates with the concerns of envkonmental 
education: 
It is not enough, then, to talk about "reading" and "writing" the 
"word-world", not any more. Rather, we need to draw into our 
project the notion and necessity of caring for the "word-world", of 
248 
CHAPTER SIX - SHIFTING TERRAINS 
care; of attending to, engaging with, intervening on behalf of, and 
looking after what might now perhaps be better described simply as 
die Wor(l)d, (Green, 1997, p, 239, Green's emphasis) 
In the context of envkonmental education. Green's statement can be read as 
an appeal to eco-poUtical agency, where the term 'agency' is taken to be 
problematic. As mentioned in Chapter Five, Gough also draws eco-poUtical 
agency into clear reUef when he advances that one of the pedagogical impUcations 
of using postmodernist/poststructuraUst narrative theory in envkonmental 
education "is to support learners as they 'play out' the meanings and impUcations 
of thek transactions with the earth ... so that they can rehearse the consequences 
of Uving these stories, and Uving with others' stories, in sustainable (or at least 
non-catastrophic) ways" (Gough, 1994b, p. 210). 
The discussion, thus far, and the two aforementioned quotations nuance the 
reader and narrative uncertainties unproblematicaUy. Hitherto, the discussion has 
theorised the play of narrative uncertainties from a seemingly detached 
perspective, as if the reader/writer were beyond the text and, thus, unaffected by 
narrative uncertainties. But given that this discussion has embraced Derrida's 
contention that there is nothing beyond the text, it is necessary, as a matter of 
logical consistency, to expUcitiy acknowledge that (the) subject is constimted 
within the chains of signification that weave the text. Therefore, consideration 
needs to be given to the constimtive role of narrative uncertainties in the 
processes of subjectification, the impUcations that this may hold for 
envkonmental education and the possible role of critical envkonmental Uteracy in 
engaging these impUcations. 
The contention that subjectivity arises within the chains of signification that 
weave the text posits subjectivity as a constmction that emerges from the play of 
differences and deferrals rather than a fixed, stable and unitary entity. Subjectivity, 
then, gams expression through shifting outward relations rather than the 
Uidividuation of a unique, inner self that sets one apart from aU others. The 
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notion of a fixed, stable, unitary self has been displaced by notions that (the) self is 
narrativised, multiple and fluid. The multipUcity and fluidity of narrativised selves 
resonates with each formulation of narrative uncertainty simultaneously and in a 
manner that resists discrete resolution. Nevertheless, it is possible to foreground 
each formulation, whUst recognising that drawing each into reUef does not sever 
the interrelations between the other formulations and recognising that any such 
attempt can only ever be partial. 
The multipUcity and fluidity of narrativised selves corresponds with the 
pluraUty and openness of narratives from which subjunctive uncertainty obtains. 
The notion of multiple selves as opposed to a unified self accedes to the notion 
that subjectivity is "multiply constmcted across different, often intersecting and 
antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions" (HaU, 1996, p, 4), In short, a 
pluraUty of selves is constmcted by multiple contexts. This contexmaUsation of 
selves prevents the resolution of this multipUcity into a unity because such a 
resolution must itself take place within a context. Thus, this multipUcity cannot be 
centred, which draws the play of decentred uncertainty into subjectivities. The 
contexmaUsation of the self also draws the second aspect of subjunctive 
uncertainty into reUef, namely openness. If one accepts that subjectivity is 
constmcted by contexts in the Derridean sense, then subjectivities are cast as 
being open rather than closed because, according to Derrida (1988), contexts are 
neither absolutely determining nor whoUy delimiting. Thus, subjectivity eludes 
being wrenched into fiUl presence. This is not a postmodern return to an Oedipal 
terrain of lack, grieving and confiision. On the contrary, the openness that arises 
from the impossibiUty of fuU presence creates opportunity. This openness admits 
that each text means more than it says, from which aUegorical uncertainty obtains. 
Thus, different subjectivities can be constructed from within any particular text. 
Constmcting different subjectivities from within any particular text or through 
intertexmal readings draws the role of critical Uteracies into reUef and mobiUses 
poietic uncertainty. The play o£poietic uncertainty is vitaUy important here because 
it obtains from the motif of the Death of the Author. The importance Ues in the 
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shift in the site of the constmction of meaning. The impUcation for the 
construction of subjectivities Ues in the fact that the construction of meaning 
resides with the reader rather than the author. Thus, (the) subject exercises a 
degree of control or influence and, hence, responsibiUty over the constmction of 
subjectivities rather than being helplessly at the mercy of capricious texts and/or 
thek authors. The uncertainty resulting from the Death of the Author resides in 
the temporal shift of meaning; if meaning is constmcted in the ever present, the 
attribution of certainty is perpemaUy postponed. Thus, the reader's constmction 
of subjectivities is a process of becoming rather than attainment because the only 
vantage point from which one could assess the certainty of the present state of 
subjectivities Ues in the fumre. Closure is perpemaUy postponed. 
Acceding to and engaging with the multipUcity and fluidity of narrativised 
selves and the narrative uncertainties that operate within this theorisation of 
subjectivity, presents an oppormnity that holds great pronUse for envkonmental 
education, Uke Caputo's (1993, p, 82) description of "thinking the Unpossible", 
engaging with the multipUcity and fluidity of narrativised selves "puUs us out of 
our most sedimented thoughts and opens up new possibiUties", The new 
possibiUties for envkonmental education include exploring how envkonmentaUy 
sensitive and responsive subjectivities are constructed, and whether these 
constmctions are foregrounded or marginaUsed, More specificaUy, it involves 
deploying critical Uteracies in order to analyse the construction of 'envkonmental' 
subjectivities so that critical understandings may be gained of both what we are 
prepared to accede to as envkonmental issues and our disposition to 
envkonmental action. This analysis involves paying attention not only to how 
different texts instantiate envkonmental issues, as mentioned in the earUer 
discussion, but also how this instantiation simultaneously constructs subjectivities 
such that we wiU subscribe to that instantiation. Playing close critical attention to 
such instantiations requkes developing a vigUance that searches for the shadows 
of the essential blindnesses that are whoUy necessary to support such 
constmctions. As noted earUer, probing constimtive blindnesses is a poUtical and 
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ethical enterprise. It is poUtical because it confronts how disciplinary power and 
the poUtics of representation predispose us to construct subjectivities that 
maintain the constimtive blindnesses and to accept these constructions. The 
ethical aspect Ues in the fact that counter constructions can be made and that we 
must accept responsibiUty for these constructions. Thus, participants in 
envkonmental education can be encouraged to undertake ethical constructions of 
subjectivities, by searching for essential blindnesses, making these visible, 
deploying these to constmct counter-subjectivities and assessing whether these 
counter-subjectivities enable us to Uve in more or less envkonmentaUy sustainable 
ways. 
The ethico-poUtical dimension of critical Uteracies or close reading has been 
widely accepted. The discussion here goes beyond the current theorising of both 
critical Uteracies in general and Stables' critical envkonmental Uteracy, however, by 
highUghting that uncertainty undergkds critical Uteracies and by arguing that the 
deployment of critical Uteracies is a means of positively responding to ubiquitous 
and perpemal uncertainty. The term 'positive' is being used here to signify that 
critical Uteracies provide a way of conducting purposeful activities in the midst of 
uncertainty, which contrasts with the negative portrays of postmodernist/ 
poststmcturaUst thought that posit accepting a paralysing defeat as the inevitable 
outcome. This discussion also goes beyond Stables' theorisation of critical 
envkonmental Uteracy by expUcitiy positioning (the) subject within the text and 
probing the effects that the text and the embedded narrative uncertainties have on 
the process of subjectification and by exploring how a reflexive deployment of 
critical envkonmental Uteracy can provide participants in envkonmental education 
with understandings of the constmction of envkonmental subjectivities and 
dispositions to engage in the resolution of envkonmental issues, 
ETHICS AND UNCERTAINTY 
The preceding sections illustrated that an attentiveness to uncertainty led into 
ethical terrain. However, this does not permit any relationship, in the strong sense, 
to be advanced between uncertainty and ethics, Thek conjunction in the 
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preceding two sections may have resulted from: the deployment of 
postmodernist/poststructuraUst themes; the constimtion of as if friends and critical 
Uteracies, and different aspects of thek constimtions may have yielded the 
conjunction; or the conjunction may simply have been incidental in each case and 
coincidental that it emerged in both. This section argues that ethics emerges with a 
strong profUe when postmodernist/poststmcturaUst perspectives are employed, 
but it also argues that this profUe is accenmated in this project because specific 
relationships obtain between uncertainty and ethics when working within a 
postmodernist/poststrucmraUst framework. The impUcations of these specific 
relationships for engagements with uncertainty within envkonmental education 
are then addressed, 
POSTMODERNIST/POSTSTRUCTURALIST PERSPECTIVES 7\ND ETHICS 
Despite the difficulties that attend characterising postmodernisms/ 
poststmcturaUsms (Stronach & MacLure, 1996), it is uncontentious to assert that 
postmodernist/poststmcturaUst perspectives are characterised by a concern for 
the other. This concern is articulated through a privUeging of difference as a 
means to dismpt totaUsation, That there is or must be a totaUty is a myth and any 
to effort substantiate this myth results in intractable epistemological difficulties 
(Van Niekerk, 1995), Yet this myth has become deeply entrenched and has 
resulted in violence toward the other. May (1997) provides a succinct statement 
of the violence that totaUtarianism infUcts upon the other, WhUst, May refers to 
'totaUtarianism', he uses this term in its broadest sense, which renders it 
synonymous with 'totaUsation' as it has been used in this project: 
the deep problem with totaUtarianism is not merely that it is false; it 
is also insidious. It is not merely mistaken to be totaUtarian in one's 
concepmal approach to the world; it is also evU, And the reason 
that it is evU is that it marginaUzes or eliminates that which is 
different. Thinking of community in terms of a common substance 
that we must aU participate in marginaUzes those who are different 
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from the participants in that common substance; thinkkig of 
language in terms of presence masks the difference that subtends it; 
thinking of ethics in terms of the Ukeness or analogies of others to 
oneself refiises the insight that what is ethicaUy relevant is often the 
difference of others from oneself; thinking of ontology in terms of 
identity precludes consideration of ontological possibiUties that are 
irreducible to any identity. In aU these cases, the different — 
although in each case it is a different 'different' - is lost, distorted, 
repressed or reduced. (May, 1997, p. 4) 
Postmodernist/poststmcmraUst perspectives expose the epistemological 
untenabiUty of totaUsation, the violence that totaUsation infUcts upon the other, 
and the capacity that totaUsation has to mask this violence. In Continental 
postmodernist/poststmcmraUst phUosophy, this often finds expression through 
reminders of the holocaust and a commitment to guard against its remrn (Adorno, 
1966/1973; Derrida, 1967/1978; Lyotard et al., 1992; Lyotard & Thebaud, 1985). 
It is unsurprising then that ethics has assumed such a high profUe throughout 
this project. This was inevitable. However, the question remains whether this 
profUe was solely due to the postmodernist/poststmcmraUst framework adopted 
within this project or whether the ethical dimension was further ampUfied because 
of specific relationships between uncertainty and ethics within this 
postmodernist/poststructuraUst framework. The determination of whether there 
are specific relationships between uncertainty and ethics in this context is relevant 
to envkonmental education due to the prominent profUe that uncertainty is 
gaining in envkonmental education and envkonmental education's commitment 
to envkonmental values education. 
Addressing the question of whether specific relationships exist between 
uncertainty and ethics in postmodernist/poststructuraUst thought is awkward, 
however, given that uncertainty is variously taken to be a symbol, theme and 
consequence of postmodernist/poststmcturaUst thought. Engaging the question 
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of a Specific relationship through the designations of uncertainty as a symbol or 
consequence could do no more than reiterate the relationship between 
postmodernist/poststructuraUst perspectives and ethics. The question of a 
specific relationship needs to be approached thematicaUy. The foUowing section 
draws on the theme of excess, as per Derrida and Levinas, in order to argue that 
specific relationships exist between uncertainty and ethics in postmodernist/ 
poststmcturaUst thought. 
EXCESS, UNCERTAINTY AND ETHICS 
Derrida's deconstmction demonstrates the inexhaustible excess of texts. This 
excess arises from the overdetermination of texts, which enables the multipUcity 
of readings that texts signify with varying degrees of expUcimess. The 
inexhaustibiUty of this excess arises from the refusal to admit fixed and final 
meanings to any of these readings. According to Derrida, for a decision to occur a 
choice needs to be made between two or more determined readings. Given that 
logocentrism is denied, one reading cannot be privUeged by appeals to knowledge, 
reason or truth. Thus, an aporia is reached. This aporia is constimted by 
kreducible uncertainty. This does not mean that decisions are grounded in 
ignorance. Derrida (1999, p. 66) insists that decisions "must be prepared as far as 
possible by knowledge, by information, by infinite analysis", but that the decision 
itself is heterogeneous to knowledge. Derrida argues that if a response were 
formulated otherwise, it could not be afforded the stams of a decision; instead it 
would simply be the appUcation of a program that is itself whoUy determined. 
Thus, decisions requke being confronted with an aporia of irreducible uncertainty. 
This aporetic uncertainty is a necessary condition for ethico-poUtical 
responsibiUty: "There can be no moral or poUtical responsibiUty without this trial 
and this passage by way of the undecidable" (Derrida, 1988, 116). FoUowing 
Derrida, then, excess leads to kreducible uncertainty, which creates the possibiUty 
for ethics and poUtics. 
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Excess and uncertaUity are central motifs in Levinas' ethics of responsibiUty as 
weU. In Levinas' formulation of the face to face encounter, the I is summoned to 
enter into an ethical relationship with the Other who "exceeds the idea of the other in 
me" (Levinas, 1961/1991, p. 50, Levinas' emphasis). In order to enter into this 
ethical relationship with the Other it is necessary to refrain from concepmaUsation 
and thematisation, which strip the Other of his or her utter excessiveness in order 
to capture the Other in concepts and language, respectively. Thus, the face to face 
relationship places the I in a position of ethical responsibiUty for the Other and 
this responsibUity can only be fulfiUed by suspending concepmaUsation and 
thematisation, which would destroy the Other by rendering him or her simply as 
other. Yet, the face to face is not simply a relationship between two unmediated 
sUigulars. The thkd party, who is there "from the fkst" (Levinas, 1974/1991, p. 
157), looks at the I through the eyes of the Other. This compels the I to compare 
incomparables. The I is assaUed by questions such as: "What are the other and the 
thkd for one another? What have they done to one another? Which passes 
before the other?" (Levinas, 1974/1991, p. 157) and "Who passes before the other 
in my responsibiUty?" (Levinas, 1984/1996, p, 168), An aporia of kreducible 
uncertainty invokes concepmaUsation, which shatters the transcendence of the 
face to face relationship. The responsibility of the face to face is abmptiy 
transformed to response ability in (the) world. Thus excess and uncertainty coincide 
in Levinas' formulation and dissolution of the face to face relationship, which 
leads to ethical and poUtical response abiUty in (the) world. 
Examining Derrida's and Levinas' work through the theme of 'excess' 
demonstrates that there are relationships, in the strong sense, between uncertainty 
and ethics as weU as the more general relationships between postmodernist/ 
poststmcturaUst thought and ethics that arise from the concern for the other. 
Clearly, the relationship between uncertainty and ethics is not the same in each 
case. This is not surprising given that the motif of excess defies resolution into a 
stable theme, and Derrida's project concerns the other of language and Levinas' 
project concerns the otherness of subjectivity. Nevertheless, the relationships are 
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simUar insofar that in each case uncertainty catapults one into ethical terrain. 
Engaging ethics in response to uncertainty is not an option; it is inescapable. 
Neither Derrida nor Levinas fiirnishes an ethical program beyond giving 
ethical primacy to the difference of the other. This is the essential poverty (Derrida, 
1999) of thek work and in each case it arises from the recognition that the 
constmction of such an ethical program or process is itself a violent act. No 
ethical program can be constmcted to be adequate to the singularity of each 
Other's excess. Nevertheless, the kremedial inadequacy of any program or 
process does not mean that programs or processes should be abandoned or 
excluded. On the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to enter into process in order 
to enact one's responsibiUty. This is a double-bind. Ethics requkes that which is 
injurious to it. This does not lead this Une of argument to coUapse in a heap. 
Instead, it means that programs and processes can and should be unrelentingly 
deconstructed, transformed and reformed in the pursmt of an impossible 
perfectibiUty that would do justice to the singularity of each Other's excess. 
UNCERTAINTY, ETHICS AND ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 
Two aspects of the preceding argument hold special significance for 
envkonmental education. The fkst is that uncertainty propels one into ethical 
terrain. This is a key finding for those in envkonmental education who wish to 
engage 'postmodern uncertainties' (Panel for Education for Sustainable 
Development, 1998) because the envkonmental education theorisUig of 
uncertainty to date treats ethical responses to uncertainty simply as an option, 
albeit a highly recommended option (Ashley, 2000; Diduck, 1997; Panel for 
Education for Sustainable Development, 1998; Rosenbaum, 2000; Scott, 2001), 
This difference between immediate responsibiUty and subsequent option arises 
from different designations of ethics. In envkonmental education, ethics seems to 
be equated with distinguishing between good and bad. Whereas, ethics precedes 
this determination for Derrida and Levinas, that is, ethics originates the moment 
that uncertainty is recognised. 
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The second aspect of the preceding argument that holds significance for 
envkonmental education is the need to unrelentingly deconstruct, transform and 
reform ethical programs on the basis that no program can be adequate to the 
singularity of the Other. There is akeady great debate over what should constimte 
envkonmental values in envkonmental values education. This debate, however, is 
of the order of a difference of opinion concerning, in part, what the envkonmental 
values should be (Fien, 1993, Sterling, 1993), This debate does not admit the 
possibiUty that any code of envkonmental values is necessarUy and irremediably 
inadequate to the singularity of the Other, This possibiUty is not included because 
the debate is underpinned by reaUst perspectives, which cannot be attentive to the 
vulnerabiUty of the Other, where the 'Other' designates the radical Other rather 
than the marginaUsed 'other', given that reaUst perspectives do not admit the 
alterity of the Other, However, if envkonmental education is to respond to the 
increasing number of caUs for the introduction of postmodernist/ poststructuraUst 
perspectives, it wUl need to admit and respond to the kremedial inadequacy of 
ethical programs based on the possible threat that they pose to the Other, 
Both deconstmctive critical envkonmental Uteracy and the previous 
postmodernist/poststmcturaUst reading of the attimde of as if friends enable and 
compel the inclusion of this ethical dUemma in the envkonmental values 
education debate. Both as if friends and deconstructive critical envkonmental 
Uteracy are sufficient to respond to the necessary and kremedial inadequacy of 
ethical programs and process. In deconstmctive critical envkonmental Uteracy, 
the repudiation of meaning beyond the text denies transcendental stams to ethical 
programs and processes. Thus, ethical programs and processes are cast as texts; 
thek instantiation is utterly dependent upon constimtive blindnesses. In other 
words, any ethical program or process 'exists' by virme of what it leaves out. 
Thus, any ethical program or process 'exists' by vkme of its kremedial inadequacy. 
In as if friends, the preservation of difference, which is the crux of the relationship, 
demands that the utmost vigUance is exercised in order to preserve the proximity 
and the separation that coincide in this relationship, each of which threatens to 
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subsume the other. This vigUance requkes a commitment to deconstmct, 
transform and reform any cognitive, ethical or poUtical process or program 
invoked within the relationship in order to prevent such processes or programs 
destroying the constimtive tension that enables the relationship. Thus, as if friends 
requkes that close attention be paid to the kremedial inadequacy of ethical 
programs and processes because of the risk of the dissolution of the relationship. 
Thus, each is sufficient, but each has different strengths from which the other can 
benefit. As if friends expUcitiy articulates key sociological dimensions necessary to 
sustain a deconstmctive attimde, namely openness, receptivity, active Ustening, 
tolerance, suspension of judgement, humiUty, scepticism, ego-distancing and 
playfiUness. Critical envkonmental Uteracy, on the other hand, expUcitiy articulates 
analytical strategies for deconstmction, such as decentring and disrupting binaries. 
Thus, embedding deconstmctive critical envkonmental Uteracy within the attimde 
of as if friends can provide envkonmental education with a potent strategy through 
which to engage and respond to the kremedial inadequacy of ethical programs and 
processes. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter has been to constmct secondary lines of fUght 
from the Levinasian and Derridean trajectories forged in Chapters Four and Five. 
Numerous lines of fUght would have been possible. However, for the purpose of 
this project, only those Unes of flight that connected with uncertainty and 
envkonmental education were mapped. These secondary lines of fUght were 
rhizomatic in two ways. Fkst, they constmcted assemblages between seemingly 
disparate elements and second, resonances were discerned between the three 
rhizomatic assemblages. 
The fkst line of flight forged a link between narrative uncertainties and thkd 
wave femiiUsms. This connection was possible because the narrative bonds of 
possibiUty, probabiUty, contingency, memory, deske, fear and hope are consigned 
to the subordinate bonds of patriarchal binarisms. As such, these bonds are 
compUcit in the discursive construction of practices, poUcies and instimtions that 
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do not afford women equaUty of opportunity and participation. Having 
estabUshed this connection, a poststructuraUst reading of Stone's attimde of as if 
friends was explored as a means to disrupt patriarchal discourse in envkonmental 
education. The need to dismpt patriarchal discourse has been identified as a 
priority in envkonmental education because patriarchal discourse is held to be 
deeply impUcated in (the) envkonmental crisis. This impUcation is twofold. Fkst, 
patriarchal discourse is held to be compUcit in estabUshing the social, cultural, 
economic and poUtical factors that enabled (the) envkonmental crisis to occur. 
Second, patriarchal discourse exercises disciplinary power to identify and 
legitimate what purportedly constimtes the envkonmental crisis. 
Engaging the attimde of as if friends provides a strategic means to respond 
purposively to and maintain uncertainty in a manner that chaUenges the hegemony 
of patriarchal discourse by respecting and preserving (the) difference that 
patriarchal discourse erases. As a result, engaging as if friends in envkonmental 
education enables community with Others, such as women and indigenous 
persons and groups, without dispossessing Others of thek otherness. The need to 
include the voices of women and indigenous persons and groups has been 
identified as a priority in envkonmental education, both nationaUy and 
internationaUy, However, this need is typicaUy driven by the deske to procure 
certainty through the constmction of meta-narratives that neatiy position other 
voices without chaUenging the concepts and stmctures that sustain the legitimacy 
of meta-narratives. The argument presented here, however, has argued for the 
proUferation of fragmented discourses on epistemological grounds and as an 
ethical imperative. As if friends enables community within a non-foundationaUst 
frame that is powered by uncertainty. 
The second Une of fUght into critical envkonmental Uteracy can be read as a 
tangential extension of as if friends. Both lines of fUght traverse the theoretical 
landscape of narrative theory and both employ the narrative uncertainties 
formulated in Chapter Five, The second line of fUght, in part, examines the 
constimtive role of uncertainty in the instantiation of envkonmental knowledge 
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and the construction of envkonmental subjectivities. The constimtive role of 
uncertainty in the instantiation of envkonmental knowledge arises from the 
rejection of logocentrism that posits the envkonment as the centre of 
envkonmental discourse. This decentring of the envkonment reveals that a 
ubiquitous uncertainty attends aU envkonmental knowledge. This denial of 
logocentrism and the play of narrative uncertainties that ensue, however, can not 
be entertained from a detached perspective. As a matter of logical consistency, it is 
necessary to view subjectivities as texmal constmctions, FoUowing the 
poststrucmraUst motif of the Death of the Author, subjectivity must be read as an 
active process for which we must accept responsibiUty, The responsibiUty for the 
construction of envkonmental subjectivity cannot be abrogated; it cannot be read 
as being at the mercy of capricious texts. This is perhaps the most important 
aspect of this Une of flight for envkonmental education. There have been caUs in 
envkonmental education for more careful and considered attention to the 
constmction of envkonmental agency (Fien, 1993), This discussion responds to 
this caU and demonstrates the constimtive role of uncertainty, 
FinaUy, the thkd Une of flight estabUshes a link, in the strong sense, between 
uncertainty and ethics. More specificaUy, this argument contends, as per Derrida 
and Levinas, that uncertainty provides the condition for ethics and that aU ethical 
decisions must pass through the ordeal of undecidabiUty, It foUows that ethics 
cannot and should not be reduced to a code of ethics. Such a programmatic 
approach eliminates the ordeal of undecidabiUty, which is not to underestimate the 
difficulties that can attend the appUcation of programmatic ethics. The 
impossibiUty of reducing ethics to a code of ethics results from the kremedial 
inadequacy of a code of ethics to be attentive to the singularity of each Other, 
Yet, it is imperative to enter into process to enact one's responsibiUty. Therefore, 
envkonmental education must strive to identify envkonmental values and commit 
to an ongoing process of deconstructing these values in response to thek 
inevitable inadequacy. This commitment to ongoing deconstruction rides upon 
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uncertainty of a different order from undecidabiUty, Thus, ethics is knbued with 
uncertainty through and through. 
Each of these lines of fUghts and the rhizomatic assemblages that were 
constmcted connected with influential themes in envkonmental education. 
However, the arguments presented induce unfamiUar resonances from these 
themes. The end of this chapter, with its unfamiUar resonances, marks the 
suspension of the mapping process. The tracing constructed in Chapter Three 
wiU now be laid over the maps constructed in Chapters Four, Five and Six in 
order to explore how the maps can desediment the akeady-said in envkonmental 
education. This process of desedimentation constimtes the final stage of 
rhizomatics, namely decalcomania. This task is to be undertaken in the next 
chapter. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Three stages are involved in Deleuze and Guattari's (1980/1987) cartography: 
tracing, mapping and decalcomania. Tracing involves foUowing the denouement 
of the theoretical terrain that has been configured within the field, whether acmal 
or possible. In other words, tracing involves reiterating the akeady-said and 
extending this terrain in accordance with what the akeady-said preconfigures. 
Tracings, then, are discursive. Most of the tracing undertaken in this project 
occurred in Chapter Three, which presented readings of current engagements with 
uncertainty in envkonmental education. This tracing covered: scientific 
uncertainty and aUied concepts, such as ignorance and risk; engaging scientific 
uncertainty and the precautionary principle in envkonmental education; 
engagements with chaos theory in envkonmental education; and poststmcturaUst 
phUosophical/Uterary engagements. Other, less pronounced tracings are 
interspersed throughout each of the arguments in other chapters in order to signal 
the argument's relevance to envkonmental education. 
Like tracings, mappings also forge connections and draw theoretical terrains 
into reUef Unlike tracings, however, mappings are non-discursive. Instead of 
surveying the boundaries and spaces enclosed within existing territories, mappings 
foUow Unes of fUght that mpmre boundaries to reveal new vistas. The most 
comprehensive mapping sections undertaken in this project involved the 
exploration of poststmcturaUst narrative uncertainties pace Vance's (1917) 
formulation of certainty, and the exploration of Levinas' ethics of responsibiUty 
pace the Panel for Education^r Sustainable Development's (1998) formulation of 
objectives for 'postmodern uncertainties'. Secondary lines of fUght, generated 
from narrative uncertainties and Levinas' ethics, mapped links between 
uncertainty and (a) postmodernist/poststmcturaUst feminisms and indigenous 
knowledges, through Stone's (1995) formulation oi as if friends, (b) deconstructive 
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critical envkonmental Uteracies in the constmction of envkonmental knowledge, 
envkonmental issues, envkonmental subjectivities and envkonmental agency, and 
(c) specific relationships to ethics through the postmodernist/poststmcturaUst 
theme of excess. Each of these lines of flight took envkonmental education 
theorising of uncertainty into new terrain where there were some resonances with 
contemporary envkonmental education theorising, but the resonances had 
unfamiUar inflections. 
The thkd aspect of Deleuze and Guattari's cartography is decalcomania, which 
in its Uteral sense means "a process or art of transferring pictures from a speciaUy 
prepared paper to surfaces of glass, porcelain, etc." (Oxford EngUsh Dictionary), 
Deleuze and Guattari criticaUy appropriate the Uteral sense of the term as weU as 
the meaning that can be derived from the Greek roots. They criticaUy appropriate 
the Uteral sense of the term in thek contention that "the tracing should always be put 
back on the map" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p, 13, Deleuze and Guattari's 
emphasis), but the purpose that they assign to this process accords more with the 
etymological meaning of the term, namely to break through strata that 
sediment/fix theoretical terrains, Deleuze and Guattari's proposal of putting the 
tracing back onto the map involves bringing the map and the tracing into contact 
in order to see what effects the map can induce in the tracing; to see how the map 
can de-sediment what has akeady been laid down in the field. This purpose, 
however, does not totaUy override the appropriated sense of decalcomania, which 
involves the comparison of maps and tracings. Deleuze and Guattari's 
cartography pays attention to the non-correspondence of maps and tracings, not 
in order to bring one into conformity with the other, but to draw gaps, blockages 
and disparities into reUef This attention to the non-correspondence of the tracing 
to the map offers a means to probe the discursive forces that configure what has 
akeady been laid down. Thus, decalcomania has a decidedly deconstructive 
aspect. 
The operation of placing the tracing over the map is performed in the two 
sections that foUow, The first section places the tracing of uncertainty in 
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envkonmental education over the maps constmcted here, with the main emphasis 
being on the capacity of the maps to de-sediment and transform existing 
engagements with uncertainty. The second section places a broader tracing of 
envkonmental education over the map and identifies the role of uncertainty in 
envkonmental education issues that have not hitherto been linked to the issue of 
uncertainty. Thus, both aspects of decalcomania are enacted in this chapter under 
the headings of Decalcomania I and II, respectively. 
DECALCOMANIA I 
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
EDUCATION 
A significant proportion of envkonmental education engagements with 
uncertainty refer to scientific uncertainty (Ashley, 2000; Diduck, 1999; Diduck & 
Sinclak, 1997a; Hardy, 1999a; Panel for Education ^ r Sustainable Development, 
1998; Rosenbaum & Bressers, 2000). To recapitulate briefly, scientific uncertainty 
is frequentiy defined as "a condition under which there is confidence in the 
completeness of the defined set of outcomes, but where there is acknowledged to 
exist no theoretical or empkical basis for assigning probabiUties to these 
outcomes" (StkUng, 1999, para. 51). Thus, scientific uncertainty arises when a 
totaUty and an kreducible deficit, from different domains, coincide. WhUst 
different renditions of scientific uncertainty and aUied terms, such as risk and 
ignorance, occur in alternative taxonomies, the unlikely partoership of totaUty and 
lack is central to each (Smithson, 1989). This results in a range of taxonomies in 
which terms are arranged differentiy, rather than fundamentaUy different 
taxonomies. 
In contrast to the assumptions that discursively enable the constmction of 
scientific uncertainty, the theorisation of uncertainty in this project has denied 
totaUtarian thought by drawing on the critiques of the metaphysics of presence as 
per Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987), Derrida (1972/1982) and Levkias 
(1961/1991, 1974/1991). This led to the claim that uncertainty arises from excess 
rather that deficit. As a result, it may seem that this project is incommensurable 
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with envkonmental education engagements with scientific uncertainty. If this were 
so, it would eliminate the possibiUty of carrying out the thkd stage of Deleuze and 
Guattari's rhizoanalysis in relation to envkonmental education's engagements with 
scientific uncertainty. In other words, it would not be possible to de-sediment the 
existing theoretical terrain by plugging the map into the tracing. Indeed, if this 
were the case the impUcation would be far more wide reaching: it would mean that 
this project constimtes a whole-scale rejection of scientific discourse. The 
mapping produced here, however, is in no way a rejection of scientific uncertainty 
or of scientific discourse. The latter is a charge that has been leveUed at Derrida 
and his rebuttal of this charge is helpful here: 
What is caUed "objectivity," scientific for instance (in which I fkmly 
beUeve, in a given simation), imposes itself only within a context 
which is extremely vast, old, powerfuUy estabUshed, stabilized or 
rooted in a network of conventions (for instance, those of language) 
and yet which stiU remains a context. And the emergence of the 
value of objectivity (and hence of so many others) also belongs to a 
context. We can caU "context" the entke "real-history-of-the-
world," if you Uke, in which this value of objectivity and, even more 
broadly, that of tmth (etc.) have taken on meaning and imposed 
themselves. That does not in the sUghtest discredit them. In the 
name of what, of which other "truth," moreover, would it? One of 
the definitions of deconstruction would be to take this Umidess 
context into account, to pay the sharpest and broadest attention 
possible to context, and thus to an incessant movement of 
recontexmalization. (Derrida, 1988, p. 136) 
Theorising uncertainty through a rejection of totaUsing thought does not 
constimte a denial of scientific uncertainty even though scientific uncertainty 
depends upon the beUef in totaUty for its existence. Thus, it is whoUy defensible to 
apply this theorisation to engaging scientific uncertainty in envkonmental 
education. Working within the neighbourhood of uncertainty, however, requkes 
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that the 'sharpest and broadest attention' be paid to the context of scientific 
uncertainty on the basis that the context of scientific uncertainty is the very 
condition for its possibiUty. Thus, working within the neighbourhood of 
uncertainty requkes the practice of deconstmctive envkonmental Uteracy when 
engaging scientific uncertainty in envkonmental education. Paying attention to the 
context of scientific uncertainty draws the issues of discipUnary power and the 
poUtics of representation into reUef Thus, participants in envkonmental 
education can discern which envkonmental issues are being designated as 
uncertain, which issues are being sUenced and probe whose interests are being 
served by these designations. 
I do not wish to suggest that contexts are easUy deUmitable. Indeed, the sheer 
immensity of Derrida's provocative designation of 'the entke real-history-of the-
world' as a context presents obvious difficulties for the delimitation of that 
context, given that that deUmitation itself must be made within a context. 
Derrida's provocation, however, compels attention to be paid to the context from 
which such determinations are made. It compels us to renounce the fantasy of a 
metacontexmal space (Briggs, 2001), Thus, engagements with scientific 
uncertainty within envkonmental education must make self-reflexivity prominent 
and include deconstructive readings of the contexts of others, for example 
governments and instimtions, when engaging envkonmental issues concerning 
scientific uncertainty. 
This promotion of deconstmctive critical envkonmental Uteracy seems to flow 
smoothly into the discussions in envkonmental education that articulate scientific 
uncertainty and the precautionary principle, which has been paraphrased into 
envkonmental education simply as "thoughtful action in advance of scientific 
proof (quoted in Ashley, 2000, p, 272), The precautionary principle is widely 
applauded in envkonmental education, education ^ r sustainable development and 
education ^ r sustainabiUty as a stance that promotes ethical action in the face of 
scientific uncertainty (Ashley, 2000; Fien, 2001; Panel for Education for 
Sustainable Development, 1998; UNESCO, 2000), Paying attention to the context 
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in which scientific uncertainty and the precautionary principle are discursively 
constructed, however, demonstrates that the ethical dimension of the 
precautionary principle is both secondary and optional. Given that scientific 
uncertainty arises from the unlikely conjunction of totaUty and lack, an aporia is 
created. The precautionary principle provides an escape route from what would 
otherwise be an epistemological bind. The precautionary principle is fkst and 
foremost an epistemological manoeuvre that promotes and justifies a course of 
action beyond the impasse created when a totaUty and a deficit coincide without 
losing thek integrity. 
The claim that ethics is secondary and optional goes against the grain of many 
renditions of the precautionary principle. There are numerous accounts of the 
precautionary principle that accenmate the ethical dimension and this accenmation 
suggests the ethical dimension is constimtive. The precautionary principle, 
however, simply sanctions action in the face of scientific uncertainty. The action 
need not necessarUy favour decisions that work toward the reduction or avoidance 
of activities that may result in envkonmental harm. Numerous examples can be 
cited as evidence for the dissociabiUty of action and ethics in the appUcation of the 
precautionary principle. For example, the dispensabUity of the ethical dimension 
of the precautionary principle is evident in the dUution of the precautionary aspect 
of the principle in the U.S. under the Reagan administration (Raffensperger & 
Tickner, 1999). But perhaps the most expUcit example of the dispensabiUty of the 
ethical compulsion to err on the side of precaution was expressed by the U.K. 
government in 1990. 
Where there are significant risks of damage to the envkonment, [we] 
wUl be prepared to take precautionary action to limit the use of 
potentiaUy dangerous materials or the spread of potentiaUy 
dangerous poUutants, even where scientific knowledge is not 
conclusive, if the balance of likely costs and benefits justifies it. The 
precautionary principle appUes particularly where there are good 
grounds for judging either that action taken promptiy at comparatively 
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low cost may avoid more costiy damage later, or that kreversible 
effects may foUow if action is delayed, (quoted in Jordan & 
O'Riordan, 1999, p. 30, Jordan and O'Riordan's emphasis) 
An interlocutor could object at this point to argue that the moves by the U.S. 
and the U.K. ought to read as acting reaUsticaUy (whatever this means) within 
economic constraints. That argument, however interesting it may prove to be, 
misses the mark. The point being made here is that the precautionary principle is 
not fiindamentaUy an ethical premise; the conjunction of action and ethics that 
many renditions of the precautionary principle accenmate is dissociable. This is 
not to say that the precautionary principle cannot or should not be embraced as an 
ethical platform in envkonmental education. However, it should be recognised as 
a precarious platform. At present the precautionary principle has been welcomed 
enthusiasticaUy as an important element of 'responsible envkonmental citizenry' 
(Ashley, 2000; Fien, 2001; Panel for Education/>r Sustainable Development, 1998; 
UNESCO, 2000). Responsible envkonmental citizenry would be better served by 
deconstmctive readings of the appUcations of the precautionary principle. 
The result of pluming the map forged within this project into envkonmental 
education engagements with scientific uncertainty is that whUst this project has 
rejected totaUsation through the adoption of postmodernist/ poststructuraUst 
perspectives, this project is not antithetical to engagements with scientific 
uncertainty, which entaU wittingly, or unwittingly, support for totaUsation. Rather, 
this project recognises and affkms those engagements, but at the same time it 
emphasises the need to pay close attention to the contexts that provide the 
condition of possibiUty for scientific uncertainty and engagements with it. Paying 
close attention to these contexts, which is by no means a simple undertaking, 
requkes developing a vigilance that searches for the constimtive blindnesses that 
are whoUy necessary to support the discursive constructions of these contexts. 
Thus engagements, with scientific uncertainty, and other engagements with 
uncertainty in different contexts, requke the adoption of deconstructive 
envkonmental Uteracy. This is also imperative for engagements with the 
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precautionary principle in envkonmental education. Thus far, the precautionary 
principle has been uncriticaUy welcomed into envkonmental education discourse. 
This warm welcome has been extended in the beUef that the precautionary 
principle provides a sound ethical platform for the development of responsible 
envkonmental citizenry. This beUef, however, is nUstaken, The precautionary 
principle is fkst and foremost an epistemological manoeuvre that provides an 
escape route from a modernist epistemological bind. The ethical dimension is an 
optional extra that can be jettisoned easUy, Envkonmental education ought to 
encourage learners to adopt a deconstructive vigUance toward the precautionary 
principle in relation to envkonmental issues. 
ENGAGEMENTS WITH UNCERTAINTY THROUGH CHAOS AND COMPLEXITY THEORIES 
Engagements with uncertainty in education through chaos and complexity 
theories have resulted in impUcations being proposed for learning processes 
(Hardy, 1999a; Sawada & Caley, 1985; Tillmann et al., 2000) and the dynamics of 
education settings (MacPherson, 1995; SungaUa, 1990). These proposals are highly 
contested with some education theorists claiming dkect links between chaos and 
complexity theories and education (Hardy, 1999a; Sawada & Caley, 1985; SungaUa, 
1990; Tillmann et al., 2000), whereas others claim that engagements with these 
theories operate at a metaphorical level (Gough, 1998d; MacPherson, 1995). 
Both types of engagement have been advanced in envkonmental education. 
Gough, whUst not a proponent of exploring chaos and complexity theories per se 
in envkonmental education, has commented that if such engagements were to be 
undertaken, then they should be approached as heuristic metaphors: "I want to 
strenuously resist the impulse to see chaos and complexity theories as new 
paradigms for curriculum work, although I am more than happy to continue 
exploring the generative possibiUties of the new metaphors they provide" (Gough, 
1998d, p. 59, Gough's emphasis). 
On the other hand, I have previously argued for a dkect appUcation of the 
impUcations of chaos and complexity theories to curriculum and pedagogy in 
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envkonmental education. This previous argument draws on research findings 
from appUed mathematics and the namral sciences. SpecificaUy, the argument 
draws on the finding that quaUtatively different forms of organisation can occur 
spontaneously when non-Unear dynamical systems are forced to far-from-
equiUbrium conditions (Davies, 1995; Prigogine, 1989; Prigogine & Stengers, 
1984; Stewart, 1990; Vivaldi, 1991). The spontaneous emergence of quaUtatively 
different forms of organisation, known as 'self-organisation', is acutely sensitive to 
initial conditions, which cannot be known with absolute precision. As a result, the 
timing and nature of the transformations cannot be predicted, which results in a 
link to scientific uncertainty. 
The Unk to education arises from the contention that learning can be 
categorised as a self-organising system. This link was advanced and defended by 
drawing on findings in neural physiology and behavioural biology. Analyses of 
EEG data have demonstrated that neural activity associated with cognition is 
chaotic and that the level of chaotic activity increases during the performance of 
mental tasks (AUman, 1993). At the macro level, behavioural smdies have 
demonstrated that learning foUows self-organising processes (Tillmann et al., 
2000). Therefore, the argument assumed a correspondence between chaos and 
complexity theories, and learning. At the same time, however, the argument 
acknowledged that the smdies in neural and behavioural biology did not provide 
expUcit information to guide curriculum and pedagogy. In response, the argument 
turned to DoU's (1993) transformative curriculum vision. This manoeuvre 
seemingly prevented the argument from stalling. However, DoU's curriculum 
vision draws on chaos and complexity theories for the metaphors that they 
provide for re-thinking curriculum and pedagogy. Thus, the argument uncriticaUy 
transgressed the divide between correspondence and metaphorical engagement. 
This shift resulted in two separate arguments being advanced, although they were 
presented under the guise of one seamless argument. 
In the previous project, DoU's transformative curriculum vision was read from 
the perspective of critical reaUsm. This reading discursively masked the shift from 
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a correspondence approach to metaphorical approach by privUeging the 
mathematical and scientific discourses of chaos and complexity theories. It 
presumed that the lack of expUcit findings to guide curriculum and pedagogy was 
provisional and that the move to invoke DoU's transformative curriculum vision 
was justified as empirical confkmation would foUow in due course. Therefore, the 
argument uncriticaUy created and supported the creation of a 'black box' as a 
dkect result of the privUege extended to mathematical and scientific discourse. 
The argument advanced that uncertainty attends the constmction of 
knowledge: the impUcations of chaos and complexity theories "posit learners in a 
creative process in which the evolution of knowledge and learners impact on each 
other in a manner that remains ambiguous untU the chaUenge has been taken" 
(Hardy, 1999a, p, 131), This seemingly pedagogical statement simply shrouds the 
constmction of knowledge in mystery. It mystifies learning and seemingly absolves 
educators and learners from responsibiUty for the constmction of knowledge. 
Further, the argument advanced that educators should create conditions that 
maintain a deUcate balance of uncertainty in order to promote learning: "in order 
to promote a self-organising process of learning, it is necessary to permrbate the 
system sufficientiy to ensure that regression back to the attractor does not occur 
and also ensure that the system does not erupt into chaos" (Hardy, 1999a, p, 130). 
I wiU argue here that the uncertainty that attends the construction of knowledge is 
better understood when DoU's curriculum vision is read as an approach for 
deconstmctive Uteracy and that the narrative uncertainties formulated in Chapter 
Five enable educators to understand and maintain the conditions of uncertainty 
from which new knowledge may be constructed. Thus, this argument re-reads 
envkonmental education's engagement with chaos and complexity theories 
through DoU's transformative curriculum; it desediments and reconstructs the 
existing terrain. 
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Re-reading Doll's transformative curriculum vision 
DoUs' transformative curriculum vision considers the metaphors from chaos 
and complexity theories in Ught of the process phUosophies of Dewey and 
Whitehead. There are only two references to Derrida and these are confined to 
footootes. Nevertheless, there are strong resonances between DoU's curriculum 
vision and Derridean themes. These resonances flow on to the narrative 
uncertainties and theorisation of deconstmctive envkonmental Uteracy that were 
constructed using Derridean themes. In order to demonstrate these resonances, it 
is necessary to re-read how DoU's transformative curriculum was paraphrased into 
envkonmental education. 
DoU's curriculum vision comprises four criteria: richness, recursion, relations 
and rigor. These four criteria, the 'four Rs', are not mumaUy exclusive, they are 
mumaUy inscribing. Nevertheless, they can be described broadly, in open terms, 
to demonstrate thek interrelations. I (1999a) have paraphrased the four Rs into 
envkonmental education as foUows: 
Richness 
DoU's fkst criterion of richness translates the neo-deterministic 
evolution of dissipative structures into curriculum terms. ... For 
learning to foUow an evolutionary pathway of self-organisation the 
curriculum must be rich with permrbative problems, provocations 
and paradoxes ... in order to drive the inner equiUbrium of the 
learner to a highly sensitive state. In the absence of an algorithm, 
such as the logistic mapping, the curriculum needs to be rich with 
multiple layers of meaning through which the learners negotiate 
passages in order to provide alternative evolutionary pathways. 
Recursion 
The second criterion of recursion is drawn from and transcends the 
iterative process of dynamical systems. ... Iteration in the 
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mathematical sense, is simply repetition that can, under some 
ckcumstances, result in the exquisite strucmres that have become 
the icons of chaos theory. However, when DoU transposes the 
mathematician's technique of iteration into the field of curriculum, 
it becomes more than simple repetition: it is a process of 'reflective 
reorganization, reconstmction, and transformation of experience' 
(Soltis, 1993, p. xi). Hence, in education terms, recursion has a 
deUberative quaUty that contrasts with the 'automaticity' of its 
mathematical counterpart. 
For learners, either individuaUy or as a group, recursion 
constimtes introspective analysis, diought coinciding with itself, 
enabling clarification, critique and regeneration. For the curriculum, 
recursion portrays each end as a reflective beginning. Reflection 
upon what has gone before embeds interpretations in the depth of 
the present, ,.. 
Relations 
The thkd criterion of relations refers to connections: the 
connections within the curriculum (pedagogical relations) and the 
relations between the curriculum and the culture in which it is 
embedded (cultural relations). The pedagogical relations, developed 
through recursion, give rise to the richness and the depth of the 
curriculum, enabling multiple passages of negotiation for the 
learners which are enhanced and enriched by the recognition of 
cultural relations. This alUance between cultural and pedagogical 
relations accenmates the contexmal nature of the curriculum by 
expUcitiy valuing persons, places and times. According to DoU: 
The chaUenge of such recognition is twofold: on the one 
hand, to honor the localness of our perceptions and, on the 
other hand, to reaUse that our local perspectives integrate 
274 
CHAPTER SEVEN - DECALCOMANIA 
Uito a larger, cultural, ecological, cosmic matrix. (DoU, 1993, 
p. 181) 
The relations that DoU refers to, both pedagogical and culmral, are 
not preordained or static; both the inner and the outer relations of 
the curriculum form a dynamic lattice that shapes and is shaped by 
the participants. 
Rigor 
FinaUy, the fourth criterion is, according to DoU (1993, p. 181), the 
most important, as it keeps the curriculum 'from falling into either 
"rampant relativism" or sentimental soUpsism'. Rigour involves 
striving to refine the quaUty of interpretation and transformation. 
Hence, rigour involves actively searching for and actively 
developing alternative relations, consciously endeavouring to 
expUcate the assumptions within the alternative relations, and 
reflectively negotiating passages between these relations and thek 
assumptions in order to achieve coherence. Rigour may be 
regarded as the ultimate example of critical thinking. For DoU 
(1993, p. 29), rigour 'makes the richness rich', (Hardy, 1999a, pp, 
132-133) 
This re-reading of DoU's curriculum vision wiU identify resonances with 
Derridean themes, identify the play of narrative uncertainties and make Unks to 
deconstructive envkonmental Uteracy, The foUowing discussion necessarUy 
traverses aU of these domains freely given the interrelatedness of both DoU's four 
Rs and narrative uncertainties. 
Any link to Derridean themes must, at the very least, demonstrate a rejection 
of logocentrism, which denotes the beUef that words, writing, ideas, systems of 
thought are vaUdated by a centre that is external to them and whose tmth they 
convey. Thus, the text must be decentred. DoU's contention that the curriculum 
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needs to be rich with multiple layers of meaning through which learners negotiate 
passages in order to constmct alternative meanings can be read as a rejection of 
logocentrism. If the meanUigs constmcted are tmly held to be alternative meankigs, 
then the text cannot be centred because it is Unpossible to ascribe "unequivocal 
domination of one mode of signification over another" (Johnson, 1981, p. xiv). 
Thus, decentred and aUegorical uncertainty are drawn into reUef, where decentred 
uncertainty refers to the uncertainty that attends the loss of reassuring centres that 
would procure certainty by grounding the text and where aUegorical uncertainty 
refers to the uncertainty that arises from multipUcity of meanings inscribed in a 
text so that each text means more than it (apparentiy) says. 
This does not mean, however, that anything goes. DoU's use of the term 
'negotiate' is helpful here. Various meanings must be negotiated according to the 
stmctural elements used in the constmction of meaning; assumptions and 
blindspots must be expUcated in the pursuit of coherence and the constmctions 
must adhere to the logic that these assumptions and blindspots dictate, wherein 
Ues the possibiUty for the evaluation and critique. We are not duty bound to 
guUibly accept any construction that is advanced, which forges a Unk to critical 
Uteracy. Moreover, this link can be refined to deconstmctive Uteracy through 
DoU's criteria of rigor and recursion. According to DoU, rigor involves actively 
searching for and developing alternative relations. This can be read as a 
commitment to deconstruction, to constmct alternative engagements with (the) 
envkonment to imagine and evaluate more 'sustainable' fiitures where the concept 
of 'sustainabiUty' must be made problematic as a matter of logical consistency in 
keeping with the notion decentred texts. The caU to make the curriculum rich with 
permrbative problems, provocations and paradoxes gains greater substance when 
read as an appeal to deconstmctive practices such as dislocating centres, 
chaUenging taken-for-granted binarisms, searching for constimtive blindnesses and 
probing the margins of texts. Furthermore, DoU's criterion of recursion can be 
read as the need to commit to ongoing deconstruction; there is no end to 
deconstruction. Deconstruction carries an ethical imperative to read, re-read and 
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cross-read in order to refine the quaUty of our interpretation, to minimise the 
violence inflicted upon the other and to be as informed as possible in our decision 
making. 
DoU's transformative curriculum vision can be further read as an approach to 
deconstructive Uteracy through his criterion of relations, which refers to the 
pedagogical relations and cultural relations. The recognition of these two types of 
relations and the generative relations between the two domains highUght that the 
stmctural components of texts/discourses are not confined to the linguistic realm, 
but are co-inscribed by the interactions, poUcies and practices that expUcitiy 
recognise and value persons, instimtions, places and times. Thus, DoU's criterion 
of relations pays sharp attention to context. As such, learners can explore the 
both the reach and the limitations of the simatedness of thek learning. This 
exploration has the potential to advance poUtical Uteracy. However, DoU's four 
Rs do not accenmate the ethico-poUtical aspect of deconstructive Uteracy that 
arises from Derrida's contention that writing is not opposed to action. But, DoU 
does impUcitiy endorse this view elsewhere in his thesis and he does so in a 
manner that resonates with the aims of envkonmental education. 
There is risk involved in this process view — as there is in aU 
transformation — for it means that we are willing to base our fiimre 
on a present grounded on nothing but itself, its historical past, and 
our querulous faith in ourselves. The risk is intensified by the 
horrendous social, poUtical, and human faUures for which our 
century may come to be known: war, genocide, famine, poverty, 
enslavement, ecological devastation — aU done under the aegis of 
rational thought and procedures, in many cases with 'good' 
intentions. ... Developing the right amount of 'essential tension' is 
the art that I beUeve that aU curricularists, teachers and learners 
need to develop - not to mention that special class: world and 
community leaders ... if we are to make our fiiture better, not 
poorer, than the one in which we now Uve. (DoU, 1993, p. 156) 
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As a result of placing the tracing over the map, I advance that envkonmental 
education's engagements with uncertainty through chaos and complexity theories 
are better served by embracing DoU's metaphorical approach than retaining hope 
for a correspondence between chaos and complexity theories and education. The 
latter approach requkes the instaUation of a 'black box' based on nothing but the 
faith attached to scientific and mathematical discourses to recommend it. 
Adopting DoU's metaphorical approach, on the other hand, enables a defensible 
account of uncertainty's capacity to affect learning through the notion of 
deconstmctive Uteracy, Furthermore, as argued in Chapter Five, this approach 
can be recommended in envkonmental education because deconstmctive 
envkonmental Uteracy provides a means to interrogate both the construction of 
envkonmental knowledge and the instantiation of envkonmental issues, as weU as 
a means for understanding the notions of subjectivity and agency. 
The metaphors that chaos and complexity theories provide can be effective in 
this process. The notion of an attractor, for example, provides a usefiU metaphor 
for the "relative stabiUty of the dominant interpretation" (Derrida, 1988, p. 143) 
and this offers more meaningfiil curriculum and pedagogical impUcations than a 
neural network that has not been sufficientiy permrbated to reach a far-from-
equiUbrium state. SimUarly, the notion of self-organisation is better understood as 
a metaphor for a reconstruction of knowledge by decentring the text and drawing 
blindspots into reUef Thus, through this re-reading of envkonmental education's 
engagements with uncertainty through DoU's transformative curriculum vision, I 
aUgn myself with Gough's conviction that chaos and complexity theories should 
be approached as heuristic metaphors for education. 
POSTSTRUCTURALIST PHILOSOPHICAL/LITERARY ENGAGEMENTS WITH UNCERTAINTY 
When tracing envkonmental education's engagements with uncertainty in 
Chapter Three, only two poststmcmraUst engagements were located: one that I 
wrote (Hardy, 1999b) and die odier by Gough and Scott (2001). The former. 
Fractal Alterity, is a poststructuraUst reading of chaos theory, thus it faUs under the 
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analysis presented in the previous section. As a result, I wiU focus on Gough and 
Scott's engagement with uncertainty in this section. 
When the maps generated in this project are plumed into Gough and Scott's 
engagement with uncertainty, no stmcmral changes occur. This is because thek 
poststmcmraUst engagement draws upon the same repertoke of themes that were 
used to construct the maps, such as the critique of the metaphysics of presence, 
ambidextrous inscriptions and decentring the subject. As a result, this section 
does not de-sediment Gough and Scott's project, it adds further layers. Thus, this 
section presents another tracing of Gough and Scott's work by extending the 
paths that the existing engagement pre-configures. However, this argument does 
not advocate that these paths should be extended sUnply because they have been 
pre-configured. Instead, it criticaUy surveys these paths and argues that one of 
them should be re-dkected because it leads to an undeskable destination. 
To recapitulate briefly, Gough and Scott propose a model for curriculum 
development that "is compatible and probably synergistic with a professional 
concern with sustainable development" (2001, p. 146), Using this model, they 
strive to work productively with, rather than against, the complexity of social 
existence. In order to faciUtate the analysis of this complexity, they propose and 
employ four categories that are both analytical and explanatory: organisational 
instimtions, culmral instimtions, practices and Uteracies. These categories are fuUy 
interrelated; each affects, and is affected by, aU of the others, as Figure One 
demonstrates. 
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Organisational Institutions (and their interactions) 
• International: e.g. donors; education NGOs; environmental NGOs; 
UN agencies; MNGs; regional groupings; academic and proiessiona! 
journals and associations etc. 
• National: e.g. Government ministries; NGO offices; newspapers; 
academic and professional associations; the military; trades unions; 
political parties; corporates; religious bodies etc. 
• Local: e.g. Local government; local religious, union, community or 
other groups; schools; NGO and MNC branches; universities; small 
and medium businesses; collectives; police; marketplaces; education 
authorities; development boards etc. 
• Sub-local: e.g. families; gangs; clubs etc. 
Practices (and their Interactions) 
e.g. teaching; farming; 
business; religion; governance; 
policy-making; parenting; 
home-building; recreation; 
policing; consuming; commuting etc. 
Literacies (and their Interactions) 
e.g. natural scientific; social 
scientific; traditional; political; 
ideological; religious; indigenous; 
artistic; spiritual; bureaucratic; 
business; moral etc 
Cultural Institutions (and their interactions) 
e.g. land use practices; ethical codes; teaching methods; school calendars and timetables; 
ceremonies and festivals; examinations; symbols of status or success; views of outsiders; 
diet; etiquette; traditional gender roles; resource use etc. 
Figure 1: Preliminary analysis of categories. 
Source: Gough, S. & Scott, W. (2001). Curriculum development and sustainable development: 
Practices, institutions and literacies. Educational Philosophy andTheory, 33(2), p. 149. 
Numerous Unks can be forged between the narrative uncertainties formulated 
in Chapter Five and the theoretical positions that Gough and Scott used to 
develop their curriculum model. The most immediate link with uncertainty arises 
from Gough and Scott's treatment of (the) environment as text. Thus, they reject 
the logocentric notion that (the) environment can act as the ground for the 
authority or truth of our readings of (the) environment. This decentring of (the) 
environment mobiUses decentred uncertainty. In addition, Gough and Scott 
uphold the poststructuraUst notion that the text is rewritten with every reading. 
Accordingly, they maintain that each time that (the) environment is read, the less it 
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acmaUy is (the) environment that we began reading. This introduces one aspect of 
subjunctive uncertainty, namely openness. The other aspect of subjunctive 
uncertainty, pluraUty, is invoked as weU through their refiisal to subordinate the 
pluraUty of narratives to a meta-narrative. The play of these narrative 
uncertainties is made more complex through Gough and Scott's decentring of 
(the) subject. Rather than upholding the humanist conception of a stable, unitary 
and self-sufficient subject, they uphold two key poststructuraUst themes: firsdy, 
that subjectivity is discursively constmcted and, given that we each operate in 
multiple discourses, subjectivity is discontinuous and multiple; and secondly, 
ambidextrous inscription of subjectivity, in which the rewriting of the text 
simultaneously rewrites the self. Both of these themes inscribe narrative 
uncertainties into the ongoing biography of the self: "Life as process and work in 
progress!" (Conley, 2000, p. 21). 
Being able to identity and characterise the forms of narrative uncertainty that 
are at play in Gough and Scott's theoretical background to their curriculum model 
adds a fiirther analytical and explanatory layer to their work. It is necessary to go 
beyond this, however. In order to do this it is necessary to draw on the 
formulations that narrative uncertainties were appUed to in this project. The 
feminist attimde of as if friends and deconstmction can be of strategic value in the 
appUcation of Gough and Scott's model of curriculum development. 
As Figure One demonstrates, Gough and Scott's model of curriculum 
development emphasises the need for the inclusion and preservation of multiple 
Uteracies/discourses. Their refusal to subordinate multiple Uteracies/discourses to 
a meta-narrative requires a commitment to the preservation of difference. This 
enables a Unk to be advanced between Gough and Scott's model of curriculum 
development and Stone's (1995) feminist formulation of the attimde as if friends, 
which enables different voices to engage in a community that does not inflict 
violence upon Others by dispossessing them of their otherness. 
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The attimde of as if friends is first and foremost an ethical relationship. WhUst 
Gough and Scott problematise the fact/value dichotomy, they do not exhibit 
demonstrable ethical motivation for the inclusion of multiple Uteracies: 
A curriculum focused on any one of [the] Uteracies would not be 
useless. It would merely be incomplete in two ways: first, because it 
ignored the other Uteracies; secondly, because it faUed to engage 
with the influence of instimtions. By itself, it would be a poor guide 
to learners formulating fiiture practices. (2001, p. 141-142, Gough 
and Scott's emphasis) 
It is possible to tease an ethical position from this statement, but it is a weak 
position. This is surely a retrograde move in Gough and Scott's presentation of 
thek curriculum model. A curriculum that focused on any one of the Uteracies 
certainly would not be useless; it would provide vested interests with a strategic 
means to strengthen their position through the erasure of antagonistic Uteracies. 
Notwithstanding the contested nature of sustainable development, this is 
antithetical to aU formulations and, given Gough and Scott's otherwise proclaimed 
accent on the pluraUty of Uteracies, I read this as being contrary to their intentions. 
Drawing upon as if friends can redirect this aspect of their argument by inserting 
an ethical imperative for the inclusion of multiple Uteracies and it adds another 
layer to their curriculum model by identifying sociological considerations to 
faciUtate implementation. As outlined in Chapter Six, as if friends requires 
openness and humiUty, both of which are multi-dimensional. Openness includes 
the dimensions of receptivity, active Ustening, tolerance and suspension of 
judgement, and humiUty includes the dimensions of scepticism, ego-distancing and 
playfiUness. For the ease of discussion, I wiU focus this intertexmal reading of as if 
friends and Gough and Scott's curriculum model on the dimension of multiple 
Uteracies, mindful that this dimension affects and is affected by each of the other 
dimensions. 
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In the implementation of Gough and Scott's curriculum model, receptivity 
involves opening oneself up to different, often antagonistic, problem definitions 
and expected solutions that are discursively constmcted by different organisational 
and cultural instimtions. Active Ustening is indispensable to receptivity. The 
Ustening must be active in two senses. Firstiy, Ustening needs to be active to guard 
against passivity and ambivalence. Secondly, active Ustening refers to the energy 
that must be expended to ensure that there is neither a power takeover by the 
dominant Uteracy nor a coUapse into fragmentation. Non-violent tolerance is also 
requked. Non-violent tolerance does not accenmate sameness over difference. 
This does not mean that simUarities should not be sought or that they should be 
disregarded; it means that we should not aUow these simUarities to blind us to the 
differences that create pluraUty. In the case of the multiple Uteracies that Gough 
and Scott promote in their curriculum model, the subordination or erasure of 
difference would make the participants "play roles in which they no longer 
recognise themselves" (Levinas, 1961/1991, p. 21). Freke's thoughts on tolerance 
also provide some insight into the implementation of Gough and Scott's model. 
Freke (1993/1998, p. 42) points out that "being tolerant does not mean 
acquiescing to the intolerable" (1993/1998, p. 42). Many fruitfiU analyses may be 
drawn from this simple statement, but I which to make only one point here. The 
need or deske to acquiesce to the intolerable occurs in undemocratic conditions. 
Therefore, when implementing Gough and Scott's model, the intolerable should 
be actively sought, exposed and interrogated to determine the repressive forces at 
work. Lastiy, the dimension of openness requkes a suspension of judgement. 
This is not an assertion that resolutions cannot or should not be sought when 
engaging multiple Uteracies/discourse in curriculum development. Rather, it is a 
caU to suspend judgments that would foreclose the engagement of multiple 
Uteracies, thereby enabling curriculum innovation as a result of being receptive to, 
Ustening to and tolerant of multiple Uteracies/discourses. 
The enactment of the dimensions of openness requkes humUity, which "helps 
me avoid being entrenched in the ckciUt of my own truth" (Freke, 1993/1998, p. 
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40). Like openness, humUity is multi-dimensional. Expressing humiUty to one's 
own view involves scepticism, ego-distancing and playfulness. In the 
implementation of Gough and Scott's curriculum model, engaging multiple 
Uteracies requkes accepting scepticism towards one's own Uteracies/discourses. 
This is not a renunciation of those Uteracies/discourses to which we subscribe. 
Rather, it is recognition that those Uteracies/discourses are mediated by the 
organisational and cultural organisations to which we accede, which, in turn are 
mediated by broader ontological and epistemological assumptions. As a result, 
scepticism requkes acknowledging and accepting that our views on curriculum 
development, sustainabUity, the curricular task to be undertaken and the possible 
approaches are whoUy dependent upon the grammar that configures our 
Uteracies/discourses and that our understandings may be rewritten differentiy, or 
incapable of representation, using other Uteracies/discourses. This acceptance of 
the fluidity of representation requkes ego-distancing, that is, it requkes us to 
separate the storyline of our Uteracies/discourse from our emotional investment in 
them. This provides the condition for the thkd dimension of humiUty, namely 
playfulness. Playfulness in curriculum development is a serious business. It 
involves reconstmcting ourselves and our projects using different Uteracies/ 
discourses, and using these constmctions as a means to envision alternative 
pathways for curriculum development, sustainabiUty and the particular task in 
progress. 
As if friends provides important sociological guides to facilitate the 
implementation of Gough and Scott's curriculum model, but it is not enough. 
WhUst it acknowledges the issue of disciplinary power and its destructive capacity, 
it does not incorporate strategies to analyse and respond to issues of power. 
Although as argued in the sections on engaging Indigenous knowledges and ethics 
in Chapter Six, this lack can be redressed by embedding deconstructive Uteracies 
within the attimde of as if friends and this combination would be most effective in 
the implementation of Gough and Scott's curriculum model. 
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Gough and Scott emphasise the issue of disciplinary power. In an example of 
competing readings of (the) envkonment performed by an economist, a biologist, 
an engineer, a Western travel writer and a local poet, they maintain that: 
Which of them subsequentiy, through thek practices, influences 
events the most and so has the greatest input into rewriting of the 
envkonment is likely to be decided not by the force of thek 
respective arguments but by the power of thek respective 
instimtions (of which thek arguments are but one resource). 
However, it is thek different arguments, and different forms of 
argument, which are Ukely to seem a proper focus for curricula of 
one sort or another. (Gough & Scott, 2001, p. 141) 
Thus, critical Uteracies are indispensable to the implementation of thek 
curriculum model. However, as Gough and Scott's argument develops it appears 
that deconstmctive Uteracies are more suited to the task. Gough and Scott openly 
chaUenge, and encourage others to chaUenge, the overwhelming tendency of 
cultural instimtions, such as coUaboration, justice and equaUty, to dominate. They 
are not opposed to these cultural instimtions per se, but with the way in which the 
venerabiUty of these cultural instimtions is wielded to preserve the stams quo. In 
other words, they are concerned with how critiques of existing practices that faU 
under the aegis of coUaboration, justice and equaUty are placed 'out of bounds'; 
they insist on the necessity to question the practices that are afforded these 
designations, to seek out the practices that are being marginaUsed or sUenced and 
to probe whose interests are being served in order to improve current practices. 
Thus, Gough and Scott can be read as upholding the need to unrelentingly 
deconstmct, transform and reform existing practices, especiaUy those that are 
venerated. Such deconstmction must pay the broadest and closest attention to 
contexts, which are neither whoUy determining nor whoUy delimitable; "there is an 
indefinite opening, an essential nontotaUzation" (Derrida, 1988, p. 137). This 
'essential nontotaUsation' creates the constimtive uncertainty of contexts, which is, 
in turn, inscribed into Uteracies, practices and instimtions, and provides the 
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condition for thek transformation, as opposed to finite stmcturaUst rearrangements. 
Thus, adopting deconstmction in the implementation of Gough and Scott's 
curriculum model provides a means to analyse and respond to issues of power in a 
manner that draws upon and preserves uncertainty. 
In summary, Gough and Scott's engagement with postmodernist/ 
poststmcturaUst Uterary theory articulates uncertainty to curriculum development 
through the critique of logocentrism and decentring the subject. As a result, they 
draw upon the foUowing themes in the formulation of thek model: the texmaUty 
of (the) envkonment; (the) envkonment is rewritten with each reading; rewriting 
(the) envkonment simultaneously rewrites (the) self; and the pluraUty of narratives 
cannot be reduced to a meta-narrative. The incorporation of these themes enables 
the narrative uncertainties formulated in Chapter Five to be laid over thek model, 
which provides an extra analytical layer to account for the play of narrative 
uncertainties in curriculum development, as per thek proposal. 
Having articulated narrative uncertainties to Gough and Scott's curriculum 
model, it was possible to forge connections between the implementation of thek 
model and the formulations that narrative uncertainties were appUed to in Chapter 
Six, namely as if friends and deconstructive Uteracies. Drawing upon as if friends 
enables a strong ethical base to be appUed to Gough and Scott's advocacy of the 
inclusion of multiple Uteracies. This makes it ethicaUy indefensible to apply a 
reductionist approach that would privUege a particular Uteracy or a select group of 
Uteracies. Adopting the attimde of as if friends also provides sociological guidelines 
to faciUtate implementation. However, the attimde of as if friends does not provide 
strategies that respond to the issue of disciplinary power. Embedding 
deconstmctive Uteracy into the attimde of as if friends provides a means to identity, 
understand and respond to the poUtics of disciplinary power. This combination 
enables curriculum development to purposively and generatively engage 
postmoderrUst/poststrucmraUst uncertainties in a manner that does not render 
uncertainty certain. 
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DECALCOMANIA II: LAYING THE TRACING OVER THE MAP 
The previous section demonstrated the effects induced when the mapping 
undertaken in this project is plugged into the tracing of envkonmental education 
engagements with uncertainty. The reading presented Ui Chapter Three 
demonstrated that the existing engagements of uncertainty are limited in number, 
scope and depth. This results in few oppormnities to de-sediment the field in 
terms of Deleuze and Guattari's (1980/1987) etymological sense of the term. 
However, when the mapping of uncertainty charted here is placed over a broader 
tracing of envkonmental education for the purposes of comparison, that is in the 
Uteral sense of decalcomania, the most striking result is that the map covers key 
areas in envkonmental education that have not as yet been identified as sites to 
engage uncertainty. These sites include identity, agency, and envkonmental values 
education. FoUowing Deleuze and Guattari, it is vital to ask why the mapping and 
the tracing are not co-extensive, and what effects are induced when the map is 
plumed into these sites on the tracing. 
UNCERTAINTY, IDENTITY AND AGENCY 
The non-coincidence of theorising uncertainty and identity in envkonmental 
education can be explained by the lack of attention that has been paid to identity 
per se. WhUst envkonmental education has deeply and ferventiy engaged the kind 
of envkonmental identities that envkonmental education ought to endorse and 
promote, the quaUfier 'envkonmental' has been treated as problematic whereas 
'identity' has been largely treated as intuitive and unproblematic. As Payne notes: 
There is a major 'lack' in the discourse of envkonmental education 
research. Too Uttie in envkonmental education, geography, 
education for sustainable development, health education and even 
citizenship education has been said directly about 'identity'. Even 
less has been said about how these curriculum fields might benefit 
from grappUng more earnestiy with the envkonmental 
consequences of learners' (and teachers') identity processes and 
Ufestyle pursuits. (Payne, 2000, p. 68, Payne's emphasis) 
287 
CHAPTER SEVEN - DECALCOMANIA 
Payne continues: 
If we can't come to grips with the self-understandings and 
formative identities [of learners] ... then any theory of 
envkonmental education wUl become just another wish Ust, 
rhetorical device or mere slogan destined for ectopian 
disappointment. (Payne, 2000, p. 72) 
The lack to which Payne refers is an under-theorisation rather than a complete 
absence. However, considerable attention has been focussed recendy on the 
question of identity, especiaUy from 'postmodern' perspectives. Payne has made 
significant contributions in this area, especiaUy through his consideration of the 
ways in which curriculum and pedagogy in envkonmental education can 
understand and respond to the constmction, maintenance and critique of 
'postmodern' envkonmental identities. Furthermore, there are resonances with 
Payne's work and the arguments developed in Chapter Six of this project. Payne 
emphasises the importance of recognising that "identities are formed unevenly 
and are uncertain" (Payne, 2000, p. 82). However, Payne does not elaborate how 
identities are uncertain and he openly rejects deconstmction and opposes it to 
reconstmction. Others in envkonmental education support deconstructive views 
of identity, but do not acknowledge the role of uncertainty in the discursive 
constmction of identity. DiUon et al., for example, "advocate that the emergent 
envkonmentaUsm research effort needs to be underpinned by materiaUstic and 
deconstmctive views of identity" (1999, p. 396). 
Fien (1993), too, has underscored the importance of the question of identity in 
envkonmental education, especiaUy with respect to the notion of agency. Fien is 
drawn to Giddens' (1979, 1981, 1982a, 1982b, 1984) dieory of stmcturation witii 
respect to the notion of agency for envkonmental educators. One of several 
problems that Fien addresses through Giddens' theory of stmcturation is the 
perceived inabiUty of teachers to effect instimtional reform. SpecificaUy, Fien 
argues that envkonmental education needs "a social action theory that does not 
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reduce explanations of human behaviour to the duaUsm of individual agency or 
social stmcmre" (1993, p. 89). Fien's focus in this analysis is more on the question 
of agency than identity. Indeed, the analysis posits identity as an unproblematic 
pre-given, although Giddens' work suggests otherwise. As a result, I wiU be 
guided by Fien's reading of Giddens in this section, although I wiU read Giddens 
differentiy. This enables resonances to form between this reading of Giddens and 
the discussion of deconstructive Uteracy presented in Chapter Five. This in no 
way discredits Fien's reading. Instead, it introduces another dimension that draws 
the constimtive role of narrative uncertainties into reUef in a manner that may be 
helpful to critical approaches to envkonmental education and education for 
sustainabiUty, as weU as postmodernist/poststrucmraUst approaches in 
envkonmental education. 
WhUst it is acknowledged and respected that Fien writes from the perspective 
of critical theory, the Ucence to foUow and re-read his engagement with Giddens 
from a postmodernist/poststmcturaUst perspective is based on the links that he 
forges with Foucault (1980). Further quaUfication is needed, however, with 
respect to reading Giddens from a postmodertUst/poststmcturaUst perspective. It 
is weU known that Giddens grounds his work firmly within modernism and 
ardendy renounces postmodernism on the basis that he locates postmodertUsm 
within modernism. This does not oppose Giddens to theorists who have been 
labeUed postmodern. Lyotard, for instance, simUarly maintains that the 
postmodern "is undoubtedly a part of the modern" (1984, p. 79). Furthermore, as 
Gaundlett (2002, p. 95) notes, Giddens "does not necessarUy disagree with the 
characterisations of recent social Ufe which other theorists have labeUed as 
postmodern". However, Giddens fiirther maintains that "stmcmraUsm, and 
poststmcturaUsm also, are dead traditions of thought" (1987, p. 195). Giddens 
regards some aspects of structuraUsm and poststructuraUsm to be 'defective', but 
contends that other aspects must be taken seriously. Thus, he seeks "not so much 
to write thek obimary as to indicate what they have bequeathed to us today in 
respect of inteUecmal possessions which stUl might be put to good use" (1987, p. 
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195) and he puts aspects of Foucault's and Derrida's theories to 'good use' Ui his 
social theory, Giddens' reading of stmcmraUsm and poststmcmraUsm is subtie, 
complex and, in places, problematic. As it is beyond the scope and purpose of 
this section to cross-read Giddens and leading postmodernist/poststmcturaUst 
theorists, I wiU simply identify resonances between Giddens and the arguments 
developed in this project. 
Giddens' theory of stmcturation bridges the divide between the Durkheim-
style theories of agency, which prioritise macro levels of social Ufe, and Weber-
style theories, which prioritise micro levels. Giddens bridges this gap by providing 
an account of agency in which macro and micro levels of social Ufe are mumaUy 
enfolded. According to Giddens: 
The domain of the smdy of the social sciences, according to 
stmcturation theory, is neither the experiences of the individual 
actor, nor the existence of any form of societal totaUty, but the 
practices ordered across space and time. Human social activities ... 
are recursive. That is to say, they are not brought into being by 
social actors but are continuaUy recreated by them via the very 
means whereby they express themselves as actors. In and through 
thek activities agents reproduce the very conditions that make these 
activities possible. (Giddens, 1984, p. 2, quoted in Fien, 1993, p. 88, 
Giddens' emphasis) 
When drawing on Giddens' theory of stmcturation, Fien identifies two aspects 
as being central "to the language of possibiUty in a critical curriculum theory for 
envkonmental education" (1993, p. 89). These are the 'duaUty of structure' (noted 
above) and "the view of people as knowledgeable agents, 'capable of making a 
difference' in the world" (1993, p. 89). Giddens explains the interaction of these 
two aspects: "aU human action is carried out by knowledge agents who both 
construct the social world through thek action, but yet whose action is also 
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constrained by the very world of thek creation" (Giddens, 1981, p. 54, quoted Ui 
Fien, 1993, p. 89). 
This duaUty of structure provides a strategic framework for envkonmental 
educators and learners to perceive ways to intervene in (the) world, to 'be capable 
of making a difference'. But it does not explain why people would be inclined to 
do so. In order to understand why people would be inclined to replace, revise or 
reproduce existing social stmctures, it is necessary to theorise identity in a manner 
that accounts for agency. An understanding of agency alone is insufficient. The 
broader corpus of Giddens' work is clear on the issue of identity and it intersects 
with arguments developed on narrative uncertainties and deconstmctive 
envkonmental Uteracy. 
According to Giddens, "a person's identity is not to be found in behaviour, 
nor - important though this is - in the reactions of others, but in the capacity to 
keep a particular narrative goin£' (1991, p. 54, Giddens' emphasis). Thus, for 
Giddens, identity is not a passive, stable or pre-given entity, but a process of 
narrative constmction of selfhood. As such, identity can be rewritten. But, there 
are constraints to rewriting one's identity. As Giddens notes: "The individual's 
biography, if she [or he] is to maintain regular interactions with others in the day-
to-day world, cannot be whoUy fictive" (1991, p. 54). This is not to be read as an 
endorsement of the fact/fiction dichotomy. Instead, it is an acknowledgement 
that the narrative construction of the self is negotiated according to the 
assumptions and blindspots that configure the discourses in which one 
participates or, in Giddens' words, the process of subjectification "must 
continuaUy integrate events which occur in the external [social] world, and sort 
them into the ongoing 'story' about the self (1991, p. 54). 
There are many resonances here between the links advanced between 
deconstructive Uteracy, narrative uncertainties and agency in Chapters Five and 
Six. The most immediate Unk Ues in the fluidity and openness that Giddens 
attributes to the 'ongoing 'story' of the self. This forges a link to subjunctive 
291 
CHAPTER SEVEN - DECALCOMANIA 
uncertainty. As noted previously, the subjunctive bears a deep relation to the 
thinker and creates "the bonds of possibiUty, probabiUty, contingency, memory, 
deske, fear and hope" (Le Guin, 1989, p. 119). Thus, subjunctive uncertaUity is a 
key feature of envkonmental education's critical utopianism. But, the play of 
subjunctive uncertainty is insufficient basis for theorising agency because it faUs to 
address the issue of power. When subjunctive uncertainty is considered in 
isolation, it faUs into the Weber-style approaches to agency. 
Giddens overcomes this through his 'duaUty of stmcmre', which accords with 
Derrida's notion of 'double movement' and what has been described in this 
project as 'ambidextrous inscription'. The 'duaUty of structure' can be read as 
decentring the subject and this is a theme that Giddens supports: "The theme of 
the decentring of the subject is without doubt one which must be taken seriously 
by anyone interested in modern phUosophy or social theory" (1987, p. 207). 
Despite this strong support, Giddens regards strucmraUst and poststructuraUst 
versions of decentring the subject as defective and maintains that a detour is 
necessary to enable a satisfactory account of agency. This detour involves 
regarding "language as simated in social practices" and rejecting "the stmcturaUst 
and poststmcturaUst and poststrucmraUst distinction between consciousness and 
unconsciousness" (1987, p. 207). The former detour is of relevance to this project. 
Giddens' contention that language must be simated in social practices can be read 
as upholding the importance of context and the view that language/text is not 
opposed to practice/action. Both of these aspects are accenmated in Derrida's 
work (1988, 1999) and have been used as stmcmral elements in the formulation of 
the four narrative uncertainties in Chapter Five. Thus, the theorisation of 
decentred uncertainty and the discussion of its role in agency resonate with 
Giddens' decentring of the subject through his notion of 'duaUty of structure'. 
The theorisation of decentred uncertainty and the associated discussion on 
agency paid attention to how texts instantiate issues and how this instantiation 
simultaneously constructs subjectivities such that we wiU subscribe to that 
instantiation. However, as Giddens (1984) highUghts, agency is not reducible to 
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subjectivity. The discussion on the constmction of subjectivities also accounted 
for whether one has the capacity and inclination to intervene in (the) world or not. 
Thus, the constmction of subjectivity and agency were posited as being 
contemporaneous. For Giddens, agency can be defined as the "ramified control 
of the body and a developed knowledge of how to 'go on' in the pluraUty of 
contexts of social Ufe" (1984, p. 43). Thus, agency can be read as the embodied 
practice of deconstmctive Uteracy. Furthermore, viewing agency as the embodied 
practice of deconstmctive Uteracy draws the issue of disciplinary power into reUef. 
Adopting deconstmctive Uteracy requkes developing a vigUance that searches for 
the shadows of the essential blindspots that are whoUy necessary to centre 
subjectivities such that we wUl subscribe to particular instantiations and the 
contemporaneous constructions of agency. Employing vigUance to deconstmct 
the supposed 'bottom Une' of texts prevents deconstmctive agency from being 
reduced to the Durkheim-style theories of agency, which prioritise macro levels of 
social aspects of agency. 
The play of aUegorical and poietic uncertainties are vitaUy important here as weU. 
AUegorical uncertainty obtains from the multipUcity of meanings inscribed in a 
text with varying degrees of expUcitness and poietic uncertainty is drawn from the 
postmodernist/poststmcturaUst motif of the Death of the Author. As a result of 
aUegorical uncertainty, numerous meanings, which may be antagonistic, may be 
constmcted from a particular text. Giddens upholds this notion, maintaining that 
"reading [is] viewed as the temporary stabilization of the indefinite range of 
meanings generated by the process of writing" (1987, p. 211). Concomitantiy, 
poietic uncertainty shifts the site and timing of the construction of meaning from 
the author to the reader. This shift problematises the author/reader binarism, but 
it does not annul authorial intentions. As Derrida notes, the author's "declared 
intention is not annuUed by this but rather inscribed in a system in which it no 
longer dominates" (1967/1976, p. 1967/1976). Giddens also upholds the vaUdity 
and importance of the Death of the Author: "In fastening on the theme of the 
[Death of the Author], stmcturaUsts and post-strucmraUsts have been able to 
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make major contributions to our understanding of cultural production" (1987, p. 
211). However, he continues that: "StmcturaUsm and post-stmcturaUsm have Ui 
my view been unable to generate satisfactory accounts of human agenc/ ' (1987, p. 
211), This negative finding arises from Giddens' focus on the loss associated with 
the Death of the Author, Giddens goes so far as to state that: "Writing is 
sometimes portrayed as though texts wrote themselves" (1987, p, 211), This is a 
misreading of the Death of the Author; the transfer of the construction of 
meaning from the author to the reader should be read as an active co-construction 
of meaning in which the author's intentions do not dominate. The impUcation for 
the simultaneous constmction of subjectivity and agency is that the subject 
exercises a degree of control or influence and, hence, responsibiUty over the 
narrative construction of the self, rather than being at the mercy of capricious 
texts or the tyranny of thek authors. 
Being attentive to narrative uncertainties through deconstructive Uteracy 
enables "the ongoing 'story' about the self (Giddens, 1991, p. 54) to be rewritten 
in a manner that accounts for both the capacity and inclination to intervene in 
(the) wor(l)d as agents. This can be of strategic value to Fien's (1993) critical 
appropriation of Giddens' theory of stmcturation into envkonmental education. 
Critical approaches would benefit from exploring the relationship between identity 
and agency from the perspective of narrative theory. This does not entaU the 
renunciation of ideology, which is an essential element of critical approaches. As 
Belsey (1997, p. 657) notes: "According to Althusser's reading (re-reading) of 
Marx, ideology is not simply a set of illusions, as The German Ideology seems to 
argue, but a system of representations (discourses, images, myths) concerning the 
real relations in which people Uve". Thus understood, ideology can be read as 
narrative existence, which enables the role of narrative uncertainties to be 
admitted into explorations of the relationship between identity and agency. In 
addition, the constimtive role of narrative uncertainties in the construction, 
maintenance and critique of identity resonates with Payne's (2000) research 
interest in 'postmodern envkonmental identities', but in a manner that counters 
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his Opposition of deconstmction to reconstmction. Further, it provides an 
analytical and explanatory framework that accounts for how "identities are formed 
unevenly and are uncertain" (2000, p, 82), 
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES EDUCATION 
Envkonmental values education is one of the essential and "essentiaUy 
contested" (Robottom, 1987, p. 26) aspects of envkonmental education. 
Numerous competing theoretical positions and associated practices have been 
advanced. However, anthropocentrism versus non-anthropocentrism and 
indoctrination are two prominent and enduring themes within the envkonmental 
values education debate, Envkonmental educators heed these themes and 
criticaUy simate thek theoretical positions in relation to them. The lines of flight in 
this project have also encountered these themes and as such can contribute to the 
ongoing debates, 
Anthropocentrism versus non-anthropocentrism 
The phUosophical elements of the anthropocentrism versus non-
anthropocentrism debate are most clearly delineated in Li's (1996) argument that 
non-anthropocentrism is logicaUy indefensible and Snauwaert's (1996) counter-
argument. The stmcmral elements and the dynamics of these two arguments are 
representative of the substance and logic used to support other arguments within 
the field. As a result, I wiU concentrate on Li's and Snauwaert's arguments to 
advance that Llewelyn's (1991) cross-reading of Levinas, Heide^er and others 
introduces a new dimension to this debate. 
Anthropocentrism is accepted in envkonmental education as the "denial that 
the non-human world has any moral stams or other significance that is not 
reducible to humans, thek ends and purposes" (Plumwood, 1990, p. 527). This 
statement is equivalent to the assertion that the non-human world has 
instmmental value only and the anthropocentrism versus non-anthropocentrism 
debate in envkonmental education revolves around the question of instrumental 
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value versus intrinsic value. This is problematic because 'intrinsic value' is a 
contested concept. Some envkonmental phUosophers have expanded the 
intrinsic/instmmental binarism in order to clarify the debate in the arena of 
envkonmental ethics (CalUcott, 1989; Regan, 1980; Taylor, 1986); although the 
terms advanced in the various classification schemes are often in conflict, which 
creates sematic difficulties. As a result, other envkonmental phUosophers have 
advanced approaches that avoid the notion of intrinsic value altogether (Carnegie, 
2000; Nelson, 1995; Page, 1992). 
Li initiaUy draws on Regan's usage of the terms 'intrinsic value' and 'inherent 
value', where 'intrinsic value' is designated as a subjective valuation that is 
dependent upon the valuer and 'inherent value' is designated as an objective, self-
revealing value that is independent of a valuer. She then, unformnately, reverses 
the usage of these terms, but the logic of her multi-faceted argument can be 
foUowed by focusing on the descriptors 'subjective' and 'objective'. In short, Li 
maintains that our moral consciousness is inevitably involved in our perception of 
'objective' values. Thus, Li impUes that objective values are an iUusion and 
accordingly argues that the anthropocentrism versus non-anthropocentrism 
debate is krelevant. She further argues that clinging to the notion of objective 
value is detrimental because it maintains the human/namre binarism which is held 
to be deeply compUcit in (the) envkonmental crisis, and unhelpful because 
objective values do not provide guidelines for envkonmental behaviours and 
because problems of distributive justice arise from the inviolabiUty of objective 
values. As a result of these Unes of argument, Li maintains that a 'human-centred', 
or anthropocentric, perspective is the only logicaUy defensible position to adopt in 
envkonmental education and that, whUst anthropocentrism is instrumental and is 
viewed pejoratively, it is capable of contributing to more sustainable fiitures, 
Snauwaert rebuts Li's proposition that non-anthropocentrism is impossible 
and argues that "the expansion of the moral community to include nonhumans in 
principle cannot be achieved on anthropocentric grounds" (1996, para, 2), In 
relation to the former, Snauwaert invokes Fox's (1990) 'anthropocentric faUacy' to 
296 
CHAPTER SEVEN - DECALCOMANIA 
rebut Li's contention that: as our moral consciousness is inevitably involved in our 
perception of values, a non-anthropocentric perspective is impossible, 
A faUacy of this kind conflates the trivial and substantive senses of a 
concept. In this case, what is conflated is the inescapable and trivial 
fact that aU envkonmental ethics is derived from a human 
perspective with the substantive content of the ethic. In the trivial 
sense, aU varieties of envkonmental ethics are equaUy 
anthropocentric because they are inescapably conceived by human 
beings. However, in the substantive sense the wide variety of 
human conceptions of responsibiUty pertaining to the envkonment 
are extremely divergent, some anthropocentric others ecocentric, ... 
It is the substance of the argument made by ecophUosophers for an 
nonanthropocentric, ecocentric ethic that is at issue, not the trivial 
fact that ecophUosophers are human beings. (Snauwaert, 1996, 
para. 4) 
Having argued for the defensibiUty of an ecocentric ethics, Snauwaert proceeds 
to chaUenge Li's proposition that an ecocentric ethics based on 'intrinsic'^^ values 
is unworkable because of the problem of distributive justice. SpecificaUy, 
Snauwaert draws on the two principles of vitalness and nearness articulated by 
Naess (1995) as an example to iUustrate the adjudication of confUct. Thus, 
Snauwaert argues that intrinsic values do not lead to paralysis as Li contends. 
FinaUy, Snauwaert argues against Li's proposition that an anthropocentric 
ethics enables an expansion of the moral community to include the natural world. 
Snauwaert argues that an anthropocentric ethics, by definition, denies the intrinsic 
value of the non-human world and that this prevents the expansion of the moral 
community because a "moral community by definition is based upon the 
•" Snauwaert retains Li's reversal of intrinsic and inherent values, which is consistent with the usage in environmental 
education. The reversal was pointed out, however, due to Li's initial references to Regan's (1980) argument. The 
remainder of this section will use the term 'intrinsic value' as per Li and Snauwaert for ease of discussion. This does 
not appear to be detrimental to this discussion, however, it would be problematic in more detailed analyses that 
connected with the broader corpus of environmental ethics. 
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recognition of the intrinsic value of each of its members" (1996, para. 8). He 
acknowledges, however, that the moral consideration of nature could rely on 
instrumental values rather than an expansion of the moral community, but argues 
that the domination of namre is impUcit in instrumental values. In summary, he 
argues that the distinction between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism is relevant 
and that "there is a profound difference between educating for a recogiUtion of 
the intrinsic value of nature as opposed to educating for a recogiUtion of nature as 
moraUy considerable on instmmental grounds" (1996, para. 10). 
Llewelyn's (1991) cross-reading of Levinas, Heidegger and others enables an 
ecocentric ethics that avoids the intrinsic/instmmental debate and its 
predicaments as they are configured in envkonmental education. To recapitulate 
briefly, for Levinas, the face to face is an encounter in which I "receive from the 
Other beyond the capacity of the I" (1961/1991, p. 51, Levinas' emphasis). The 
face to face is an ethical encounter in which the Other beseeches/commands the I 
to refrain from the violence of concepmaUsation and thematisation, which would 
dispossess the Other of his or her otherness. This is in no way a plea/command 
to recognise, respect and protect the intrinsic value of the Other; it is not a 
question of intrinsic value at aU, The utter excessiveness of the alterity of the 
Other invaUdates the notion of Uitrinsic value because the Other is otherwise than 
being or beyond essence. The utter excessiveness of the Other is "refractory to 
every typology, to every genus, to every characterology, to every classification" 
(1961/1991, p. 73). Therefore, the finimde of the notion of intrinsic value cannot 
do justice to the infinimde of the Other, even if intrinsic value is set at the 
maximum level on the greatest scale. Any attempt to impose intrinsic value on the 
Other would infUct the greatest violence upon the Other, annihUation, This is the 
same mode of logic used in the more famiUar arguments constructed by Nietzsche 
and Heidegger to advance thek renowned proclamations that "God is dead" 
(1887/1974) and "value does not let beUig be bekig" (1952/1977, p. 104), 
respectively. Levinas avoids the violence that the notion of value infUcts on the 
Other by constmcting his ethics in terms of responsibility. Further, as outlined in 
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Chapter Four, Levinas overcomes the problem of distributive justice through the 
questioning look of the thkd party that unwaveringly inhabits the face qua face. 
Levinas' formulation of the face to face specificaUy attends the realm of 
human sociaUty. Llewelyn, however, extends the range of the face to face 
encounter by cross-reading Levinas with Heidegger and others. This extension is 
not an extension of inter-personal ethics into the non-human realm; instead, "it is 
an extension beyond humanity of the range of beings with which I can be face to 
face" (1991, p. 245). Thus, contra Levinas, it is not only another human being 
with which I can be face to face. Llewelyn achieves this extension, in part, by 
drawing upon the interconnectedness of Heidegger's four-fold space. This 
estabUshes an "ecological dependence of things; human and non-human, other 
non-human beings have a claim on me through thek simply being needy beings 
other than me" (1991). This neediness, however, is not sufficient to forge a link 
to Levinas' ethical encounter of the face to face. In order to do this, it is necessary 
to estabUsh that the encounter is transcendent in Levinas' sense, that is, it is 
necessary to estabUsh that the non-human Other is otherwise than being or 
beyond essence. Llewelyn achieves this by drawing on non-quaUtative difference. 
As non-quaUtative difference cannot be thematised or concepmaUsed, it is alterity. 
This forges the Unk to Levinas' ethics of responsibiUty; the non-quaUtative 
difference or "naked alterity of a finite vulnerable being suffices to put me under 
dkect responsibility to it" (1991, p. 255, emphasis added). 
By drawing on the four-fold space and non-quaUtative difference, Llewelyn 
formulates an ecocentric ethics that avoids the identification, classification and 
reckoning of value, and responds to the problem of distributive justice through 
Levinas' formulation of the thkd party in an expanded domain of the face to face. 
I submit that this opens up an important avenue for re-thinking the normative 
aspect of envkonmental education because the issue of intrinsic vems 
instmmental value is a hurdle that we keep jumping time and time again. With aU 
this practice, the sophistication and rigour of the arguments have increased and 
this is not to be dismissed. However, we keep returning to the same hurdle; the 
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very expression 'envkonmental values education' steers us back to the 
consideration of values. Thus, it may be helpfiU to think of this normative aspect 
of envkonmental education in terms of 'envkonmental ethics' or 'envkonmental 
consciousness', 
Llewelyn's ecocentric ethics, however, can only contribute to postmodernist/ 
poststructuraUst strands of envkonmental education, which admit the notion of 
alterity or non-quaUtative difference. It cannot inform those strands of 
envkonmental education, education ^ r sustainable development and education ^ r 
sustainabiUty that uphold Huckle's rendition of materiaUsm: 
Everything that exists (including everything mental or spirimal, 
including our values) comes into being on the basis of material 
causes and arises and develops in accordance with the laws of 
science (materiaUsm), The world and its laws are knowable and 
whUe there is much in the material world that may not yet be 
known, there is no unknowable sphere of reaUty that Ues outside the 
material world, (Huckle, 2002, p, 65) 
FoUowing this view of materiaUsm, neither alterity nor non-quaUtative 
difference can be admitted as a means to avoid the question of value. Those 
committed to this version of materiaUsm, however, may find ways to go beyond 
the question of value in Nelson's (1995) notion of 'thick concepts' or Page's (1992) 
notion of existential 'meaning', both of which are creative alternatives to avoid the 
question of intrinsic/inherent value when justifying our obUgations to the 
envkonment (Carnegie, 2000). 
Indoctrination 
As noted in Chapter One, indoctrination, the teaching of a body of knowledge 
uncriticaUy in order to eUcit acceptance and aUegiance, is a highly sensitive issue in 
envkonmental education and envkonmental educators actively strive to distance 
themselves from charges of indoctrination. The notion of critique is central to this 
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debate, but 'critique' is not a monoUthic concept. Biesta and Stams (2001, p. 59, 
Biesta and Stams' emphasis) point out that postmodernists/poststructuraUsts, 
feminists and neo-pragmatists are among those who question "whether the idea(l) 
of critical thinking is a neutral, objective, universal and self-evident idea(l), or 
whether it is in some way biased (e.g. by culture, class or gender)". Thus, idea(l)s of 
critique per se can be impUcated in indoctrination as weU as being advanced as a 
means to avoid indoctrination. 
The indoctrination debate in envkonmental education is concentrated around 
UberaUst versus critical theorists' approaches to envkonmental values education. 
This is particularly evident in Jickling and Spork's (1998) critique of Fien's 
Education for the environment: Critical curriculum theorising and environmental education 
(1993) and Fien's (2000) response. LiberaUst approaches to envkonmental values 
education, such as that upheld by Jickling and Spork, advance that aU values 
should be critiqued equaUy and that it is always up to the individual to evaluate the 
relative merits of competing positions. Critical theorists reject both aspects of this 
view; they reject the notion that critique requkes aU positions be treated equaUy 
and they uphold that a committed approach to teaching particular envkonmental 
values does not constimte indoctrination when the values in question are disclosed 
and reflexively subjected to critique. At this level of analysis, Jickling and Spork's 
and Fien's positions regarding the nature of critique in the avoidance of 
indoctrination are diametricaUy opposed, but they are urUted in thek 
concepmaUsation of critique. Jickling and Spork are arguing that fak-mindedness 
and non-intervention are criteria that should be appUed in order to evaluate a 
specific state of affaks, whereas Fien argues for the recognition of power 
differentials and committed approaches. Therefore, both conceptions of critique 
embrace criteria 2iS foundations that Ue beyond the reach of the critical operation^ ^  
(whUst particular criteria are contested, the notion of criteria is not). Thus, each 
" I read Fien's (1993; 2000) advocacy of reflexivity as the adoption of a reflexive stance toward to the product of 
critique rather than a reflexive stance to the operation of critique. 
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"derives its right to be critical from the tmth of the criterion" (Biesta & Stams, 
2001, p. 60, Biesta and Stams' emphasis). 
I am not arguing against this conception of critique, although I would point 
out that this is not the only conception of critique, JCant's (1781/1929) 
transcendental critique and Derrida's deconstruction (1967/1978, 1972/1981) 
offer different conceptions. Therefore, the unproblematic advancement of 
criteria-based critique could in itself be read as indoctrination. Furthermore, it can 
be argued that as the notions of foundations and (univocal) tmth are discursive 
features of patriarchy, criteria-based critique marginaUses femirUst perspectives 
(Wheary & Ennis, 1995) and, therefore, acts a source of oppression. 
It is beyond the scope and purpose of this section to enter into the fuU range 
of conceptions of critique and thek relations to the issue of indoctrination, I wiU, 
therefore, Umit the remaining discussion to deconstmction because it has been a 
major theme in this project, UnUke criteria-based critique, deconstmction is a 
mode of criticaUty that radicaUy problematises the idea(l) of critique whilst 
ardendy maintaining the necessity of critical analysis. In an interview with Ewald, 
Derrida commented that: "Critical thinking, which I beUeve one should never 
renounce, has a history, and assumptions, the deconstructive analysis of which is 
also necessary" (Derrida & Ewald, 1991/1995, p, 286, Derrida's emphasis). Thus, 
deconstmction can be read as a means to avoid indoctrination resulting from the 
unproblematic advancement of particular modes of critique, which are founded 
upon, and therefore limited by thek histories, presuppositions and constimtive 
sUences. 
Deconstmction problematises the idea(l) of critique without invoking a critique 
of critique, which would be deeply problematic at the very least. This is perhaps 
best understood through Derrida's articulation of differance and deconstmction to 
Saussure's (1959) stmcturaUst linguistics. As noted in Chapter Five, Saussure 
proposed that signifiers acquke meaning non-referentiaUy through thek position 
in a closed system of language. The radical aspect of Saussure's stmcmral 
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Unguistics Ues in his conception of language as a system of differences: "Ui 
language there are only differences without positive term/' (1959, p. 120, Saussure's 
emphasis). Thus, each term acqukes meaning through systematic oppositions; 
each signifier acqukes meaning from its constimtive other; "what is excluded 
thereby, in a sense, returns to sign the act of its own exclusion" (Biesta & Stams, 
2001, p. 66). Deconstruction cannot, and does not try to, escape this double 
movement. Therefore, the operation of deconstmction is not a critique of critique; its 
aim is humbler, yet more powerfiU. Every deconstmctive gesture is indebted to its 
constimtive other. As a result, a deconstructive gesmre can never be whoUy 
present and, as it is systematicaUy related to its constimtive other, it is 
'contaminated' (Derrida & Ewald, 1991/1995). It is in this sense that it is 
impossible for deconstmction to perform a critique of critique. Instead, 
deconstmction strives to bring the constimtive other 'into view'. 
This is relevant to the issue of indoctrination in envkonmental education at 
two levels. Fkstiy, deconstruction can be appUed to the operation of critique in 
envkonmental education. Deconstmcting the operation of critique shows "that 
there is no safe ground upon which we can base our judgements, that there are no 
pure, uncontaminated, original criteria [such as the UberaUst's fak-mindedness or 
the critical theorist's support for 'pro-envkonmental' values] on which we can 
simply and straightforwardly base our judgements" (Biesta & Stams, 2001, p. 68). 
Thus, deconstmction accenmates the kreducibiUty of decentred uncertainty that 
inhabits critique. Furthermore, deconstmction can 'expose' the sUences that 
discursively constimte the critical operation of different modes of critique and the 
injustices that these operations may effect. 
Secondly, deconstmction may be appUed to the objects of critique in 
envkonmental education. The advocacy of critical approaches to avoid charges of 
indoctrination presentiy operates at this level in envkonmental education. As 
argued in Chapter Six, developing deconstmctive envkonmental Uteracy enables 
learners to understand how texts are configured and how they are systematicaUy 
related to the sUences or the constimtive other. Critical understandings can be 
303 
CHAPTER SEVEN - DECALCOMANIA 
gained about which envkonmental issues are being foregrounded and which are 
being marginaUsed, and how the poUtics of representation and disciplinary power 
partition and position these issues. Also, developing deconstructive Uteracy 
enables learners to discern the ambidextrous inscription, or double movement, of 
these texmal constmctions. As rewriting the text simultaneously rewrites the self 
(Barthes, 1971/1977), critical understandings may be gained about how texts 
configure envkonmental issues such that we wiU accede and respond to that 
instantiation. In other words, learners can understand how envkonmentaUy 
sensitive and responsive subjectivities are constructed and whether these 
subjectivities are being foregrounded or marginaUsed. Furthermore, foUowing the 
problematisation of the author/reader binarism resulting from the Death of the 
Author, the reader has an active role in the construction of these meanings; 
meanings are not tyrannicaUy imposed upon the reader by the text/author. 
Acceding that the reader plays an active role in the construction of meaning, 
however, does not imply that the reader has total freedom in this task. Reading is 
constrained by contexts. However, given that contexts are neither absolutely 
determining nor whoUy deUmiting, the text and the self can be written differentiy. 
Hence, the reader must accept some measure of responsibiUty for the 
ambidextrous construction of meaning and subjectivities. 
These critical aspects of deconstmctive Uteracy enable learners to recognise, 
deconstmct and resist indoctrination, but they do not provide a guarantee against 
indoctrination. Given the different levels of proficiency of teachers and learners 
to deconstruct texts, it is essential that safeguards are included to protect learners 
from unethical deconstructive practices of 'boa-deconstmctors' (Hartman, 1981). 
At a minimum, these safeguards should include: the disclosure of the teacher's 
preferred texmal reading of envkonmental issues and the constimtive sUences that 
configure that reading, demonstrations that the teacher's texts can be configured 
differentiy and accenmating that no reading is innocent. 
FinaUy, it could be objected that the critical aspects of deconstructive Uteracy 
sketched above constimte a reinvention of the doctrine of individuaUsm couched 
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in postmodernist/poststmcturaUst jargon sUice the reader is requked to choose 
between multiple readUigs. This charge has been leveUed repeatedly at 
postmodernism/poststmcmraUsm (Feldman, 1998; Johnston & Lio, 1998; Welch, 
2001) and, if it withstands scrutiny, it would appear to return us to the UberaUst 
vems critical theorists' debate. On the surface, there appears to be something to 
this objection. But a closer reading demonstrates that this objection is deeply 
problematic and difficult to sustain. The doctrine of individuaUsm is predicated 
upon the notion of a unitary, stable and self-sufficient subject. Postmodernist/ 
poststrucmraUst perspectives, on the other hand, seriously trouble the 'foundation' 
of individuaUsm by positing subjectivity as an ambidextrous inscription. This 
ambidextrous inscription accenmates and compUcates the relations between the 
subject and the other; it is antithetical to the reductionism necessary to sustain the 
notion of individuaUsm, This point is made clearly by Atkinson (2002), who states 
diat: 
Postmodern theory explores the relationship between the personal 
and the poUtical, between discourse and society. The reductionist 
view of postmodernism, which sees it as limiting the scope of 
inquiry to the personal, the contingent, and the local, faUs to 
recognise the postmodern view of the personal as the product of 
the social, the contingent as a product of the determined, the local 
as a product of the global, and vice versa in each case, (Atkinson, 
2002, p, 81) 
In summary, deconstruction can be advanced as a means to avoid 
indoctrination because it requkes deconstmcting the idea(l) of critique as a matter 
of logical consistency. This accenmates the untenabUity of indoctrinating smdents 
into a particular mode of critique, which is necessarUy limited and exclusionary. 
Developing deconstructive Uteracy also enables smdents to understand the social 
constmction of knowledge and provides them with skUls to recognise, deconstmct 
and resist indoctrination, although safeguards are necessary to protect smdents 
from the unethical practices of those who have greater proficiency in 
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deconstmction. And fmaUy, these critical aspects of deconstmctive Uteracy do not 
reinstate individuaUsm, as some critics suggest, 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion of this chapter marks the suspension of the three-fold process 
of Deleuze and Guattari's (1980/1987) cartography: tracing, mapping and 
decalcomania. The fkst phase was undertaken in Chapter Three, which traced the 
existing engagements with uncertainty in envkonmental education. The second 
phase, mapping, was undertaken in Chapters Four, Five and Six. The mapping 
process involved forg^g Unes of fUght that resonate with envkonmental 
education's engagements with uncertainty, but the resonances have unfamiUar 
inflections. This chapter enacted the thkd phase, decalcomania, which involves 
placing the tracing over the maps in order to see how the lines of fUght can open 
up new spaces by de-sedimenting and reforming the existing terrain, and drawing 
blockages that fix affects in the existing terrain into reUef 
The relative importance that should be assigned to the last two phases is 
disputed. Braidotti privUeges the second phase, mapping lines of flight: "aU that 
counts is the going" (1994a, p. 170). This privUege can be supported by Deleuze 
and Parnet's contention that: "The only great error pies] in thinking that a Une of 
flight consists in fleeing from Ufe; the fUght into the imaginary, or into art. On the 
contrary, to flee is to produce the real, to create Ufe, to find a weapon" 
(1977/1987, p. 46). In contrast, Gedalof (2000) accenmates the Unportance of the 
last stage, decalcomania. She argues that "What should be important ... is not 'the 
going', but a different type of relationship with the space one inhabits" (2000, p. 
343, Gedalof s emphasis). This stance can also be supported by Deleuze and 
Guattari's previous quotation. I aUgn Deleuze and Guattari with Gedalof. The 
justification for this positioning is twofold: fkstiy, there would be no point to 
'finding a weapon' if it were not to be used; and secondly, positioning Deleuze and 
Guattari with Gedalof is consistent with the conviction that if postmodernist/ 
poststmcmraUst thought is motivated by a concern for the other, then the 
'insights' gained from the lines of flight should be folded back onto existing 
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practices in order to make a difference. Thus, I agree that we should "consider 
the necessary tensions between our 'roots and routes'" (Gedalof, 2000, p. 343, 
quoting Gikoy, 1993, p. 133). Having said this, it is clear that the time and space 
devoted to foUowing lines of fUght in this project were greater than that devoted 
to the final stage. This is not to be read as privUeging 'the going'. Quite simply, 
this occurred because it was necessary to traverse great distances in order to 
discern the bearing of the Unes of flight to envkonmental education. 
Laying the tracing over the map was performed in two sections to demonstrate 
the effects that the map can produce in the tracing and to explore thek non-
correspondences. The former process was appUed to envkonmental education's 
engagements with uncertainty through scientific uncertainty and the precautionary 
principle, chaos and complexity theories, and Gough and Scott's (2001) 
poststmcmraUst phUosophical/Uterary model of curriculum development. It was 
argued that whUst scientific uncertainty is whoUy dependent upon a commitment 
to totaUsation, the lines of flight undertaken within this project intersect with 
envkonmental education's engagements with scientific uncertainty by emphasising 
the need to take this context into account. It was specificaUy argued that 
deconstmctive envkonmental Uteracy should be used to interrogate which 
envkonmental issues are being designated as uncertain, which issues are being 
sUenced and probe whose interests are being served. This argument was 
conjoined to an examination of the precautionary principle which advanced that 
the warm reception that is extended to the precautionary principle should be 
tempered. The precautionary principle is being heralded as a sound ethical 
platform in envkonmental education, however, it was argued that the 
precautionary principle offers a precarious ethical platform because the ethical 
component is an optional extra that can be jettisoned easUy. This does not mean 
that the precautionary principle should be abandoned as an ethical platform, but 
that 'responsible envkonmental citizenry' would be better served by 
deconstmctive readings of the precautionary principle. 
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Plugging the lines of flight into existing engagements with chaos and 
complexity theories resulted in rewriting an argument that I advanced earUer 
(Hardy, 1999a). The earUer argument proposed the dkect appUcation of science 
and complexity theories as a means to engage scientific uncertainty in 
envkonmental education. It was argued, however, that the previous argument 
uncriticaUy transgressed the correspondence/metaphorical divide. This 
transgression went unnoticed because of the privUege that was afforded to 
mathematical/scientific discourse. The deconstructed argument advances that 
envkonmental education's engagements with chaos and complexity theories are 
better served by embracing DoU's (1993) metaphorical approach. Re-reading 
DoU's metaphorical approach led to the identification of Derridean themes, which 
enabled a link to be forged between DoU's transformative curriculum model and 
deconstructive Uteracy. This link enabled the play of the narrative uncertainties, 
formulated in Chapter Five, to be articulated to learning processes. 
Gough and Scott's poststmcturaUst model of curriculum development was the 
final tracing to be laid over the maps constructed in this project. As Gough and 
Scott's project draws on the same poststmcmraUst themes that were used to 
constmct the maps, this aspect of decalcomania did not de-sediment thek model 
of curriculum development. Instead, it added fiirther layers. Fkstiy, Unks were 
forged between thek curriculum model and the narrative uncertainties formulated 
in Chapter Five. Secondly, Stone's (1995) feminist attimde, as if friends, was 
advanced as a means to faciUtate dialogue between different voices/Uteracies in a 
manner that did not reduce difference. The sociological quaUties needed to 
support the attimde of as if friends, namely the multi-faceted quaUties of receptivity 
and humiUty, were also considered from the perspective of curriculum 
development. The articulation of as if friends to Gough and Scott's model of 
curriculum development also adds an ethical imperative for the inclusion of 
multiple voices/Uteracies. This ethical imperative is absent in thek formulation, 
which makes it vulnerable to the erasure of antagonistic voices by vested interests. 
FinaUy, it was argued that as if friends did not expUcitiy provide strategies to 
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respond to the destmctive capacity of disciplinary power. As a result, it was 
advanced that deconstmctive Uteracy should be embedded in as if friends so that the 
pluraUty of voices/Uteracies can recogiUse and respond to disciplinary power, 
which threatens to overpower the community of difference. 
The second phase of decalcomania involved laying a broader tracing of 
envkonmental education over the maps in order to discern non-correspondences. 
The aim of this is not to bring one into conformity with the other, but to identify 
blockages that fix affects in the existing terrain. The lines of flight had identified 
identity, agency, and envkonmental values education as themes that had not been 
expUcitiy identified as sites for engaging uncertainty in envkonmental education. 
The non-coincidence of theorising of uncertainty and identity in 
envkonmental education can be explained by the under-theorisation of identity in 
envkonmental education. It was noted, however, that some attention has been 
focussed on identity recentiy, especiaUy from 'postmodern' perspectives (DiUon et 
al., 1999; Payne, 2000). The discussion focussed on Fien's (1993) critical 
appropriation of Giddens' (1981, 1982a, 1982b, 1984) social theory because of 
links that Giddens expUcitiy forges between identity and agency. However, this 
argument re-read Giddens differentiy by drawing on the broader corpus of his 
work. SpecificaUy, it focussed on reading Giddens' formulation of identity as a 
process of narrative construction of (1991). This enabled an examination of the 
play of narrative uncertainties in the constmction of identity and the simultaneous 
constmction of agency. It was argued that the play of narrative uncertainties can 
be of strategic value to Fien's critical appropriation of Giddens' social theory into 
envkonmental education, and, foUowing Althusser, this does not entaU 
renouncing the concept of ideology, which is central to critical approaches in 
envkonmental education. 
FinaUy, the non-coincidence of the tracing and the maps focused on the issue 
of envkonmental values education. SpecificaUy, it analysed two prominent and 
enduring themes in envkonmental values education, namely the 
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anthropocentrism/non-anthropocentrism debate and the thorny issue of 
indoctrination. In relation to the former, it was argued that the intrinsic/extrinsic 
debate effectively blocks links to Levinas' ethical relationship to the face to face 
(Levinas, 1961/1991, 1974/1991), This Unk is precluded because the notion of 
attributing value to the Other dispossesses the Other of his or her otherness. It 
was argued that if the normative aspect of envkonmental education shifted the 
focus of the debate from values to responsibiUty, then an eco-ethics could be 
pursued foUowing Llewelyn's (1991) cross-reading of Levinas, Heidegger and 
others. As argued in Chapter Four, this enables envkonmental education to 
engage the possibiUties afforded by 'postmodern uncertainties', as formulated by 
the Panel for Education for Sustainable Development (1998), The Panel for 
Education for Sustainable Development cast 'postmodern uncertainties' as the 
conjunction of the limitation of knowledge and pluraUty, This conjunction is 
exempUfied in Levinas' formulation of the face to face and in Llewelyn's extension 
of it into the non-human realm. 
The analysis of the indoctrination debate advanced that the notion of critique 
is endorsed as a means to avoid indoctrination by both UberaUsts and critical 
theorists in envkonmental education. Both of these groups advance a criteria-
based mode of critique, but the criteria that they endorse differ. The criteria-
based mode of critique, however, is only one of several different conceptions of 
critique. Thus, it can be argued that the unproblematic advancement of this one 
mode of critique constimtes a means of indoctrination in itself It was advanced 
that adopting deconstmction overcomes this problem because deconstruction 
radicaUy problematises the idea(l) of critique without resorting to a critique of 
critique. In addition to providing a means to interrogate the operation of critique, 
deconstmction offers a means of interrogating the object of critique in a manner 
that reduces the risk of indoctrination. This is possible because deconstruction 
analyses the assumptions and constimtive sUences that configure texts. Drawing 
attention to these discursive elements facilitates the re-writing of texts. Thus, 
developing deconstructive Uteracy in envkonmental education assists learners to 
310 
CHAPTER SEVEN - DECALCOMANIA 
recognise, deconstmct and resist indoctrination. Safeguards are necessary, 
however, to protect learners from the risk of unethical practices of those who 
have greater proficiency in deconstmction. Developing deconstructive Uteracy not 
only has the potential to protect smdents from indoctrination, it also makes 
expUcit and engages the play of narrative uncertainties that were mapped in 
Chapters Five and Six. 
The three stages of Deleuze and Guattari's cartography - tracing, mapping and 
decalcomania - have traced existing engagements with uncertainty, mapped new 
theorisations of uncertainty and plugged these new theorisations into the existing 
terrain, respectively. The influences that the mappings can induce in the field 
have been sketched briefly because of the space that needed to be devoted to 
pursuing the lines of fUght. Thus, the arguments presented in this chapter open 
up spaces for fiirther exploration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chapter One advanced the figuration of 'the neighbourhood of to 
problematise the notion of an introduction. It was argued that 'the 
neighbourhood of enables simated introductions to occur, whUst acknowledging 
that beginnings never are. The notion of a conclusion is equaUy problematic. 
Postmodernist/poststructuraUst rejections of totaUsation banish any notion of 
conclusion from 'now-here' to 'no-where': "Conclusions never are" (Baker et al., 
1998, p, 173). The problem that arises now is how to 'conclude' a project in 'the 
neighbourhood of where beginnings and ends have no efficacy? Conclusions 
uphold the dominant privUege granted to closure in the closure/openness 
binarism, but the reversal of this privUege has provided a key stmctural element in 
the arguments presented. Epistemological questions of power are at stake here. 
There are also issues of power of a different order that intensify the problem. 
There is the wiU to power of the researcher that results from the "deske to 
convince our coUeagues of the tmth of our vision" (Reid, Kamler, Simpson, & 
Maclean, 1996, p. 94) and this wiU to power is sustained by and sustains the 
"disciplinary gaze" (St. Pierre, 2000a, p. 261). These could be classified as 
pragmatic questions of power. The fiindamental question here, however, is not 
whether or not to offer a conclusion; such a simpUstic opposition does not 
withstand the scmtiny of the either I and logic that operates within the rhizomatic 
'neighbourhood of. The fundamental question is how to enact "an operation 
involving the summing up relative to the expectation of meaning from some 
interpretation" (Boucher, 2000, para, 6) whUst troubling the notion of a 
conclusion. This alone is a daunting task, but the problem is compounded by 
another issue that must be faced. It is also necessary to confront the problem of 
how to conclude a project that sought to theorise uncertainty in a manner that 
respected uncertainty as uncertain. How can this be done without fixing 
uncertainty? 
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I wUl invoke Deleuze and Guattari's (1980/1987) notion of 'becoming' as a 
means to grapple with these issues and trouble this conclusion both inform and 
substance. The introduction of any new material in a conclusion goes against 
conventional form, which is founded on "the formaUst deske to find closure 
integral to the stmcmre of the work, and the coroUary assumption that texts can 
and do achieve closure" (Cooke, 1995, p, 523), The introduction of new material 
dismpts this assumption and upholds the view that "the text overruns aU limits 
assigned to it" (Derrida, 1977/1979, p, 84), A variety of themes would dismpt the 
form of this conclusion, but Deleuze and Guattari's notion of 'becoming' has been 
SpecificaUy chosen due to its capacity to trouble the substance of this conclusion as 
weU, The notion of 'becoming' troubles the substance of the conclusion by 
inserting an assemblage that resists further dichotomising logic between the poles 
of the beginning/end binarism. Becoming is always in-between; it "is a verb with 
a depth aU of its own" (Iyer, 2002, p, 96), Deleuze and Guattari describe 
'becoming' as foUows: 
A becoming is always in the middle, one can only get to it by the 
middle, A becoming is neither one nor two [beginning nor end], it 
is the in-between, the border or line of flight or descent running 
perpendicular to bodi, (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p, 293) 
I wUl use the notion of 'becoming' to frame the reflections on the denouement 
of this project, the manner in which the 'aims' and 'objectives' were enacted, and 
the 'findings', I wiU also advance that 'becoming-uncertain' is an important 
pedagogical venture for envkonmental education, Fkstiy, however, a reading of 
Deleuze and Guattari's notion of 'becoming' is requked, 
BECOMING 
Why are there so many becomings of man, but no becoming-man? 
Fkst because man is majoritarian par exceUence, whereas becoming 
is minoritarian; aU becoming is a becoming-minoritarian. When we 
say majority, we are referring not to a greater relative quantity ... It 
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is not a question of whether there are more mosquitoes or fUes than 
men, but of knowing how 'man' constimted a standard in the 
universe in relation to which men necessarUy (analjrticaUy) form a 
majority.. .the majority in the universe assumes as pregiven the right 
and power of man. In this sense women, chUdren, but also animals, 
plants and molecules, are minoritarian. (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1980/1987, p. 291) 
Deleuze and Guattari's notion of 'becoming' is a radical theorisation of the 
poUtics of thought; 'becoming' is the process of radical poUtics; 'becoming' is the 
radical other of 'being'. The introductory quotation proclaims that there is no 
becoming-man, this is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, because man declares 
'being' in both senses of the term 'declares', that is, man is the ground of being 
and man fixes the limits of being. Colebrook (2000, p. 11) incisively summarises 
this state of affaks: "man is not just one concept among others, but it presents 
itself as the origin of aU concepts". This declaration of being is poUtical and 
Deleuze and Guattari designate it as 'majoritarian' or 'molar' poUtics. Majoritarian 
or molar poUtics attends unities, stabilities, certainties, totaUties and presence. In 
short, majoritarian or molar poUtics is synonymous with patriarchal discourse. 
Man designates and assumes the central point. Accordingly, man "has the 
property of organizing binary distributions within the duaUsm machines, and of 
reproducing itself in the principal term of the opposition" (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1980/1987, p. 292). 
Becoming, on the other hand, attends 'minoritarian' or 'molecular' poUtics. 
Deleuze and Guattari cast minoritarian poUtics in binary opposition to 
majoritarian poUtics, which simultaneously casts 'becoming' in binary opposition 
to 'being'. However, in order to avoid subsuming minoritarian poUtics to 
majoritarian poUtics by reproducing majoritarian, patriarchal, Platonic, 
dichotomising logic, they do not cast minoritarian and majoritarian poUtics in total 
opposition. Instead, they dismpt and contaminate the majoritarian by 
emphasising that whUst there are distinctions between majoritarian and 
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minoritarian poUtics, "they are inseparable, they overlap, they are entangled" 
Peleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 213). 
Two powerful consequences emerge as a result of this entanglement. Fkstiy, 
this entanglement precludes the possibility of becoming being subordinated to 
being, thus openness cannot be legitimately subordinated to closure. This has a 
dkect bearing on the notion of a conclusion: becoming troubles the notion of a 
conclusion, but the entanglement of the minoritarian and the majoritarian does 
not aUow the notion of a conclusion to be abandoned. This is important for this 
conclusion because, as noted in the preUminary remarks, beginnings and ends 
have no efficacy in 'the neighbourhood of, but the notion of a conclusion cannot 
be discarded because such a simpUstic opposition does not withstand the scmtiny 
of the either I and logic that operates in the rhizomatic 'neighbourhood of. 
Furthermore, it bears dkect relevance to this project because this project has 
repeatedly argued that uncertainty and openness co-enable each other. Secondly, 
becoming has the power to dismpt the majoritarian and the majoritarian has the 
power to arrest becoming, but these opposing powers do not simply neutraUse 
each other and attain equiUbrium. Rather than attaining stabiUty, each destabiUses 
the other, creating a latent, but potent, tension. The second consequence is 
relevant to envkonmental education generaUy because it signals the possibUity of 
deploying the disruptive capacity of becoming as a tactical means to disrupt the 
stams quo that sanctions and sustains envkonmental degradation and exploitation. 
Just as majoritarian poUtics of thought is reified in the discursive construction of 
instimtions, poUcies, practices and subjectivities, the 'transgressions' effected by 
becomings can become reified as a result of the entanglement of the two realms. 
To put it bluntiy, becoming can produce tangible effects. 
The expression and possible reification of the minoritarian, through the 
entanglement with the majoritarian, involves an essential phase of becoming, 
namely 'becoming-imperceptible'. The notion of 'becoming-imperceptible' may 
not sound very appealing to envkonmental education theorists given that they are 
engaged in a constant struggle to counter the marginaUsation of envkonmental 
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education within the broader arena of education. But becoming-imperceptible is a 
cmcial element of minoritarian poUtics and it does not mean becoming 
imperceptible, invisible or sUent. Instead, of being "a function of invisibility or 
lack of importance", becoming-imperceptible "is a function of recomposition" 
(FUeger, 2000, p. 46). Becoming-imperceptible refers to breaking away from the 
hegemonic constmcts of the majoritarian register and entering the radicaUy other 
domain of minoritarian thought. Becoming-imperceptible, then, does involve 
becoming indiscernible in the sense that the majoritarian gaze cannot penetrate 
minoritarian territory. Majoritarian surveiUance does not and cannot operate here 
because majoritarian thought denies the minoritarian realm and there is no 
Memory of that which has been excised. This is "no-man's-land" (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 293). There are (in)sights and memories here, but they 
are not coUected, organised, recorded and recoUected by the majoritarian Memory. 
The (in) sights and memories are avaUable for rewriting (the) wor(l)d, however, by 
those who enter this molecular realm, that is, by those who undertake the process 
of becoming. Thus, the molecular poUtics of becoming can contribute to the 
utopianism of envkonmental education. Indeed, Colebrook (2000, p, 17) argues 
that "any movement of utopianism or poUtics of the fiiture is perhaps best 
thought of through a Deleuzian notion of becoming". 
In summary, Deleuze and Guattari's figuration of becoming informs this 
'conclusion' by opening up a space in which it is possible to grapple with the 
notion of a conclusion without reverting to dichotomising logic which threatens 
to coUapse 'the neighbourhood of; and it provides a means to grapple with the 
idea of concluding a project on uncertainty without resorting to totaUsing practices 
which would undoubtedly render uncertainty certain, Deleuze and Guattari's 
becoming can also be of great strategic value to envkonmental education's overt 
poUtical agenda. The entanglement of the majoritarian and minoritarian realms 
enables becomings to produce tangible effects. 
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BECOMING-UNCERTAIN 
In this troubled conclusion I advance that becoming-uncertain ought to be 
both a pedagogical venture and a key educational objective in envkonmental 
education. However strange this may sound, the hyphen indicates that 'becoming-
uncertain' is distinct from 'becoming uncertain'. 'Becoming-uncertain' is not the 
path to, or arrival of, incertimde. Becoming is a pedagogical venture; it is a 
process that involves opening up spaces within present conditions, enabling de-
territoriaUsations and re-territoriaUsations of dominant knowledges (Iyer, 2002). 
Accordingly, becoming-uncertain designates the experience of thinking the concept 
of uncertainty differentiy, experiencing the capacity of the concept of uncertainty to 
affect and be affected when freed from the domination of majoritarian poUtics, 
and experiencing the possibiUties that becoming-uncertain opens up, forecloses or 
transforms. Thus, both the general notion of 'becoming' and the specific notion 
of 'becoming-uncertain' designate purposefiil processes, which enable this 
conclusion to reflect upon and evaluate the denouement of this project, the 'aims' 
and 'objectives', and the 'findings' of this project. However, the dismption that 
becoming effects in the beginning/end binarism requkes the notions of purpose 
and purposefiU processes to be thought differentiy. Purpose and purposeful 
processes need to rethought in terms of opening up new spaces. Open-endedness 
and purpose are not cast in binary opposition. 
DENOUEMENT OF THIS PROJECT: 'AIMS' AND 'OBJECTIVES' 
The denouement of this project was framed by 'aims' and 'objectives' that 
were placed under erasure {sous rature). The 'aims' and 'objectives' were regarded 
as heingparergonal (De.tnd2i, 1978/1987), that is as frames that don't just or simply 
divide inside from outside. The 'aims' and 'objectives' delimited the scope of the 
inquiry and sanctioned the Unes of inquiry that could be legitimately admitted, 
whUst the nature and legitimacy of the 'aims' and 'objectives' were systematicaUy 
and necessarUy inscribed by the text. This mumal inscription chaUenges and 
compUcates deUmitation; it aUows neither the unproblematic appointment of 
frames nor the "dream of the pure and simple absence of a frame" (Derrida, 
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1978/1987, p. 73). As a result, care was taken to avoid a rigid formulation of the 
'aims' and 'objectives' because such an approach upholds an unproblematic view. 
'AIMS' 
Two broad aims guided the denouement of this research project. Neither 
could be described as the principal aim, but one logicaUy preceded the other. The 
fkst of these aims was to explore the (im)possibiUty of theorising uncertainty in a 
manner that respected uncertainty as uncertain. This aim can be read as a deske 
for becoming-uncertain. It was argued that to theorise uncertainty differentiy, to 
render uncertainty certain, would eradicate the topic of investigation and deprive 
uncertainty of the honour of its name. This approach is an ethical imperative from 
postmodernist/poststmcmraUst perspectives, which can be characterised by thek 
concern for the Other. However, the aim to respect uncertainty as uncertain has a 
seemingly tautological quaUty. It does not quite comply with the 'A is A' 
formulation of a strict tautology, but it is close to it. This closeness to tautological 
form caused considerable concern at the outset of the project. The cause of this 
concern can be discerned in Corcoran's description of tautology: "Since 
tautologies do not exclude any logical possibiUties they are sometimes said to be 
'empty' or uninformative; there is even a tendency to deny that they are genuine 
propositions and that knowledge of them is genuine knowledge" (Corcoran, 1995, 
p. 788). 
The mapping of prospective methodologies for theorising uncertainty in a 
manner that respected uncertainty as uncertain was in no way anciUary or 
subordinate to the enactment of that theorisation. The mapping involved 
readings of constmctive consonance (Drees, 1988, 1990), falUbiUsm (Pekce, 1931) 
and rhizomatics (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987). Constmctive consonance and 
falUbiUsm were rejected during the denouement of this project because of thek 
modernist orientations. Nevertheless, each has the potential to contribute to 
theorisations of uncertainty and other themes in the contested 'neighbourhood of 
envkonmental education; constmctive consonance offers a strategic means to 
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mediate critical theory and postmodernism, and faUibiUsm offers a theoretical 
framework for engaging scientific uncertainty. Deconstmction is also a valuable 
approach for postmodernist/poststmcmraUst research in envkonmental 
education. However, deconstmction was not investigated as a method for this 
project because deconstmction yields its 'best' results on comprehensive texts 
which purport to have aU the loose ends neatiy 'mcked in'. Deconstruction was 
excluded on this basis because the present engagements of uncertaUity in 
envkonmental education are sparse and underdeveloped. 
Deleuze and Guattari's (1980/1987) rhizomatics was ultimately selected 
because it enabled a theorisation that respected uncertainty as uncertain that was 
neither 'empty' nor 'uninformative'. This is possible because of Deleuze and 
Guattari's rejection of the majoritarian Platonic mode of individuation. Instead of 
grounding identity in an inner set of quaUties that can be set in contradistinction 
to aU other sets, Deleuze and Guattari locate identity in outward connections; 
concepts, organisms, systems of ideas and instimtions become individuated by 
thek capacity to affect and be affected. Thus, it was possible to theorise 
uncertainty by asking questions such as: What does uncertainty connect with? 
What is its capacity to affect and be affected? How can we position theory and 
practice in relation to uncertainty? Addressing these kinds of questions avoids the 
violence of rendering uncertainty certain and provides a rich theoretical terrain to 
inform curriculum and pedagogical questions. This iUustrates the productive 
entanglement of majoritarian and minoritarian poUtics and the transformative 
potential of that entanglement. Rhizomatics provides a process for becoming-
uncertain. 
This fkst aim was two-pronged. In addition to exploring the (im)possibiUty of 
theorising uncertainty in a manner that respected uncertainty as uncertain, it was 
anticipated that such a theorisation might have relevance beyond envkonmental 
education and the broader arena of education. This bold sub-aim was advanced 
because it was necessary to draw beyond the concepmal resources avaUable Ui 
envkonmental education; the concepmal resources in envkonmental education 
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were inadequate for the task. As a result, the project drew on postmodernist/ 
poststmcturaUst phUosophy and Uterary theory, which Uiform a diverse range of 
disciplines. On reflection, it appears that this bold sub-aim has been met; the 
postmodernist/poststmcturaUst theorisations of uncertainty that have been 
advanced have the capacity to inform contemporary debates in feminist theory. 
Uncertainty is a recurrent theme in feminist theorising and feminists often 
articulate uncertainty to topics that have featured in this project: subjectivity 
(GardUier, 1995; Kushner, 2002), epistemology (Rose, 1997), etiUcs (CUfford, 
2002), poUtical and social change (Crowley, 1999; Gardiner, 1995; Moss & 
Matwychuk, 2000), difference (MuUings, 1999), open-endedness and possibiUties 
(Moss & Matwychuk, 2000). The connections that are made between uncertainty 
and these themes, however, are often under-theorised and intuitive. In the 
context of difference, MuUings (1999, p. 337) argues that: "recognising and 
naming these uncertainties is an important step towards not only estabUshing rigor 
in the research process, but also displacing the indomitable authority of the 
author". Thus, the theorisations of uncertainty presented in this project, especiaUy 
narrative uncertainties, may be of interest to feminist theorists beyond the 
education arena. 
The second aim of this project was to articulate to and extend 
postmodernist/poststructuraUst discourse in envkonmental education and to 
contribute to the contestation that comprises 'the neighbourhood of 
envkonmental education. In relation to the former aspect, this project has 
articulated to postmodernist/poststmcturaUst constmctions of (the) envkonment 
tiirough narrative dieory (Gough, 1993, 1998b; Stables, 1996, 1997), die 
deconstmction of subjectivity (DiUon et al., 1999; N. Gough, 1997, 1999a; Payne, 
2000) and eco-poUtical agency (N. Gough, 1999a; Payne, 2000). Each of these 
articulations has extended the akeady-said by theorising the play of uncertainties 
in these themes and by admitting the notion of radical alterity as per Adorno 
(1966/1973) and Levkias (1961/1991, 1974/1991). This project has also 
articulated to current postmodernist/poststmcturaUst discourse in envkonmental 
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education by drawing on the phUosophies of Barthes (1957/1972, 1966/1987, 
1968/1977,1971/1977), Derrida (1967/1978,1972/1981,1972/1981,1972/1982, 
1977/1979, 1978/1987, 1980/1987, 1988, 1993/1994, 1991/1995) and Lyotard 
(1983/1988, 1984, 1992, 1985), yet k has extended die current 
postmodernist/poststmcturaUst discourse in envkonmental education by drawing 
on these phUosophies in greater depth than previous engagements and by 
substantively mobilising the phUosophies of Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) 
and Levinas (1961/1991,1974/1991). However, this project has not articulated to 
Foucauldian discourse in envkonmental education, such as that being undertaken 
by Ferreka (1999/2000). A conscious decision was made to not articulate to 
Foucault's corpus in a stmcmral manner when the possibUities and the 
practicaUties of this project were being mapped. This was a pragmatic decision; 
engaging with Foucault's corpus in a stmctural manner as weU as the work of the 
other postmodernist/poststmcturaUst phUosophers mentioned above would have 
taken the scope of this project beyond a manageable limit. However, Foucauldian 
themes have been used for Ulustrative purposes. 
It is anticipated that this project wiU add to the contestation that comprises 
'the neighbourhood of envkonmental education. In particular, it is anticipated 
that the narrativisation of (the) envkonment wiU draw fierce criticism from those 
committed to reaUst ontologies and the Gaianist orientation. WhUst those 
committed to critical reaUsm problematise the notion of transparent access to 
'reaUty' by admitting biases introduced by the socio-cultural construction of reaUty 
and theory-ladenness, they have not chaUenged the notion of reference. Thus, 
the critique of logocentrism and Derrida's famous remark that "there is nothing 
outside of the texf (1967/1976, p. 158, Derrida's emphasis) are likely to continue to 
be read as a denial of the materiaUty of (the) envkonment. It is also likely that 
Gaianists wiU strenuously object to the critique of logocentrism because it 
prevents envkonmental Tmths and Values being grounded in (the) envkonment. 
Critical reaUsts who uphold Huckle's (2002) rendition of dialectical materiaUsm 
wiU necessarUy have to reject those aspects of this project that admit the notion of 
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radical alterity. Accordingly, those critical reaUsts wUl necessarUy question the 
notion of a Levinasian eco-ethics that has been advanced. It is also anticipated 
that the deconstmction of the indoctrination debate is likely to intensify the 
debate around that issue simply because it is such a sensitive issue in 
envkonmental education. Thus, this project can make substantial contributions to 
the contestation that constimtes 'the neighbourhood of envkonmental education, 
'OBJECTIVES' 
The fkst and second objectives of this project were undertaken coUectively. 
Together, these objectives involved the enactment of a theorisation of uncertainty 
that respected uncertainty as uncertain in the context of envkonmental education. 
This was undertaken by enacting Deleuze and Guattari's (1980/1987) cartography, 
also known as rhizoanalysis, nomadism, schizoanalysis and micro-poUtics. 
Cartography is a three-fold process: tracing, mapping and decalcomania. Tracing 
involves foUowing the denouement of the theoretical terrain that has akeady been 
configured in the field and extending the akeady-said by foUowing the paths that 
have been preconfigured. The tracing stage was undertaken in Chapter Three and 
although the existing engagements with uncertainty in envkonmental education 
are sparse and underdeveloped, the tracing process drew a surprisingly diverse 
terrain into reUef This terrain included engagements with scientific uncertainty 
and alUed concepts, such as risk, ignorance, indeterminacy and the precautionary 
principle (Diduck, 1999; Diduck & Sinclak, 1997b; Panel for Education for 
Sustainable Development, 1998; Rosenbaum & Bressers, 2000; Scott, 2001), chaos 
theory (Hardy, 1999a), and curriculum development (Gough & Scott, 2001). 
Interestingly, the projects that constimte this diverse body of work expUcitiy take 
normative positions in relation to uncertainty, although these positions are 
polarised. 
Mapping, the second stage, enabled the thkd objective to be pursued, as weU 
as being integral to the reaUsation of the fkst and second objectives. The thkd 
objective involved the articulation of the postmodernist/poststructuraUst 
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theorisations of uncertainty to key themes in envkonmental education, with 
particular attention to envkonmental values education and engaging indigenous 
voices. The mapping stage constimted the major component of this project, with 
Chapters Four, Five and Six being devoted to this task. The lines of flight 
foUowed divergent trajectories into Levinas' (1961/1991, 1974/1991) ethics of 
responsibiUty, narrative theory. Stone's (1995) feminist formulation of as if friends 
and deconstructive Uteracy. The articulation of these lines of flight to key 
envkonmental education themes wiU be elaborated in the later section, 'Revisiting 
Envkonmental Education'. 
These Unes of flight also made a crucial contribution to the fkst objective, to 
explore the (im)possibiUty of theorising uncertainty in a manner that respected 
uncertainty as uncertain. SpecificaUy, these trajectories resulted in divergence, 
juxtaposition, overlap, contiguity and incongmence. Thus, multiple theorisations 
were presented and this multipUcity does not submit to resolution in a meta-
narrative. This multipUcity that refiises to submit to dialectical resolution in order 
to form a coherent stability prevents uncertainty being rendered certain and is, 
thus, essential to any theorisation that is committed to respecting uncertainty as 
uncertain. 
The final stage of cartography, decalcomania, was performed in Chapter 
Seven, This final stage enabled the fifth objective to be pursued, as weU as 
contributing to the reaUsation of the fkst, second and thkd objectives. The fifth 
objective was to investigate whether the postmodernist/poststructuraUst 
engagements with uncertainty de-territoriaUse and re-territoriaUse existing 
engagements with uncertainty in envkonmental education and to identify the 
existence, if any, of other sites in envkonmental education that have not been 
hitherto identified as sites in which to engage postmodernist/poststructuraUst 
uncertainties. Decalcomania was essential for this task. 
Deleuze and Guattari criticaUy appropriate the term 'decalcomania' from the 
fine arts and deploy the term to refer to the process of putting the tracing(s) over 
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the map(s) in order to discern non-correspondences and to investigate the effects 
that the map(s) can Uiduce Ui the tracing(s). Thus, decalcomania has a decidedly 
deconstmctive aspect. Two approaches to decalcomania were possible: the fkst 
involved the identification of a smaU number of non-correspondences and 
performing detaUed analyses of the impUcations of the theorisations of 
uncertainty; whereas the other approach was a broader treatment that analysed a 
greater number of non-correspondences in less detaU. 
The latter approach was adopted as the non-correspondences were 
heterogenous. Thus, it aUowed a diverse range of envkonmental education 
themes to be analysed: scientific uncertainty, the precautionary principle, chaos 
and complexity theories, curriculum development, identity, agency and 
envkonmental values education. The broader treatment afforded by the latter 
approach enabled the fifth objective to be engaged more substantively. The 
analyses that the broader approach enabled are elaborated in the later section, 
'Revisiting Envkonmental Education'. The latter approach was also taken on 
pragmatic grounds to compensate for the absence of 'going to the field' in the 
conventional empkical sense. Thus, the analyses undertaken are introductory and, 
as such, represent sites for further research. 
The fourth objective of this project was to explore the efficacy of one of the 
objectives advanced by the Panel for Education for Sustainable Development 
(1998). The particular objective under consideration stated that smdents should: 
"understand the concept of cultural change in the shift from the certainties of the 
modern age to the uncertainties of the postmodern age, and what oppormnities 
this may afford for reaUsing a more sustainable society" (1998, p. 11) . In the 
absence of postmodernist/poststmcturaUst theorisations of uncertainty in 
envkonmental education and the broader arena of education, envkonmental 
educators could do no more than draw on intuitive understandings of 
'postmodern uncertainties' in thek enactments of this objective. The lack of a 
theoretical framework to envision 'postmodern uncertainties' affkmed and fueUed 
the aim to theorise uncertainty in a manner that respects uncertainty as uncertain. 
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Concomitantiy, this project sought to explore the 'opportunities' that the Panel for 
Education for Sustainable Development identified with the shift to the 
uncertainties of the postmodern age. Given the lack postmodernist/ 
poststrucmraUst theorisations of uncertainty, this conjunction was intriguing. It 
could signal nothing more than hope and faith, an appeal to serendipity. There 
was no reason to presume that postmodern uncertainties would be associated with 
oppormnity rather than disaster. The Unes of flight pursued in this project, 
however, forged pathways in 'the neighbourhood of uncertainty' and advanced 
possibiUties for engaging uncertainty in envkonmental education in ways that may 
afford oppormnities to reaUse more sustainable fiitures, such as a Levinasian eco-
ethics, deconstmctive Uteracy and as if friends, each of which can be read as a 
means of becoming-uncertain. This is discussed further in the foUowing section. 
'FINDINGS' 
Contradictory meanings have been attributed to the term 'findings' throughout 
history. During the twelfth cenmry, 'finding' designated the action of inventing or 
devising and its root 'find' designated 'to go' or 'to journey'. In the sixteenth 
century, however, 'finding' was rewritten; the action of inventing or devising was 
replaced by the action of uncovering (Oxford EngUsh Dictionary). Deleuze and 
Guattari's (1980/1987) juxtaposition of rhizomatic and arborescent logic 
resonates with this sematic shift. Deleuze and Guattari do not deny arborescent 
logic and the contemporary rendition of 'findings', but they chaUenge the 
hegemony of arborescent logic and the contemporary rendition of 'findings' and 
the constraints that they impose on the inteUecmal landscape. According to 
Deleuze and Guattari, knowledge is also actively constmcted by forging rhizomatic 
connections that draw disparate elements together. Furthermore, Deleuze and 
Guattari articulate rhizomatics to nomadism. As a result, Deleuze and Guattari's 
rhizomatics accords with the medieval rendition of 'findings'. Therefore, the 
contemporary meaning that is attributed to 'findings' is conspicuously at odds 
with the rhizomatic approach adopted in this project. Even though the term 
'findings' has been placed under erasure thus far, it wiU be discarded and the term 
325 
CHAPTER EIGHT - IN-CONCLUSION - BECOMING-UNCERTAIN 
'intensities' wUl be used instead. The term 'intensities' is used to designate a 
volatUe juncmre where disparate elements are held together in an intensive state 
creating a dynamism that in this instance affects and is affected by theories and 
practices in 'the neighbourhood of envkonmental education. 
This project constructed four major intensities — Levinasian eco-ethics, 
narrative uncertainties, as if friends and deconstmctive Uteracy — and each of these 
intensities involves the experience of thinking the concept of uncertainty 
differentiy, experiencing the capacity of uncertainty to affect and be affected, and 
experiencing the possibiUties that are opened up. Of these four intensities, 
Levinasian eco-ethics, as if friends and deconstmctive Uteracy can be read as modes 
of becoming-uncertain. The play of narrative uncertainties is an important 
element in each of these modes of becoming-uncertain, but it does not in and of 
itself constimte a mode of becoming-uncertain. Levinasian eco-ethics, as if friends 
and deconstmctive Uteracy each involves a departure from the majoritarian 
register of poUtics into the minoritarian register, but the departure is incomplete 
and this incompleteness is essential to Utopian poUtics that strive to effect changes 
in (the) wor(l)d. The minoritarian and the majoritarian are entangled, which 
enables agency. Accordingly, Levinasian eco-ethics, as if friends and deconstmctive 
Uteracy can be read as agentive pedagogical venmres that promote becoming-
uncertain in envkonmental education. 
LEVINASIAN ECO-ETHICS 
This intensity draws together: the rendition of uncertainty advanced by the 
Panel for Education ^ r Sustainable Development (1998); Levinas' (1961/1991, 
1974/1991) ethics of responsibiUty; Llewelyn's (1991) cross-reading of Levinas, 
Heidegger and others; the anthropocentrism (Ei, 1996) versus the non-
anthropocentrism (Snauwaert, 1996) debate in envkonmental values education; 
envkonmental education's commitment to eco-poUtical agency (A. Gough, 1999; 
Gough, 1994b, 1999a); the advocacy of narrative theory in envkonmental 
education (Gough, 1993; Stables, 1996,1997, 2003) and narrative uncertainties. 
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The Panel for Education ^ r Sustainable Development casts uncertainty as the 
conjunction of the pluraUty of discourses that does not admit to dialectical 
resolution in a meta-narrative and the limitation of knowledge. Thus, engaging 
uncertainty as the conjunction of the pluraUty of discourses and the limitation of 
knowledge in a manner that eludes/transgresses majoritarian poUtics would 
constimte a mode of becoming-uncertain. This mode of becoming-uncertain can 
be undertaken by participating in Levinas' ethics of responsibiUty. 
Levinas' ethics of responsibiUty dismpts majoritarian poUtics by: welcoming 
the utter excessiveness of the Other, the Saying {le Dire), which defies totaUsation 
through thematisation, the Said {le Dit); decentring the self-sufficient humanist 
subject by locating the constmction of subjectivity in the heteronomous face to 
face relationship; chaUenging the modernist myth of seamlessness by accenmating 
the fractured movement from the ethical realm of the face to face to the poUtical 
realm; and by replacing the economistic appraisal of value with a responsibiUty 
that exceeds aU quantification and that cannot be abrogated or delegated. Levinas' 
ethics of responsibUity is entangled in majoritarian poUtics, however, by the 
unwavering presence of the thkd party that inhabits the face qua face. The thkd 
party shatters the transcendence of the face to face, causing a shift from the 
ethical to the poUtical domain where response ability for the Other can be enacted. 
The shift from the ethical to the poUtical domain necessitates that the "Saying is 
fixed in the Said, is written, becomes a book, law and science" (Levinas, 
1974/1991, p. 159). The shift from the SayUig to the Said epitomises the 
entanglement of the majoritarian and minoritarian. Yet this shift can and must be 
read concomitandy as a narrative enterprise, which further disrupts majoritarian 
poUtics by admitting the play of narrative uncertainties. Thus, Levinas' ethics of 
responsibiUty can be regarded as an ethics of becoming-uncertain. 
FoUowing Levinas, this ethics of becoming-uncertain attends the realm of 
human sociaUty. This is germane to envkonmental education given its 
commitment to social justice. However, becoming-uncertain through Levinas' 
ethics of responsibiUty can be extended to incorporate envkonmental ethics 
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through Llewelyn's (1991) cross-reading of Levinas, Heidegger and others. Both 
Levinas' ethics of responsibiUty and Llewelyn's extension can inform 
envkonmental education practice. SpecificaUy, becoming-uncertain through these 
ethics can be promoted by providing learning experiences that: promote 
receptivity to the Other; chaUenge the myth of seamlessness by accenmating the 
fractured movement from the ethical to the poUtical domain; and shift the focus 
of the normative aspect of envkonmental education away from the concept of 
values and its coroUary of ranking, to Levinas' thesis of responsibiUty for the 
Odier. 
DECONSTRUCTIVE LITERACY 
Practising deconstmctive Uteracy can also be read as a pedagogical enterprise 
that promotes becoming-uncertain. The link between deconstructive Uteracy and 
uncertaUity arises from the narrative uncertainties that deconstruction unshackles 
and mobiUses within the text. This can be regarded as a mode of becoming in 
Deleuze and Guattari's sense because deconstruction is a minoritarian mode of 
poUtics and it is inextricably entangled in majoritarian poUtics, which enables 
deconstmction and narrative uncertainties to manifest tangible effects in the molar 
register. 
Practising deconstructive Uteracy can be read as a minoritarian mode of poUtics 
because it does not submit to the phUosophical assumptions that configure 
majoritarian poUtics. The minoritarian phUosophical assumptions that guide 
deconstmctive readings chaUenge and compUcate the customary notion of 
reference through the critique of logocentrism, decentre and resimate (the) 
subject, dismpt the namralness and purported self-evident nature of binarisms, 
and probe the margins and sUences of the text, aU of which render the famiUar 
strange and contingent and demonstrate that the witting, or unwitting, 
constmction of the famiUar privUeges specific ends. 
However, deconstruction is inextricably tied to majoritarian poUtics; it cannot 
effect a 'transgression' (Derrida, 1972/1981). The entanglement of 
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deconstruction in majoritarian poUtics occurs at many levels. At the abstract level, 
deconstmction is entangled in majoritarian poUtics because each deconstmctive 
gesmre is counter-signed by its constimtive other. This counter-signature occurs 
because both minoritarian and majoritarian poUtics are inscribed in language; each 
occurs in the endless chains of signification that ultimately become entangled. At 
a more concrete level, deconstruction is entangled in majoritarian poUtics because 
it is appUed to majoritarian texts or to the effects of majoritarian poUtics that are 
inscribed in texts that claim minoritarian aUegiance. This more concrete form of 
entanglement was prominent in this project because a deconstructive stance was 
adopted towards majoritarian motifs in envkonmental education, such as 
envkonmental knowledge, eco-poUtical agency and envkonmental values 
education. 
Thus, practising deconstmctive Uteracy in envkonmental education can be 
read as a mode of becoming-uncertain because it involves thinking the concept of 
uncertainty differentiy, experiencing the new spaces that are opened up, and 
experiencing the capacity of uncertainty to affect and be affected. Becoming-
uncertain enables learners and envkonmental educators to deconstmct how 
customary renditions of certainty and uncertainty determine and constrain thek 
envkonmental identities, thek capacity and disposition towards eco-poUtical 
agency and envkonmental knowledges. Thus, I submit that becoming-uncertain 
through deconstmctive Uteracy is a strategic pedagogical approach because it 
promotes the awareness, knowledge, attimdes, skiUs and participation objectives 
advanced in The Tbilisi Declaration (UNESCO-UNEP, 1978). Becoming-uncertain 
through deconstructive Uteracy also accenmates and accommodates envkonmental 
education issues that have become prominent subsequent to The Tbilisi Declaration, 
such as poUtical Uteracy, critical envkonmental Uteracy and indoctrination (Fien, 
1993, 1997a, 2000, 2001; JickUng, 1992; JickUng & Spork, 1998; Stables, 1996, 
1997,1998, 2003; Stables & Bishop, 2001). 
Becoming-uncertain through deconstmctive Uteracy also affects professional 
practices in envkonmental education at another level. Envkonmental education 
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theory and practice are not anterior to deconstmctive Uteracy or, to put it another 
way, envkonmental education is not simply the stage on which deconstructive 
Uteracy is enacted. Practising deconstmctive Uteracy in envkonmental education 
requkes envkonmental educators to adopt a reflexive deconstructive stance 
toward theory and practice. This is not to say that envkonmental education does 
not strive to scmtinise theory and practice; the contestation that constimtes 'the 
neighbourhood of envkonmental education is testament to the Uvely and ongoing 
scmtiny within the field. Deconstmctive Uteracy affkms envkonmental 
education's commitment to prevent the field from becoming sedimented. 
However, the need to deconstmct several aspects of envkonmental education 
theory and practice has been identified during the denouement of this project. 
These aspects specificaUy include the need to subscribe and respond to the 
kremedial inadequacy of any ethical program, the uncritical promotion of criteria-
based critique as a means to avoid indoctrination and the uncritical embrace of the 
precautionary principle as a sound ethical platform. 
AS IF FRIENDS 
The intensity as if friends (Stone, 1995) draws together narrative uncertainties, 
poststmcturaUst feminisms, difference and indigenous knowledges in an ethical 
relationship that can be read as a means of becoming-uncertain. The link to 
uncertainty arises from the accent on preserving difference. The privUege granted 
to difference is most clearly expressed in Stone's composition of as if friends in a 
fictional letter to late the Senegalese feminist Mariama Ba: "In spite of some 
simUarities, we are to my mind, significandy different. This is the difference that I 
want to retain and yet communicate across" (Stone, 1995, p. 175). This 
preservation of difference promotes the play of narrative uncertainties. For 
example, subjunctive uncertainty, which obtains from the pluraUty of voices, is 
promoted by this preservation of difference. The preservation of difference also 
promotes the play of decentred uncertainty by obstructing logocentric 
manoeuvres that would erase difference by either privUeging particular voices or 
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subsuming the diversity of different voices to a meta-narrative. The play of other 
narrative uncertainties foUows the chaUenge to logocentrism. 
As if friends can be read as a means of becoming-uncertain because it involves 
minoritarian poUtics whUst being entangled in majoritarian poUtics. The 
minoritarian aspect of as if friends arises from the commitment to refrain from 
erasing difference through the violent form of tolerance that accenmates sameness 
over difference. This commitment necessarUy precludes the constmction of meta-
narratives on both epistemological and ethical grounds, and, in the same gesmre, 
fmstrates the apparent certainty that the construction of meta-narratives strives to 
procure. PluraUty, discontinuity, incongruity and the uncertainties that obtain are 
valued as the 'uncommon ground' (Cronon, 1995) on which as if friends is enacted. 
The entanglement of the minoritarian and majoritarian realms can be read as 
occurring in at least three ways. Fkstiy, from a negative perspective, the 
minoritarian and majoritarian are entangled by the constant threat that 
majoritarian poUtics poses to as if friends. Majoritarian poUtics constantiy threatens 
to destroy the community of difference by either effecting a power takeover or 
fragmenting the community. Secondly, as if friends is entangled in both 
minoritarian and majoritarian poUtics because it is a feminist formulation. 
Feminist scholars have grappled with this entanglement and accede that no text, 
not even 'feminist' texts, can escape this entanglement because "the very 
categories, concepts, and methodologies avaUable today are spawned by 
[patriarchal] history" (Grosz, 1994, p. 190). FinaUy, the minoritarian and 
majoritarian realms are entangled by the ways in which dominant discourses have 
constmcted and positioned the participants and the simations in which as if friends 
is enacted. The latter has been the focus in this project and professional 
impUcations for envkonmental education can be advanced. 
Enacting as if friends as a mode of becoming-uncertain has important 
professional impUcations for envkonmental education because it forges links with 
prominent contemporary issues, such as the need to dismpt patriarchal theory and 
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practice, and the need to include indigenous voices (Di Chko, 1987a; Fien, 2001; 
A. Gough, 1997; Panel for Education for SustaUiable Development, 1998; 
UNCED, 1992). Fien (2001) and Gough (1997) have emphasised die 
interrelatedness of these two issues and the need to address them in conjunction. 
As if friends provides a means to respond to these issues in conjunction, whUst 
avoiding the problems of the naive appropriation of indigenous knowledge and 
romantic mrns (Bonnett, 1999; Gough, 1991, 1994b; Stables & Scott, 2001; 
Suchet, 2002). Not only does as if friends create a miUeu in which to deconstruct 
the social constmction envkonmental knowledges and envkonmental issues, it 
also advances sociological quaUties that support the estabUshment and 
maintenance of a community of difference. The attimde of as if friends requkes 
openness and humiUty, each of which is multidimensional. These sociological 
quaUties can inform professional practices such as curriculum development that is 
committed to the inclusion of different voices as per Gough and Scott (2001) as 
weU as informing pedagogical practices for the inclusion of different voices as per 
the Panel for Education^r Sustainable Development (1998). 
NEW SPACES, NEW KNOWLEDGE 
The intensities outUned above have opened up new spaces in existing practices 
for envkonmental education to engage uncertainty in a manner that respects 
uncertainty as uncertain. These intensities designate volatUe juncmres where 
disparate elements are held together in an intensive state. Some of the elements 
were avaUable in the existing theoretical terrain; they were resources. But other 
elements were constructed after prying open new spaces. It became possible to 
think new thoughts in these new spaces; new knowledge was generated and used 
in combination with existing concepmal resources to construct these intensities. 
As the intensities took shape, however, some of the new knowledge that was 
integral to thek constmction receded into the background. It is important to 
recaU this new knowledge to prevent these intensities from appearing self-evident. 
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It is possible to divide this new knowledge into that which pertaUis to 
envkonmental education expUcitiy and that which has broader appUcations. The 
new knowledge that pertains expUcitiy to envkonmental education wiU be 
presented in the foUowing section. 
The overarching contribution of this project to new knowledge is the 
determination that it is possible to theorise uncertainty in a manner that respects 
uncertainty as uncertain. This is possible by employing Deleuze and Guattari's 
(1980/1987) rendition of identity which locates identity in the act of making 
outward connections. This act, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is dynamic; 
identity is not fixed and stable; it is a work in progress. Thus, it is possible to 
theorise uncertainty without rendering it certain. This involves asking what 
uncertainty fiinctions with, how it connects with other things, how it affects and 
can be affected. Thus, theorisations that respect uncertainty as uncertain do not 
valorise uncertainty and they do not make uncertainty enigmatic or unknowable. 
Instead, they demystify uncertainty by asking pragmatic questions that do not seek 
to capture uncertainty in a concept and deprive it of the honour of its name. 
Although, the determination that it is possible to theorise uncertainty in a 
manner that respects uncertainty as uncertain is the overarching contribution to 
new knowledge, the new knowledge that wiU perhaps be of the greatest strategic 
advantage to envkonmental education and beyond is the formulation of the four 
narrative uncertainties: subjunctive uncertainty which arises from the openness and 
pluraUty of text; decentred uncertainty which arises from the refiisal to ground the 
tmth or vaUdity of text in logocentric centres; allegorical uncertainty which arises 
from the postmodernist/poststmcturaUst motif that words, concepts and texts 
overflow thek boundaries; and poietic uncertainty which arises from the ever-present 
constmction of meaning foUowing the Death of the Author. The formulation of 
these narrative uncertainties provides an analytical and explanatory framework for 
the ubiquitous and constimtive role of uncertainty in the deconstmction of 
knowledge, subjectivities and agency. Feminist theory appears to be a potentiaUy 
receptive site for this formulation of narrative uncertainties because feminist 
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scholars attribute a high profile to the role of uncertaUity in knowledge 
constmction (Rose, 1997), the constmction of subjectivities (Kushner, 2002), 
agency and social change (Crowley, 1999; Gardiner, 1995; Moss & Matwychuk, 
2000). Furthermore, MuUings (1999) has voiced the need for such an analytical 
and explanatory frame to increase the rigour of feminist theorising. 
The last contribution of new knowledge that has broad appUcation is the 
determination that a relationship, in the strong sense, exists between ethics and 
uncertainty in postmodernist/poststmcturaUst thought, as per Derrida (1999) and 
Levinas (1961/1991, 1974/1991). This is important because whUst uncertainty is 
taken variously to be a symbol, theme and consequence of postmodernist/ 
poststmcturaUst thought and postmodernist/poststmcturaUst thought has a strong 
ethical character due to its attentiveness to the Other, this conjunction is not 
sufficient to claim a relationship between uncertainty and ethics in 
postmodernist/poststructuraUst thought: ethics and uncertainty could simply 
coincide without any relationship existing between them. The analysis of a 
relationship between ethics and uncertainty through the theme of excess, however, 
enabled a strong relationship to be advanced and defended, 
A final comment can be made as a result of these three contributions to new 
knowledge. It is common to encounter claims that herald postmodernism as the 
Age of Uncertainty, but given that uncertainty is taken variously to be a symbol, 
theme and consequence of postmodertUst/poststmcturaUst thought, such claUns 
seldom, if ever, rise above rhetoric. The new knowledge constructed in this 
project, however, provides concepmal resources that enable discussions of 
postmodernist/poststrucmraUst thought and uncertainty to move beyond rhetoric 
to substantive dialogue. This could be regarded as a fourth contribution to new 
knowledge. 
REVISITING ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION 
Enacting the thkd stage of Deleuze and Guattari's cartography, decalcomania, 
resulted in new spaces being opened up in existing knowledges and practices in 
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envkonmental education. It became possible to tiUnk new thoughts in relation to 
existing engagements with uncertainty scientific uncertainty and the precautionary 
principle, and chaos and complexity theories. It also became possible think about 
the impUcation of uncertainty in the social constmction of (the) envkonment, 
identity, agency, envkonmental values education and including indigenous voices. 
The social constmction of (the) envkonment and identity formation had been 
loosely identified as sites to engage uncertainty by the Panel for Education for 
Sustainable Development (1998) and Payne (2000), respectively. The remaining 
themes, however, had not been expUcitiy articulated to uncertainty. The foUowing 
sections briefly review this project's contributions to these themes in 
envkonmental education. 
Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle 
The majority of envkonmental education's engagements with uncertainty 
address scientific uncertainty (Adams, 2001; Ashley, 2000; Diduck, 1999; Diduck 
& Sinclak, 1997a; Panel for Education for Sustainable Development, 1998; 
Rosenbaum & Bressers, 2000; Scott, 2001), in which a totaUty and an kreducible 
lack coincide without either losing integrity. The commitment to totaUties that 
scientific uncertainty requkes has been ardendy rejected in this project. 
Nevertheless, this project does not and cannot reject the notion of scientific 
uncertainty. Rather, it subscribes to the views that scientific uncertainty is whoUy 
contingent upon context and that that context, like aU contexts, is constmcted 
upon constimtive blindnesses. Thus, this project argues that the social 
constmction of scientific uncertainty should be made more visible and open to 
analysis. This draws the issues of discipUnary power and the poUtics of 
representation into reUef This project advocates that participants in 
envkonmental education should use deconstmctive Uteracy to discern which 
envkonmental issues are being designated as uncertain, which issues are being 
sUenced and whose interests are being served. 
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Many of the engagements with scientific uncertainty welcome the 
precautionary principle, which has been paraphrased into envkonmental education 
as "thoughtfiil action in advance of scientific p roof (quoted in Ashley, 2000, p. 
272). The precautionary principle is widely applauded in envkonmental education, 
education for sustainable development and education for sustainabiUty as a stance 
that promotes ethical action in the face of scientific uncertainty (Ashley, 2000; 
Fien, 2001; Panel for Education ^ r Sustainable Development, 1998; UNCED, 
1992). However, the renditions of the precautionary principle that have been 
admitted in envkonmental education have been uncriticaUy simpUfied. This 
simpUfication has resulted in the precautionary principle being presented as an 
ethical principle. However, this project argues that the precautionary principle is 
an epistemological manoeuvre that provides an escape route from the impasse 
that results when totaUty and kreducible lack coincide in scientific uncertainty. 
The ethical dimension of the precautionary principle is an optional extra that can 
be jettisoned easUy. This is not to say that the precautionary principle cannot or 
should not be embraced as an ethical platform in envkonmental education. 
However, it should be recognised as a precarious platform. At present, the 
precautionary principle is being heralded as a key element in 'responsible 
envkonmental citizenry'. Responsible envkonmental citizenry would be better 
served by deconstmctive readings of the appUcations of the precautionary 
principle. 
Chaos and Complexity Theories 
Engagements with uncertainty through chaos and complexity theories in the 
broader education arena have resulted in impUcations being advanced for learning 
processes (Hardy, 1996, 1999a; Sawada & Caley, 1985; TUUnann et al, 2000) and 
the dynamics of education settings (MacPherson, 1995; SungaUa, 1990). These 
proposals are highly contested; some education theorists claim dkect links 
between chaos and complexity theories and education, whereas other support 
metaphorical engagements. This polarisation occurs in envkonmental education: 
Gough (1998d) advances that chaos and complexity theories should be 
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approached as heuristic metaphors for education, whereas I have previously 
argued for more dkect appUcations (Hardy, 1996; 1999a). 
The previous argument that I advanced drew on findings from neural 
physiology and behavioural biology (Allman, 1993; Tillmann et al., 2000) to argue 
that learning can be modeUed by chaos and complexity theories. The argument 
then turned to DoU (1993), who, it was argued, translated the abstractions from 
science and mathematics into concrete curricular and pedagogical guidelines. This 
project has re-read the shift to DoU's transformative curriculum vision. As a 
result, I advance: that the shift from smdies in neural physiology and behavioural 
biology to DoU's curriculum vision uncriticaUy transgressed the 
correspondence/metaphor divide; this shift resulted in two separate arguments 
being presented under the guise of one seamless argument; and that this 
transgression resulted from the privUege afforded to scientific and mathematical 
discourses. 
This project has also re-read DoU's curriculum vision and argued that whUst 
DoU considers metaphors from chaos and complexity theories in Ught of the 
process phUosophies of Dewey and Whitehead, there are strong Derridean 
themes. DoU can be read as upholding the critique of logocentrism, which 
enables the play of narrative uncertainties to be engaged through deconstmctive 
Uteracy. As a result, I advance that DoU's metaphorical approach provides an 
analytical and explanatory framework for engaging uncertainty as an integral and 
constimtive element of curriculum. Furthermore, I argue that DoU's curriculum 
vision provides a framework that enables deconstmctive Uteracy to be enacted. 
Conversely, I argue that hope for a correspondence between chaos and 
complexity theory and education requkes the instaUation of a 'black box'. This 
mystifies the dynamics of uncertainty. Thus, I renounce my previous support for 
a correspondence between chaos and complexity theories and education; I aUgn 
myself with Gough's conviction that chaos and complexity theories should be 
approached as heuristic metaphors for envkonmental education. However, the 
argument that I advance goes beyond that advanced by Gough by considering the 
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play of uncertainty in the deconstmction of knowledges, subjectivities and agency 
in DoU's curriculum vision. 
The Social Construction of (the) Environment 
The notion of (the) envkonment as a social constmct can be upheld across 
most phUosophical orientations in 'the neighbourhood of envkonmental 
education, although the meanings assigned to the 'social constmction of (the) 
envkonmenf differ greatiy. For positivists, postpositivists and classical UberaUsts, 
the social constmction of (the) envkonment refers to the intentional or 
unintentional alteration of the material envkonment. As such, the social 
constmction of (the) envkonment has been occurring since the dawn of 
humankind. Contemporary UberaUsts, critical theorists and poststrucmraUsts 
differ from positivists, postpositivists and classical UberaUsts by subscribing to the 
power/knowledge complex. However, disparities proUferate beyond this broad 
level of agreement. The contemporary UberaUsts and critical theorists admit the 
influence of some restrictive social influences in the construction of knowledge 
and ignore others (Feinberg, 1975), This view casts some aspects of (the) 
envkonment as prediscursive, which constrains the extent to which we can 
participate in the social constmction of (the) envkonment, PoststrucmraUsts 
foUowing Derrida, however, subscribe to the view that aU knowledge is mediated 
by language. This chaUenges and compUcates the issue of reference. This does 
not amount to a derUal of the materiaUty of (the) envkonment, but it decentres the 
envkonment as the ground of our truth claims, which means that (the) 
envkonment becomes intelUgible at the "moment we name it and imbue it with 
meaning" p i Chko, 1987b, p. 25). 
This project has subscribed to the view that aU knowledge of (the) 
envkonment is mediated by language; it has treated (the) envkonment as text that 
can be re-written differentiy. This view, which is also upheld in envkonmental 
education by Gough (1993, 1998d, 1999a) and Stables (1996, 1997), enabled die 
four forms of narrative uncertainty to be mobiUsed in order to understand the 
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constimtive role of uncertainty Ui the social constmction of (the) envkonment. 
This second aspect extends Gough's and Stables' readings of the social 
constmction of (the) envkonment, which do not attend expUcitiy to the role of 
uncertaUity. A Unk between uncertaUity and the social constmction of (the) 
envkonment has been advanced in the report presented by the Panel for 
Education ^ r Sustainable Development (1998), but this link is underdeveloped. 
This is not a criticism of the panel's report; the development of the link between 
uncertainty and the social constmction of (the) envkonment would have requked 
a theorisation of 'postmodern uncertainties', which was beyond the purpose and 
scope of the report. Instead, the panel simply advances Unks between uncertainty 
and the pluraUty of envkonmental knowledges constmcted by different groups 
and advocates that this pluraUty should be engaged in envkonmental education. 
However, the absence of a theorisation of 'postmodern uncertainties' enables the 
pluraUty of voices to be discursively denigrated to equivocation about the 
envkonment, which re-instaUs the envkonment as the centre of envkonmental 
discourse. This project prevents this logocentric manoeuvre by drawing on the 
critique of presence when theorising narrative uncertainties. This project also 
argues that Stone's (1995) formulation of as if friends can be used as a pedagogical 
approach that preserves difference during intertexmal readings of (the) 
envkonment. This provides a practical approach for envkonmental educators to 
prevent the pluraUty of voices to be discursively denigrated to equivocation about 
the envkonment. 
Identity and Agency 
The lines of fUght forged in this project mapped the constimtive role of 
uncertainty in the formation of identities and agency. Identity formation has been 
identified as a site where uncertainty plays a role by Payne, who emphasises that 
"identities are unevenly formed and uncertain" (2000, p. 82). However, Payne 
does not elaborate how identities are uncertain and he openly rejects 
deconstmction. In contrast, DiUon et.al. (1999) and Gough (1999a) advocate the 
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Uitroduction of deconstmctive views of identity, but do not acknowledge the role 
of uncertainty in the formation of identities. 
This project has contributed to this discussion in envkonmental education by 
theorising the role of uncertainty in deconstmctive views of identity. Given that 
this project subscribed to the view that aU knowledge and experiences are 
mediated by language, it has, as a matter of logical consistency, embraced the 
texmaUty of subjectivity. This posits subjectivity as a construction that emerges 
from the play of differences and deferrals rather than a fixed, stable and unitary 
entity. Thus, the play of narrative uncertainties can be mobiUsed and different 
subjectivities can be constmcted. Most importandy, foUowing the Death of the 
Author, (the) subject exercises a degree of control or influence and, hence, 
responsibiUty for the constmction of subjectivities rather than being at the mercy 
of capricious texts and/or tyrannical authors. 
Accepting responsibiUty for the constmction of subjectivities signals links to 
agency. Fien (1993) has underscored the importance of the question of identity in 
envkonmental education, especiaUy with respect to the notion of agency. Thus, 
the mapping of uncertainty's role in the constmction of identities and agency was 
laid over Fien's theorisation. This enabled Fien's work to be read differentiy. It 
was acknowledged and respected that Fien uphold critical theory, but the Ucence 
to re-read his work from a postmodernist/poststmcturaUst perspective was based 
on the Unks that he forges with Foucault (1980). Giddens' work was also re-read 
as Fien draws on Giddens' (1979,1981 1982a, 1982b, 1984) social dieory. 
Giddens' (1987) support, albeit reserved support, for postmodernist/ 
poststmcturaUst themes, such as the Death of the Author, and his view that 
identity is located in "the capacity to keep a particular narrative goin^'' (1991, p. 54, 
Giddens' emphasis), enabled the conclusion that being attentive to narrative 
uncertainties through deconstmctive Uteracy aUows "the ongoing 'story' about the 
self (Giddens, 1991, p. 54) to be written as a work in progress in a manner that 
accounts for the capacity and inclination of (the) subject to intervene in (the) 
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wor(l)d as an agent. This can be of strategic value to Fien's critical appropriation 
of Giddens' social theory into envkonmental education. Critical approaches in 
envkonmental education would benefit from exploring the relationship between 
identity and agency from the perspective of narrative theory, which enables the 
role of narrative uncertainties to be rendered visible and more open to analysis. 
Environmental Values Education 
Envkonmental values education is one of the essential and "essentiaUy 
contested" (Robottom, 1987, p. 26) areas in 'the neighbourhood of 
envkonmental education. Numerous competing positions and associated 
practices are advanced. The lines of flight forged in this project have encountered 
two of the most contested aspects of envkonmental values education: the 
anthropocentrism versus non-anthropocentrism debate and the thorny issue of 
indoctrination. 
The phUosophical elements of the anthropocentrism versus non-
anthropocentrism debate are most clearly delineated in Li's (1996) argument that 
non-anthropocentrism is logicaUy indefensible and Snauwaert's (1996) counter-
argument. This debate hinges around the (Un)possibiUty of intrinsic values. The 
predicament of the (im)possibiUty of intrinsic values drives the debate into an 
Unpasse. However, the readings of Levinas' (1961/1991, 1974/1991) and 
Llewelyn's (1991) ethics presented in this project enable a biocentric ethics to be 
advanced in envkonmental education that avoids the question of intrinsic value 
altogether. 
To recapitulate briefly, for Levinas, the face to face encounter is an ethical 
encounter in which the Other beseeches/commands the I to refrain from the 
violence that would dispossess the Other of his or her otherness. This is in no 
way a plea/command to recognise, respect and protect the intrinsic value of the 
Other; it is not a question of intrinsic value at aU. The utter excessiveness of the 
Other would be violated by the finimde of the notion of intrinsic value. Levinas 
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avoids the violence that the notion of value infUcts upon the other by constmcting 
his ethics in terms of responsibility. 
As a result of mapping Levinas' ethics and Llewelyn's ecological cross-reading 
of Levinas, Heidegger and others, this project contributes to the envkonmental 
values education debate by arguing that the anthropocentrism versus non-
anthropocentrism impasse can be avoided by replacing ethics founded on the 
economistic notion of value with an ethics of responsibiUty. However, only 
postmodernist/poststmcturaUst perspectives in envkonmental education can 
admit the notion of radical alterity that is constimtive in Levinas' thesis. 
Nevertheless, this project has identified Nelson's (1995) and Page's (1992) work as 
other possible pathways to avoid the predicament of intrinsic value without 
invoking the notion of radical alterity. 
Indoctrination 
Indoctrination, the teaching of a body of knowledge uncriticaUy in order to 
eUcit acceptance and aUegiance, is a highly sensitive issue in envkonmental 
education. The indoctrination debate is concentrated around UberaUst versus 
critical approaches to envkonmental values education (Fien, 2000; Jickling, 1992). 
LiberaUsts advocate that values should be critiqued equaUy, whereas critical 
theorists defend the view that a committed approach to teaching particular values 
does not constimte indoctrination when the values in question are disclosed and 
subjected to critique. This project contributes to the indoctrination debate on two 
levels. 
Fkst, this project points out that both UberaUst and critical theorists embrace 
the same notion of critique to avoid charges of indoctrination; both conceptions 
of critique embrace criteria as foundations that Ue beyond the reach of the critical 
operation. Critical theorists and UberaUsts simply endorse different criteria. 
Criteria-based critique, however, is merely one among at least three modes of 
criticaUty. Therefore, the unproblematic advancement of one mode of criticaUty 
can be read as a means of indoctrination. Furthermore, this project advances 
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deconstruction as a means to avoid this mode of indoctrination. This is possible 
because deconstmction radicaUy problematises the notion of criticaUty without 
resorting to a critique of critique, which would be deeply problematic at the very 
least. Deconstruction avoids the critique of critique because every deconstmctive 
gesture is counter-signed by its constimtive other. As deconstmction cannot 
escape this entanglement, it cannot occupy a metacontexmal position from which 
to conduct a critique of critique. Thus, this project contributes to the indoctrination 
debate by introducing more phUosophical considerations. 
This project also contributes to the indoctrination debate at the existing level 
in envkonmental education by advocating the use of deconstmctive Uteracy as a 
means to minimise the risk of indoctrination. SpecificaUy, it is advanced that 
developing critical Uteracy enables learners to understand how texts are configured 
and how they are systematicaUy related to constimtive sUences. Critical 
understandings can be gained about which envkonmental values and issues are 
being foregrounded and which are being marginaUsed. Also, developing 
deconstmctive Uteracy enables learners to discern how texts are positioning them 
so that they wiU subscribe to particular views and how they can be positioned 
differentiy. These critical aspects of deconstmctive Uteracy enable learners to 
recognise, deconstmct and resist indoctrination, but they do not provide a 
guarantee against indoctrination. Given the different levels of proficiency of 
learners and teachers to deconstmct texts, it is essential that safeguards are 
included to protect learners from unethical deconstructive practices. At a 
minimum, these safeguards should include: the disclosure of teachers' preferred 
texmal reading of envkonmental issues and the constimtive sUences that configure 
that reading, demonstrations that teachers' texts can be configured differentiy and 
accenmating that no reading is innocent. This provision of safeguards to protect 
against indoctrination aUgns this aspect of this argument with Fien (1993). 
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Summary 
The lines of flight forged in this project have made it possible to think new 
thoughts in relation to existing knowledge and practice in envkonmental 
education. New spaces were opened up in existing engagements with uncertainty 
and in envkonmental education themes that had not been specificaUy identified as 
sites to engage uncertainty. 
This project supports existing engagements with scientific uncertainty, even 
though scientific uncertainty requkes a commitment to totaUsation, which this 
project stridendy rejects. This seemingly contradictory position arises because this 
project acknowledges that the possibiUty of scientific uncertainty is whoUy 
contingent upon the context in which it is constmcted. This project goes beyond 
existing engagements with scientific uncertainty, however, by upholding that the 
context of scientific uncertainty should be deconstructed in envkonmental 
education in order to determine which issues are being designated as uncertain, 
which issues are being marginaUses and whose interests are being served. 
SimUarly, this project argues that envkonmental education's engagements with 
the precautionary principle, which is dkecdy related to scientific uncertainty, 
should be deconstmcted. Hitherto, the precautionary principle has been 
welcomed as a sound ethical platform to guide envkonmental decision making. I 
have agued, however, that the precautionary principle is an epistemological 
manoeuvre to escape the impasse that arises when a totaUty and an kreducible lack 
coincide in scientific uncertainty. The precautionary principle is not an ethical 
principle. The ethical aspect of the precautionary principle is an optional extra 
that can be jettisoned easUy. This does not mean that envkonmental education 
cannot or should not embrace the precautionary principle as an ethical platform, 
but that it should be recognised as a precarious platform. Therefore, appUcations 
of the precautionary principle should be deconstmcted. 
The project has also re-read engagements with uncertainty through chaos and 
complexity theories. This re-reading has caused me to aUgn myself with Gough's 
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(1998d) conviction that chaos and complexity theories should be approached as 
providing heuristic metaphors for envkonmental education. This re-reading also 
requked DoU's (1993) curriculum vision to be re-read. DoU can be read as 
upholding the critique of logocentrism, which enables the play of narrative 
uncertainties to be engaged through deconstructive Uteracy, As a result, I advance 
that DoU's metaphorical approach provides an analjrtical and explanatory 
framework for engaging uncertainty as an integral and constimtive element of 
curriculum. Furthermore, I argue that DoU's curriculum vision provides a 
framework that enables deconstructive Uteracy to be enacted. 
This project supports postmodernist/poststmcturaUst views on the social 
constmction of (the) envkonment, which involve treating (the) envkonment as 
text. This position is upheld by Gough (1993, 1998d, 1999a) and Stables (1996, 
1997). However, this project goes beyond the positions advanced by Gough and 
Stables by using the four formulations of narrative uncertainties to analyse and 
explain the constimtive role of uncertainty in the social constmction of (the) 
envkonment. 
The critique of logocentrism that requkes (the) envkonment to be treated as 
text also has impUcations for discussions on identity and agency. As a matter of 
logical consistency, (the) subject must also be regarded as text. This enables the 
formulation of narrative uncertainties to be used to analyse and explain the 
constimtive role of uncertainty in the constmction of subjectivity and agency. 
This analysis focused on Fien's (1993) theorisation of identity and agency through 
Giddens' (1979, 1981 1982a, 1982b, 1984) social dieory. This analysis concludes 
that critical approaches in envkonmental education would benefit from exploring 
the relationship between identity and agency from the perspective of narrative 
dieory, which enables the role of narrative uncertainties to be rendered visible and 
more open to analysis, 
FinaUy, the lines of fUght forged in this project enabled contributions to be 
made to two of the most contested issues in envkonmental values education: the 
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anthropocentrism versus non-anthropocentrism debate and the issue of 
indoctrination. The rendition of uncertainty proposed by the Panel for Education 
for Sustainable Development (1998) enabled a line of fUght to be forged from 
envkonmental education to Levinas (1961/1991, 1974/1991), Levinas' ethics of 
responsibiUty and Llewelyn's (1991) ecological cross-reading of Levinas, 
Heidegger and others enable the introduction of a biocentric ethics that avoids the 
predicaments of the (im)possibiUty of intrinsic value into envkonmental 
education. 
This project also contributes to the indoctrination debate on two levels, 
Fkstiy, the project advocates deconstmction as a mean to avoid indoctrinating the 
operation of critique, Deconstmction enables the play of uncertainty in the 
operation of critique to be rendered visible and open to analysis because every 
deconstructive gesmre is counter-signed by its constimtive other. Secondly, this 
project advocates the development of learners' deconstructive Uteracy to minimise 
the risk of indoctrinating the object of critique. It is argued that developing critical 
Uteracy enables learners to understand how texts are configured and how they are 
systematicaUy related to constimtive sUences. This enables the play of uncertainty 
in constmction of envkonmental values and issues to be rendered visible and 
more open to analysis Critical understandings can be gained about which 
envkonmental values and issues are being foregrounded and which are being 
marginaUsed. Also, developing deconstmctive Uteracy enables learners to discern 
how texts are positioning them so that they wiU subscribe to particular views and 
how they can be positioned differentiy. 
OPENINGS 
Many rhizomatic openings were mapped throughout the denouement of this 
project, but not aU could be pursued. Some were not pursued because preUminary 
investigations indicated that the resultant rhizomatic assemblages were configured 
by phUosophical assumptions that were contrary to those upheld in this project; 
whereas, others were not foUowed simply because of the limited time and space 
avaUable. As a result, this project has mapped openings for fiirther lines of fUght 
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that hold promising possibilities for engaging uncertainty in 'the neighbourhood 
of envkonmental education. 
At the methodological level, both Drees' (1988,1990) constructive consonance 
and Pekce's (1931) faUibiUsm present envkonmental education with oppormtUties 
to re-think and engage uncertainty in different ways. The link to uncertainty in 
Drees' constructive consonance arises from the rejection of the correspondence 
theories of tmth in favour of an eclectic approach that invokes both the 
coherence and pragmatic theories of truth. This eclectic approach engages 
uncertainty because the coherence and pragmatic theories of truth are mumaUy 
exclusive. This eclecticism creates a constimtive instabiUty that can act as a 
generative source of debate. However, despite the constimtive uncertainty that 
constmctive consonance embeds into transdiscipUnary dialogue, constmctive 
consonance was not chosen as the method for this project because of its 
inattentiveness to the constimtive role of language in the social constmction of 
reaUties, knowledges and subjectivities. Nevertheless, there are decidedly 
postmodern turns in constmctive consonance, such as the rejection of the 
correspondence theories of tmth, and many points of agreement between 
constmctive consonance and critical approaches to envkonmental education and 
education for sustainable development, such as the existential dimension. As a 
result, constmctive consonance may provide a usefiU method for those in 
envkonmental education who are committed to mediating critical theory and 
postmodernism, often under the banner of 'reconstructive postmodernism', such 
as Huckle (1999), Adopting constmctive consonance in envkonmental education 
would, however, chaUenge and compel envkonmental educators to elevate notions 
of tmth to the level of discourse, thereby, making the stams and role of tmth 
more visible and open to analysis. This would enhance contemporary debates in 
envkonmental education because although the arguments presented in these 
debates uphold different theories of tmth, thek bearing is invariably tacit, 
Pierce's doctrine of falUbUism also warrants reading in envkonmental 
education, FalUbiUsm provides a theoretical perspective on ineradicable 
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uncertainty that has methodological impUcations, According to Pekce: 
"FalUbiUsm is the doctrine that our knowledge is never absolute but always swUns, 
as it were, in a continuum of uncertaUity and of Uideterminacy" (1931, p, 70), 
Given Pekce's ardent support for scientific method, the doctrine of falUbiUsm is 
germane to contemporary theorisations of scientific uncertainty and can inform 
postpositivist approaches in envkonmental education, such as that advanced by 
Scott (2001). Further, when Pekce's falUbiUsm is cross-read with his formulation 
of the pragmatic theory of tmth, resonances form between Pekce's phUosophy 
and discussions in envkonmental education that articulate scientific uncertainty 
and the precautionary principle. like constmctive consonance, engaging Pekce's 
phUosophy would entaU rigorous debate about notions of tmth in envkonmental 
education. But unUke constmctive consonance, faUibUism would fiirther privUege 
scientific discourse. 
Further research Uito engaging uncertainty in envkonmental education 
through constmctive consonance and/or falUbiUsm would yield assemblages that 
are thoroughly at odds with those constmcted in this project, but this is not to be 
discouraged. Contestation is one of the greatest assets of 'the neighbourhood of 
envkonmental education. Closer readings of constmctive consonance and 
falUbiUsm would intensify and enrich envkonmental education's engagements with 
uncertainty. 
The denouement of this project has also mapped openings for constmcting 
fiirther intensities, especiaUy with feminist thought and indigenous voices. The 
link between uncertainty and feminism was initiated through the formulation of 
subjunctive uncertainty. According to Le Guin (1989, p. 44), the subjunctive 
creates the narrative "bonds of analogy, possibiUty, probabUity, contingency, 
memory, deske, fear and hope". The most conspicuous link to femiiUsms Ues in 
the fact that these narrative bonds are stereotypicaUy assigned to (the) feminine: 
correspondence/analogy, acmaUty/possibiUty, certainty/probabiUty, surety/ 
contingency, satisfaction/deske, courage/fear, wiU/hope. FoUowing this thread, 
rhizomatic Unks were made to a poststmcturaUst reading of Stone's (1995) 
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formulation, as if friends. However, as if friends was simply chosen as an example of 
the rhizomatic Unks that could be forged between uncertainty and feminisms. 
Other thkd wave feminist perspectives may provide fiirther insights into engaging 
uncertainty in envkonmental education, as weU as providing further strategies for 
dismpting patriarchal discourse, which has been identified as a priority (Fien, 
2001;A. Gough, 1997). 
One such fiirther investigation of thkd wave feminism that is particularly 
relevant to this project and could be considered a logical extension of it involves 
feminist readings of Levinas. This opening was signaUed in the reading of as if 
friends. Like Levinas' face to face relationship, as if friends occurs in a paradoxical 
space where proximity and distance coincide. The resonances between as if friends, 
Levinas and feminist readings of Levinas were not pursued, however, because the 
focus of the project was elsewhere at that stage and because of constraints on 
space. Cross-readings of femirUst thought and Levinas would also be germane to 
dUs task. Howitt's (2001, 2002) and Howitt and Suchet-Pearson's (2003) cross-
readings of Levinas and thkd wave feminisms in cultural geography provide a 
scholarly point of entrance that is both critical and exegetic, and they carry the 
analysis into areas that are of dkect interest to envkonmental education in 
AustraUa, such as the issue of indigenous land rights. Thus, this appears to be a 
fertUe site for envkonmental education to map. Furthermore, feminist readings of 
Levinas and cross-readings of Levinas and femirUsms have not been initiated in 
the broader arena of education to date. Thus, this task could have impUcations 
beyond envkonmental education. 
The notion of radical alterity has been embraced in this project and its 
embrace is essential if a Levinasian eco-ethics, such as that developed by Llewelyn 
(1991), is to disrupt the economistic appraisal of value that dominates the 
anthropocentrism/ecocentrism debate in envkonmental values education. 
However, only postmodernist/poststructuraUst orientations in envkonmental 
education can admit the notion of radical alterity. The notion of radical alterity is 
inadmissible to those in envkonmental education who uphold Huckle's (2002) 
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rendition of dialectical materiaUsm. Nevertheless, the denouement of this project 
opened up possible ways for those committed to Huckle's dialectical materiaUsm 
to escape the bind that the economistic appraisal of value imposes on 
envkonmental values education. Further research into Nelson's (1995) notion of 
'thick concepts' and/or Page's (1992) existential 'meaning' may help envkonmental 
education to move beyond the economistic appraisal of value by avoiding the 
question of intrinsic/inherent/extrinsic value altogether when justifying our 
obUgations to the envkonment (Carnegie, 2000), 
FinaUy, an important area for fiirther research that overflows 'the 
neighbourhood of envkonmental education concerns the question of why 
uncertainty has emerged as a transdiscipUnary issue worthy of attention. This 
question was not broached at aU in this project because responding to this 
question is a thesis in its own right. A Foucauldian genealogical approach that 
excavates the historical layers and analyses the historicaUy specific social practices 
that enabled uncertainty to emerge as a legitimate concern and object of inquiry is 
requked. Such a genealogical approach involves analyses of the "vast 
heterogenous webs of social practices criss-crossed by relations of power" (Darier, 
1999, p. 15), As a result, such an analysis would provide a critical account of how 
uncertainty is being represented; which representations of uncertainty are being 
privUeged, by whom and by vkme of which authority. The extensive searches 
conducted for this project faUed to locate any such analysis. Such an analysis is 
important, however, because it provides a means to analyse the material effects of 
the social practices that are ambidextrously inscribed in contemporary 
theorisations of uncertainty and, more importandy, because such an understanding 
enables strategies of resistance to be formulated and enacted against oppressive 
and/or destructive material practices and thek effects. The intensities constmcted 
in this project are involved in this task. However, a genealogical analysis of 
uncertainty is 'bigger' than the contributions of this project. 
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IN-CONCLUSION 
It is not possible to offer the final word in 'the neighbourhood of because 
beginnings and ends have no efficacy in that krepressibly fluid space. The notion 
of having the final word is also annuUed in poststructuraUst thought by the Death 
of die Audior (Bardies, 1968/1977; Derrida, 1972/1981; Foucault, 1969/1988) 
and Deleuze and Guattari's (1980/1987) notion of 'becoming'. Each of these 
factors thoroughly problematises the notion of offering a conclusion, but an 
outright rejection of the conclusion is not an option. This is not an option 
because such a stance simply provides another prescription, where the absence of 
the conclusion serves as a 'termination-fimction'. The only way to overcome this 
dUemma is to problematise the conclusion by subscribing to the view that multiple 
theoretical conclusions are possible. 
This is not an evasive manoeuvre. It is, instead, an acknowledgement that the 
meaning of the text is co-constmcted by the author and the reader, and that these 
meanings may vary because of the different intertexmal linkages enabled by 
respective socio-culmral contexts. The multipUcity of theoretical conclusions also 
arises from Barthes' (1968/1977) contention that meaning is constmcted in the 
present rather than the recuperation of the Author's intended meaning. 
Therefore, the text is in a continual state of becoming in the conventional sense, 
which enables conclusions to be continuaUy rewritten. FinaUy, a multipUcity of 
possible conclusions is an inevitable consequence of the rhizomatic approach: 
"any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be" 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 7). Hence, the intensities that have been 
constmcted here can be dismanded and arranged differentiy, leading to alternative 
conclusions. 
Each of these postmodernist/poststmcturaUst twists and turns thoroughly 
problematises the notion of the conclusion by renouncing the notion of finaUty; 
but this does not preclude the formation of simated and provisional conclusions. 
The readers of this work wiU assuredly draw thek own conclusions. But in 
addition to those conclusions, I would Uke to share my conclusion with you. To 
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think differentiy is to exist differentiy (Gatens, 2000). Therefore, becoming-
uncertain by thinking the concept of uncertainty differentiy, by experiencing the 
capacity of uncertainty to affect and be affected, and experiencing the spaces that 
this opens up, transforms or forecloses involves existing differentiy, in ways that 
may be more or less sustainable. I submit that becoming-uncertain is an important 
objective and pedagogical venture in envkonmental education, and that becoming-
uncertain through practices such as enacting a Levinasian eco-ethics, 
deconstmctive Uteracy and feminist formulations such as as if friends may afford 
more sustainable fiimres. Becoming-uncertain can contribute to the critical 
utopianism of envkonmental education. 
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